COALITION BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE: A CASE STUDY OF FOOD SECURE CANADA (2001-2012)

By

Sarah Duni

BSW, York University, 2009

MSW, York University, 2010

A dissertation

presented to Ryerson University

in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the program of

Policy Studies

Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2018

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Coalition Building and Maintenance: The case of Food Secure Canada (2001-2012)

Doctor of Philosophy, 2018

Sarah Duni, Policy Studies, Ryerson University

Abstract

This study deals with the question of advocacy coalition formation and maintenance, in the specific case of Food Secure Canada (FSC), a pan-Canadian alliance of non-profit organizations and individuals working together to advance food security and food sovereignty in Canada. Using theoretical frameworks from literature on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Resource Mobilization Theory, this dissertation provides a case study of FSC. Examining food civil society organizations in Canada from the 1970's onward, this study provides insights on the social, economic and political context that surrounded the formation of FSC as an advocacy coalition. Through review of existing reports and documents produced by FSC and 21 semi-structured interviews this project provides insights into the role of coalition building and maintenance. The study provides insights on how advocacy coalitions form, maintain unity and deal with internal differences and how they utilize resources in overcoming organizational challenges. This study also explores how FSC built consensus around its three goals -zero hunger, a sustainable food system, and healthy and safe food - between 2001-2006 and how it managed to stir its Policy Framework of food security to food sovereignty between 2006-2012. This case study, will contribute to the literatures on food policy and advocacy coalitions with a focus on the role of coalition building and maintenance in the policy making process.

Above all, I want to thank God, my good Father. With Him all things are possible and I thank Him for He is the one who let me finish my dissertation. Thank you, Lord!

Dedication

To my beloved grandfather Antonio Vizziello

1929 Matera, Italy - 2013 Toronto, Canada

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List of Abbreviations

ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework

AGM Annual General Meeting

CSO Civil Society Organizations

ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council

ED Executive Director

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

FSC Food Secure Canada

FSC/SAC Food Secure Canada/Sécurité Alimentaire Canada

GMOs Genetically Modified Foods

NGO(s) Non-Governmental Organization(s)

PFC People's Food Commission

PFPP People's Food Policy Project

RMT Resource Mobilization Theory

UN United Nations

WFC World Food Conference

WFS World Food Summit

WFS-FYL World Food Summit-Five Years Later

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Over the past 30 years, hunger has been a matter of increasing concern in Canada. The reaction of government, or the lack thereof, has meant that it has not created, let alone implemented, a policy to address hunger. The response instead has involved a reliance on charitable food distribution as the means to feed the hungry. Organizations that make advocacy for food and hunger their priority typically fall into one of two groups: those focused on food security and those on food sovereignty. Regardless of the differing priorities of these two groups, the pervasive charity based response has crafted hunger as an issue for philanthropy to address, rather than a political issue requiring the attention of governments. The increased dependence on charity to address issues of hunger has also involved a gradual deterioration of Canada's social safety net, also known as that of the Canadian welfare state.

According to Asa Briggs (2014), a welfare state refers to a state structured in such a way that its power is used, through politics and administration, to turn market forces toward the direction of guaranteeing families a minimum income to limit the extent of insecurity for the population. Thus, it identifies provision of social services for its citizens as a priority. Since the 1970s, however, there has been a restructuring of the Canadian welfare state. Included in this restructuring has been an ideological shift toward neoliberalism, which has involved a number of changes, including moving from increased government expenditure to a decrease in government expenditure; from the belief in the market's ability to assign true costs to a trust in the efficiency of the market; and from the collectivization of risk and gain to the individualization of risk and gain (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). In addition, during the 1970s and 1980s, similar to many other industrialized countries the Canadian state adopted neoliberal policies such as

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privatization, commodification, devolution, deregulation, and self-regulation (Guthman, 2008; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004). These policies have emphasized the primacy of the markets and private property, restricted eligibility for social services and targeted social programs, with the result being increased social stigma as well as inequality and poverty for those accessing such programs and services (McKeen & Porter, 2003). These effects have come to be known as the erosion of the social safety net, and Riches and Silvasti (2014) claimed that one consequence has been an increase in hunger and food insecurity.

As a result of these changes, particularly in the 1980s, many of the responsibilities of the state were transferred to the voluntary sector (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). The process of redrawing state responsibilities has been referred to as the "responsibilization" of the community, as the responsibility to provide social and economic support to those in need was turned over to local communities, individuals, and groups, as well as non-profit organizations working at the local level (Kelly & Caputo, 2011). Non-profit organizations (also referred to as non-profits) make up what is referred to as the "voluntary" sector, which consists of social agencies that are organized, nongovernmental, non-profit, self-governing, and volunteer-friendly; took an increasingly bigger share of social assistance responsibilities (Saunders, 2004). Barr, Brownlee, Lasby, and Gumulka (2005) found that 19,000 voluntary social agencies exist in Canada, and these employ almost 300,000 people. In terms of human resources, market-based regulation has resulted in non-profit organizations (NGOs) experiencing pressure to move away from a "community-oriented focus" and toward a "business model" of competitive practices and culture as well as labour-management practices (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). Due to neoliberal restructuring, an overall decentralization has taken place, whereby non-profit organizations have been impacted financially, compromising their autonomy and advocacy

functions (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). In terms of accountability, non-profit organizations have experienced imposed burdens that have led to a strain on their organizational capacity (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). For example, funding through governments frequently results in accountability functions that render the non-profit organization with little control over funding or program delivery. Despite these constraints, Koç et al. (2008) confirmed that the non-profit sector has initiated action and advocacy for addressing food insecurity at the provincial and national levels. Non-profit organizations also impact food systems by working with each other along lines of mutual interest, such as alleviating food insecurity, as well as by serving the public through providing humanitarian and social services (Mook & Sumner, 2010).

In conjunction with its restructuring as a welfare state, Canada has witnessed the increasing involvement of non-profit organizations in policy making and the advocacy process (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). In response to the challenges of neo-liberal state restructuring of the economy and of social programs, many non-profit organizations have become involved in filling the gap left by the state in the area of service delivery (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). As frontline agencies observing the impacts of such challenges, they have also been taking a more active role in advocacy for both their clients and for policies and policy change.

1.2 Addressing rising concerns about food in Canada

Hunger and poverty are not just prevalent in developing countries, but also in advanced market economies, including Canada, where hunger and undernutrition are increasing (Riches, 1997). In the global north, food security risks have taken the form of nutrition-related issues, including obesity, and these issues have been largely the result of lifestyle changes brought on by urbanization (Wurwang, 2014), among other factors. Food security, broadly defined by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2013), is achieved when individuals have

physical, social, and economic access to sufficient and nutritious food at all times. Household food insecurity has been measured in Canada using the Canadian Community Health Survey, and according to the most recent estimates, food insecurity increased from 11.3% in 2007–2008 to 12.7% in 2012 (Proof Food Insecurity Policy Research, 2016).

Since the 1970s, increasing concerns around the equitability and sustainability of the food system in Canada have been the target of civil society attention. Issues such as crises in fisheries and farming, unfair farm labour management policies, environmental effects of industrial agriculture, lack of safety for industrial farm workers exposed to hazardous working conditions, healthiness of our diet, and upward trends in hunger and obesity rates have been the focus of related civil society activism (Andree, Ayres, Bosia, & Massicotte, 2014). The concept of food sovereignty has also been introduced to address such food system issues by focusing on both the sustainable production of food and local community control over food distribution (Nyéléni, 2007; Trauger, 2015).

The implementation of national legislation establishing food and nutrition security a right has been already been accomplished on an international level (Rocha, 2009a; 2009b). Brazil's policies for food and nutrition security including the Bolsa Familia program is one such example (Rocha & Lessa, 2009; Wittman & Blesh, 2017). With that said, observers have pointed out that Canada has never had an integrated national food policy (MacRae, 2011; Ostry, 2006). Thus, in recent decades, many non-state actors including non-profit organizations have moved to address the need for a national food strategy (Webb, 2005). Food Secure Canada (FSC), a national not-for-profit organization and alliance of organizations and individuals, has been advocating for a holistic national food strategy. What is particularly unique about FSC is that it is the only non-profit organization in Canada that is advocating for food policy change at the national level.

With this study, I have aimed to understand what kind of coalition FSC has entered into in its effort to advocate for a holistic national food policy. More specifically, my research questions have asked how FSC surmounted threats to forming its coalition and to maintaining itself over time. These questions are important to consider given the increased involvement of non-profit organizations in the policy making process in the past two decades. I conducted this study, as I was very interested in learning about the challenges faced by non-profits in building coalitions, particularly as non-profits often work with limited resources for their advocacy efforts. Also, I wanted to understand more about the enablers to building such coalitions, including establishing a membership base and leadership to advocate for a policy agenda. I have explored these questions using the FSC coalition as a relevant case study as it has successfully managed to build a coalition and maintain itself over a period of 10 years.

My experiences working in the non-profit sector led me to consider that there are non-profit organizations in the sector advocating for policy change that persevere to overcome challenges. Between 2008–2010, I worked as a social worker at a legal aid clinic and then as a management consultant at a non-profit organization in Toronto. During this time, I had the opportunity to see how change happens. As part of my work as a management consultant, I was part of an anti-poverty coalition in which residents, community groups, and non-profit organizations sat together around the same table to solve community issues. Throughout those months I bore witness to the personal problems of residents becoming public issues and to how a collection of resident stories initiated the organization of a group to build important community visions and plans. During one particular meeting, one "private" concern of not having enough money to purchase groceries became a collective issue that many members were able to relate to. It became clear that there were food security issues related to access to healthy and affordable

food in the community. The anti-poverty coalition began asking the question of why this was the case and found that low-income neighbourhoods, like Jane-Finch, in Toronto, were paying higher prices for some grocery items and healthy foods than wealthier neighbourhoods. In response to these findings, the anti-poverty coalition began to raise awareness of this systemic issue in the Jane-Finch community, linking poverty with the barriers experienced by many residents in terms of accessing healthy and nutritious foods. Through my work experience in the field of social work, I came to realize that food system issues are a blind spot that needs more exposure. This need was the catalyst for my pursuit of graduate studies in social work, where I focused my practice-based research paper on how Ontario social assistance policy addresses access to and availability of food for welfare recipients. The whole of my experience within the community and academia has helped me realize that community mobilization can be reconciled with advocacy for social policy change. I was eager to pursue doctoral studies in the hopes of gaining a deeper understanding of how the FSC coalition formed and mobilized to advocate for food policy, and how, despite challenges, it maintained itself overtime..

To approach an understanding of these matters that will add to important gaps in the literature and in practice, in this qualitative study, I have examined questions of coalition building and maintenance utilizing the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) as a conceptual framework. I used qualitative interview techniques. I have used Food Secure Canada as a reference point and as an example of a coalition's ability to organize collectively. Examining the FSC coalition's pursuit of advocating for a national food policy contributes to two fields. First, it contributes to food policy literature, as it provides insight into the tensions between policy frameworks, food security and food sovereignty. Second, it contributes to policy studies literature, as it provides insight into advocacy coalition theories

regarding the coalition building and maintenance.

Next, I give a background to contextualize my study, including a discussion of food policy, food policy in Canada, and the role of non-profits in advocacy. Following this will be an overview of the case study of this dissertation, FSC, as well as an overview of my theoretical framework and methodology. Lastly, I outline the chapters to follow. Before addressing the role of non-profits in advocacy, it is important to look more closely at issues related to food provisioning and food system issues by examining how food policy is a complex policy arena.

1.3 Introducing food policy

Food policy refers to a body of public policy that involves principles, rules and regulations adopted by various private, public and not for profit organizations that deals with matters related to the production, distribution, and consumption of food (Gittinger, Leslie, & Hoisington, 1987). Obenchain and Spark (2016) offered a definition of food policy as "any guideline, rule practice or regulation" that affects how we "package, label, distribute, protect, store, access, purchase, prepare, eat, and, in the end, [how] we dispose of excess or spoiled food" (p. 3). Timmer, Falcon, and Pearson (1983) described food policy as being "concerned with all food-related issues, ranging from agricultural performance to the distribution of nutrition intake, and with the mechanisms available to address these issues" (p. 9-10). Finally, Lang and Heasman (2009) suggested that food policy should include decision-making throughout the food supply chain, and argue that the uniqueness of an analysis from a food supply chain perspective stems from the fact that it "assumes that change in one part of the chain, intentionally or not, has an impact on other parts" (p. 14) (see Figure 1). This perspective shows the importance of looking at food policy in systemic way as interconnected parts that not only form a complex whole, but also place guidelines and impact each other.

Supply of Agricultural Inputs
eg fertilizers, pesticides, vet drugs, GMO seeds

Primary Production
eg farmers, fisherman, fish farmers

Primary Food Processing
eg on-farm, dairies, abattoirs, grain mills

Secondary Food Processing
eg canning, freezing, drying, brewing

Food Distribution
eg national/international, import/export

Food retailing
eg supermarkets, shops

Food Catering
eg restaurants, hospitals, schools

Domestic Food

Figure 1. A simple version of the food supply chain. Source: Lang and Heasman, 2009, p. 14.

McMillan (1991) referred to the food policy as a chain or pyramid of rules and regulations, and pointed out that food policy is not merely a topic that resides in the bureaus of international banks and organizations, but that it is in fact ultimately established by members of family households who select the kinds of food that they will purchase. At the same time, McMillan (1991) recognized that, more often than not, local people and households do not partake in macro-level decision-making in terms of policies that impact whether they will eat "cheap, imported wheat at a given market price"; still, he said, "the food decisions of consumers and local policymakers are affected all down the pyramid" (p. 3). While recognizing the systemic nature of food policy, Obenchain and Spark (2016) stated that this "minimizes the fact that

policies carry unstated values impacting individuals within the system" (p. 3). Sheingate (2003) also proposed that the food system has become more unsustainable and more inequitable, and argues that there are concerns around both safety and the healthiness of our diets. In fact, policies that promote genetically modified goods and free trade, expose a deep commitment to international competitiveness and a narrow definition of market efficiency (Barling & Lang, 2003; Barling, Lang, & Caraher, 2002; Friedmann, 2006; Lang & Caraher, 1998). The focus on the food system as a pyramid illustrates that we need to address the impact of top-down approaches to policy making, whereby policy makers impose harmful food practices onto those individuals at the bottom end of the pyramid.

According to Lang and Heasman (2009), the food policy making arena is in essence a social process that involves organizations that perhaps do not consider themselves policy makers (p. 13) (see Table 1). Timmer, Falcon, and Pearson (1983) stated that food policy also incorporates the shared efforts of governments to impact the decision-making environment and "further social objectives," in ways that affect "food producers, food consumers, and food marketing agents" (p. 9).

Table 1

Food Policy Makers and Domains of Food Policy

Organizations, Policy Makers	Policy Domain, Areas of Policy Decision-making
Food policy makers	Decisions and actions (ranging from consumption to production)
Food industry	Sets specifications for food products, determines nutritional intake of consumers
Health-care planners	Decision makers of "policy" dealing with diseases (i.e., diabetes and some cancers) that are the result of how food is produced and consumed
Town planners and competition authorities	Decision makers about retail market share (i.e., location of supermarkets) that determine pricing, access to food shops, local culture

Source: adapted from Lang and Heasman (2009).

According to Lang and Heasman (2009), food policy is not just a very broad domain, but contested terrain, in which there are differing beliefs, values, interests, and knowledge among policy makers; these influence both decision-making and how the delivery of food policy is managed (see Figure 2). Lang and Heasman (2009) also contended that useful discussion across ministries (e.g., health, trade, environment, agriculture and fisheries, consumer production, development, foreign affairs, and industry) rarely exists. Lang (1999) pointed to the challenges of balancing these seemingly contradictory policy imperatives (e.g., health, environment, consumer aspirations, and commerce) and bridging tensions within the food system (e.g., land, industry, domestic life). Several scholars have suggested that bridging tensions within the food system can be done through the networking and partnering of academics as liaisons with non-profits (Lang, 1997; Lang, 1999; Lang & Caraher, 1998; Lang, Caraher, & Barling, 2001; Levkoe, 2011; Wekerle, 2004). This perspective demonstrates the importance of addressing the

tensions in policy making processes through coalition building and partnerships such as those between non-profits and universities.

Figure 2. Food Policy. Source: Lang and Heasman, 2009, p. 45.

The domain of food policy is therefore multifaceted and complex insofar as it involves all areas of the food system, from food production, consumption, and distribution, and even food waste. A number of publications are helpful in understanding issues related to food policy. The *Food Policy Journal* (Food Policy, 2016) is a multidisciplinary journal that publishes articles on issues related to policy making for the food sector; selected topics include food systems, environmental sustainability, food safety, food needs and food aid, nutritional and health aspects of food and food production, trade, marketing, and consumption. The domain of food policy is a complex one, and the complexity of food policy making in Canada does not prove otherwise.

1.4 Making food policy in Canada

Similar to many industrialized countries across the globe, Canada does not have a coherent, integrated, or, what MacRae and Winfield (2016) referred to as, joined-up national

food policy. It is important to note that as of October 2016, the Canadian Federal government recognized this deficit and the Prime Minister mandated the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food to develop a joined-up food policy (Office of the Prime Minister, 2016). While writing this dissertation, public hearings were held regarding the proposed Canadian National Food Policy.

As many observers have identified, the constitutional division of jurisdictional and policy responsibilities among the federal and provincial governments has historically been a significant barrier to creating a joined-up food policy in Canada (Koç et al., 2008; MacRae & Winfield, 2016). These constitutional divisions as well as complex sectoral and regional diverse interests have been responsible for the multilevel and complex food policy that exists in Canada today. The food policy arena is a complex area in terms of the sectors, actors, and governments involved, as policies dealing with food are made at the local, municipal, provincial, and federal levels.

MacRae and Winfield (2016) described a national joined-up food policy as being one that is created within a policy environment that "links food system function and behavior to the higher order goals of health promotion and environmental sustainability," that "unites activities across all pertinent domains, scales, actors and jurisdictions," and that "employs a wide range of tools and governance structures to deliver these goals, including sub-policies, legislation, regulations, regulatory protocols and directives, programs educational mechanisms, taxes or tax incentives, and changes to the loci of decision-making" (p. 141). However, MacRae (2011) referred to the complexity of food policy making processes in Canada as being related to the various intersections between a number of policy systems that have been historically divided, both in terms of ministries and constitutionally. Additionally, the Canadian government did not have a recognizable ministry from which to carry out the work of food policy making, and the

tools of multi-departmental policy decision-making are in their early stages (Dombkins, 2014).

In other words, as MacRae (2011) asserted, there was simply, "no department of food" (p. 428).

Dombkins (2014) suggested that in the Canadian context, a joined-up food policy would govern

a "policy system of systems," as Canada's policy environment is complex, multi-layered, multi-

sectoral, and multi-focal. Table 2 provides a summary of the constitutional divisions cited by

various studies as impediments to a joined-up food policy in Canada.

Table 2

Jurisdictional Division in Canada

Level of Government	Area(s) of Responsibility
Federal government (Abergel & Barrett, 2002; Castrelli & Vigod, 1987)	Leads policy role on matters related to: - Cross-border commerce - Farm financial safety nets - Agricultural research and technology and development - Food and phytosanitary safety - Food standards - Packaging and labelling - Nutritional health
Provincial governments (Courchene & Telmer, 1998; Fowke, 1946; Hessing, Howlett, & Summerville, 2005)	Lead policy role on matters related to: - Commence and food safety within their boundary - Land use and agricultural land protection - Property taxation - Areas of environmental protection - Public health - Agricultural extension

Table 2 (continued)

Level of Government	Area(s) of Responsibility
Municipal governments (Bloom & Hinrichs, 2011; Louden & MacRae, 2010)	Generally, have little direct role in food production and supply. Lead policy role on matters related to: - Food distribution through zoning policies determining food store and food company locations - Promotion of urban agricultural - Public health delivery - Food inspection activities - Nutrition health promotion - Household and commercial waste management
Rural municipal governments (Eliadis & Howlett, 2005)	Lead policy role on matters related to: - Direct impacts on agriculture through zoning - Property and education tax decisions

While the federal government takes the lead on various responsibilities such as commerce, research, food safety, and nutritional health, provincial governments take a "back seat" and more of a supportive role (Hedley, 2006). For example, both the federal and provincial governments negotiate on the design of programs, while the federal government establishes national guidelines for program design in order to promote national coherence and equivalency (Jackman, 2000). In terms of funding for federal agricultural research as well as technology and development, 60% is federal, while 40% of funding is contributed by provincial and local governments (MacRae & Winfield, 2016; Savoie, 1999). As far as municipalities are concerned, they often have a very limited role regarding policy making related to food production and supply; their emphasis on policy making resides in public health delivery, as well as in the areas of household and commercial waste management (Ostry, 2006). Pushchak and Rocha (1998) prompt government to consider indicators of sustainable production in that a "good can be

considered sustainable if the wastes associated with its production are siteable" (p. 25). It is

important to note that the jurisdictional divisions of authority related to policy making and food

production, distribution, and consumption are extremely complex (Atkinson, 1993). This leads to

competition among various jurisdictions for authority, while at the same time they try to "avoid

responsibility for problematic files" (MacRae & Winfield, 2016, p. 147). These jurisdictional

complexities are far reaching, and include the areas of social policy, health care provision, and

transportation (Atkinson, 1993). In the following, Koç et al. (2008) outlined these complexities:

> Over the years, the federal government has expanded its jurisdiction over social
> welfare programs…Yet, the administration of many food-related levers such as
> education, labor, health care, agriculture, and social legislation have remained
> under provincial jurisdiction. Municipal governments were left to fund and
> govern their own public health (including food inspection and health education),
> water supply, urban and regional planning, housing, recreation, transportation, and
> social services – all of which were directly or indirectly relevant to food system
> sustainability (p. 131).

Pertaining to issues related to food security, Koç et al. (2008) claimed that federal

inactivity on various issues outlined in Canada's Action Plan for Food Security (1998) is the

result of the "uncoordinated distribution of agriculture and food-related responsibilities among

various branches of government" (p. 131). Table 3 provides a list of jurisdictional responsibilities

for food-related policy issues in Canada.

Table 3

Jurisdictional Responsibilities for Food-related Policy Issues in Canada

Agriculture and Food-related Responsibilities	Responsible Branches of Government
Food production and processing	- Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada - Canadian Food Inspection Agency - Fisheries and Oceans Canada
Trade and foreign aid	- Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (or Global Affairs Canada)
Nutrition-related matters	- Health Canada - Public Health Agency of Canada - Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Hunger, poverty, local development and equity concerns	- Employment and Social Development Canada - Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada - Status of Women Canada - A variety of regional agencies

Source: adapted from Koç et al., 2008, p. 131.

Koç et al. (2008) stated that the division of these responsibilities according to different levels of government and branches within provincial and municipal governments makes food security an unmanageable task for the political system. Additionally, there exist tensions related to the ambiguity of the federal and provincial distribution of legislative powers (Roberts, Secor, & Sparke, 2003). These dynamics and ambiguities place a strain on civil society based activism, as it is increasingly difficult to keep abreast of ever-changing developments in this complex policy environment (MacRae & Winfield, 2016). Despite these strains, Canada has seen dynamic civil society activism, particularly from the non-profit sector, aimed at sustainable food systems, food security, and food sovereignty since the 1970s.

1.5 The role of non-profits in policy advocacy

Dynamic civil society activism focused on promoting sustainable food systems has included the action of non-profit organizations. This dissertation focuses on the efforts of one such organization: FSC. Therefore, it is important to first understand the unique characteristics and distinguishing features of a non-profit organization. The Democracy Collaborative, a research centre based out of the University of Maryland dedicated to the pursuit of democratic renewal and civil participation for almost two decades, outlined five characteristics of a non-profit organization that are distinguishable from conventional organizations (Community Wealth, 2015). First, the objective is not profit driven; instead, the organization's interest is reflected in a mission that shapes each proposed project. Second, the promoters of a non-profit organization are organized as a group and there is a democratic foundation to the organization. For example, members (also referred to as policy actors) make major decisions together and appoint representatives whom they mandate to oversee operations and make decisions on their behalf. Third, non-profit organizations choose a distinctive type of economic activity whereby they seek to respond to a need rather than focus on maximum gains. Fourth, non-profit organizations rely on a diversified base comprised of members, the community, government, and financial stakeholders to secure funding. Fifth, non-profit organizations are grounded in the local community in that they are often the result of a community group's initiative or originate from a local community in some other way. Not only is it important to understand the unique features of non-profit organizations, but, due to the fact that FSC functions as a non-profit advocacy coalition, it is important to grasp the definitional distinctions of advocacy.

Advocacy has been defined as "activities aimed at influencing the social and civic agenda and at gaining access to the arena where decisions that affect social and civil life are made"

(Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008, p. 582). There are two important definitional distinctions that emerge regarding advocacy efforts by non-profits: individual advocacy and systemic advocacy. Whereas individual advocacy efforts by non-profits pursue provision of relief for a single person or for a circumstance pertaining to a small sum of people, systemic advocacy pursues change through the avenue of manipulating government policy and uses the members of their constituencies to endorse the policy interests of the organization (Casey, 2011). Balassiano and Chandler (2010) identified that non-profits involved in systemic advocacy, also known as policy advocacy, often participate in actions that promote benefits for their own members as well as the wider community in which they work. Non-profits who engage in policy advocacy use specific tactics in their advocacy activities related to securing information-based resources and mobilizing membership (for more, see Alexander, 1998; Billis & Glennerster, 1998; Casey, 2011; DaFonseca, 1991; Krashinsky, 1997; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Powell & Friedkin, 1987; Sugden, 1984; Young, 2001). Non-profits must also identify skillful leadership as a crucial factor in successfully handling members' needs (Conger & Benjamin, 1999; Fiedler, 1967; Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002; Heifetz, 1994; House, 1971; Lane & Wallis, 2009; Little, 1988; Nanus & Dobbs, 1999; Selsky 1998, 1991; Tichy & Devanna, 1986; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Finally, non-profits identify securing financial resources as a key activity for policy advocacy efforts (Fyall & McGuire, 2015; Hamilton, 2002; Hood & Lodge, 2006; Salamon, 1987; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Weisbrod, 1988). The following section will elaborate further on these four specific advocacy tactics that non-profits use in their activities.

First, related to information-based resources, non-profits participate in research and policy analysis insofar as they prepare and disseminate research projects and policy briefs, as well as provide data and access to researchers external to their organization (Casey, 2011; Da

Fonseca, 1991; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Non-profits also participate in education and mobilization whereby they prepare and distribute print or online materials to educate communities about an issue, organize and promote educational, arts, cultural, and community activities, promote campaigns to contact legislators to express concern about issues, promote petitions and boycotts, and organize and promote demonstrations, rallies, street action, and even civil disobedience (Casey, 2011).

Second, non-profits seek to mobilize membership through coalition building and capacity development (Alexander, 1998; Krashinsky, 1997; Young, 2001). These activities include forming and maintaining new organizations as well as creating and sustaining "coalitions of organizations" (Casey, 2011, p. 2). Third, non-profits require leaders who have leadership skills that include an "inspirational style" and "transformational" leadership qualities (Conger & Benjamin, 1999; Tichy & Devanna, 1986). Non-profits who engage in policy advocacy must have leaders with inspirational qualities that are reflected in their judgment-making abilities with regard to the direction of their non-profit's development (Fiedler, 1967; Heifetz, 1994; Lang & Wallis, 2009; Little, 1994; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Also, inspirational leadership qualities are made manifest when non-profit leaders are able to "impact, direct, and retain a following of members and assemble their members to commit to and realize a particular vision" (Lane & Wallis, 2009, p. 145). Non-profit leadership styles must avoid "transactional" leadership qualities (i.e., an "eye for an eye" approach) and instead adopt a "transformational" approach. Such a "transformational approach" aims to build a following of members whereby leaders aim to reach and fulfill the higher needs of Maslow's hierarchy (e.g., self-actualization, personal growth and fulfillment) (Lane & Wallis, 2009).

Fourth, in terms of financial resources, Fyall and McGuire's (2015) study identified related tensions for non-profits insofar as they often struggle to chase aggressive policy goals, while at the same time appeasing and avoiding upset with funding bodies as well as other community supporters. Casey (2011) elaborated on this further, stating that, despite the notion that the active participation of non-profits in the policy process is a central function within the non-profit sector, which is also democratic, there continues to be pushback by those who pursue to limit and curb non-profit advocacy work; such pushback promotes the dispute that organizations that obtain advantageous tax status or government grants should not be allowed to partake in any labour that may be interpreted as political in nature. Despite these challenges that non-profits face in securing information related resources, members, finances, and skillful leadership, non-profits have historically and continue to be major players in policy debates (Hall, 2005), and have influenced issues extending from civil and human rights, to education, to health (Balassiano & Chandler, 2010). Canada has witnessed the increased involvement of non-profit organizations in the policy making and policy advocacy processes, including around issues related to the food system.

1.6 Food Secure Canada

In Canada, many non-profit organizations have come forward and united in an effort to lobby government for policy change across many fronts, resulting in powerful advocacy coalitions. Since 2001, one of these non-profit organizations has been FSC, a pan-Canadian alliance representing various non-profit organizations and individuals working together to address food system issues and advocate for a national food policy in Canada (see Table 4). The FSC is a "national voice for the food movement in Canada – a non-profit organization committed to zero hunger, healthy and safe food, and a sustainable food system" (FSC, 2015). Since 2001,

and as a non-profit organization since 2006, the FSC (2015) has been involved in advocating for

the reform of Canada's Food System, which requires a national food policy as outlined in the

People's Food Policy Project (PFPP, 2011).

Table 4

The FSC's Defining Moments in its History

Year	Assembly	Title of Assembly	Location	Defining Moments
2001	1st	Working Together: Civil Society Input for Food Security in Canada Conference	Toronto	- Tensions emerge, re: coalition building strategies - Sectoral tensions emerge - FSC is called "Canadian Food Security Network" - Conference examines Canada's Action Plan for Food Security
2004	2nd	Growing Together: Cultivating food security in Canadian Society	Winnipeg	- FSC commits to "3 pillars" (*Deep Core*): (1) zero hunger, (2) healthy and safe food, and (3) sustainable food systems
2005	3rd	National Gathering	Waterloo	- FSC coalition is first introduced to the concept of food sovereignty
2006	4th	Bridging Borders Towards Food Security	Vancouver	- FSC becomes ratified as a non-profit organization called "Food Secure Canada" /Securite Alimentaire Canada - FSC deepens commitment to the three pillars - The concept of food sovereignty is mentioned again, yet not accepted collectively by FSC members

(continued)

Table 4 (continued)

Year	Assembly	Title of Assembly	Location	Defining Moments
2008	5th	Reclaiming our Food System: A Call to Action	Ottawa	- FSC decides to embrace the work of the PFPP which promotes food sovereignty - FSC members provide feedback on PFPP policy position papers drafted by the PFPP
2010	6th	Weaving Together Food Policy and Community Action: An Agenda for Change	Montreal	- FSC continues to support the work of the PFPP - In 2011, the PFPP released policy document outlining food sovereignty titled, "Resetting the Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada"
2012	7th	Powering Up! Food for the Future	Edmonton	- FSC formally adopts the Resetting the Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada created by the PFPP - The PFPP key policy recommendations for Canada as it relates to food policy is grounded in food sovereignty

Source: adapted from Food Secure Canada, 2015.

The FSC first emerged as an idea at a conference held at Ryerson University in 2001, titled "Working Together: Civil Society Input for Food Security in Canada." Following this conference, a Canadian Food Security Network was established that sought to bring non-profit organizations across the country together to develop strategies for encouraging Canada's domestic and international commitment to food security (FSC, 2015). By 2006, the FSC was incorporated as a non-profit organization and had developed a coalition of organizations that had together agreed upon three basic principles. First, the FSC (2015) is committed to zero hunger, and more specifically to ensuring that, "all people at all times must be able to acquire, in a dignified manner, an adequate supply of culturally and personally acceptable food" (para. 3).

Second, the FSC (2015) is committed to a sustainable food system; more specifically, its mandate is to contribute to actions toward "the production and consumption of food in Canada [in that we] must maintain and enhance the quality of land, air and water for future generations, and provide for adequate livelihoods of people working in [Canada]" (para. 4). Third, the FSC (2015) is committed to healthy and safe food, which means that foods "free of pathogens and industrial chemicals must be available. No novel food (genetically modified organisms – GMOs) may enter [the] food system without independent testing and monitoring" (para. 5). Beyond these three principles, there has been little agreement between coalition members on *how* to implement these principles. As my research shows, while some coalition members have preferred to advocate for a national food policy framework based on food security, others have suggested food sovereignty be the focus. The purpose of this study has been to explore how the FSC coalition was able to negotiate these differences, and how it was able to build and maintain its coalition over time, specifically from 2001 to 2012.

Since 2016, the FSC has been receiving a lot of media attention (Hui, 2016) due to its advocacy for a national joined-up food policy for Canada. It appears as though the FSC coalition's advocacy efforts have not been in vain, as Prime Minister Trudeau's recent mandate letter in 2016 to the Federal Agriculture Minister Lawrence MacAulay asked the government to "develop a food policy that promotes healthy living and safe food by putting more healthy, high-quality food, produced by Canadian ranchers and farmers, on the tables of families across the country" (Office of the Prime Minister, 2016, para. 17). While one cannot attribute all the credit to the FSC for this achievement, it is important to determine what brought this non-profit advocacy based coalition together, how they could formulate their agenda in a relatively short

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time, and how they formed and maintained a coalition in a sector with diverse and often conflicting interests. These are the focuses of this research study.

1.7 Theoretical framework

Mule and DeSantis (2017) argued that the efforts of advocacy coalitions that engage in policy advocacy can be understood through the theoretical lenses of many fields such as the ACF and RMT. In fact, a non-profit that engages in collective advocacy for policy change is itself an advocacy coalition and a coalition forms "when [non-profit] organizations agree to act in concert on particular issues of common interest…giving up the right to act independently on [a] particular issue…but maintaining their individual and organizational identity" (Mule & DeSantis, 2017, p. 8). As such, FSC as a non-profit advocating for policy change is an advocacy coalition. The following section explores the theoretical frameworks of the ACF and RMT as each of these theories informed this study of the FSC coalition.

While the ACF, first created and endorsed by Sabatier (1987, 1988), has been applied by and large to environmental, public health, domestic violence, drug, and energy policy issues, this study is unique insofar as it applies the ACF to food policy in the context of a non-profit advocacy coalition, the FSC. Utilizing the ACF as a theoretical framework for understanding policy making processes, this study deals with questions around advocacy coalition formation and maintenance using the specific case study of the FSC. There are three analytical insights this study aims to address when examining coalition formation (see Appendix A). First, according to the ACF, in order for advocacy coalitions to form, they must overcome challenges to create common objectives and shared values (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987). The most important challenge that coalitions must overcome is disagreement among members regarding policy positions and core values. Pursuing this view, this study examines the conditions that led to the formation of

the FSC as a coalition, and how it overcame challenges in creating common objectives and shared values, known as Deep Core beliefs (Sabatier 1987, 1988). Looking at the Deep Core beliefs (also known simply as Deep Core) of an advocacy coalition brings attention to its underlying philosophy and how its normative axioms are what hold the coalition together over time (Jenkins-Smith, 1990). As such, in this study, I am particularly interested in how the FSC coalition was able to successfully negotiate a philosophy as reflected in its common objectives, despite the obstacles to doing so. Second, the ACF aids in considering how coalitions turn their Deep Core beliefs into actual policies, also known as Policy Frameworks (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987). It is important to note that in creating the ACF, Paul Sabatier (1987, 1988) named the Policy Framework(s) of advocacy coalitions "Policy Core"; however, for the purposes of this study, Policy Core will be referred to as Policy Framework(s). Policy Framework(s) refers to the fundamental policy position(s) of a coalition that are directly related to achieving its foundational goals (e.g., Deep Core beliefs). Such Policy Frameworks may therefore be difficult to change. However, if the experiences of a coalition reveal anomalies, this can lead coalitions to change their Policy Framework. In the case of the FSC, a pivotal focal point is how the FSC coalition advocated for a policy position concerning the food system, formulating a Food Security Policy Framework in their formational years, and how this Policy Framework shifted to food sovereignty in the years that followed. More specifically, I have aimed to understand the experiences of FSC coalition members that revealed anomalies, and how these experiences were the catalyst that led to the FSC coalition adopting a new Policy Framework centered around food sovereignty.

Third, ACF's Secondary Aspects, or Tools for Implementation, relates to the tools that coalitions use to implement their Policy Frameworks. In creating the ACF, Paul Sabatier (1987,

1988) referred to the Tools for Implementation as "Secondary Aspects." However, for the purposes of this study and in an effort to promote more basic terminology, Secondary Aspects will be referred to as Tools for Implementation. Tools for Implementation refers to the guidelines and principles and administrative functions that outline how the Policy Framework can be implemented (Schlager, 1995). As such, in this study, my main focus is on examining how members of the FSC coalition managed to create a Tool for implementing food sovereignty, and more specifically, the policy document titled *Resetting The Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada* (PFPP, 2011). An essential focus is also how these FSC members brought this Tool back to the FSC coalition for negotiation and successfully had the FSC coalition adopt it as its official policy platform in 2012. Equally important are the reasons why FSC coalition members felt the need to create the tool outside of the coalition; how FSC members were able to craft this tool and achieve consensus outside of the coalition with the PFPP; and finally, how members managed to introduce the Tool back into the FSC coalition and achieve consensus regarding it. These are all fascinating features of the FSC coalition case study, as the literature (Sabatier, 1988) suggests that the Tools for Implementation of the Policy Framework within coalitions tend to be relatively easy to adopt; however, this study uncovers the complexities that occur within coalitions and the obstacles coalitions must overcome to reach consensus.

In order for advocacy coalitions to maintain themselves, they must overcome challenges in securing resources (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). Utilizing RMT as a compliment to the ACF, this study further investigates the role of resources in the maintenance of coalitions (McAdam et al., 1996). The RMT applicability to this study is significant, as it has been recognized as having the ability to examine theory in action, thereby making ground where the ACF struggles to do so. The first category of resources for advocacy coalitions is information, as coalitions seek out

information and advice from their coalition members in an effort to not just discover policy alternatives, but to then argue specific policy views (Ingold, 2011). In this study, I am particularly interested in how the FSC coalition was able to secure information-related resources to embrace a Food Security Policy Framework, and then later convince their membership base to adopt food sovereignty as a foundation. Second, advocacy coalitions must secure a membership base and then mobilize their members to promote a policy agenda, as well as support the coalition's leadership through letter-writing campaigns and participating in fundraising (Weible, 2007). My main focus is on examining how the FSC coalition was able to create a membership base, and the ways in which its members supported the coalition to promote their policy agenda. Third, advocacy coalitions must consider financial resources and aim to secure financial apparatuses (Heinmiller, 1975). My primary interest is how the FSC coalition was able to secure financial resources to hire staff and finance research and campaigns, and the successes and challenges they faced in doing so. Finally, skillful leadership is a resource that advocacy coalitions must secure in order to build cohesion amongst members regarding the adaptation of policy beliefs, and to mobilize members to support initiatives and policy positions as well as acquire financial resources (Kingdon, 1995). Of pivotal importance to this study is how the FSC coalition managed to secure leadership throughout its history, and how FSC leadership has been invaluable for the coalition insofar as strengthening its resolve as well as shifting its focus to the new Policy Framework of food sovereignty. Given the ever-increasing role of advocacy coalitions in policy advocacy, the FSC coalition provides a unique perspective in understanding the challenges that advocacy coalitions face in securing resources to ensure their success and how they have managed to overcome such challenges.

1.8 Methodology

My purpose with this research study was to gain insight into the role of coalition building and maintenance in the policy making process by examining issues related to coalition formation and maintenance over time. My objective was to explore how the FSC as an advocacy coalition surmounted threats to collective action. I sought to accomplish this objective by examining two research questions: first, how did the FSC advocacy coalition surmount internal threats to coalition formation? Second, once formed, how did the FSC advocacy coalition surmount threats to coalition maintenance? I utilized a qualitative research approach as it adapted well to the way I wanted to take in exploring how organizations experience change.

In terms of the procedures I initiated to collect data, I first selected the FSC as my primary site for investigation, and made my primary unit for analysis the organizational partners of the FSC coalition. After obtaining approval from the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board, I undertook a snowball sampling method and used field-based tools such as formal interviews with key informants (Creswell, 2011). I utilized snowball sampling to identify key people of interest, beginning with identifying the organizational groups that were members of the FSC in 2001 and that had remained as members until 2012. The purpose of enlisting this criterion for sampling was so that I could gather the experiences of those who participated in the coalition during its formational years, and also explore its maintenance throughout the years, including the period of time when the FSC shifted its Policy Framework from food security to food sovereignty (see Appendix B for screening script). While 22 organizations participated in the formational years of the FSC coalition, only 8 of them remained FSC coalition members until 2012 (Appendix B). However, I would not want to neglect mention of the fact that, at the time of this study, while less than half of the initial organizations were still coalition members, the FSC

coalition boasted over 90 member organizations. Nevertheless, my aim in this study was to examine coalition formation and maintenance, and so my recruitment of participants was very targeted and specific (see Appendix D for screening script).

On November 16, 2015, I attended the FSC's Annual General Meeting in Montreal, Quebec, where I had the opportunity to meet longstanding FSC organizational members. During this time, I was able to begin to build a rapport with these members, revealing that I was a doctoral student from Ryerson University and talking about my interest in how the FSC has acted as an advocacy coalition in advocating for food policy in Canada. These conversations took place with ease and were sparked during break times and over lunch, where, after speaking with an FSC coalition member, I was often then introduced to additional members. If certain members were not present, it was suggested that I contact them by email. While I had created a recruitment poster (see Appendix B), this recruitment poster did not turn out to be useful for my recruitment of participants as I met FSC coalition members at the Annual General Meeting. Following this event, I began with interviewing 7 organizational members who agreed to be interviewed and had remained as FSC members until 2012; I continued interviewing until each participant began naming organizations I had already interviewed (see Appendix C for recruitment script). I conducted a total of 21 interviews from November 2015 to March 2015 through the telephone or Skype, or in person. During my semi-structured interviews with participants, I asked them direct questions about their experiences as members with building the FSC coalition, as well as the Policy Framework shift that took place within the coalition. In addition, the ACF and RMT frameworks guided the questions posed to each interviewee; they also assisted in my preliminary identification of emerging themes when analyzing the data (Denzin, 2013), which I will discuss further in Chapter 5. Each interview followed a script (Appendix E) and all questions were open-

ended. The 21 interviews held ranged from 26 minutes to 120 minutes in length, and averaged 90 minutes in length.

In addition to the interviews, I relied on secondary data. I conducted a review of relevant documents, which added various perspectives that allowed for greater context when analyzing the data (McCullock & Richardson, 2000). More specifically, I read and analyzed the FSC coalition's assembly reports from its National Assemblies in 2001, 2004, 2005, and by-annually from 2006 through 2012. While reading these reports, I conducted patterned coding and identified themes in these documents related to the theoretical frameworks of this study, the ACF and RMT. My rationale in seeking out secondary data, and, more specifically, in reviewing these specific documents, was to glean greater insight into the role of the FSC coalition's National Assemblies in, first, forming its coalition through establishing policy beliefs, and second, in maintaining its coalition through securing resources, such as mobilized members, leadership, finances, and information.

In terms of data analysis, I chose qualitative research as my method and the conceptual framework of the interpretivist paradigm. Interpretivism required that I analyze the data by decoding each research participant's interpretations (Creswell, 2013). The qualitative approach also implies that the textual meaning of the data analyzed derives from my prior knowledge as a researcher (Kelle, 2005). I can affirm this, as my prior knowledge of the ACF and RMT theories provided me with a guideline for not only creating the interview questions, but also for building my understanding and interpretation of what participants shared during their interviews. I chose triangulation as a tool for interpreting my findings as it allowed me to engage with multiple methods, such as interviews and secondary data, in my effort to study emerging themes from a variety of perspectives. Each interview was audio recorded. Following each interview, I

transcribed the interview and entered each transcript into Atlas.ti (2011), a computer software program used to organize and analyze qualitative data. I followed Ryan and Bernard's (2003) method to interpret the data; I first made notes of my initial thoughts, highlighting key passages, and utilized scrutiny techniques to look for themes. I implemented a two-cycle method provided by Saldana (2013); I began by outlining concepts, also known as descriptive coding, and then, as a second step, I implemented pattern coding, which involved summarizing re-occurring themes. I reviewed each of the transcripts and documents I analyzed with the intention of exposing concepts and themes related to my research questions.

As a national coalition that brings various organizations together to work toward addressing problems within the Canadian food system, the FSC provides a valuable case study of the challenges involved in coalition formation. Its success in achieving consensus around three principles and its ability to shift to a different Policy Framework, from food security to food sovereignty, without tearing the coalition apart is also valuable to document and analyze. This study therefore sheds important light on how advocacy coalitions form and maintain themselves.

Using the FSC coalition as a reference point and as an example of the non-profit sector's influence on national food policy formulation in Canada, this qualitative study contributes to two fields: food policy literature, as it provides insight into the tensions between policy frameworks in food policy making (e.g., food security and food sovereignty), and policy studies literature, as it provides insight into advocacy coalition theories related to coalition building and maintenance.

1.9 Chapter outline

In building upon this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews civil society activism for food system reform in Canada since the 1970s. This chapter examines different historical periods in terms of non-profit activism dealing with food policy in Canada. It reviews civil society's

reaction to the 1970s oil crisis by way of the People's Food Policy Commission, the

institutionalization of food banks in the 1980s in response to increasing neoliberal policies, and

the emergence of alternative community based food security initiatives in the 1990s. Following

this is a discussion of the increased involvement of civil society in matters related to national and

international food policy initiatives, such as the World Food Summits of 1996 and 2002 and

Canada's Action Plan on Food Security of 1998. The key events outlined in this chapter provide

a broad context from which to appreciate the involvement of the non-profit sector in policy

making processes.

Next, Chapter 3 reviews the prominent Policy Frameworks of food security and food

sovereignty that have emerged in addressing food system issues for non-profit organizations such

as the FSC. It provides an overview of the problem-and-solution perspective of food security, as

well as the principles and pillars of food sovereignty. The overview of each of these Policy

Frameworks provides for a deeper understanding of food policy transformation in Canada, and of

how, in the case of the FSC, the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework became the coalition's

dominant policy position and belief system over time.

Chapter 4 presents a review of the theoretical frameworks that guided this study. This

chapter presents the questions of the ACF and RMT as they relate to this study, specifically those

concerning advocacy coalition formation and coalition maintenance.

Chapter 5 reviews the research methodology used to conduct this study. First, it outlines

the research questions, after which it presents a literature review on qualitative research.

Included in this literature review is a discussion of the methodology's strengths and limitations.

Finally, this chapter reviews the ethical issues that were taken into consideration and addressed

throughout this study, as well as the data collection procedures and data interpretation and analyses.

As the first findings chapter, Chapter 6 presents a discussion of findings related to the main research question of this study, as revealed by the case study of the FSC. Utilizing interviews and document analysis, the chapter reviews the challenges the FSC faced and overcame in forming their coalition. Next, Chapter 7 presents a discussion of findings related to the securing and maneuvering of organizational resources that assisted the FSC in maintaining its coalition over time. Finally, factors that led to changes within the FSC coalition, including shifts in the Policy Framework of its belief system, are examined.

The final chapter presents conclusions from the study. Specifically, it discusses the roles of shared beliefs in coalition formation and of organizational resources in coalition maintenance, based on insights gained from this empirical analysis of the FSC coalition. Limitations of the study and areas for future research are also highlighted.

Chapter 2: Civil Society Activism

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the historical context of food activism and policy advocacy in Canada. Since the 1970s and into the 2000s, there have been several key milestones of advocacy efforts by civil society actors. This chapter gives an overview of these milestones and events as it relates to the advocacy efforts of non-profit organizations and national food policy making in Canada, including the 1974 World Food Conference, the People's Food Commission of 1977–1980, the institutionalization of food banks beginning in the 1980s, the alternative community based food security initiatives of the 1990s, the World Food Summit of 1996, Canada's Action Plan on Food Security in 1998, and the World Food Summit – Five Years Later of 2002. In highlighting the efforts of activism by non-profit actors, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the ongoing civic activism through the work of non-profit organizations in Canada and provide a brief history of activism for food system reform in Canada. In turn, these events contributed to an emerging food movement that was informed by various alternative food Policy Frameworks, to be discussed in Chapter 3.

2.2 History of non-profit activism and food policy

The early 1970s was a period in the global economy marked by crisis. In August 1974, the Third World Population Conference took place in Bucharest, and this was the first conference held by the United Nations that included intergovernmental representatives (World Population Conference, 1974, para. 7). This was followed by the World Food Conference (WFC) in Rome, in November 1974. The impetus for the WFC was a severely wounded food supply system, which resulted in the reduction of world food production by 33 million tons in 1974 (Page, 1984). There was widespread awareness that the world population was increasing and that food

security was becoming a problem (Koç, 2009). The WFC adopted the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, and the 138 UN member states attending the Conference, including Canada, proclaimed that "every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and mental faculties" (World Food Conference, 1974, para. 1).

The queries addressed at the 1974 World Food Conference related to establishing an international fund for agricultural development, addressing world food security, and developing an institutional framework for implementing the conference's recommendations. First, the international fund for agricultural development established that member states ought to participate on a voluntary basis, and that the governing body of the fund would be comprised of both developed and developing countries (Van Rooy, 1997). The finances derived from the fund would contribute to specific projects that aimed to increase food production, which included projects related to stock breeding and fisheries (Van Rooy, 1997). The United States agreed to the fund being set up, but explicitly stated that it had no intention of contributing to the fund (Shaw, 2007).

The second recommendation coming out of the conference centered around world food security. The member states that participated in the conference understood that in order to achieve world food security, a global information system whereby early warning signs related to food and agriculture could be communicated internationally was needed (Van Rooy, 1997). All member states agreed to this system, however the USSR and China were not in favour of it. Both countries expressed reluctance to embrace such a system for fear that it might undermine the sovereignty of member states (Van Rooy, 1997). Further, both China and the USSR were hesitant to adopt a global system of information for fear that it could prove to be a method for the

strategic dissemination of information that would support the operations of multinational companies (Shaw, 2007). Nevertheless, member states were required to provide forecasts of production, consumption, and trade related to basic foods (e.g., meat, rice, wheat, secondary cereals, soya beans) (Van Rooy, 1997). In addition, achieving world food security meant examining reserve stocks (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). Due to the fact that in 1974 cereal stocks had plunged to their lowest level since World War II, many developing countries expressed the need to have a system that allowed for them to access emergency cereal stock of up to 500,000 tonnes within their own countries (Page, 1984). However, the developed countries rejected the proposal. Instead, they opted for setting up specific locations throughout the world where developing countries could access emergency stocks of cereals, if need be (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). Additionally, providing food aid was understood as a method to achieve world food security. A specific recommendation deriving from the conference was that cereal as a form of food aid should be increased to a minimum of 10 million tonnes per year (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). Previous to this decision, Canada had already expressed its willingness to increase food aid in the form of cereal from 500,000 tonnes to 1 million tonnes (Shaw, 2007). Member states within Europe and the United States accepted the aim of reaching 10 million tonnes (Shaw, 2007). However, oil producing member states were unwilling to support this initiative, and expressed their primary concern to be establishing an international fund for agricultural development (Van Rooy, 1997).

The third outcome was that deliberations were held regarding the conference's institutional framework and key recommendations were established. The member states participating in the conference recommended that a World Food Council be created that would act as a coordinated mechanism through which to implement an integrated approach to

addressing world hunger (Van Rooy, 1997). It was also established that this World Food Council would meet to explore government policies and measures taken by countries to address food system issues (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). The member states of the World Food Council would be geographically balanced, and would have to be nominated by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). Also recommended was a Food Security Committee, which would be responsible for monitoring the supply, demand, and stock of food products around the world (Shaw, 2007). The intention behind such monitoring would be to effectively assess the extent to which countries had an adequate stock of food in case of underperforming crops (Shaw, 2007). Finally, the member states recommended the reshaping of the existing inter-governmental Committee for the World Food Programme into the Committee for Policies and Programmes for Food Aid (Van Rooy, 1997). This committee was responsible for assessing the need for and availability of food aid, as well as coordinating national, international, bilateral, and multilateral food aid programs (Van Rooy, 1997). The committee would also make recommendations to member states regarding the food aid program priorities of countries.

In addition to the 138 nation states that were represented, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were encouraged to attend the 1974 World Food Conference. The World Bank (1995) defined NGOs as "private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development" (p. 7). Whereas Werker and Ahmed (2008) understand the NGOs to be a "subset of the broader nonprofit sector that engages specifically in international development" (p. 74). UN Conference Secretary-General Sayed Marei stated that he "wanted them [NGOs] as…they are the ones who form public opinion at home," and declared that "we

[the UN] need them [NGOs]" (Van Rooy, 1997, p. 94). As such, a broad range of NGOs were invited to participate in the conference, and an NGO coordinator was appointed to oversee their facilities and camps located outside of the main meeting buildings (Van Rooy, 1997). Members of Canadian NGOs formed part of a new and emerging activist community in Canada. During the early 1970s, the Canadian International Development Agency, also known as CIDA, had supported student movements in Canada and internationally (Conway, 2006). Upon their return, many of these volunteers founded several hundred NGOs in Canada, including the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and the United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC) (Conway, 2006). It was members from these two NGOs, together with CIDA, that represented Canadian NGOs at the 1974 World Food Conference (Conway, 2006).

The Canadian NGOs that attended the 1974 World Food Conference held fundamentally different views related to the causes of the food crisis than the UN member states (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). Many of these NGOs analyzed the crisis as being the result of political structures, and particularly the unequal relations between the global North and global South (Shaw, 2007). Thus, the recommendations put forward by Canadian NGOs were: the "redistribution of International Monetary Fund (IMF) special drawing rights, debt alleviation, fairer pricing, extended pricing, extended commodity agreements, increases in food aid, establishment of grain and fertilizer pools, integrated agricultural production assistance, and better access to Northern markets through GATT" (Van Rooy, 1997, p. 95). However, member states, including Canada, believed that the recommendations of the NGOs required more "sensible solutions"; as one official argued, the "NGOs had talked up the crisis to apocalyptic proportions, making realistic debates difficult to conduct" (Van Rooy, 1997, p. 95). Still, Canada had crafted a short-term and long-term response to the food crisis.

The Canadian state response to the food crisis focused on addressing the gaps between food production technology and the increase in population (Van Rooy, 1997). Also, a short-term focus of the Canadian government was increasing food aid; however, its long-term focus was on assisting developing countries to increase their capacity to improve their own productivity (Van Rooy, 1997). While Canada did not embrace the recommendations of the NGOs, the conference was a significant catalyst for propelling NGO policy actors into policy making circles; as one official stated, "it was the first time NGOs were seen as [a] legitimate, extra-parliamentary political force in opposition to government" (Van Rooy, 1997, p. 98). The conference was an opportunity for NGOs to voice their concerns and address UN delegates more freely than in other conferences (Ram, Crawford, & Swaminathan, 1974). However, while the conference afforded Canadian NGOs the opportunity to reach the international stage, the global economic recession still impacted the Canadian economy. Canadian civil society responded to the worsening of the global economic recession (Koç, 2009).

The mid-1970s to the late 1980s saw a significant degree of deindustrialization in industrialized countries like the United States and Canada, and many major corporations underwent corporate restructuring schemes (Shields & Evans, 1998). The restructuring schemes included a cost-benefit analysis of regulatory proposals, and these analyses demonstrated that the cost exceeded their benefits; as a result, many regulatory proposals were eliminated (Harvey, 2005). Further restructuring included tax code revisions that permitted several corporations to escape the need to pay taxes (Harvey, 2005). The decline of jobs in key branches of the manufacturing sector led to increases in unemployment (Harvey, 2005). As the revenues started declining, governments attempted to balance budgets by cutting expenditures and social programs (Evans & Shields, 1998). Cuts in social assistance led to a rise in poverty and hunger

(Koç, 2009). In Canada, civil society organizations were very much aware of the economic decline and its social consequences. The People's Food Commission was one of the civil society based responses to the impacts of the economic downturn in 1977 (Koç, 2009).

2.3 1970 - People's Food Commission

One of the earliest examples of civil society activism for food system reform in Canada was the People's Food Commission (PFC), formed by a group of activists in September of 1977 (People's Food Commission, 1980). For the first time in Canadian history, through the PFC, diverse segments in the civil society movement were brought together to discuss problems with the food and agricultural system, and they identified food insecurity as a Canadian problem (Koç, 2009). In total, 125 Canadian civil society organizations participated, including the Canadian Labour Congress, the National Farmers Union, the Canadian Union of Students, the YWCA of Canada, and the National Indian Brotherhood. The various organizations met in Regina, Saskatchewan, to discuss the issues present within the food system, and the PFC members held 75 hearings in provinces throughout Canada, except in Quebec (People's Food Commission, 1980). The PFC was largely a volunteer-run organizing effort, with activists who had little organizational apparatus and little previous experience to draw from (People's Food Commission, 1980). It is important to note, however, that the PFC embodied the voice of civil society and stressed the importance of input from ordinary people; each of the hearings began with the postulation that ordinary life experience is an indispensable supplier of information, and that the stories that people share have significant legitimacy (People's Food Commission, 1980). Through informal discussions and academic presentations, written briefs, discussions, slides, puppet shows, slides, songs, and statements, the PFC documented how Canadians were dealing with deteriorating economic conditions, and explored food system connections (Levkoe, 2014).

After receiving 1,000 submissions from 75 hearings and public consultations across Canada, findings of the PFC hearings were presented as submissions in the form of a report published in 1980 titled, "The Land of Milk and Money" (People's Food Commission, 1980). The report charted several damaging developments within the food system (People's Food Commission, 1980). First, participants identified the increased price of food; as one participant stated, "people notice the increase in the price of lettuce more so than the price increase in a new car" (p. 14). Indeed, Statistics Canada reported that, by the end of July 1979, food prices had risen by 3.2 percent and there was a yearly food price increase of 12.2 percent (People's Food Commission, 1980). Second, individuals on a fixed income reported suffering from end-of-the-month blues, as many were running out of money at the end of the month and having to resort to "begging from the Salvation Army, the church doors…anything edible is devoured at this time" (People's Food Commission, 1980, p. 15). Third, Indigenous communities and specifically residents of Frobisher Bay, the largest community of Baffin Island, stated that they felt discriminated against through food prices. As one individual stated, "the cost of seven items is 201 percent more than in Ottawa. The people must absorb transportation costs amounting to forty-one cents a pound and frequently the product is inferior" (People's Food Commission, 1980, p. 17). Fourth, farmers had suffered financially as a result of increased food prices, and Canada had witnessed a rapid rate of farm depopulation, as the total number of "agricultural holdings" in Canada declined from 366, 128 to 338, 578 between 1970 and 1971 (People's Food Commission, 1980). Fifth, fishermen on the east coast had been affected in much the same way as farmers. One fisherman explained, "capital and maintenance costs have doubled and tripled in the last few years. A sixty-five-foot boat in Nova Scotia now costs $1 million" (People's Food Commission, 1980, p. 2). Through this series of hearings held throughout Canada between 1977

and 1980, the PFC identified the above key concerns regarding the economy and its impact on food security (Koç, 2009). The PFC served as a source of inspiration that influenced the increase of social mobilization around food issues in Canada, an increase that continued into the 1980s and 1990s (Levkoe et al., 2012). Indeed, the PFC was set up in response to the financial crisis of the early 1970s; however, when it published its final report in 1980, the financial situation had become significantly worse and the institutionalization of food banks soon followed.

2.4 1980s - Institutionalization of food banks

In a market economy, an individual's ability to achieve food security depends on their ability to exchange their labour power as a product or service within the marketplace (Riches, 2003). The challenges of chronic unemployment and underemployment during the 1980s caused by corporate restructuring forced individuals into part-time, precarious work (Shields & Evans, 1998). In an environment of shrinking social programs, for those with limited income to buy their food in the marketplace, charitable food banks became an alternative source for access to food (Food Banks Canada, 2012). Charitable food banks involve distributing the surplus of the food industry and require a lot of volunteer labour (Eakin & Tarasuk, 2003). During the 1980s, food banks were the response from the non-profit sector to this new challenge of addressing food insecurity. Food banks have been defined as "centralized clearinghouses that coordinate the collection, storage, and distribution of donated food stuffs from producers, retailers, and private donors to assistance programs," and they have been institutionalized in Canada (Davis & Tarasuk, 1994, p. 52). As the demand for food banks increased, so did their numbers. The first food bank opened in Edmonton, Alberta, in 1981, followed by several others in the following decades (Koç, 2009). According to Davis and Tarasuk (1994), 2.1 million Canadians received food assistance from a food bank between the 1980s and 1992. Irwin et al. (2007) indicated that,

by 2007, there were as many as 650 food banks across Canada providing food assistance to those in need. By 1992, food banks were outnumbering McDonald's franchises three to one (Koç et. al., 2008).

The existence of food banks as a charitable approach to addressing food insecurity became a divisive point among Canadian civil society activists (Food Banks Canada, 2012; Tarasuk & Davis, 1996). While the use of food banks as a method for alleviating hunger was prominent in the 1980s, critiques emerged claiming that they do not address the root causes of poverty (Eakin & Tarasuk, 2003; Power, 2007; Riches, 1997). One major critique was that, while food banks provide food to individuals, they often do so at the expense of ensuring those same individuals are able to achieve the necessary income to access healthy, culturally appropriate food. In this way, there is a tendency for food banks to construct food assistance as a supplement, and such an approach diminishes the importance of the quality of food provided to individuals (Irwin et al., 2007). In other words, the objective of providing food assistance often becomes "helping clients to get through the month, but not actually trying to ensure that their food needs [are] met" (Eakin & Tarasuk, 2003, p. 1509). It is precisely because clients' food needs are obfuscated through the everyday practices of food banks that there ought to be an impetus for community groups and governments to seek out other solutions (Tarasuk & Davis, 1996). Advocates of food banks understand that, while community groups and governments struggle to implement preventative social policy changes to address the root causes of poverty, food banks are a haven for individuals and serve as an intervention for those who access them. Individuals require the services of food banks for a variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, the loss of a job or reduced work hours, family break up, the need to live on savings, not qualifying for employment insurance, the termination of employment insurance, and sudden disability; food

banks also serve immigrants, who are often "told for the hundredth time that they have great skills, but no Canadian work experience" (Food Banks Canada, 2012). While at the same time, the primary correlate of a household's food security is income and enhancing the employability of immigrants is key to improving the financial power of new immigrants to purchase "sufficient, nutritious, and culturally acceptable food" (Vahabi, Damba, Rocha & Montoya, 2011, p. 929). Lessa and Rocha (2007, 2009) advocate that for immigrants and in particular, immigrant women, food can promote diasporic healing and integrate the loss of home into a transformed new life.

Despite the institutionalization of food banks, many scholars call for addressing hunger as a political issue, and more specifically, as a human right. For example, Riches (2003) claimed that welfare policy has been used as a method to drive down wages as well as maintain large pools of reserve labour, and boldly stated that, "no government pursuing such policies wishes to be reminded of its international commitments to fulfill the right to food" (p. 3). Riches (2003) directly challenged the acceptance of hunger in "affluent" countries, including Canada, by calling for the decommodification of social rights, including, but not limited to, the right to full employment and adequate income, which would in turn affect food security. More recently, Riches and Silvasti (2014) have claimed that the institutionalization of food banks has undermined the fight to advance the human right to adequate food. Food banks have functioned as a moral safety valve that has served to de-politicize hunger in first world countries. By de-politicizing hunger and relegating its services to the non-profit sector, addressing food security has become a non-priority for state and government (Power, 2007). The institutionalization of food banks in Canada during the 1980s was followed by an increase in community based food security initiatives in the 1990s.

2.5 1990s – Alternative community based food security initiatives

While exploring the historical foundations of civil society involvement in food policy making in Canada, it is important to recognize that civil society involvement has also emerged at the local and municipal level. In this way, civil society involvement in food policy making has not just included national efforts. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of non-profit organizations, including FoodShare, that challenged the deeper structural issues and root causes of food insecurity. In addition, in 1985, Art Eggleton, founder of FoodShare, sought a variety of strategies to deal with food insecurity, and in 1993 described FoodShare as planning "to change the political and economic situation as it affects "food security," with the aim of overhauling the food distribution system in the city" (Classens, 2015, p. 48). FoodShare stood as an example of a non-profit organization that framed issues related to food security in such a way that promoted macro-economic policy levers; however, these organizations often had limited access to such levers (Martin & Andree, 2014).

The 1990s saw policy actors from both the non-profit sector and local government involved in fighting against food insecurity. It was during this time that partnerships were formed between the non-profit sector and local governments, as seen through the creation of the Toronto Food Policy Council and the Edmonton Food Policy Council. More specifically, both of these councils had a more radical analysis of the root causes of food insecurity, including, but not limited to, the impact of international trade agreements as well as government agricultural policy on food security (Martin & Andree, 2014). These councils readily supported the ongoing work of non-profit organizations by creating declarative food charters that linked current non-profit sector programming with social justice aims. For example, the Toronto Food Policy Council claimed that "food security is . . . not just a set of problems. It creates opportunities" (Toronto

Food Policy Council, 1998, p. 2). The Toronto Food Policy Council was formed with the

intention of partnering with business and community groups in an effort to advance both policies

and programs that endorse equitable access to food, and a focus on environmental health as well

as community development (Koç et al., 2008, p. 128). Several stop-gap measures were

implemented by these non-profit and government partnerships. For example, the Edmonton Food

Policy Council supported the work of local non-profit food banks with funding support from the

Department of Health and Welfare in order to conduct surveys on food security (Martin, 2010).

Many such initiatives viewed food insecurity through the lens of specific, targeted policy reform

instead of a universal program policy. As a result, food security issues were addressed by way of

the work of small non-profit organizations. This can be seen to be the result of neoliberalism and

the "re-responsibilization" of provision to the community level (Food Banks Canada, 2012). An

unintended consequence of the increased responsibility given to the non-profit sector to address

hunger was that this responsibility helped to develop the skills of non-profit organizations

necessary to engage in policy advocacy. While alternative community based food security

initiatives spread throughout Canadian provinces and local municipalities during the 1990s, with

the mid-1990s came the World Food Summit.

2.6 1996 - World Food Summit

In November 1996, the FAO hosted the World Food Summit, which saw the creation and

adoption of the Rome Declaration on World Food Security. In this declaration, UN member

states pledged their political will and national commitment to achieving food security for all,

with an immediate goal of reducing the number of undernourished people to half the present

level no later than 2015 (World Food Summit, 1996). The World Food Summit of 1996 was

called by the FAO to address the ongoing undernutrition of individuals around the world and

increasing questions regarding the ability of agriculture to meet future food needs (Hassanein, 2003). The 1996 World Food Summit took place at the FAO headquarters in Rome and included high officials from over 185 countries, hosting a total of 10,000 participants (World Food Summit, 1996). The objective was to return, at the highest political levels, to the global promise of eradicating hunger and malnutrition, and to achieve sustainable food security for all people (World Food Summit, 1996).

The World Food Summit of 1996 created an opportunity for civil society to engage in advocacy around food systems issues at the international level (Koç & Bas, 2012). However, in 1994, even before the 1996 World Food Summit, the Global Assembly on Food Security conference took place in Rome, Italy. This conference hosted 200 individuals from 60 different countries and was the preliminary introduction of the non-profit organizational activity that led up to the World Food Summit two years later (Koç & MacRae, 2001). The participation of non-profit organizations at the 1994 Global Assembly facilitated the preliminary dialogue that impacted the Canadian government's position at the World Food Summit in 1996 (Diani & Bison, 2004).

During the 1996 World Food Summit, Canada's Minister for Agriculture and Agri-Food of Canada, Ralph E. Goodale, stated that the key to addressing food security issues was to guarantee the involvement of all elements of civil society, including, but not limited to, the non-profit sector, women, Indigenous peoples, and those who contribute to the stewardship of natural resources (World Food Summit, 1996). Goodale also acknowledged the strong role of non-profit organizations in Canada that had contributed to the substance of the World Food Summit (World Food Summit, 1996). In particular, non-profit organizations in Canada had been a powerful force in pinpointing the consequences of the deregulation of trade (Koç & Bas, 2012). For example,

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deregulation policies expose individuals and communities to the disproportionate risk-taking of corporations that will operate at any cost to gain the highest profit possible. Perhaps just as important, if not more, non-profit organizations have also had a strong proclivity for advocating against policies of industrialized nations that severely reduce, if not completely eliminate, the social entitlements that have traditionally protected individuals against poverty and hunger (Koç & MacRae, 2001). The 1996 World Food Summit saw the rise of the non-profit sector, which played a critical role in designating the "right to food" as a strategic policy issue at the next World Food Summit, five years later (Koç & Bas, 2012).

2.7 1998 - Canada's Action Plan on Food Security

Released in 1998, Canada's Action Plan on Food Security was Canada's policy document in reaction to the commitment Canada made at the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS). The commitment Canada made was to reduce the number of undernourished people by half in or before 2015 (Koç & Bas, 2012). Overall, the construction of Canada's Action Plan on Food Security was built upon the World Food Summit Plan of Action from the 1996 World Food Summit (Koç & Bas, 2012). Canada's international commitment included conventions on human rights, education, housing, urban development, and international trade and environmental issues (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). Furthermore, Canada's Action Plan on Food Security built upon existing domestic programs in Canada, including: Nutrition for Health: An Agenda for Action; Gathering Strength: Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan; revisions to legislation, including the Fisheries Act; and Canada's evolving economic, social, and environmental programs and policies (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998).

Canada's Action Plan for Food Security was a document created through the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) and was comprised of *both* non-profit organizations and government

agencies (Koç & Bas, 2012). Appendix I in Canada's Action Plan for Food Security outlines a list of non-profit organizations and civil society representatives that participated in formulating the policy document (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). The document defined civil society as non-profit organizations and associations of people, formed for social or political purposes that are not created or mandated by governments. More specifically, civil society members that participated in forming the policy document were business associations, trade unions, cooperatives, academic institutions, grassroots organizations, and churches (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). The decision to include non-profit organizations in creating the policy document was an approach that earned the support of other civil society and industry groups. It also provided an opportunity for discussions between various stakeholders as well as the creation of new partnerships (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998).

Canada's Action Plan on Food Security offered a Canadian perspective on the multifaceted issue of food insecurity and actively included civil society in developing its perspective. It also set out particular actions to address challenges such as access to adequate and sufficient food supplies, poverty reduction, social justice, and sustainable food systems (Koç & Bas, 2012). In addition, it outlined ten priorities for achieving food security, both domestically and internationally. Two of the ten priorities outlined in the action plan mentioned the work that needed to be done by the non-profit sector to support the goals of the 1996 World Food Summit. The first priority had to do with the *right to food*, and the action plan stated that all actions needed to ensure that civil society endorsed the International Code of Conduct on the Human Right to Adequate Food. Also, the plan stated that civil society needed to be involved in the work of both national and international bodies in their quest to define and give meaning to the "right to food" and reach the full and progressive realization of the right to food around the world

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(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). The second priority listed in the plan mentioned the role of the non-profit sector in acting as a monitoring system for food insecurity. The plan declared the need for the non-profit sector to identify wide-ranging indicators that describe the extent, nature, and evolution of food insecurity (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). In order to develop suitable responses and observe the usefulness of indicators, Canada's Action Plan on Food Security stated that *both* the non-profit sector and government needed to work together to develop such indicators for both national and international systems (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998).

Nevertheless, Canada's Action Plan on Food Security stated that there is a paradox: Canada is one of the world's largest donors of food aid, yet the country itself is not immune to the problem of food insecurity. More specifically, there are individuals in Canada who are susceptible to food insecurity, as these individuals are often powerless to secure their food needs without compromising other basic needs (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). Despite this paradox, Canada's Action Plan on Food Security stated that hope resides within Canada, and that this hope is tied to the common responsibility between all stakeholders, including all levels of government, municipal, territorial, provincial, and federal (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1998). The non-profit sector readily took up this responsibility in advocating for a national food policy for Canada, and five years later, the 2002 World Food Summit took place.

2.8 2002 - World Food Summit – Five Years Later

Recognition of civil society's role in action and advocacy for food security as outlined by Canada's Action Plan on Food Security provided legitimacy for increasing demands for participation by NGOs in federal and provincial food policy circles. As preparations were underway for the World Food Summit – Five Years Later (WFS-FYL) conference, to be held in

Rome in November 2001, the Canadian federal government wanted to prepare a report on the contributions of Canadian civil society organizations to food security. At the same time, various local organizations such as FoodShare Toronto, the Child Hunger Education Program (CHEP) in Saskatoon, and a few more from the 1990s (see Koç & MacRae, 2001) started demanding federal level commitment to food policy reform. In light of the federal government's ambition to include Canadian civil society at the WFS-FYL, together with other partnering organizations, these local organizations organized a conference to discuss Canadian civil society demands for food security. The Working Together: Civil Society Input for Food Security in Canada conference was held at Ryerson University from June 15th through 17th, in 2001 (Koç & MacRae, 2001). The objectives of the conference were to:

> (i) develop a working plan for a civil society based national action plan for food security; (ii) assess the contributions of the Canadian government to food security nationally and internationally; (iii) make practical policy proposals to provincial and federal governments on achieving the goals of Canada's Action Plan for Food Security (Koç & MacRae, 2001, p. 4).

Drawing from the experiences and strengths of participants as well as from the goals of the conference, the conference hosted a number of interactive events along the topic lines of Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems, Right to Food and Social Justice, Food Security in Canadian Foreign Policy (Aid and Trade), Community Health, and Food Security (Koç & MacRae, 2001).

The conference brought together over 150 representatives from various Canadian food security organizations, including social service agencies, food banks, and farmer and fishery organizations. This conference was the first event in Canada that brought together representatives of various civil society organizations including the non-profit sector and networks from each province to address food insecurity in Canada. In order to execute the program for the conference

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and set up criteria for securing participants, the organizing committee leveraged resources and relied on existing regional networks from across Canada to identify potential participants and facilitate an open framework for selection (Koç & Bas, 2012). In establishing an invitation list, close attention was paid to ensuring that there was representation from various sectors to allow for a comprehensive discussion of food issues in Canada (Koç & Bas, 2012).

In addition to making recommendations for the WFS-FYL in Rome, Italy, The Working Together: Civil Society Input for Food Security conference participants decided that there was a need for a Canadian Food Security Network. The conference participants also stated that the organizing committee of the conference should be given a mandate to help determine ways of enabling and expediting it (Koç et al., 2008). As a result, the Canadian Food Security Network was launched, and an electronic mailing list was created in an effort to notify Canadians who were concerned about food issues, food security, and food sustainability (Koç et al., 2008). This electronic mailing list from the Canadian Food Security Network was the early iteration of what would later be known as the FSC coalition.

Due to security concerns following the events in the United States on September 11th, 2001, the WFS-FYL was held in June 2002. The Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Dr. Jacques Diouf, stated that the purpose of the Summit was to give fresh stimulus to global energies working on behalf of hungry people, as well as to increase both the financial resources and political will of policy actors to fight hunger (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2001). While the yearly target for reducing the number of malnourished people in the world was 22 million, as established by the 1996 World Food Summit, the current data revealed that the decline in the malnutrition rate was only six million per year (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2001).

In addition to hosting international delegates from 179 countries across the globe, the WFS-FYL offered a forum for both non-profit and civil society organizations, including, but not limited to, government officials, farming, forestry, and fishing communities, young people, and Indigenous groups. The events that facilitated these discussions included topics ranging from the role of the FAO in emergency situations to the role of women in feeding the world (WFS-FYL, 2002). And, for the first time, an independent event, the NGOs and Civil Society Organization (NGO/CSO) Forum for Food Sovereignty, was held parallel to the WFS-FYL. The NGO/CSO Forum hosted 1, 600 people from over 700 organizations in 92 countries, including, but not limited to, foresters, farmers, and fisher folk from the developing world. Despite this, civil society and non-profit participants of the NGO/CSO Forum articulated their displeasure regarding the unfulfilled target to reduce malnutrition by 22 million people (WFS-FYL, 2002). These participants also expressed concern regarding the increasing commodification and privatization of communal and public land, water, fishing grounds, and forests. The non-profit and civil society participants of the NGO/CSO Forum made several policy demands at the WFS-FYL, calling for an international convention on food sovereignty and for establishing the right to food, as well as access to water and land, forests and fisheries; they also called for the protection of local seed and a suspension on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (WFS-FYL, 2002). However, many civil society and non-profit participants from the NGO/CSO Forum believed that these policy demands were, by and large, dismissed by the member states of the WFS-FYL.

2.9 Conclusion

The key events described above – the food crisis of the 1970s and the response of the 1974 World Food Conference and the People's Food Commission, the institutionalization of food banks in the 1980s, the community based food security initiatives of the 1990s, civil society's

involvement in the World Food Summits of 1996 and 2002, and Canada's Action Plan on Food Security of 1998 – showcase the ever present mobilization of civil society in the emerging food movement, and in policy making processes as they relate to food policy on municipal, provincial, federal, and international levels. Despite the obstacles outlined above, non-profit sector policy actors have organized for food system reform since the 1970s, on local, national, and international levels, and they continue to fight for space within the policy making process in Canada. As it relates to food policy reform on a global scale, the two opposing frameworks are food security and food sovereignty. Food security is defended by international agencies such as the FAO of the United Nations, while food sovereignty emerged in 1996 at the World Food Summit through La Via Campesina. The following chapter will outline these two competing frameworks.

Chapter 3: Competing Frameworks

3.1 Introduction

While there are various food policy frameworks in the food policy field, food security and food sovereignty have been two of the most widely influential frameworks adopted by civil society organizations in Canada. Examining these two frameworks is vital because they have been enabling policy recommendations regarding crises in the food system from very different perspectives. Each has been pivotal in informing the Policy Framework of many non-profit organizations, including the FSC. This chapter outlines these two alternative food policy frameworks, their distinct ways of identifying problems within the food system, solutions they offer, and their key principles. The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the reader to understand the shift within the FSC coalition from an emphasis on the food security framework to the food sovereignty framework.

3.2 Food security: Problem and solution perspective

The concept of food security emerged in the 1970s during the capital accumulation crisis. The emergence of the food security framework brought forward a critical perspective around the conditions of production, distribution, and consumption of food, the effects of neoliberalism and globalization on the livelihoods of people, and the functions that frameworks and ideology play in legitimizing or reinforcing such conditions (Koç, 2013). This is because, as Koç (2013) states, food security as a framework "refers to ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that define conditions of food provisioning in modern society" (p. 247). Scholars such as Jarosz (2009, 2011) suggest that even though food security emerged as an affirmation of the human right to food, in later years, it has more so reflected a neo-liberal vision, in that a shift happened

from an emphasis on national to household food security, and from welfare provision to a focus on the non-profit sector to provide food security.

The food security framework has evolved over time. It is a rather ambiguous concept with multiple indicators. For example, Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith (1992) have noted that there are some 200 different definitions of food security. What is meant by food security, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2013), is "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (para. 7). The Centre for Studies in Food Security at Ryerson University identified five key elements of food security, including:

> (1) availability: sufficient food for all people at all times; (2) accessibility: physical and economic access to food for all people at all times; (3) Adequacy: Access to food that is nutritious and safe, and produced in environmentally sustainable ways; (4) Acceptability: Access to culturally acceptable food, which is produced and obtained in ways that do not compromise people's dignity, self-respect or human rights; (5) Agency: The policies and processes that enable the achievement of food security (Ryerson University, 2014).

The World Health Organization, which is the major constituency for the food security movement, offered a new definition of the concept which includes four pillars to achieving food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability (FAO, 2013). While there are various definitions of food security, the food security framework identifies issues of availability and accessibility as the matters to address when it comes to food provisioning (Koç, 2013). The following sections explore the concepts and pillars of food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability as determinants of food security.

3.2.1 Availability

The availability of food has to do with the supply system of food, and this can be understood in terms of the production, distribution, and exchange of food (Sansoucy, 1995). These three features of the food supply system will be outlined below. First, adequate food production involves ensuring that appropriate amounts of quality food from either local agriculture or imported production are available (Bajagai, 2016). There are several factors that affect production, including, but not limited to, livestock production, harvesting, land ownership, climate change, soil management and farming strategies (Bajagai, 2016). The FAO asserts that the relative success of the agricultural economies of developing countries has much to do with their livestock production (Sansoucy, 1995). Livestock production goes well beyond direct food production, and includes capital accumulation of commodities with versatile uses, such as fuel, fertilizer, and fibre (Sansoucy, 1995). Also, livestock are very much connected to the cultural and social lives of farmers, especially in developing countries, as these farmers may lack supplies and resources in areas where owning livestock can provide some degree of economic stability (FAO, 1997c). Concerning harvesting, the FAO (1997c) has declared that, in relation to production and distribution, an efficient harvest and marketing chain will consider consumer needs and guarantee that the price of transfer from producer to consumer will be held to a minimum. On the subject of land ownership, the FAO (2011) stated that good land and water management has meant that demands for food and fibre have been rapidly met as needed. However, the rise in commodity price levels and increased large-scale land acquisition by large multinational corporations have compromised the availability of land and water, making it difficult to meet global demands for food and agricultural production (FAO, 1997c). Rocha and Liberato's (2013) case study of the Cinta-Vermelha-Jundiba village in Brazil demonstrates the

importance of Indigenous communities owning land as land ownership can assist Indigenous communities to preserve their identity and achieve food security. At the same time, climate change has negatively impacted farmers insofar as harvests are now unpredictable, due to shifts in rainfall patterns. In relation to soil management, the FAO (2015) stated that the availability of food depends on soil, as quality food can only be produced where soil is healthy. Furthermore, the FAO (2015) proposed that soil has been under a great degree of pressure as a result of the increased use of agricultural technology to produce more food over the past 50 years. Intensive crop production has exhausted the soil, endangering its productivity and capacity, with the result being that the ability to meet the needs of forthcoming generations is at stake (FAO, 2015). The final factor in terms of production is that farmers utilize strategies that have a seasonal rationale, including mixed copping, serial cropping, and varietal selection (FAO, 2015). The intercropping techniques used by farmers for planting and determining crop spacing allows them to produce a unremitting movement of food (FAO, 1997c).

Second, the FAO (2016) indicated that distribution is a key component of food availability, as, once produced, food products need to be prepared, collected, parcelled, stowed, and relocated to urban markets. It is vital that, in rural markets, handling and storage facilities are well informed of techniques that will assist them in averting the contamination of food as well as food spoilage (FAO, 2016). With respect to transportation, which is key to distribution capabilities, public infrastructure or the lack thereof can increase the price of moving food across national borders and global food markets (FAO, 1997b).

Third, food marketing and exchange is the final key component of food supply and availability (FAO, 2016). The FAO (2016) pointed to cost-effective marketing as an important factor, as it reduces the cost of harvest losses and reduces health risks by making food accessible

financially. Furthermore, the FAO (2016) recognized the role of changing wholesale markets, which adapt their retail chains to fit with urban growth and the capacity of consumers to purchase food. The FAO (2016) also recognized that the informal commercial sector plays a significant role in making food obtainable to individuals in low income and urban communities.

As noted by Koç (2013), the World Food Conference of 1974 reflected a more traditional concern with food supply, expansion of consumption, and international trade. This traditional concern frames availability as ensuring that there consistently exists an acceptable level of global food provisions, including rudimentary crops, produce, harvests, and food products, to withstand solid growth in food consumption and to counterbalance variations in production and prices (United Nations, 1974). More specifically, the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, adopted on November 6, 1974, stated that food security ensures continuous availability and sensible costs for food, notwithstanding periods of weather instability, and is unrestricted by partisan and financial pressures (FAO, 1974). In addition to ensuring the availability of food, food security requires that food also be accessible.

3.2.2 Accessibility

Food access refers to a household's financial and physical capacity to retrieve food (Nothwehr, 2012). The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that the causes of malnutrition and hunger have everything to do with the inability of households to access food, usually due to poverty – not the scarcity of food (FAO, 2013). There are two distinct types of access to food, one of which can be understood as *direct access* and the other as *economic access* (FAO, 2013). In regard to *direct access*, location is often a determining factor when it comes to directly accessing food. Direct access depends on whether a household can produce food using material resources (FAO, 2013). Direct access also refers to physical access

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to food, and the FAO has identified several indicators of physical access, including "paved roads (% of total road), logistics performance index, and railways and roads passengers carried (million passenger-km)," which are thought of "as a proxy for physical access as they measure the mobility and the quality of the logistics/infrastructure in the country" (Napoli, 2011, p. 27). Additionally, an indicator of physical access to food is the impact of natural disasters on household's and communities insofar as people affected by natural disasters and floods face barriers in physically accessing food that they have produced (Napoli, 2011).

Concerning *economic access*, demographics including levels of education, income, and gender may affect what types of food households purchase (Ecker & Breisinger, 2012). Poverty, on the other hand, limits access to food in a different way, and can increase how vulnerable an individual or household is to changing food prices (Garrett & Ruel, 1999). Those households with enough resources can maintain their access to food and overcome changes due to unstable harvests and local food shortages (Ecker & Breisinger, 2012). Interventions addressing food insecurity are highly focused on education, income, and gender (Leslie, 2014), which are discussed next.

First, the FAO (1994) stated that economic access to food is often determined by education. Research confirms these findings in the United States as well as in Canada. Using the 1999 California Women's Health Survey, a study of the patterns of food insecurity for 8,169 women in California found that almost one fifth of the women (18.8%) had an income below the poverty line, and 41.3% had at least a high school education (Adams, Grummer-Strawn, & Chavez, 2003). The evidence suggests that a low level of education (less than high-school) is associated with reduced food security (Gordon, Bullen, & Ni Mhurchu, 2009). For example, Kaiser et al. (2007) found that having less than 12 years of education doubled the risk of food

insecurity for women. Horowitz et al. (2004) confirm that households with inadequate monetary funds *and* poor knowledge concerning nutritionally suitable foods might encounter difficulty in sustaining a healthy diet. Kirkpatrick and Tarasuk (2010) confirmed these findings in their study, where higher odds of food insecurity were apparent among households in which respondents had less than a high school education. Burlandy, Rocha, Maluf, Avila, Ferreira and Pereira (2016) examined educational practices, such as online distance learning courses as a way to build food food and nutrition skills in Brazil, Canada and Angola. Second, the FAO (2013) stated that income is an indicator of economic access to food security. One particular result of high income-related inequality in terms of achieving food security is the increasing gap between the rich and the poor. As Kirkpatrick and Tarasuk (2010) found,

> lower odds of household food insecurity were observed with increasing income and among families in which the household head and/or his/her partner were a recent immigrant to Canada, while families whose main source of income was welfare had higher odds of food insecurity (p. 1141).

In addition, The United States Department of Agriculture states that access to food is considered to be met when food is attained in socially accepted ways, outside the use of coping strategies like scavenging, stealing, or using emergency sources (Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016).

Third, the FAO (2013) stated that gender is an indicator of economic access to food security. A 1990 UN report is consistent with a number of reports by women's groups in Canada that speak of the systemic denial of women's political and economic rights resulting from government actions (National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 1990). A direct result can be seen in the numbers where the highest incidence of child poverty in 2009 was among female-headed single-parent families in Canada, at 37.2%, or 338,000 families out of the total of

908, 602 families living in single-mother families were poor (Hunter, 2006). In addition, women not only endure the burden of poverty more than men, they also make up the bulk of caregivers for children and seniors, and they are *most likely* to assume responsibility for taking care of the nutritional needs of the household on a daily basis (Phillips, 2009, p. 495); yet, women are also least likely to participate in the policy making decisions that often control the very food system they need to access (Van Esterik, 1999). Ferreira Jacques de Moraes and Rocha (2013) confirm this finding as in developing countries women are rarely represented in bodies that decide on water management, yet they are often responsible for managing water at the household level. Ferreira Jacques de Moraes and Rocha's (2013) case study on the Program "One Million Cisterns" in the Brazilian Semi-Arid region demonstrates empowerment developed in in women as they became cistern builders and members of local water commissions. As such, it is a reasonable expectation that women's food experiences should inform the macro food security systems usually dominated by men (Aguirre, 2000; McIntyre, Conner, & Warren, 2000). Thus, as looking at economic access must also address macro food security systems, such a focus pays particular attention to how education, income, and gender shape the experiences of household and communities. However, food security not only requires access to food. The food that is being accessed must also meet the conditions of utilization.

3.2.3 Utilization

Utilization refers to both the quantity and quality of food secured by a household, in that it must be both safe and able to meet the physical needs of each household member (Canada's Action Plan for Food Security, 1998). This section will explore utilization in terms of food safety and healthcare. First, food safety refers to the ways in which food is prepared, processed, and cooked (Canada's Action Plan for Food Security, 1998). The FAO (2016) stated that "consumers

have the right to expect that the food available on domestic markets is safe and of the expected quality" (para. 1). The FAO (2016) collaborates with governments and industry partners in order to ensure that all standards related to the quality of food in domestic markets are met. The goal of the FAO and, more specifically, the Food Safety and Quality Programme (2016) is to, "improve systems of food safety and quality management, based on scientific principles, that lead to reduced foodborne illness and support fair and transparent trade thereby contributing to economic development, improved livelihoods and food security" (para. 2).

Second, an important factor in food utilization has to do with access to healthcare to prevent and treat nutritional deficiencies as well as maintain a healthy metabolism (Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016). In Canada, Tarasuk et al. (2015) stated that as the severity of household food insecurity rises, so do total healthcare costs, which include prescription drugs, surgeries, physician services, hospital emergency visits, and inpatient hospital care, as well as same-day surgeries. In particular, Tarasuk et al. (2015) identified that, for working-age adults, a vigorous forecaster of healthcare utilization, separate from further social determinants of health, is household food insecurity. Burchi, Fanzo, and Frison (2011) examine the "nutrition subsystem," which is comprised of various nutritional factors such as fibre, macronutrients, and micronutrients. Burchi et al. (2011) asserted that the overall state of an individual's health greatly impacts their nutritional health in terms of their ability to properly digest food, which affects their body's ability to absorb and utilize nutrients. While looking at access to food takes into account the value of physical and economic access, the concept of utilization recognizes that one's ability to locate and access food is not sufficient to achieve food security (Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016). Instead, the utilization concept recognizes that an individual's

physical state must be one that is able to resourcefully utilize the intake of food and its

macronutrients and micronutrients for optimum health and well-being; thus, utilization

necessitates an acceptable nourishment regime (Burchi et al., 2011). While food security refers to

the fact that food must be safe and nutritionally sufficient for individuals, stability is also a factor

in achieving food security.

3.2.4 Stability

Stability refers to a household's ability to secure food for an extended period of time

(FAO, 2013). The concept of stability as it relates to food security is explored in terms of it being

transitory, seasonal, or chronic, and each of these types of duration is explored next. First,

securing food can be *transitory*, in that food may be available for a select and specific period of

time. The FAO (2008a) deemed that transitory food insecurity is short-range and impermanent,

and it occurs when there happens to be an unexpected decline in the capacity to produce (e.g.,

crop, harvest, and yield), or a decline in access to sufficient food to uphold a satisfactory

nutritional status. Transitory food insecurity results from temporary and interim instabilities in

the accessibility and availability of food, such as through year-to-year disparities in the

production of local and domestic food, food costs, and family earnings (FAO, 2008a). It is

important to note that transitory food crises are often fairly erratic and can occur unexpectedly.

As a result, planning and programming become increasingly difficult and such planning

necessitates specific forms of intervention, for example the capacity for primary warning notices

(FAO, 2008a). Food may be unavailable beginning at the food production stage and this is often

seen as a result of drought or natural disasters, which may result in the failure of crops. However,

the FAO (1997a) readily stated that transitory food security cannot just be understood as limited

to the impact of natural disasters, such as the South Africa drought crises of 1991 and 1992.

Instead, as the World Bank (1986) cited, the major contributors to transitory food insecurity are,

> year-to-year variations in international food prices, foreign exchange earnings, domestic food production and household incomes. These are often related. Temporary sharp reductions in a population's ability to produce or purchase food and other essentials undermine long term development and cause loss of human capital from which it takes years to recover (p. 42).

Since that report, the FAO (1997a) suggested that transitory food insecurity has possible links with trade liberalization insofar as, after a food crisis, liberalization increases the risk of shock to trade regimes and impacts the most vulnerable populations within the crisis area. The FAO (1997a) referenced the period of the 1990s as a time of great instability for international grain markets. With respect to national governments, the liberalization of agriculture could also result in the intensified unpredictability of food production and prices. For example,

> Maize yields, maize production and other agricultural products appear to have been more volatile since around 1988/89 when there have been considerable changes in agricultural institutions. Simple Chow tests show that in some countries, notably Malawi and Zambia, agricultural performance was significantly more variable in the 1990s than previously. (FAO, 1997a, para. 33).

Certainly, market instability and, in particular, wavering food price indexes as a result of trade liberalization, can cause transitory shortages of food (Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016). Rocha (2007) examined the economic theory of market failure and concepts such as externalities and public goods and she prompts governments to develop market-based policies that improve food security.

Second, food security can be impacted by *seasonal changes* related to changing patterns in growing food. As such, the FAO (1997a) recognized seasonal food security as a dimension of food security and states that it lies between transitory food insecurity and chronic food insecurity

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(Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016). Seasonal food insecurity has similarities to transitory food insecurity insofar as it is unpredictable and usually follows an arrangement of recognized events; however, it occurs during a restricted time period, and can also be persistent, like many of the aspects of chronic food insecurity.

   Chronic food insecurity is understood as a persistent lack of food and is not temporary but long term in nature (Alderman, 1986). According to the FAO (2008a), chronic food insecurity is longstanding, continuous problem that occurs when households are incapable of meeting minimal food supply needs over a period of time. Households are often and consistently unable to secure food to meet the needs of all their members (Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016). Chronic food insecurity can result from lengthy phases of poverty, scarcity, and shortage, as well as the absence of assets and insufficient access to productive or financial resources (FAO, 2008b). It can be overcome by taking long term and expansive actions to address issues related to poverty, such as gaining access to productive resources, such as education. To overcome chronic food insecurity, there is a need for greater immediate access to food, which then enables households to increase their productive ability (FAO, 2008a).

   Finally, it should be noted that these aspects of stability in achieving food security are interconnected. For example, the continual experience of transitory food security can create more vulnerability for households, putting them at greater risk for developing chronic food insecurity (Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2016). While the FAO understands that, for food security to be reached, specific conditions must be met by way of availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability of food, food sovereignty offers an alternative framework for viewing food system issues and possible solutions.

3.3 Food sovereignty: Concept and principles

The concept of food sovereignty emerged in 1996 from La Via Campesina at their Second International Conference in Tlaxcala, Mexico. Later that same year, La Via Campesina introduced the food sovereignty framework to the World Food Summit. Menser (2014) suggested that the framework emerged mostly due to the insufficiency of the food security framework to preserve and protect the welfare of peasants, small-scale farmers, and rural communities, predominantly in Latin America. Andree et al. (2014) elaborated further, stating that the framework of food sovereignty was created by La Via Campesina to democratize the food system by opposing the neoliberal framework of monocultures and agribusinesses, while appealing for other options to tackle the agrarian crisis and advocate for the necessities of small-scale food producers – all of which the food security framework does not call for. According to La Via Campesina, the food sovereignty framework includes, "the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems" (Nyéléni, 2007, para. 4). Trauger (2015) identified the 1990s and 2000s as the period in which nation-wide mobilization around the framework of food sovereignty occurred, whereby NGOs took up the framework; this was done through their embracing of it and advocating from the standpoint of food consumers, along with having a dynamic desire to join the food production systems of local and regional levels. Martin and Andree (2014) suggested that the adoption of the food sovereignty framework by NGOs has meant a focus on ensuring that access to healthy food is equitable in nature, which ultimately signifies a growing authority, facility, and legitimacy in terms of the control of food. La Via Campesina focuses on food for people, values food providers, localizes food systems, places control of food system on local levels, builds knowledge and skills, and works with

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nature's capacity to supply food (Altieri & Manuel Toledo, 2011). The following section outlines the six pillars of the food sovereignty framework as identified in the 2007 Forum for Food Sovereignty in Sélingué, Mali. These pillars have also been adopted by the FSC coalition, along with a seventh pillar, "food as sacred."

3.3.1 Focusing on food for people

The food sovereignty framework stresses the "right to sufficient, healthy and culturally appropriate food for all individuals, peoples and communities, including those who are hungry or living under occupation, in conflict zones and marginalized" (Nyéléni, 2007, para. 4). The framework rejects the proposal that food is just another commodity for international agribusiness (Nyéléni, 2007). This section will explore the impact of industrialization and the food sovereignty framework's emphasis on people, including small-scale farmers. The industrialization of agriculture has led to the merging of agricultural land and material goods in the hands of large commercial companies, agribusinesses, and large landowners (Windfuhr & Jonsen, 2005). Many countries are effectively removing and shutting out small-scale farmers from productive land and forcing them onto unproductive land, while the most fertile and extensive areas of land are controlled by large companies. Such large companies contribute to environmental threats from global agricultural production through the extensive use of water, the loss of soil through erosion and salinization, the loss of agricultural biodiversity through the simplification of production and the destruction of agroecosystems, intensive animal production, and over-fishing (Krebs, 1992). All of the above factors have allowed for an open world market to remain, as well as established low prices for all major commodities, which creates pressure to produce as cheaply as possible (Raeburn, 1995).

The impact has been an increase in poverty and reduced resources for small-scale

farmers; in some cases, small-scale farmers end up having to succumb to using unsustainable agricultural methods. However, small-scale farmers constitute little threat to the environment and have instead been the main custodians of the environment for millennia (Smith, 1992). In fact, it has been the diligence and knowledge of Indigenous peoples that have created the diversity of sustainable practices around water, soil, land, and forest use, and provided additional supplies such as seeds and livestock breeds (Windfuhr & Jonsen, 2005). The food sovereignty framework critiques the industrialization of agriculture for producing greater environmental threats, and instead points to the value of small-scale farmers in promoting agricultural methods that are sustainable. The framework also values food providers within the food system.

3.3.2 Valuing food providers

The food sovereignty framework values the efforts of those who provide food, and more specifically, those who "cultivate, grow, harvest and process food," including, but not limited to, women and men, small-scale family farmers, fishers, migrants forest dwellers, Indigenous peoples, pastoralists, and Indigenous peoples (Nyéléni, 2007, p. 39). Many families and communities are malnourished and these include those who are landless and rural labourers (Ayres & Bosia, 2014; Menser, 2014). The food sovereignty framework recognizes these issues related to malnourishment, particularly their limited access to productive resources as well as land and water (Zerbe, 2014). The framework keeps these individuals in mind and advocates for policies, actions, and programs that support their livelihoods. The food sovereignty framework and related policy recommendations include effective labour regulations, as well as employment guarantee schemes in an effort to support rural employment (Ayres & Bosia, 2014; McMahon, 2014). The food sovereignty framework does not only recognize those who grow, harvest, and process food, but also calls for the food system in which they live and work to be localized.

3.3.3 Localizing food systems

The food sovereignty framework advocates for the cooperation of both local food providers and consumers in gaining local control of the food system, and assumes that in order to do so, both parties ought to be at the centre of decision-making (Nyéléni, 2007); however, local small-scale farmers face the challenge of "cheap exports." In other words, establishing local control of the food system by local small-scale farmers is often an uphill battle. A central issue for small-scale farmers involves "cheap exports," which includes the fact that often-imported agricultural products are sold at prices significantly below the cost of production. This is mainly due to the fact that countries that export products are often given government subsidies, including food aid and marketing boards (Wise, 2010). For example, in 2000, approximately US$245 billion was spent on subsidies by industrial countries to subsidize their agriculture (FAO, 2002). On a related note, excess subsidies also create the trend of depressed prices, as subsidies paid by industrialized countries create structural over production, which then needs to be exported or destroyed (Wise, 2010). Of course, over production places industrialized countries at a loss in terms of profit and so the incentive for increased export becomes clear. Over time, long-term subsidies for large farms controlled by transnational companies in industrialized countries leads to an acquired competitive advantage over small-scale farmers (Wise, 2010).

La Via Campesina has appropriately labelled the problem of "cheap exports" as "dumping," as products are being sold at less than their cost in the countries of *both* their origin and destination (Massicotte, 2014). The issue of "dumping" is of central concern to supporters of the food sovereignty framework, and such supporters demand that the end of dumping goes further than the simple elimination of export or other subsides paid to agricultural industries in the global North (Wise, 2010). Rather, at the national level, the food sovereignty framework calls

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for increased measures to protect local producers against unfair competition, the removal of unjust subsides at the international level, and national policies that foster the supply and management of food (Andree et al., 2014). The food sovereignty framework not only aims to localize control of the food system, but advocates that those who produce food at the local level should be at the forefront of making decisions that affect their land and territory.

3.3.4 Making decisions locally

The food sovereignty framework advocates that community control be not just over land and territory, but also that seeds, water, livestock, and fish populations be given to those who produce and provide food (Nyéléni, 2007). With this in mind, the framework proposes that local territories have geopolitical borders and suggests that communities ought to be able to inhibit and use their territories (Nyéléni, 2007). The food sovereignty framework thus seeks control over and access to territory, land, grazing, water, seeds, livestock, and fish populations for local food providers (Knezevic, 2014). These resources ought to be used and shared in socially and environmentally sustainable ways that conserve diversity (Wright, 2014). The framework recognizes that local territories often cross geopolitical borders and advocates for the right of local communities to inhabit and use their territories; it promotes positive interaction between food providers in different regions and territories and from different sectors, in order to resolve internal conflicts or conflicts with local and national authorities (McMichael, 2014). The food sovereignty framework also rejects the privatization of natural resources through laws, commercial contracts, and intellectual property rights regimes (McMichael, 2014). Instead, the framework endorses the concept of localism, and more specifically, the idea of microresistance as well as community ownership of food systems.

First, "localism" presents itself as a challenge to neoliberalism and the commodification of food, as it acts from a position of microresistance in promoting several oppositional activities that can be taken up in everyday life (Mittelman, 2004). Such practices linked to the localism movement have presented a significant challenge to neoliberal globalization. Smith (2005) and Mittelman (2004) claim that such microresistance strategies can reinforce democratic practices. Efforts to relocalize food systems act in such a way that resists the movement toward a globalized food regime. At the same time, Andree et al. (2014) speak to the seemingly contradictory relationship that localism has with neoliberalism, as it also promotes entrepreneurialism and is market-oriented. For example, the Italian Slow Food movement, founded by Carlo Petrini in 1986, which emphasizes local food production, still promotes a kind of technique and expertise that serve to promote a system of production and social reproduction (Miele & Murdoch, 2002). Mittelman (2004) refers to the tactics and ideas of localism as "microencounters" or "microresistence," and defines microresistance as a myriad of various beliefs and actions that push forward torrents of uncertainty and hesitation, and call into question the practicability and justifiability of neoliberal globalization. In a tangible sense, when food activists and rural workers emphasize local markets and locally grown foods over food that has been shipped thousands of miles, they are participating in acts of resistance.

Second, the domain of the food sovereignty framework includes particular guidelines such as putting ownership of food systems *back* into the hands of communities (Smyth, 2014). Localism advocates that control is brought back into the community through a long-term process that is sustainable, providing communities the opportunity to produce their own local produce while escaping the confines of international markets (Attalla, 2012). A beekeeping project of a non-profit organization in Oaxaca, Mexico, called CAMPO, is just such an example of localism

in action, as it is a project that not only has a goal of producing honey, but also supports coffee production and local community vegetable gardens (Fitting, 2006). It contributes to the region's biodiversity by using an endangered bee species to produce a rare type of organic honey that can be later produced as a natural antibiotic and medicinal remedy (Attalla, 2012). The hives are specifically placed in the region's forests, which contain various wildflowers; this location is beneficial for the local environment and is a key factor in the sustainable and organic production of honey (Fitting, 2006). Finally, when the honey is produced, the community then sells the honey in local markets as an additional source of income (Attalla, 2012). CAMPO's bee project reveals the multiple benefits communities receive when they are trained to manage projects independently and on a long-term basis (Attalla, 2012). The food sovereignty framework aims to ensure that the community itself is in control of its own food system (Zerbe, 2014). The framework also involves a community sustaining itself following the removal of external assistance (Wright, 2014).

Localism, as a spatial feature of the food sovereignty framework, still confronts a globalized market in the sense that it is at the level of local micro-climates where globalization is in fact recognized and resisted (Martin & Andree, 2014). The focus on micro-climates is where re-localization of production and distribution creates a strengthening of rural communities and re-establishes a sense of independence and autonomy (Ayres & Bosia, 2014). In this way, localism acts upon the principles of the food sovereignty framework and in particular, emphasizes sustainability and self-reliance on the local level. In addition to promoting local decision making, the food sovereignty framework also aims to build on the knowledge and skills of agroecological agriculture best associated with small-scale farming practices.

3.3.5 Building knowledge and skills

The food sovereignty framework recognizes the limits of technology-based solutions for changing the food system and advocates for agroecological agriculture (Andree, 2014). This section will discuss the limitations of technology-based solutions, as well as explore the advantages of agroecological agriculture as promoted by the food sovereignty framework.

First, in examining the limitations of technology-based solutions, it is important to recognize that the benchmark answers to fighting hunger and malnutrition throughout the globe are most often relegated toward increasing productivity and yield per hectare through the use of modern plant varieties, as well as by way of using the latest technologies (Windfuhr & Jonsen, 2005). These benchmarks are usually set by large transnational corporations, and more specifically, seed companies and their researchers, in order to justify additional work on industrial production systems (Anderson, Gundel, & Pound, 2001). While improving such conventional agro-industrial methods (e.g., maximizing productivity on an area of land), as endorsed by large transnational companies, may not be a negative pursuit in and of itself, the food sovereignty framework states that marginalized and disenfranchised communities are most in need of attention (Anderson, Gundel, & Pound, 2001). Furthermore, there are several negative environmental consequences of conventional agro-industrial systems, including the fact that the increased intensification practices are leading to increased water shortages (Anderson, Gundel, & Pound, 2001). In addition, intensive industrial production is also leading to increased environmental problems like salinization, which refers to the accumulation of salts in soil that eventually creates levels that are toxic to plants (Windfuhr & Jonsen, 2005).

Second, on the subject of solutions to the limits of technology-based solutions, as proposed by the food sovereignty framework, Jules Petty (2001) claimed that not only is small-

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scale farming agroecological agriculture, but that the traditional knowledge of millions of small-scale farmers can provide the solution to restoring water reserves leading to improved cropping intensity. Estimating their number at 1.4 billion, Altieri (2002) noted that these small-scale farmers on resource-poor farms across developing nations find themselves living in marginal, high-risk environments, and yet remain unaffected by advanced agricultural technology. Petty (2001) also stated that long-term solutions for achieving higher yields through sustainable means must in fact be agroecological. Miguel Altieri (2002) further reaffirmed this, proposing that agroecological resources can increase the productivity of poor soils. Altieri (2002) also claimed that new systems specific for varied farming environments must be invented and tailored using pioneering approaches from natural resource management. Agroecology offers a new system that uses scientific rationale to deal with production in a biodiverse agroecosystem (Altieri, 2002). While the food sovereignty framework rejects technologies, such as genetic engineering, that undermine, threaten, or contaminate natural resources (Andree, 2014), it suggests that agroecosystems and agroecological research need to support natural resources management that contends with the needs and interests of small-scale farmers (Altieri, 2002). The food sovereignty framework recommends agroecological agriculture most associated with small-scale agriculture, but it also fosters the food system working with nature.

3.3.6 Working with nature

The framework of food sovereignty promotes resiliency in the food system by boosting the contributions of ecosystems (Martin, 2014; Menser, 2014). More specifically, the food sovereignty framework attempts to bolster the contributions of nature and ensures this is done through low external input agroecological production. An example of low external input agroecological production is often carried out in the crop sector, and includes the use of ruminant

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farm animals (e.g., sheep and goats) "to clear old stalk residues of harvested crops" (Ibeawuchi, Obiefuna, & Iwuanyanwu, 2015, p. 110). Low external input agroecological production is considered by the food sovereignty framework as a harvesting method that makes the most of "the supplies given by ecosystems" (Nyéléni, 2007, para. 6). The objective, and motto, of the food sovereignty framework is to "heal the planet so that the planet may heal us," and this involves rejecting practices that might be harmful to ecosystems, such as those which depend on livestock factories, destructive fishing practices, and other manufacturing and commercial production methods that harm the environment (Nyéléni, 2007).

Furthermore, there are extreme environmental and climate-related problems facing the rural world today, which are contributed to by agricultural production. These issues will continue to impact agricultural practices. For example, the FAO (2008b) reported that, should temperatures drop by 3 degrees, cultivated crops including, but not limited to, maize may fall in number by up to 40 in countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, among others. McMichael (2009) confirmed that world-wide agricultural production is accountable for between a quarter and a third of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For example, food production and more specifically, agricultural practices are accountable for GHG emissions from the use of fertilizer and pesticide use as well as from fuel and oil for trucking and shipping equipment. Given these impacts on the environment, the principles of the food sovereignty framework not only recognize the sacredness of food, but also works with nature to advance sustainability in agricultural production (Andree, 2014).

3.3.7 Food as Sacred

During the People's Food Policy Project (PFPP, 2011) a new pillar of food sovereignty emerged from the Indigenous Circle. This new pillar came to be known as the seventh pillar of

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food sovereignty which emphasizes that "food is sacred" (FSC, 2015). This seventh pillar

recognizes food as part of a "web of relationships with the natural world that define culture and

community" (Kneen, 2011, p. 92). The concept of Indigenous food sovereignty is not "purely

traditional" in the sense that it only endorses pre-colonial ways of knowing (Grey & Patel, 2015).

Instead, it takes two fundamental values of the Indigenous worldview, non-ownership of land

and the "non-destructive use of natural resources," and claims that these are irrefutable (Perry,

2013, p. 3). Perry (2013) affirms that so long as these values are in place, untraditional sources of

food production can be implemented. The implementation of Indigenous food sovereignty, which

encompasses both values of non-ownership of land and non-destructive uses of natural resources,

is grounded upon three propositions:

> First, the non-existence of property ownership that allows alienation of land by
> individuals. Second, the proscription of various western modes of land usage that
> are deemed environmentally destructive. Third, the ability of Indigenous
> communities (as groups) to make decisions regarding the adoption of modern
> technologies and values, within the limits set by the previous two propositions
> (Perry, 2013, p. 3).

Due to its socio-ecological context, the food system is complex as it involves various sources of

knowledge and values including, Indigenous ways of knowing (Power, 2008; Valley et al., 2017).

Indeed, the Indigenous food sovereignty perspective is "crucial for the long-term sustainability"

of "fragile and threatened ecosystems" (Wiebe & Wipf, 2011, p. 8). Wittman et al., (2017) argues

not only that support for Indigenous food systems can be the basis for food security, but that such

systems can "have a protective function for the maintenance of regional agrobiodiversity" (p.

1291). The seventh pillar questions the commodification of food and the treatment of food as

simply a marketable item to be bought and sold (Hart, 2010; Hill, 2011; Kneen, 2011).

Furthermore, the seventh pillar, "food as sacred" challenges the commodification of food and the

food system by calling for the respect and support of food providers (Desmarais & Wittman, 2015). Wittman (2015) asserts that food sovereignty demands for "Indigenous peoples to exist as food providers and guardians of the global socio-ecological resource base" (p. 174). While the Indigenous food sovereignty perspective advances that there is no universal definition of food sovereignty, it is understood to be the most innovative method to addressing issues of food insecurity (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d.; Loppie Reading & Wein, 2009). Supporting Indigenous food sovereignty requires a heightened cross-cultural grasp of the ways in which Indigenous ways of knowing, principles and insights can inform global food system issues. Indigenous food sovereignty moves away from emphasis on "expert" knowledge and moves towards "knowledge production and processes respectful of the local and Indigenous" (Stock, Forney, & Wittman, 2014, p. 20). Martens et al., (2016) calls our attention to the fact that although Indigenous ways of knowing, as it relates to food production, has been a "living reality" for centuries, it has only recently appeared in the literature and cites the BC Food Systems Working Group on Indigenous Food Sovereignty. Martens et al., (2016) goes as far as to state that Indigenous food sovereignty "still represents an afterthought in the food-related literature" (p. 21). In an effort to appreciate the seventh pillar, it is important to uncover its underlying philosophy.

It is vitally important to recognize that the Indigenous food sovereignty perspective is rooted in an Indigenous eco-philosophy. Dawn Morrison (2006), chair of the Working Group on Indigenous Food Sovereignty (WGIFS) and member of the *Shuswap Nation* in British Columbia states that Indigenous eco-philosophy challenges the notion of human control over nature, claiming that humans can only manage their relationships to nature (Morrison, 2006). In 2010, the Indigenous Circle of the People's Policy Project produced the First Principles Protocol for

Building Cross-Cultural Relationships and in this protocol, proclaimed a resistance against the

structures which enforce human control on nature:

> The relationship between governments and Indigenous people is colonial in
> nature. Neocolonial structures and processes continue to assert "control with no
> soul" over Indigenous land and food systems. We refuse to allow the imposed
> neocolonial structures and processes to govern the way in which we live and
> work. This is the base from which we address what is called "Aboriginal title and
> rights" and "self-government" in section 35 (1) of the Canadian Constitution
> (Indigenous Circle, 2010).

The eco-philosophy of Indigenous food sovereignty calls for the global food system to include

Indigenous ways of knowing in policies and institutions (PFPP, 2011; Wittman, Desmarais &

Weibe, 2010). For example, permaculture brings the junction between sustainable agriculture and

traditional harvesting strategies together by using "perennial crops and patterns to create a

regenerative relationship between people and the earth" (Morrison, 2011, p. 105) Not only is it

vitally important to recognize the eco-philosophy behind the Indigenous food sovereignty

movement, it is just as vital to acknowledge its beginnings.

While the Canadian food movement was well underway, in March 2006, the Working

Group on Indigenous Food Sovereignty (WGIFS) was formed during British Columbia (B.C.)

Food System Network gatherings. It was created with the purpose of promoting an understanding

of the issues facing Indigenous peoples and the ways of responding to those needs. The aim of

the WGIFS is to:

> apply culturally appropriate protocols and ancient ways of knowing through a
> consensus based approach to critically analyzing issues, concerns and strategies as
> they relate to Indigenous food, land, culture, health, economics and stability
> (Morrison, 2011, p. 101).

Furthermore, the WGIFS is comprised of a variety of members with diverse voices such as

traditional harvesters (e.g., fishers, hunters, gatherers), Aboriginal community members,

researchers, non-profits as well as grassroots organizations (Morrison, 2011). Together these voices aim to promote cross-cultural participation in a way that is balanced. After the inception of the WGIFS, the Indigenous Food Systems Network (IFSN) was birthed.

The main function of the IFSN is to share pertinent information related to four key principles of Indigenous food sovereignty. This information is shared to a large list-serve with the aim to build capacity of the Indigenous food sovereignty movement (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d.). The working members of the WGIFS and in particular, the Elders, traditional harvesters and community members, established four main principles that guide Indigenous communities in achieving food sovereignty (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d.). Today, these four principles still frame the concept of food sovereignty in Indigenous communities and the Indigenous Food Systems Network. Also, these four key principles are the accumulation of thousands of years of traditional knowledge and practices (Mundel & Chapman, 2010). First, *sacred or divine sovereignty* is a principle that recognizes that food is "a gift from the creator" (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 3). Therefore, food cannot be thought of a commodity as defined by colonial laws, policies and institutions (LaDuke, 2005; 2008). Instead, there exists a responsibility to "nurture healthy, interdependent relationships with the land, plants and animals that provide us with our food" (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 3; Stroink & Nelson, 2009; Willows, 2005). Second, *participation* is a key element of Indigenous food sovereignty. The word itself is a verb and is precisely "based on action" (Alfred, 2005; Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 4). For Indigenous communities, continuing and sustaining cultural harvesting techniques is absolutely vital to both present and future generations (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 4; Salmón, 2012). Third, *self-determination* requires that Indigenous communities be able to make decisions freely by deciding

on what constitutes "healthy, culturally adapted Indigenous foods" but also "the amount and quality of food [they] hunt, fish, gather, grow and eat" (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 5; Rudolph & McLachlan, 2013; Simpson, 1999; Young 2004). This principle exposes the control that corporations wish to maintain on how food is produced, distributed and consumed and it resists such corporate control with the aim of breaking free from any sort of dependence to it (Daes, 1996; Hannum, 1996; Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d.). Fourthly, *legislation and policy* including but not limited to, laws, policies and mainstream economic activity, need to be joined-up to Indigenous ways of knowing related to food and culture (Council of Canadian Academics, 2014; Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 6). This fourth pillar offers a "restorative framework" by which comprehensive social policy reform can happen across a range of sectors such as "forestry, fisheries, rangeland, environmental conservation, health, agriculture, and rural and community development" (Indigenous Food Systems Network, n.d., para. 6; Boldt, 1993). Despite the strength that these pillars carry, the Indigenous food sovereignty movement has not been without its challenges.

The challenges of the Indigenous food movement have permeated both micro and macro levels (First Nations Information Governance Centre, 2012; Ledrou & Gervais, 2005; Tarasuk, Mitchell & Dachner, 2013). On a micro level, Indigenous peoples and communities are disproportionately impacted by food insecurity (Meyer, 2014; Rocha & Liberato, 2013; Thompson et al., 2011; 2012; Weiler et al., 2015). For example, Reading and Wien (2013) reported that between 1998 to 1999 alone, Indigenous people living off reserve were three times as likely to experience food insecurity than Non-Indigenous people. Friedmann (2011) points to initiatives such as the Toronto Urban Aboriginal Framework (UAF) in creating special programs such as the Peer Nutrition Program (PNP) for the Aboriginal community. This program addresses

food insecurity by way of "community gardens, bake ovens and community kitchens to fresh food markets" (Friedmann, 2011, p. 179). On a macro level, Morrison (2011) refers to the impact of the "neocolonialist agenda" that removes the value of Indigenous land and food systems and replaces it with values held by corporate stakeholders who are moving in on Indigenous land and food systems (p. 103). Morrison (2011) provides the example of a Japanese investor, in cooperation with Delta Hotels, who invested millions of dollars to develop a ski resort in "the most culturally and spiritually significant hunting, fishing and fathering area in the *Neskonlith Secwepemc* traditional territory" (p. 103). The Centre for Indigenous Peoples' Nutrition and Environment (CINE) at McGill University have put forward demands for agrarian reform that includes increased access to land "for the purposes of traditional hunting and gathering" and "training in agricultural methods" (Engler-Stringer, 2011, p. 142; Turner et al., 2009). In addition, as a result of large scale environmental contamination, the depletion of salmon is happening at alarming rates which is an important source of protein in marine ecosystems (Morrison, 2008). First Nations groups have criticized fish farming operations in British Columbia for failing to comply with the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Wittman & Barbolet, 2011). Chief Robert Joseph, heredity chief of the *Kwicksutaineuk Ah-kwa-mish* First Nation stated:

> The demise of wild salmon…reflects the demise of our culture, way of life and spirituality. Since the advent of salmon farming in our territories we have seen an apocalyptic decline in the state of our wild salmon stocks in the Broughton Archipelago. And because Norway is the world leader in salmon farming and the Norwegian Government is the leading shareholder in Cermaq we are asking for their moral leadership to bring about best practices and to mitigate environmental deregulation. (KAFN, 2009).

Overall, the widespread obliteration of Indigenous knowledge and values has been widespread in virtually every area from fields to forests and waterways (Cidro, et al., 2015; Grey & Patel, 2015;

LaDuke, 2005). Still, the Indigenous food sovereignty movement pushes ahead, focusing on

solutions and creating change from the bottom-up. Such change is predicated on the action of

both Indigenous and Non-Indigenous peoples as both are responsible for addressing

environmental injustices (Morrison, 2006).

3.4 A critical discussion of food security and food sovereignty

This chapter has provided a literature review to outline two of the key food Policy

Frameworks adopted by civil society organizations in Canada in recent decades. This review has

demonstrated that there are significant gaps between the food security and food sovereignty

frameworks, and this section will outline critiques of each framework.

Critics of the food security framework argue that there are several gaps within this

framework. First, the food security agenda is more of an administrative agenda (e.g., with an

emphasis on ensuring that conditions are met), rather than a social justice agenda (e.g., an

emphasis on transforming the food system) (McMahon, 2014). Second, food security often

involves the distribution of food, however it does not necessarily involve the redistribution of

income or political participation for citizens (Fraser, 2005). Third, food security as a framework

promotes hunger alleviation, and this promotion is used to justify interventions that include

partnerships between large agri-industry corporations, international organizations, rich nations,

and private foundations (Kneen, 2010a; 2010b). Since the early 2000s, there have been

increasing efforts among Canadian civil society organizations to adopt the food sovereignty

framework. Patel (2010) goes as far as to state that the framework of food security dismisses

discussion and critique of the actual social control of the food system. Koç (2013) elaborated,

stating that food security does not deliver a critical inquiry on the ownership of the "means of

production, access to commons (such as land, water, seeds) and ignores the concentration of

decision-making process on conditions of food production and access to food in the hands of a few corporations" (p. 258). The food sovereignty framework focuses on issues beyond food distribution to include more radically democratic perspectives, such as people's symbolic, material, and ethical relationships with their world, as well as their right to control their own food systems, work toward local sustainability, take action toward gender equality, and take part in neoliberal resistance (Patel, 2010; Patel, Balakrishnan, & Narayan, 2007). Food sovereignty, a framework born from civic mobilization, thus comes to the forefront as a framework that underlines the right of nations and their people to define their own food production systems (e.g., production, distribution, and consumption) without having to depend on fluctuating international markets (Andree et al., 2014). It is therefore not possible to fully realize food sovereignty without controlling the main determinants of agricultural policies today, for example, rules regarding tariffs and domestic supports, which are decided upon within trade policies (especially through the World Trade Organization) (Andree et al., 2014). While critiques of the food security framework exist, critiques of food sovereignty have also been brought forward.

Critics of the sovereignty framework argue that it has several limitations. First, the concept of food sovereignty is not an everyday concept insofar as there is confusion about the concept of sovereignty. As well, Hospes (2014) readily stated that the epistemic community has failed to debate "how to reconcile conflicting values, discourses, and institutions" (p. 119) around food, and points to further missing generic questions, including: "who is considered the holder of food sovereignty? To what extent is food sovereignty territory-based? Is food sovereignty absolute or not?" (p. 122). Second, how food sovereignty is measured is not as evolved and sophisticated as how food security is measured. As Calix De Dios et al.'s (2014) study revealed, "food security indicators are relatively easier to measure, while food sovereignty

indicators present challenges in terms of defining progress" (p. 199). Third, there is a question of whether peasant agriculture, and specifically "practicing low (external)-input and labour-intensive farming, can feed current and projected world population" (Bernstein, 2014, p. 1057). Moreover, Jansen (2015) questioned the anti-agro-industrialization position of food sovereignty, asking: "should identifying smallholders really farm without external inputs (e.g.., no machinery, fertilizer, plastics to pack their produce, no fuels for machines or those of the transporters, no new seeds)?" And, Jansen (2015) asked, if they resolve do so, "will they be able to increase productivity in the short term (both as labour and land productivity) and respond to market demands?" (p. 13). Fourth, crucial questions are unsatisfactorily addressed by the framework, such as the fact that "some food-deficit regions (i.e., due to famines) and nations simply cannot produce enough food for current populations and have no choice but to engage in long distance trade, with all of the vulnerability to food price volatility that this implies" (Edelman et al., 2014, p. 918). Finally, critical questions related to the food sovereignty framework's multi-jurisdictional complexities are easily overlooked, specifically around how "food sovereignty may implement its radical vision within existing structures of the modern liberal nation state by working with, against and in between its jurisdictional structures by reworking the central notions of sovereignty: territory, economy and power" (Trauger, 2014, p. 1145).

3.5 Conclusion

Despite the contentious debates that exist within the literature, this discussion of the two competing food Policy Frameworks in this chapter has provided insight in an effort to better grasp the tension that grew between the FSC coalition members, some of which were proponents of food security, while others sought to promote the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. The following chapter will explore the theoretical frameworks used within this study.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the research on two food Policy Frameworks most often advocated by non-profit organizations, food security and food sovereignty. The chapter also introduces the theoretical framework used to guide this study: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF provides insight into how the structure of an advocacy coalition's Deep Core belief system can remain relatively stable while at the same time, its Policy Framework changes. Also explored are the Tools an advocacy coalition uses to implement its beliefs. Finally, the chapter introduces Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), a theoretical framework that explores the ways in which an advocacy coalition secures resources to maintain itself overtime.

This study adds to our understanding of the ACF by offering an historical exploration of belief system stability in advocacy coalitions and coalition building. The particular setting examined is food system policy debates in Canada. This study contributes to the ACF literature, specifically research on advocacy coalition formation and maintenance. The non-profit organization FSC is used as a case study. The theoretical frameworks developed in this chapter provide a structure for understanding the participants' perceptions. The following section examines the ACF in an effort to better understand how an advocacy coalition forms, maintains itself and utilities its resources over time.

4.2 Advocacy coalitions and policy-making processes

In the late 1980s, the work of Paul Sabatier and his colleagues developed and stretched the concept of a policy subsystem to include advocacy coalitions. While a policy community, also known as a policy universe, refers to the vast collection of actors (e.g., interest groups, legislatures, non-profit organizations) that have a complete or partial interest in any given policy-

related problem (MacLean & Wood, 2010), a policy subsystem is a subset of the policy

community that is comprised of policy actors "involved in discussing options to deal with

problems recognized as requiring some government action" (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p.

12). The policy actors included in a policy subsystem must have enough knowledge and

expertise in a problem area to partake in drafting policy options to address the problems at hand,

which are often raised at the agenda setting phase (Howlett et al, 2009). Each policy subsystem is

comprised of advocacy coalitions, and an advocacy coalition consists of

> actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government
> who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus casual and other perceptions)
> and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and personnel of governmental
> institutions in order to achieve these goals over time (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 83).

It is important to note that an advocacy coalition may be "tightly bound" and "limited to a

few participates" or large like a "loose constellation" of actors who "come and go around an

issue area" (Barberio, 2014, p. 62). The ACF advocates for a more complex view of the policy

subsystem – one that include various actors in advocacy coalitions such as anti-poverty activists.

In addition, the ACF allows us to study the things that bring policy actors together in an

advocacy coalition, such as their common beliefs, their shared knowledge of a public issue and

their common interest in advocating for solutions (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987). The ACF asserts

that the cohesive force that holds policy actors within an advocacy coalition is a shared sense of

beliefs, which tends to be stable and consistent over time (Howlett et al., 2009). Each policy

actor within a given advocacy coalition participates in the policy making process by advocating

for certain ends and using government machinery to promote the self-serving goals of the

advocacy coalition to which they belong (Nohrstedt, 2010). The ACF also brings several

beneficial features to the arena of policy analysis.

Within the field of policy, the ACF has established itself as a valid research framework which offers several advantages for an in-depth analysis of the policy-making process (Kahan et al., 2011; Montpetit, 2011; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). First, the key feature of the ACF is that it diverges from the stages heuristic paradigm that was dominant in the 1980s (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987). The word heuristic refers to any approach to decision making (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). The stages of the heuristic paradigm refer to a specific approach to understanding the policy-making process; one that identifies all of the stages of a policy cycle (e.g., agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation, policy evaluation). A major criticism of this paradigm is that even though the stages of a policy cycle are understood as fluid, meaning they can occur at the same time, it fails to address the complexities of the policy-making process and specifically the forces (e.g., belief systems) that drive the policy cycle forward (Benoit, 2013).

A basic premise of the ACF is that public policies and programs can be conceptualized as belief systems insofar as such public policies and programs are created as inherent sets of value priorities that may or may not change over time (Fenger & Klok, 2001). Such belief systems involve the varying perceptions that advocacy coalitions have about state responsibility as well as perceptions about the gravity of a problem (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). By charting the changing belief systems of an advocacy coalition, one can assess the role that both beliefs and resources play in policy making (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Most theories of policy process understand policy actors as autonomous, and thus focus research on the complexity of the individual actors. In contrast, the ACF collects a number of policy actors within a policy subsystem and places them within a coalition that is created based on shared beliefs (Sewell, 2005). It is important to note that the ACF appreciates the complexity of policy actors in terms of

their own individual beliefs and holds that the policy actors are diverse (Larsen, Vrangbaek, & Traulsen, 2006). The ACF offers several advantages for the analysis of policy-making processes. It was chosen as the theoretical approach for this study because it created a pathway for in-depth analysis of policy-making processes as they relate to coalition formation and maintenance.

The ACF was chosen as a theoretical approach for this study for two significant reasons. First, the aim of the ACF is to examine the policy-making process critically and in a way that looks beyond the policy cycle and examines what actually propels policy processes. The ACF is ideal for addressing issues that are ideologically divisive (Pierce, 2011). This case study involved approaches to food policy making that are ideologically divisive, as seen through the existing debates arising between the Policy Frameworks of food security and food sovereignty. Second, the value of the ACF can be found in its ability to address complex debates that are normative in nature. As Sabatier (1998) explained,

> Several people have wondered whether the ACF applies to policy domains—such as gun control, human rights, gender politics—in which technical issues are dominated by normative and identity concerns. In my view, it should work very well in these areas. Clearly, these subsystems seem to be characterized by well-defined coalitions driven by belief-driven conflict (p. 122–123).

In much the same way, food policy, and more specifically the conflict between the food security and food sovereignty Policy Frameworks, is framed by belief-driven conflict over how food system issues ought to be addressed. At the most basic level, food is part of the human condition, as it is a biological necessity, in addition to being a cultural phenomenon that connects individuals (Koç & Welsh, 2002). The role of food in connecting individuals and the fact that there is no established global diet signifies that food is very much a vehicle through which individuals express their identity (Koç & Welsh, 2002). The ACF was chosen for this study "on

purpose," as it adequately addresses the divisive issues and belief-driven conflict inherent in this case study, but the case study, in turn, can expand our understanding of ACF, and contribute to the ACF policy studies literature.

This study contributes to policy studies literature in an important way. The ACF has been most commonly applied to energy and environmental policy issues in the United States and Canada and to areas such as public health, domestic violence and drug policy in Australia, South America, Africa and Asia (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). This study contributes to the ACF literature as it deals with the topic of food systems. More specifically, this case study contributes to the ACF literature by providing a historical analysis of advocacy coalition building and maintenance. The following section explores the questions posed by the ACF about how a coalition forms and how it maintains itself over time.

4.3 Coalition formation and maintenance: Questions

This study explores advocacy coalition formation and maintenance through the use of both descriptive and explanatory questions. It is descriptive in nature, and it aims to explore the question of "what is" a coalition – more specifically how a coalition forms and maintains itself. The ACF offers the following three key descriptive questions about coalition formation, which have guided the data collection tools for this study:

> What are the belief systems of an advocacy coalition? What strategies and resources do advocacy coalitions use to achieve their policy goals? How much consensus is there among coalition members? (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013, p. 148)

The ACF also uses an explanatory question to addresses coalition formation and maintenance: How do coalition members overcome threats to collective action? (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). The key descriptive and explanatory questions referenced above are pursued in an effort to

develop an understanding of the fundamental component of the ACF – the stability of belief systems (Weible & Sabatier, 2005).

Weible and Sabatier (2005) examined belief system stability within coalitions and claimed that a coalition creates and promotes stability by coordinating its networks, particularly its memberships' specific beliefs. Weible and Sabatier (2005) also asserted that belief system stability is contingent on the coalition's Policy Framework. Section 4.6.2 discusses what is meant by a Policy Framework. Briefly, a coalition's Policy Framework serves as the primary perceptual filter for policy actors when they are examining policy problems. A coalition's Policy Framework assists policy actors in determining their perceived allies and opponents in a coalition (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). According to the ACF, Policy Frameworks structure the network choices of policy actors within an advocacy coalition because policy actors will interact primarily with policy actors who have similar Policy Framework beliefs (Smith, 2000). An advocacy coalition needs a Policy Framework in order to create belief system stability, and a stable belief system is what allows an advocacy coalition to overcome threats to collective action.

4.4 Surmounting threats to collective action

The ACF suggests that there is a central explanation for why subsystem coalitions surmount threats to collective action and activities (Sabatier, Hunger, & McLaughlin, 1987). The method used to surmount threats to collectivization is coordination among actors in an advocacy coalition. In their study of the behaviour of coalitions, Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) clearly stated that coordination within a coalition has to do primarily with the shared beliefs among its actors. These *shared beliefs* that bind actors together promote coordination, as policy actors who share policy beliefs will coordinate with each other in an effort to participate in joint activities to

advance a policy position (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Such policy actors are more likely to

engage in activities if they (i) interact repeatedly (e.g., conferences, assemblies) and ii) if they

view their opponents as powerful enough to impose costs on them if their advocacy efforts are

unsuccessful (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2007). Scholars who have used the ACF to conduct

qualitative case studies have found that coordinated activities occur within coalitions. Examples

of such activities involve joint projects and training programs between coalition members related

to domestic violence (Abrar, Lovenduski, & Margetts, 2000) as well as the coordination of

research on global tobacco policy by coalition members (Farquharson, 2003). When examining

the success of activities within a coalition, it is important to focus on the extent to which beliefs

are shared between coalition members as it is *shared* beliefs that prompt joint activities as

Zafonte and Sabatier stated in the following hypothesis, "Coordination increases with belief

congruence. Conflict increases with belief divergence" (1998, p. 477). In fact, one hypothesis of

the ACF argues that coordination occurs when a coalition shares three categories of beliefs: Deep

Core beliefs, Policy Framework and Tools for Implementation (Fenger & Klok, 2001).

4.5 Coalition formation

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) identified three categories of beliefs and argued that

these beliefs influence the political behaviour of policy actors in an advocacy coalition: Deep

Core beliefs, Policy Framework and Tools for Implementation. According to the ACF, policy

actors possess a three-tiered model of beliefs that are hierarchical in terms of their abstractness

(Weible, Sabatier, and Queen, 2009). Sabatier (1988) outlined these three structural categories

suggesting that Deep Core beliefs "define a person's underlying philosophy," while Policy

Frameworks are the basic strategies and policy positions that lay the groundwork for Deep Core

beliefs in the policy area in question (p. 144). The third category of beliefs, Tools for

Implementation allows for a vast variety of instrumental decisions necessary to implement the Policy Framework in a specific policy area. Sabatier (1988) argued that these three structural categories carry varying degrees of resistance to change; for example, Deep Core beliefs are the most resistant to change, whereas Policy Frameworks are somewhat resistant to change, and Tools for Implementation are the least resistant to change. The following sections explore each of these categories in more detail.

4.5.1 Deep Core beliefs

Of the three structural categories, the most abstract beliefs are Deep Core beliefs and they hold several defining characteristics (Henry, 2011; Jenkins-Smith, 1990). Deep core beliefs are fundamentally normative (i.e., hold an evaluation standard); they are ontological axioms that reach across virtually all policy areas (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Deep Core beliefs are normative in the sense that they hold a descriptive evaluative standard that decrees *what ought to be* (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996). Additionally, Deep Core beliefs are ontological insofar as they deal with the nature of existence or reality. Deep core beliefs can be considered rudimentary personal philosophies applicable to all policy areas (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The Deep Core beliefs of an advocacy coalition shape its most basic concepts and attitudes towards an issue. In terms of susceptibility to change, Deep Core beliefs are very difficult to change, almost parallel to religious conversion (Sabatier, 1988). When Deep Core beliefs change within a coalition, it signals that a change of identity and such as conversion requires policy actors to internalize a new identity. Sabatier (1993) provided several illustrative components of Deep Core beliefs such as whether the nature of man is intrinsically wicked or socially redeemable. Another illustrative example is whether an advocacy coalition views policy actors as egotists, aiming only to enhance favourable views of themselves or as contractarians whereby their primary self-

interest will lead them to act morally. Deep Core beliefs are manifested as an overriding

preference for some ideals over others, such as the values of security and freedom, knowledge,

health, love and beauty (Sabatier, 1988). Sabatier (1988) suggested that Deep Core beliefs

consider the "elementary principles of distributive justice asking questions such as 'whose

welfare counts?' Relative weights of self, primary groups, all people, future generations, and

non-human beings" (p. 145). In this way, Deep Core beliefs aim to address questions related to

the distribution of resources within society and the element of justice, such as the extent to which

distribution aims to allocate resources in a way that decreases inequality.

The Deep Core belief category is the most abstract category of all three belief categories

and the most difficult to change. In contrast, Policy Frameworks are less abstract and less

resistant to change than Deep Core beliefs (Longaker, 2013). However, despite their abstract

nature, Deep Core beliefs provide the foundation for an advocacy coalition's "very existence"

(Longaker, 2013), as they form the very starting point for the chain of beliefs as well as serve as

the steady and unchanging trans-situational guides for coalition members (Matti & Sandstrom,

2010, p. 18). Advocacy coalitions actively seek out ways to implement Deep Core beliefs by

establishing Policy Frameworks.

4.5.2 Policy Frameworks

As discussed in Chapter 1, it is important to mention that although Paul Sabatier (1987,

1988) called Policy Frameworks "Policy Core" beliefs, for the purposes of this study and in an

effort to promote more basic terminology, "Policy Core" beliefs are referred to as Policy

Framework(s). Policy actors are motivated to transform their Deep Core beliefs into actual

policies. Policy Frameworks are defined as the preferred policy strategies for a particular,

specialized policy area that will transform an advocacy coalition's Deep Core beliefs into actual policy changes (Henry, 2011).

The Policy Frameworks of an advocacy coalition have several unique characteristics. The defining characteristic of Policy Frameworks is the essential policy positions underlying the rudimentary tactics for accomplishing the normative axioms of the Deep Core beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). In other words, Policy Frameworks are the basic principles of the actions or strategies that are carefully planned by an advocacy coalition. An advocacy coalition endorses an action or strategy with the intention of ultimately achieving the deep-rooted ideas and attitudes that the policy actors believe *ought to be* (Matti & Sandstrom, 2011). Policy Frameworks are broad in scope and can apply to any policy area of interest and to a few other policy areas of interest (Albright, 2011; Balassiano & Chandler, 2010). Policy Frameworks are difficult to change; however, change can occur if the experiences of policy actors reveal serious anomalies (Mawinney, 1991). For example, if policy actors attend an event that relates to a specific policy problem, information arising from the event may change their Policy Framework. According to the ACF, of the three categories of beliefs, it is the Policy Framework of an advocacy coalition that holds policy actors together within a coalition:

> the ACF further postulates that consensus on the beliefs in the policy core [Policy Framework] specifically, rather than on Deep Core beliefs or on the secondary aspects [Tools for Implementation] of the policy domain, is the primary force that brings actors together in the process of forming advocacy coalitions (Matti & Sandstrom, 2010, p. 10).

Sabatier (1988) offered several illustrative components of Policy Frameworks that explain the direction and alignment of policy conflicts within an advocacy coalition. One such example is the debate on whether an advocacy coalition should address a policy problem through market-based action or government-related activity. Another example of conflict often mentioned in the

ACF literature is centred on issues of environmental policy; specifically, whether an advocacy coalition should align itself with strategies that promote environmental protection or those that promote economic development (Fenger & Klok, 2001). Sabatier (1993) also found that within a policy subsystem, Policy Frameworks are resistant to change even over decades (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). A coalition's Policy Framework is important because it is, in essence, the crucial link between the "basic value-priorities and criteria for distributive justice" of the Deep Core beliefs (Matti & Sandstrom, 2011, p. 9) and the policy-specific opinions of the Tools for Implementation, as well as is the link between "ultimate goals" and the tactics for fulfilling such goals within the policy subject area in question (Matti & Sandstrom, 2010, p. 9). The following section discusses the third category of beliefs, Tools for Implementation.

4.5.3 Tools for Implementation

As mentioned in Chapter 1, in this study we are using the term Tools for Implementation instead of Paul Sabatier's (1987, 1988) term "Secondary Aspects." Tools for Implementation are the Tools that affect an advocacy coalition's ability to implement its Deep Core beliefs and Policy Framework. They play an important role in the formation and maintenance of advocacy coalitions (Schlager, 1995). There are several defining characteristics of Tools for Implementation. Sabatier (1988) defined such Tools as "decisions concerning administrative rules, budgetary allocations, disposition of cases, statutory interpretation, and even statutory revision" as well as "information concerning program performance, the seriousness of problems" (Sabatier, 1988, p. 145). Tools for Implementation are also specific in scope than the other policy beliefs (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) showed that Tools for Implementation are precise beliefs about the significance of the problem in specific milieus as well as policy inclinations towards guidelines and the design of particular institutions (Weible &

Sabatier, 2006; 2007). Decisions to implement specific Tools are made with the understanding that they are necessary to achieve the advocacy coalition's Policy Framework (Sabatier, 1988). Weible and Nohrstedt (2013) asserted that advocacy coalitions are relatively susceptible to changing their Tools to implement their Policy Framework. Such changes are easy, because policy actors learn through information-related searches the possible effects of the various Tools at their disposal, and if they find the tool will not effectively implement their Policy Framework, they may change their tactics. Also, Tools for Implementation are easy to change in the sense that policy actors within a coalition are willing to "give up" Tools for Implementation before they are willing to admit weakness in the Policy Framework beliefs (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009).

The importance of the Tools for Implementation lies in their role as relatively unstable vehicles that bring Deep Core beliefs and Policy Frameworks into fruition; they also expose the sometimes narrow and unpredictable attitudinal opinions of coalition members regarding the implementation of strategies in specific situations (Matti & Sandstrom, 2010). The beliefs (i.e., Deep Core beliefs, Policy Frameworks, Tools for Implementation) outlined by the ACF are complex and ambiguous categories. Although beliefs assist in the formation of advocacy coalitions, the utilization of resources is what helps to maintain an advocacy coalition over time.

4.6 Coalition maintenance

The second method for looking at how an advocacy coalition surmounts threats to collectivization and maintains itself is by examining its access to resources. Maintaining an advocacy coalition and securing its long-term viability is a challenge for policy actors. The role of advocacy coalition resources in maintaining advocacy coalitions has been a regular feature within the ACF literature and scholars have placed particular emphasis on this area by offering a

typology of coalition resources including (1) information, (2) mobilizing troops, (3) financial

resources and (4) skillful leadership (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). Sewell (2005) has confirmed

that in an effort to influence policy, policy actor's in advocacy coalitions seek out available

resources that allow them to act upon strategies to achieve their goals. The following section

explores four categories of resources that advocacy coalitions seek to secure.

4.6.1 Information

The first category of resources is information. According to the ACF, information can

inform an advocacy coalition of various policy alternatives and more specifically, assist it in

closing a gap between a variety of possible solutions and their desired outcome (Ingold, 2011).

As it pertains to advocacy coalitions, the use of information manifests itself in three significant

ways.

First, the use of scientific and technical information is vitally important for determining

the severity of a policy problem as well as the advantages and disadvantages of available policy

options. While the ACF suggests that belief systems are the tools used by coalition members to

understand and interpret the world and policy issues, the ACF also claims that beliefs are not

simply values and priorities. Policy beliefs also contain casual and correlational relationships that

shape the empirical world (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Such empirical knowledge is sourced by

technical and scientific information that helps to define the set of problems and policy

alternatives that an advocacy coalition then chooses from. For example, information-based

resources can provide a coalition with a cost-benefit analysis that systematically establishes the

strengths and weaknesses of all possible solutions and desired outcomes (Albright, 2011). The

output of a cost-benefit analysis can assist an advocacy coalition in determining which policy

options will achieve the most benefits (Barke, 1993). Information-based resources can also

provide an advocacy coalition with information about the severity of the problems it is contending with in regards to policy options (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Therefore, it is imperative that a coalition recognize the value of information, in particular the ways in which scientific and technical resources inform the policy beliefs of a coalition.

Second, an advocacy coalition uses information as a way to win policy disputes (Ingold, 2011). Information can be used by coalition members to argue policy views that run counter to the policy views of another coalition. Information can also be used to convince those in decision-making roles to support the coalition's positions and to influence public opinion (Weible, 2007). Sabatier and Weible (2005) have pointed out that having "better" information is not in and of itself sufficient for a policy victory against an opposing advocacy coalition, but it pushes the opposing coalition to expend additional resources. The ACF suggests that the exchange of information involves interactions between policy actors and that policy actors prefer to seek out information and advice from like-minded sources within their advocacy coalition (Albright, 2011). For example, Weible and Sabatier (2005) provided the example that "an environmentalist might rely on information from a like-minded university researcher to support their argument" (p. 185). The ACF highlights the roles of various coalition members including a variety of policy actors including but not limited to researchers, consultants and academic researchers (Weible, 2007) and explains the use and effectiveness of scientific and technical information including policy analyses and reports (Sabatier & Zafonte, 2001). In addition to utilizing information, an advocacy coalition must also secure membership to maintain itself and its work over time.

4.6.2 Mobilizing troops

The second category of resources an advocacy coalition aims to secure is membership. Securing membership involves mobilizing members of the public, also known as "troops," to

support and join the advocacy coalition (Munro & Ditto, 1997; Munro et al., 2002). According to the ACF, mobilized troops are members of the wider public who identify with a particular advocacy coalition and subscribe to its beliefs. Members of the wider public who identify with an advocacy coalition may include individuals and non-profit organizations. In terms of *how* advocacy coalitions mobilize members, technology and the media are often used to mobilize members. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) introduced the idea of "mobilizing potential." Mobilizing potential refers to the advocacy coalition's ability to formulate a strategy to mobilize support from individuals and/or organizations from the broader society. An effective mobilizing strategy conveys messages of goodwill and creates sympathy for the policy issue the coalition is advocating for. An advocacy coalition's mobilizing potential is dependent on the framing strategy of the messages it is conveying (Munro & Ditto, 1997). An effective framing strategy that mobilizes members will neutralize and discredit the messages of rivals and those in opposition to the coalition's goals, while being able to secure member bystanders (Gamson, 2007).

The membership of an advocacy coalition serves two purposes. First, according to the ACF, an advocacy coalition will seek support from members of the public, either individuals or organizations, in order to engage in a variety of activities. At times, advocacy coalitions will petition the public and coalition members for assistance in activities meant to help accomplish its objectives (Weible, 2007). Supporters are often asked to "engage in letter-writing campaigns, to provide labor in electoral and fund-raising campaigns, and to participate in public demonstrations and other activities" (Weible, 2007, p. 100). Advocacy coalitions that have very limited financial resources actually rely on the mobilization of troops, especially when the

interests of an advocacy coalition are endangered by threats of decreases in government-sponsored assistance or government lapses in implementing regulations (Weible, 2007).

Gamson (2007) introduced the idea of the "depth of challenge." The depth of challenge refers to the degree to which advocacy coalition members challenge the advocacy coalition's deeply held and taken-for-granted assumptions and Gamson (2007) warned of two extremes. The first extreme are those members who fervently challenging a coalition's beliefs and cause the advocacy coalition to silence the carriers and messengers of the advocacy coalitions beliefs, rendering their belief system invisible. On the other extreme, advocacy coalition members who choose not to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions that may be problematic end up with a very constricted view of the advocacy coalition's beliefs. Such a lack of challenges results in eventual constraints on the advocacy coalition's belief system and leaves the coalition vulnerable to opposing views. It is vital that an advocacy coalition develops a strategy for mobilizing members to join its coalition and for encouraging its membership to not only participate in events, but also to challenge policy beliefs. In addition to information and membership, an advocacy coalition must secure finances to maintain itself over time.

4.6.3 Financial resources

The third category of resources that an advocacy coalition uses to maintain itself over time is financial. Heinmiller (1975) boldly states, "money cannot buy policy, but it can buy advocacy coalitions a lot of resources towards this end" (p. 43). Financial resources and apparatuses such as funding are valuable resources as they can be used to purchase the additional resources (Mawinney, 1991). According to Weible (2007), an advocacy coalition with deep pockets can financially support political candidates who support the coalition's views, which can provide access to both political appointees and legislators who can influence the broader policy

subsystem (Weible, 2007). Financial resources can also assist an advocacy coalition to purchase the resources needed to create and put forward media campaigns to advertise their policy positions to the broader public (Barke, 1993). Financial resources allow an advocacy coalition to carry out wide-ranging public education campaigns, which in turn potentially generate and strengthen their mobilized membership (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), leading to a broader, more sustained membership base.

Furthermore, financial resources can afford an advocacy coalition the means necessary to finance research and think tanks that can generate information that might influence the policy making process (Albright, 2011). More specifically, advocacy coalitions are able to use financial resources to hire professionals such as public relations experts and to purchase the services of professional lobbyists (Heinmiller, 1975) Such information would be used to influence public opinion and to mobilize their supporters (Weible, 2007). Financial resources also allow an advocacy coalition to carry out wide-ranging public education campaigns that may increase its membership (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Finally, securing financial resources for an advocacy coalition allows an advocacy coalition to employ full-time support and administrative staff. While financial resources assist an advocacy coalition to maintain itself over time, it needs skillful leadership to secure additional resources.

4.6.4 Skillful leadership

The fourth category of resources that an advocacy coalition needs to maintain itself over time is skillful leadership. Skillful leadership is characterized by individuals who are charismatic (Heinmiller, 1975). According to the ACF, skillful leadership of an advocacy coalition creates two main benefits (Weible et al., 2011). First, coalition leaders assist in articulating a comprehensible belief system for coalition members (Weible, 2007). An advocacy coalition with

an established belief system can solidify its resolve and focus. According to Kingdon (1995),

policy victories are often led by skillful leaders, who guide a coalition through the process.

Kingdon (1995) argued that precursors to policy change are not usually external events in the

policy system, but rather the work of leaders of advocacy coalitions. Skillful coalition leaders

entice additional resources (e.g., financial resources) to an advocacy coalition, which in turn

allows for more strategic choices as well as more opportunities to influence and advance public

policy interests (Weible, 2007). Coalition leadership has a significant influence on the internal

cohesion of a coalition's policy beliefs and financial activities (Heinmiller, 1975).

While the ACF offers an understanding of how an advocacy coalition uses resources to

maintain themselves overtime, social movement research and in particular, the RMT is effective

in examining the "theory of action," which is only obliquely defined in the ACF (Kubler, 2001).

By examining the RMT's applicability to the ACF, one can examine whether the strategies used

for coalition maintenance according to the RMT are consistent with the ACF's actor model

(Kubler, 2001).

4.7 Resource Mobilization Theory

Broadly speaking, the objectives of the ACF and social movement theory, in particular

the RMT, are compatible. First, it is important to define the term social movement; Birkland

(2011) defined it as a "broad-based group of people that come together to press for political or

policy goal" (p. 136). While social movement theory suggests that social movements are often

unorganized, the theoretical propositions of RMT help us to understand the role of organized

collective action, such as advocacy coalitions, in achieving social movements' policy goals. As a

major sociological theory arising in the 1970s, RMT explains how the success of a social

movement is dependent on the effective mobilization of resources (Tilly, Tarrow, & McAdam,

2003). The major criticism of RMT has been that it does not adequately explain how social movements are sometimes able to achieve social change despite limited organizational resources. The objectives of the ACF are based on the idea that policy actors engage in the policy making process in an effort to translate their beliefs into action (Sabatier, 1988); thus, the ACF and RMT are compatible, as they both consider collective action as a catalyst and driving force behind social change (Kubler, 2001). The ACF has been criticized for not explaining coalition behaviour; fortunately, the RMT has the potential to address the limitations of the ACF (Schlager, 1995). The theoretical propositions of the RMT help us to better understand coalition behaviour; more specifically, the role of collective action in achieving policy goals for organized advocacy coalitions.

There are two broad-based versions of RMT. The version originated from and advocated by sociologists John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald adopts an economic perspective of coalition resources and takes an entrepreneurial-organizational approach to examining the role of resources in advocacy coalitions (Walder, 2009). The second branch of RMT, originated by sociologists Charles Tilly and Doug McAdam, adopts a political perspective to examine advocacy coalitions' use of resources (Walder, 2009). As this study focuses on the policy making process, we concentrate on the politically oriented branch of RMT, which pays close attention to institutions and more specifically, the mobilizing structures of organizations such as advocacy coalitions (Buechler, 1993). For the RMT, "mobilizing structures" are the networks that assist groups of individuals to mobilize (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003). An example of an organizational structure may be a network of individuals whose basis for network connection is friendship. RMT suggests that the primary cause of social action is the interests of coalition members, and that the underlying social dynamic is a result of political conflict (Hart, Sinclair, &

Veugelers, 2009). Political conflict is the primary driver that brings individuals together to argue for one side of a political conflict and advance a policy agenda (McAdam et al., 2003). However, when political contention is diminished, insofar as there are no significant political conflicts keeping individuals together in a coalition, RMT argues that friendship will keep "the spirit of collective action alive" (Hart et al., 2009, p. 370). Thus, RMT does not see institutions as playing a central role in social change; rather it is based on the assumption that collective actors, such as those in a coalition, drive the process (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003). Research on social movements has produced an integrated theoretical synthesis for examining the emergence of advocacy coalitions that focuses on mobilizing structures (McAdam et al., 1996).

The primary concern of mobilizing structures is to examine the factors that make individuals join an advocacy coalition (Jenkins, 1983). Such factors may include social or group networks or informal social organizations such as family, friends and voluntary associations (Jenkins, 1983). According to the politically oriented version of the RMT, which focuses on the political processes of engaging resources, collective settings encourage individuals to join an advocacy coalition (McAdam, 1988). Such settings are structured through "solidarity incentives" and organizational resources. Solidarity incentives are the factors that motivate individuals to join a social movement. Individuals are motivated to join when this action yields an interpersonal reward (Jackson et al., 1960). Interpersonal rewards create a collective identity shared by the policy actors within an advocacy coalition, and establishing such a collective identity involves nurturing relationships amongst policy actors. Social movements often have to address the issue of "free-riding" (Hart et al., 2009). Free-riders are individuals who take advantage of the benefits of joining an advocacy coalition, but do not actively work to attain the goals as all members of an advocacy coalition are expected to do (Jackson et al., 1960). An advocacy coalition must

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therefore work towards identifying coalition members who do not actively pursue the goals of the coalition. The solidary incentives inherent in advocacy coalitions, such as offering interpersonal rewards, solves the "free-loader" problem, as each member joins a social movement to be part of a collective identity that works together towards goals (Hart et al., 2009). In addition to creating "solidarity incentives," an advocacy coalition must also secure resources to effectively mobilize itself.

Organizational resources are crucial for converting beliefs into action (Kubler, 2001). More specifically, the RMT seeks to explore how the resources (e.g., social conditions and strategies) that advocacy coalitions use translate not just into action, but to success (Abel, 1973). The inner workings of an advocacy coalition involves the mobilization of three inter-organizational resources including the entry and exit of members, the ebbs and flows of communication, and leadership arrangements (Hart et al., 2009). By examining the role of these three specific resources, i.e., membership, communication methods and leadership, one can better understand the processes that lead to the rise, persistence and also decline of advocacy coalitions.

4.7.1 Members

The first of three resources that an advocacy coalition utilizes to promote development and success is the recruitment of members. The RMT suggests that the recruitment of members is based on psychological variables (Brady, Scholzman, & Verba, 1999). Such psychological variables include the degree to which individuals are affected by the political issue that an advocacy coalition is mobilizing to address (Brady et al., 1999). Curtis and Zurcher (1973) found that the greater the degree to which individuals related to the political conflict, the swifter they were mobilized to join an organization and participate in its activities. Securing members of an

advocacy coalition is a matter of recruitment, and according to RMT, recruitment of members primarily happens through "established lines of interaction" (McAdam, 1982, p. 44). Establishing such lines of interactions is referred to in the RMT model as "facilitative contact" between an advocacy coalition and individuals. The RMT offers two patterns of member recruitment (Leighley, 1990).

The two patterns of member recruitment discussed in RMT research are associational networks and bloc recruitment (McAdam, 1982). The first type of recruitment occurs among individuals who are involved in networks outside of but associated with the emerging advocacy coalition, known as "associational networks" (Knoke,1990; McAdam, 1982). For example, in the nineteenth century women's rights movement, a significant number of individuals who were recruited to join the movement came from extant abolitionist groups (Melder, 1964). The second type of recruitment does not happened at the individual level, but rather through "bloc recruitment" strategies (Jasper & Paulsen, 1995; Oberschall, 1973). In this way, coalitions emerge through the merging of existing groups. For example, the short-lived People's Party, also known as the Populist party of the 1870s, was created through a coalition of American farmers who organized an economic agrarian economic movement (Hicks, 1961). Another example is the University of Berkeley Free Speech movement of the 1960s in which member recruitment happened as the result of mergers between campus student groups (Leighley, 1990; Lipset & Wolin, 1965). Thus, advocacy coalitions can effectively recruit members through the recruitment of blocs of people who are already highly organized (Lake & Huckfeldt,1998; McAdam, 1988; Oberschall, 1973). As Gerlach and Hine (1970) argued, "no matter how a typical individual describes their reasons for joining the movement [advocacy coalition]…it is clear that the original decision to join required some contact with the movement [advocacy coalition]" (p. 79).

The RMT also suggests that an advocacy coalition's communication network is an important resource.

4.7.2 Communication network

Another organizational resource necessary for translating policy beliefs into action is a communication network. The strength and breadth of an advocacy coalition's ability to communicate largely determines how quickly its actions spread and the development of new organizations to expand the movement. The women's liberation movement of the 1960s is an example of a movement that was able to build a communication network that supported a successful movement (Leighley, 1990). Scholars such as Freeman (1973) have demonstrated that while the socioeconomic conditions necessary to spark a women's movement was present in the 1950s, it was not until a communications network emerged in the 1960s, bringing individuals together across local boundaries, that an organized movement formed. Bradley (2005) described this communication network as an association between activists and the media, as many feminist activists worked within the media industry and participated in "media activism" to promote the women's liberation movement across the United States. Jackson et al. (1960) provided a counter example of the failure of a California-based property tax opposition movement. In that case a pre-established and conventional network of communication did not exist. This restricted the advocacy coalition's ability to unite the suburban property owners who were the principal base for the movement (McClurg, 2003). Research on cultural diffusion is consistent with these findings; it has affirmed the importance of communication networks in social movements and advocacy coalitions. Despite this evidence, communication networks have been largely overlooked by social movement theorists, with the exception of Maurice Pinard (1971).

Pinard (1971) applied the central tenant of cultural diffusion theory to RMT. Cultural diffusion refers to the spreading of beliefs from one group to another. Pinard (1971) applied cultural diffusion to the development of social movements and found that the spread of beliefs is closely related to the social integration between individuals and the movement and that "the higher the degree of social integration of potential adopters, the more likely and the sooner they will become actual adopters" (p. 186-187). McAdam and Rucht (1993) described the process of cultural diffusion in the RMT as a process of identification. Cultural diffusion occurs when the "adopters" of an advocacy coalition generate an identity that potential adopters can relate to, so that the potential adopters can justify adopting the beliefs of the social movement. McAdam and Rucht (1993) listed the following features of identity: "—language facility, shared status as students, similar social profiles" (p. 74). Oberschall (1973) further found that the greater the number and variety of organizations in a collectivity such as in an advocacy coalition and the higher the participation of diverse members in its network, the more rapidly the identification processes occur and the greater the mobilization of the individuals to join the advocacy coalition. In this way, cultural diffusion provided a theoretical context for understanding the significance of associational networks in building movements (Lake & Huckfeldt,1998). Cultural diffusion also explains bloc requirement strategies through which the links between existing organizations help to facilitate the emergence of new advocacy coalitions (Myers, 1994). These links offer a communication pathway along which the emerging social movement, similar to a cultural item, can be distributed throughout a population (Vrablikova, 2014). In addition to networks of communication, leadership is also a vital resource for successful social movements.

4.7.3 Leadership

The importance of leadership and movement organizers in generating a social movement cannot be understated (Norris, 2002). McAdam (1982; 1988) went as far as to state that understanding leadership as fundamental to an organization does not require a theory, but only "common sense." McAdam (1982) argued that regardless of how and when member recruitment happens, leadership is an invaluable resource for movement building and how well a movement is organized will impact the availability of recognized leaders who are willing to join the movement. For an advocacy coalition to effectively mobilize itself, a "centralized direction" needs to be present (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Lake & Huckfeldt,1998). What RMT refers to as a "centralization direction" is established leadership at the centre of decision making about the direction that the advocacy coalition takes (Knoke, 1990). The role of cultural diffusion and associational networks are central to understanding the importance of leadership for social movements and more specifically, advocacy coalitions.

Cultural diffusion influences how leadership is established within an advocacy coalition. It is understood that already established leaders, due to their central positions within the community (e.g., their high degree of social integration with other "adopters"), are likely be the first to join a new movement (Brady et al., 1999; McClurg, 2003; Zald & Ash, 1966). One such example is Lipset's (1950) study of the rise of the 1932 Socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) Party in Canada, which showed that already established leaders are the first to join a social movement: "in Saskatchewan it was the local leaders of the Wheat Pool, of the trade unions, who were the first to join the C.C.F" (p. 197). The associational networks surrounding a movement, and more specifically the already established organizations located inside of a movement's base, ensure that already established and acceptable leaders can use their

"prestige" and "organizing skills" to the shape the emerging movement (Jasper & Paulsen,1995; McAdam, 1982). In this way, pre-existing organizations are the "primary resource" for emerging advocacy coalitions (Abel, 1973; Leighley,1990).

The lack of supportive organizational resources, such as leadership, will deprive an advocacy coalition of the capacity for effective collective action, even if other resources are present (McAdam, 1988). An examination of the mobilizing structures of the RMT demonstrates how an advocacy coalition maintains itself overtime (Buechler, 1993). Therefore, in exploring advocacy coalition maintenance, one must take into account how coalition members serve as conduits to build up coalitions and how organizational arrangements such as communication networks and leadership direct the flow of mobilization resources (Kubler, 2001).

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter provided a review of the research on the theoretical frameworks of the ACF and RMT, which together provide the analytical framework for this study. The ACF was used to examine various stages of advocacy coalition formation and maintenance and how they surmount threats to collective action. The ACF also offers insight into how an advocacy coalition mobilizes important resources such as information, finances, mobilizing membership and skillful leadership to overcome threats to collective action. The RMT compliments the ACF, as it attempts to answer the question of why people join social movements. To address this question, the RMT identifies various mobilizing structures, which are the organizational structures that promote mobilization such as solidarity incentives and organizational resources. This chapter explored the incentives that create solidarity amongst individuals within an advocacy coalition. Such incentives involve collective settings and include interpersonal rewards for individuals. This chapter also explored the organizational resources that are important for an advocacy

coalition's success such as membership, communication networks and leadership. This chapter presented an overview of the analytic insights of the ACF and RMT, which together provide the structure used to interpret the meaning and messages of the data collected in this study. The next chapter provides an overview of this study's methodology, specifically the prescriptive principles that were adapted to collect and analyze the data.

Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the rationale and methodology of this study including the research design, data collection and data analysis techniques. It reviews the literature on qualitative research and discusses the strengths and limitations of this approach. The chapter then presents the study's research design and attempts to justify the methods and tools used in the data collection. Finally, this chapter discusses the methods used to analyze the data.

5.2. Research questions

This study was guided by the following question: How did the FSC coalition surmount internal threats to collective action? The answers provide insight into the role of advocacy coalitions in policy-making processes and highlight the importance of coalition building and maintenance processes to policy making. Specifically, the study asks the following two questions:

- How did the FSC advocacy coalition surmount threats to coalition formation?
- How did the FSC advocacy coalition surmount threats to coalition maintenance?

5.3 Introducing qualitative research

Qualitative research is the method of inquiry implemented in this study. Denzin and Lincoln (2003) offer a definition of qualitative research that is comprehensive. It is described as

an activity that locates the researcher in the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). In an effort to make the world visible, qualitative research employs a set of interpretative practices (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Interpretative practices alter the world into a series of representations which include conversations, photographs and recordings (Creswell, 1998). In essence, qualitative research prompts the researcher to study phenomenon in natural settings and then interpret the meanings participants bring to these settings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Denzin (2013) also suggests that qualitative research begins with a worldview, also known as a theoretical lens. It is through a theoretical lens that researchers collect data in natural settings (Creswell & Clark, 2006). Finally, researchers analyze the data they collect with the aim of establishing patterns and themes (Denzin, 2013). While at the same time that the definition of qualitative research has several key features, qualitative research also has several common characteristics.

The qualitative approach to research includes key characteristics. First, whereas other forms of research may require research participants to be involved in a manufactured setting, qualitative research collects data at the site where participants undergo the problem being studied (Creswell, 2007). Second, qualitative research aims to uncover the meaning that participants hold about the problem being studied (Creswell, 2007). Third, qualitative research is a form of interpretive inquiry where researchers interpret what is seen, heard and understood in the data that they have collected (Creswell, 2013). Overall, the characteristics of qualitative research aim to create a holistic approach to collecting and analyzing data. The ultimate aim of the research is to sketch a large picture of the problem under study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). I chose qualitative research as the methodology to guide this study, as it allows for thick descriptions of coalition building and maintenance processes. These thick descriptions allowed me to sketch a picture of the organizational practices that influenced how the FSC advocacy coalition was

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formed and how it maintained itself over time. I chose this approach because qualitative

research seeks to make the world visible, including the ways in which organizations operate and

undergo change, and this is particularly important in light of the shift in the FSC coalition's

Policy Framework from food security to a food sovereignty.

5.3.1 Qualitative research tools

It is important to understand how qualitative research functions as a tool for researchers.

To understand its importance, it is necessary to consider its epistemological foundations. First,

epistemology refers to the study of "how people or systems of people know things and how they

think they know things" (Ryan, 2006, p. 15). Epistemology fundamentally refers to the nature of

knowledge. There are different paradigms that seek to explain the nature of knowledge, one of

which is post-positivism and interpretivism (Ryan, 2006). This study undertook the interpretivist

form of qualitative research, while at the same time, drew from a post-positivist paradigm.

Denzin and Lincoln (2003) confirm that qualitative research embraces two tensions at the same

time, "on the one hand, it is drawn to a broad interpretivist sensibility. On the other hand, it is

drawn to a more narrowly defined…post positivist... furthermore these tensions can be combined

in the same project" (p. 9). While the positivist paradigm may fall under an epistemology which

promotes objectivism, post-positivism diverges from positivism and renders itself compatible

with interpretivism (Creswell, 2007; Denzin, 2013). In the same way that interpretivism believes

in multiple realities and aims to explore the best reality which is the most relevant for the inquiry

aim of the study at hand, post-positivism believes in a tentative truth rather than an absolute truth

(Creswell, 1998). The post-positivist epistemological assumptions of qualitative research lead

researchers to position themselves as objective but active observers (Hammersley, 2013). The

weakness of the post-positivist approach lies in the question of whether a researcher can truly be

objective and the interpretivist paradigm compensates for this by insisting that researchers have

bias (Denzin, 2013; Van Maanen, 1979). The tensions between the interpretivist and post-

positivist paradigm were combined in this study and described below.

By borrowing from the interpretivist paradigm, I was able to acknowledge my theoretical

bias in collecting and analyzing data using RMT and the ACF. In addition, although the

qualitative approach is often applauded for its affinity to experiential knowledge, it also works

well when combined with theory—in this case the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT)—and is useful when attempting to document and

understand transformational shifts in organizations, like the shift in the focus of the FSC

coalition's food Policy Framework from food security to food sovereignty (Van Maanen, 1979).

My own research question focused on how the FSC advocacy coalition utilized its resources to

maintain itself over time. At the same time, I pushed myself to be an objective researcher insofar

as I took a neutral stance between the Policy Frameworks the FSC coalition members endorsed

and challenged. This proved to be a strength during the data interpretation stages of this study as

I was able to present compelling arguments for both Policy Frameworks that the FSC coalition

members contended for. Additionally, the post-positivist paradigm renders the voice of the

researcher as distant and this distance calls into question the extent to which the researcher can

truly understand a phenomenon if they do not actively engage with it (Creswell, 1996; Creswell

& Clark, 2006). This is where the interpretivist method of qualitative research allows for the

researcher to engage with the phenomenon under study. In the same way, I was able to engage

with members of the FSC coalition by building a rapport with them when I attended their AGM

in Montreal and later conduct interviews with them. Ultimately, I choose a post-positivist

epistemological paradigm as it seemed like a natural fit with the site of my case study, the FSC

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coalition. The members of the FSC coalition aimed to seek out a tentative truth by promoting

two opposing Policy Frameworks, food security and food sovereignty. The following section

outlines the concept of triangulation as it relates to the interpretation of data in this study. It is

equally important to acknowledge the strengths and limitations of the qualitative method of

inquiry.

5.3.2 Qualitative research: Strengths and limitations

The strength of qualitative research is found in its interpretivist approach to social

scientific phenomena (Ryan, 2006). Such an approach to research opposes the positivism of

natural science, assumes that reality is socially constructed and aims to understand this reality by

accessing the meaning that participants assign to reality (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Rhodes

(2006) suggested that policy analysis could make greater use of qualitative tools implemented

within an interpretivist approach, including the following tools:

> studying individual behavior in everyday contexts; gathering data from many
> sources; adopting an "unstructured" approach; focusing on one group or locale;
> and, in analyzing the data, stressing the interpretation of the meanings and
> functions of human action. (p. 19)

Qualitative research allows the researcher to "create thick descriptions, their own

constructions of other people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to"

(Geertz, 1973, p. 9). A particular strength of the qualitative approach is the ability of the

researcher to create thick descriptions that "penetrate the surface layers" of the phenomenon

under study in order to discover what the phenomenon is "really" like (Bryman, 2012, p. 446).

Qualitative research also has some limitations.

Although qualitative research offers many advantages for understanding social contexts,

perhaps its greatest limitation is "the strong desire to adhere to what they see as a basic

principle…"emergence" of categories from the data (Kelle, 2005). In other words, it is precisely because action and meaning are explained in terms of their immediate context, that the *prior* knowledge of actors, and even more importantly the interrelationships between the immediate context and that knowledge, can obscure the wider social structures. Qualitative research seeks to understand the dialectic between continuity and change and Bryman (2012) confirms that "it is rarely possible to understand organizational change in quantitative studies (p. 116). In this way, RMT and the ACF, allowed me to explore how the FSC coalition maintained itself as well as how it changed overtime. The following section discusses the data collection procedures of this study.

5.4 Data collection procedures

According to Creswell (2013), qualitative data collection procedures are used when quantitative measures and statistical analyses "simply do not fit the problem (p. 40). For example, it is extremely difficult to capture the interactions among people and the differences therein with existing quantitative measures because "to level all individuals to a statistical mean overlooks the uniqueness of individuals in our studies" (p. 40). Denzin and Lincoln (2003) understand that qualitative research offers a distinct way of generating and assessing data, insofar as these methods rest upon actions (e.g., talking, laughing, working, doing) and proactive perceptions (e.g., observing, listening, reading, smelling). In this qualitative study of the FSC coalition, I investigated coalition building practices using the ACF and RMT as the theoretical framework underlying my data collection and analysis.

In qualitative studies, data can be collected in multiple forms. For this study, I conducted face-to-face, telephone and internet formal interviews with key informants. Interviews are a form of data collection that is described by some as "useful when participants can provide historical

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information" (Creswell, 2009, p. 179). There are limitations to conducting interviews. A significant limitation is not all participants may be equally articulate and perceptive (Creswell, 2013). Nonetheless, qualitative interviewing allowed for the RMT and ACF framework to guide not only the questions "posed to the informant during the interview but also [to] assist in the preliminary identification of emerging themes" (Denzin, 2013, p. 142). In a tangible sense, there was a dialectical interplay between the formation of my interview questions and the method of analysis, as both processes were informed by the ACF and RMT. Qualitative research is also personalized, as the researcher interacts with participants under study. Accordingly, on November 15-16, 2015, I attended FSC's Annual General Meeting in Montreal, Quebec. There, I had the opportunity to meet, in person, long-standing FSC members, and I observed their annual general meeting. Qualitative research is multifactorial in the sense that it encourages the use of at least two data collection techniques; in this study, both interviews and document reviews were used (Creswell, 2013). In data collection and analysis, ethical considerations must be observed. These are discussed in the following section.

5.5 Ethical considerations

This project followed the principles outlined in the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans* (TCPS 2). The Tri-Council Policy Statement outlines three principles including respect for persons, concern for welfare, and justice (Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2010). All of the decisions and actions pertaining to this study were conducted with these principles in mind and were approved by the Ryerson Research Ethics Board.

FSC is a coalition of organizations. In an effort to better understand how it built up its coalition of member organizations, I thought it was important to sample and interview some of the organizations that make up this coalition. I began by seeking to identify all of the organizations connected to the coalition since its inception in March 2001. At its inception, 21 organizations were part of the FSC advocacy coalition; however, only eight of the original organizations were members in 2012.

My recruitment was very targeted and specific. First, I obtained a list of the 21 non-profit organizations that were known to have been original FSC members due to their participation in the first ever FSC meeting on Friday, March 9, 2001. Second, the following questions were used as criteria to determine who to approach: Does this person works for a non-profit organization? Has this organization been a member of FSC between 2001 and 2012, inclusively? and Was this organization present at the first FSC meeting on Friday, March 9, 2001? (Appendix D). The eight member organizations that were identified as being FSC organizational members throughout the 2001-2012 period were approached individually (Appendix B). I then contacted eight potential participants through e-mail or telephone calls; only seven agreed to participate in this study (Appendix C). Each organization was represented by public figures whose contact information was available online. All of the contact information, including specific email addresses, were available online and publicly accessible. The participants represented various organizational members of the FSC coalition.

5.6 Recruiting participants

I selected FSC as a primary site for investigation. The primary unit of analysis in this study was organizations. I used a *snowball sampling* method (Creswell, 2011), which identifies "cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are information-rich" (p.

127). I began by identifying the groups and non-profit organizations that were in partnership with FSC at its inception in 2001 and remained on as members until 2012 (FSC, 2015). The rationale for choosing these organizations was that I was interested in the views and experiences of organizations that had witnessed and participated in the coalition building over the 2001 to 2012 period, as they could specifically speak to the change in FSC's Policy Framework from food security to food sovereignty.

In an attempt to identify organizational members that were members of the FSC coalition from its inception until 2012, I first retrieved the list of organizations that had participated in the Canadian Food Security Network/Federal Government Consultation Phone Conference Call, which took place from 11:00AM-1:00PM (EST) on Friday, March 9, 2001. Each of the 20 organizations that participated in this phone call were represented by one individual. However, only 8 of the 20 organizations that participated in the Consultation Canadian Food Security Network/Federal Government Phone Conference Call remained on as FSC members as of 2012. The participants I initially contacted for interviews were purposely selected to ensure their experiences were connected to the beginnings of FSC and the Canadian Food Security Network/Federal Government Consultation Phone Conference Call. Publicly available documents revealed that all eight of the organizations I identified had participated in the founding FSC. All but one of these eight organizational members accepted my invitation to participate in an interview, and all confirmed that they supported FSC's coalition building activities. To protect the participants' privacy and maintain confidentiality, the names of the seven participants are not used in the remainder of this study. Representatives from each of the seven organizations were comfortable discussing the maneuvering for resources, their role in coalition building and the policy shift from a food security Policy Framework to a food

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sovereignty Policy Framework. Although some of these organizations were apprehensive about shifting to a food sovereignty Policy Framework, each remained an FSC members through 2012. I was specifically interested in the experiences of these seven consenting organizations, that together formed the core of the organization and had built and maintained the FSC advocacy coalition. I should note that although only eight of the original organizations have remained on board as FSC coalition members as of 2012, FSC's membership grew to over 90 organizational members between 2001 and 2012.

Once I identified the seven organizations I wished to study, I contacted an individual representative of each organization through e-mail, requesting an interview (Appendix C). Seven organizational participants agreed to participate. Following each interview, I used a snowball sampling technique to identify more participants (Dudley, 2005). Specifically, I asked each of the initial interviewees to identify other key informants, i.e., "people who have special knowledge and experience" (p. 205), who they believed were key in building and maintaining the FSC coalition and who had participated in the shift from a food security Policy Framework to a food sovereignty Policy Framework. The initial seven interviewees identified fifteen further members to interview. I contacted each of these informants, via e-mail, requesting an interview. I continued snowball sampling until I reached saturation, whereby each participant began naming organizations I had already interviewed. Between November 25, 2015 and March 10, 2016, I conducted 21 telephone, Skype and in person interviews. The sample included five academic FSC members who were employed by various post-secondary institutions and 16 non-profit FSC members who were employed by a non-profit organizational member. All of the participants had significant experience in mobilizing resources for FSC and the interview questions elicited a

deeper understanding of the experiences of non-profit organizations in building a coalition to advocate for food policy changes at a national level (Smith, 1986; Smith, 1999).

5.7 Informed consent

Consent was obtained beginning with the initial telephone contact I made with individuals (Appendix C). During these telephone conversations, the participants who expressed a desire to proceed were advised that a consent agreement/letter would be forwarded by email. In the case of individuals who were not reachable by telephone, I directly forwarded them an e-mail inviting them to participate in the study. The participants who expressed interest in participating were asked to complete the participation agreement form (Appendix F). In each initial recruitment e-mail sent to possible participations, I included the consent form for participants to review.

5.8 Voluntary nature of participation

Each participant was informed that he or she would have the right to skip questions or voluntarily withdraw from the study at any point in time. They were informed that their decision to take part (or not) would in no way influence their current or future opportunities and relationship with Ryerson University, or with the researcher involved in the study. If they were to withdraw after or during participation, all of the data related to their participation would be immediately destroyed and they could change their mind at any point and withdraw their consent at any time. None of the participants who voluntarily consented to participate in the study have withdrawn their consent. In signing the consent agreement (Appendix F), the participations were told that they were not giving up any of their legal rights.

5.9 Risks, benefits and confidentiality

To address the risk of funding loss for participants and organizations, in addition to keeping all of the individual and organizational names (and other identifying information) confidential, I changed the wording and approach of my interview questions so that instead of asking participants to provide me with a direct criticism of the government, I asked them to provide me with recommendations about how to improve existing practices (Appendix E). The only time I asked direct about the government was in one interview question that asked, "If you were giving advice to the government, what would be the most important issue in your mind that will make food sovereignty a possibility in Canada?" In an effort to keep all the names of people and organizations (and other identifying information) confidential, the participants' and organizations were assigning a numerical alias that replaced their names (i.e., "M1," see Appendix E).

5.10 Data storage

The data were collected in accordance with the Privacy and Confidential protocols established by the TCPS 2. More specifically, I audio-recorded interviews and ensured that all of the data, including but not limited to the audio recording, transcription and notes, were kept in a locked filing cabinet at my home. The transcripts and impression notes were kept confidential by assigning numbers to individuals. The data were stored and handled in the following ways: I made back-up copies of computer files; used high-quality recordings for the audio-recorded interviews; developed a master list of types of information gathered; protected the confidentiality of participants by masking their names in the dataset; and stored files electronically on a password protected USB. In terms of data storage, all of the documents pertaining to each interview will be kept for a minimum of two years following the interview date and then

physically and electronically destroyed. In terms of data dissemination, as in all research and as I noted in the informed consent form, the organizations and the public will have access to the results of my research (Appendix F). As indicated in the informed consent form, the data collected in this study will be used for publications, conference presentations, journal publications, books and additional educational services. Although the public will have access to the results, none of the organizations' names will be attached to the results.

5.11 Interviews

I conducted semi-structured interviews with FSC's members, all of whom were engaged in initiatives related to food policy making in Canada (Albright, 2011). In all 21 semi-structured interviews (Dworkin, 2012; Gubrium & Holstein, 2003), I asked participants questions related to the role of various actors in the policy subsystem and direct questions about their experiences building a coalition to advocate for a national food policy (Albright, 2011). The interviews followed a script and all of the questions were open-ended, allowing the exploration of the participants' experiences and insights (see Appendix E).

In some of the interviews, the questions were altered to accommodate the flow of the conversation, while keeping within the parameters of the interview protocol. For instance, if and when participants made peculiar comments or insights, follow-up questions were asked. Each of the interviews were digitally recorded with each participant's permission. All 21 participants agreed to the digital recording of the interview. Each of the participants was informed that the interview would last approximately an hour; in practice, the 21 interviews ranged in length from 26 minutes to 120 minutes, and averaged 90 minutes.

5.12 Incentives and study location

The participants were not provided with any incentives and were not reimbursed for out of pocket expenses. Each participant was asked to indicate a place in which he or she would be most comfortable to conduct the interview, and that ensured privacy. As I am a doctoral student at Ryerson University, living just outside of Toronto, and many of the participants resided outside of Ontario, many of the participants suggested Skype or telephone interviews. As a result, eighteen interviews were completed via telephone and/or Skype and three were conducted in person. Of the three in-person interviews, two took place in the participant's work offices in Toronto and one took place in a quiet commercial establishment.

5.13 Document review

In addition to interview data, I reviewed and analyzed secondary data. Secondary data sources are sources created following an event and include interpretations of events (McCulloch & Richardson, 2000). Secondary data sources allow for the analysis of the wider context by adding various perspectives on the events that have occurred (McCulloch & Richardson, 2000). The secondary data I reviewed were publicly available assembly reports from FSC's National Assemblies, which took place in 2001, 2004, 2005 and bi-annually from 2006 to 2012.

These reports are publicly available on the Internet, and I accessed them through a Google search. I read and analyzed these reports using patterned coding, which allowed me to identify themes related to the ACF and RMT. The patterned coding was based on identifying the advocacy coalition's Deep Core beliefs, Policy Frameworks and Tools for Implementation. These three belief systems are explained in more detail in the theoretical frameworks chapter of this study. The patterned coding was also based on identifying coalition resources including information sharing (e.g., how coalitions use information to strengthen their coalition and

support arguments for their policy beliefs), mobilizing troops (e.g., how coalitions use members to support their activities), finances (e.g., how advocacy coalitions use financial resources to gain access to financial research and think tanks that can sway public opinion) and skillful leadership (e.g., how leaders emerge in coalitions to guide the coalition towards a coherent belief system, strengthen their focus and secure financial resources).

The intention of the document review was to analyze FSC's coalition-building practices at their national assemblies. Specifically, it focused on the development of their shared policy beliefs and resource maneuvering. This review provided insights into the leadership skills necessary to found FSC in 2001 and to maintain it until March of 2012, when FSC hired its first executive director (ED). The review also provided insights into the difficulties of securing funding and how the People's Food Policy Project (PFPP, 2011) secured funding from the Heifer Foundation. In terms of belief system changes, the document review's purpose was to identify FSC's Deep Core beliefs, Policy Framework and Tools for Implementation.

5.14 Data interpretation and analyses

In terms of data interpretation, the concept of triangulation provides a means to interpret the cultural constructions of meanings. Data interpretation is conducted in an effort to enrich the understanding of a particular phenomenon by combining various methods and data analysis (Creswell & Clark, 2006). I chose triangulation as a tool for the interpretation and analysis of my findings, and it is generally defined as "the use of multiple methods in the study of the same object" (Denzin, 1978, p. 296). In addition, I chose triangulation because it provides the opportunity to examine phenomenon in a variety of settings and at different points in time and space. During my observations, I employed data triangulation by conducting interviews with FSC coalition members while also analyzing FSC's national assembly reports. The use of

triangulation not only allowed for the systematic analysis of multiple data sources, but also an inductive analysis that allowed patterns, categories and themes to evolve as the data collection proceeded. These were then related to the ACF and RMT (Denzin, 1978).

The specific process used for data interpretation followed the guidelines given by Ryan and Bernard (2003). With the participants' permission, each interview was audio-recorded. I then transcribed the audio-recorded data verbatim. In an effort to ensure that the subtleties of language were captured, I re-read and edited the transcriptions while simultaneously listening to the interview. As advised by Ryan and Bernard (2003), I began the process of identifying themes while I was transcribing the recording, creating a memo of my thoughts. The transcripts were then entered into Atlas.ti (2011), a computer software program used to organize and analyze qualitative data sources. I re-read the documents, noted my initial thoughts and highlighted key passages. Consistent with Ryan and Bernard's (2003) approach, I utilized scrutiny techniques to look for themes. These techniques included noting the following patterns: repetitions insofar as "topics that occur and reoccur"; indigenous typologies or categories including cultural domains or classifications; metaphors and analogies to deduce schemas or underlying themes; transitions that were "naturally occurring shifts in content which may be markers of themes"; and theory-related material that might help to understand "how qualitative data can illuminate questions of importance to social science and in particular, the ACF" (pp. 90-93).

In terms of coding, interview questions were specific and thematic to the analytical frameworks used, and thus it was far less complicated to group and order the data (Hammersley, 2013). I used the two-cycle method provided by Saldaña (2013). The first coding cycle created introductory codes by outlining the content and concepts within the transcripts. The first cycle was purely descriptive coding, in which I assigned a topic

code to a large segment of data in an effort to begin organizing the data. This was a preliminary method that assisted me in breaking down and organizing significantly large amounts of data. The second coding cycle consisted of pattern coding in which I identified and summarized re-occurring themes in the data while simultaneously focusing on codes that identified the most common, important and most analytically relevant codes within the dataset. I analyzed the texts by first discovering themes and subthemes, winnowing themes to a manageable few by deciding which themes were important; establishing hierarchies of themes; and finally linking themes into the theoretical model, the ACF and RMT. The emerging categories and theme(s) were identified as the data were being collected (Ryan & Bernard, 2003).

In each of the transcripts and documents, I looked for the presence of concepts and themes related to the research questions raised by the application of ACF and RMT to coalition formation and development. Emerging concepts and themes were guided by the ACF and RMT and in particular were focused on the identification of the Deep Core, Policy Framework and Tools for Implementation of the belief systems and on the identification of resource maneuvering related to information, mobilizing troops, financial resources and skillful leadership. The strategic formation of interview questions led to a coding process that produced a thick description of themes, subthemes and concepts/items that enabled me to tell a story about the people under investigation and more specifically, the FSC's advocacy network.

5.15 Conclusion

This chapter presented the research design, data collection and data analysis techniques of this study as well as ethical issues related to the research. More specifically, this chapter described my research methodology, explained the sample selection procedures, described the

procedure used to design the instrument and collect the data, and provided an explanation of the qualitative procedures used to analyze the data. The next chapter will explore the findings of this study as they relate to advocacy coalition formation.

Chapter 6: Coalition Formation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents some key findings and discussions based on the interviews I conducted, documents I analyzed, and the academic literature I reviewed. In order to protect the identity of the participants in this study, no demographic variables or summaries of the participants were collected or will be shared here, as is typical in the opening of a findings chapter. Instead, I will only share that they were an organizational member of the Food Secure Canada (FSC) coalition between 2001 and 2012. This chapter is the first of two chapters that aim to explore the main research question of this study: how the FSC coalition surmounted internal threats to collective action. Using the FSC as a case study, this chapter seeks to provide answers to this main research question through the distinct category of coalition formation. In particular, this chapter aims to answer this question by specifically exploring the role of coordinating shared beliefs within a coalition. As discussed in chapter four, this study uses two theoretical frameworks to examine the findings: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT). The ACF is used as a theoretical basis to explain how the beliefs of an advocacy coalition are like the "glue" that keeps coalition members together over time. The ACF outlines three types of beliefs: Deep Core beliefs, which make up a coalition's underlying personal philosophy; Policy Framework, which refers to the fundamental policy positions that help in implementing the coalition's Deep Core beliefs; and Tools for Implementing policy goals. In addition to the ACF, this study makes use of the theoretical lens of the RMT to explore how the FSC coalition formed. The RMT is a theory of action that focuses on the role of collective action in coalition formation. This chapter analyzes the findings of this study through the politically oriented category of RMT, which concentrates on organizational

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resources that build a coalition, such as its membership base, communication network, and leadership.

This chapter begins by identifying challenges to the FSC coalition's formation and the ways that the coalition overcame those challenges. Specific challenges to coalition formation are discussed in terms of tensions around making sectoral priorities, creating coalition building strategies, and defining Policy Frameworks. Finally, the ways the FSC coalition overcame these challenges are explored insofar as how it established common ground and created consensus around common objectives.

6.2 Tensions in terms of coalition building strategies

In June 2001, the Working Together: Civil Society Input for Food Security Conference was held at Ryerson University. This conference was a gathering of cross-provincial civil society organizations and individuals who wanted to underwrite and establish a national response to the World Food Summit—Five Years Later (Levkoe et al., 2012). The Working Together conference was also the first gathering of what was to become Food Secure Canada / Sécurité Alimentaire Canada (FSC-SAC) in 2006 (Koç & MacRae, 2001). Despite the ability to gather civil society representatives from across the country with the goal of "showing the Canadian government that they cannot get away with including civil society in the policy making process and then expecting civil society to roll over and play dead" (M1), several tensions arose within the FSC coalition around coalition building strategies and over a "big tent" versus "activist" approach (see Appendix A). It is important to note that although it would have been helpful to know which specific FSC coalition members advocated for the "big tent" or "activist" approach, no interviewee commented on this particular matter.

It was between 2001 and 2006, during the coalition's formational years, that these differences and tensions arose creating significant challenges for the members of the Canadian Food Security Network. More specifically, this tension was due to key differences between two groups regarding the envisioned organizational model of the FSC coalition. One member of the FSC coalition remembered the Working Together conference as the beginning of tension arising between some of the strongest voices very much in favour of the "people's movement" kind of activity that had an "activist" orientation and those who preferred a "big tent" approach to coalition organizing (M2)[1].

The aim of the "big tent" approach was to create a more clearly focused advocacy coalition that advocated for food security. Within this group, widely known as the "big tent," were food security proponents who supported a "big tent" model that represented diverse views on food security. As one FSC coalition member stated,

> and it became clearer I think to all of us [FSC coalition members] that there was a role to be played out in the national level, by an organization that was big enough to tent, that it could help advance issues that were common to all the members of the organization (M6).

Several FSC coalition members who advocated for the "big tent" approach claimed that it offered several advantages.

Interviewed members identified the following advantages. First, the "big tent" approach provided grounds for people to negotiate around their policy priorities and enabled dialogue regarding policy belief systems with opposing groups. Under this model, sectors and interest

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[1] To protect the identity of participants, interview participants were coded as M1, M2, M3.

groups in opposition with each other would dialogue with one another. As one FSC coalition member described,

> [it was] interesting…when people from the other sectors [came into the FSC coalition] they took the food concepts from their own sector and re developed [meaning] in their own terms… some … just took the definition of food security and reframed it as a function of health, and we said hold on a cotton picking minute, don't you dare take the definition and define it as a function of health, any more than farmers (M6).

A second advantage of the "big tent" orientation was that it allowed FSC coalition members to recognize that their particular and unique interests were part of a much larger food movement with various interest groups, as well as being part of other movements. For example, the "big tent" approach would permit potential partners, such as industry, whose policy priorities may be diverse compared to those of the FSC coalition, to negotiate with the FSC coalition around policy priorities. As one FSC coalition member affirmed, "industry also understands that it cannot carry on like civil society and the food movement do not exist" (M17). Another FSC coalition member, who clearly stated of the "activist" orientation that "we [M9's organization] were not interested in the journey," said that "effective coalition building" includes meeting with industry:

> We [M9's organization] would meet up at the Chamber of Commerce, those in social planning Council and a couple of unions pushing on advocacy, on social housing issues. So when you build a unique coalition, with different kind of partners, there's different kinds of chemistry, than the quality of the fight is brilliant, it becomes way up, and the quality, and the impact is very strong. If you take a coalition of all like-minded people, you are going to stay as like-minded people on the fridge of society (M9).

Third, the "big tent" model would allow FSC coalition members to uncover the parallels between various movements, such as the environmental, anti-poverty, affordable housing, and public heath movements. One FSC coalition member who advocated for the "big tent" approach

elaborated on movement connections, stating that, "we have always talked about FSC as being a big tent, and we've always talked about the parallel between the environmental movement and the food movement" (M6). Gibb and Wittman (2013) applied a three-pronged environmental justice approach to food justice, characterizing food justice as "ensuring that food system benefits and burdens are shared fairly; ensuring equal opportunities to participate in food system governance and decision-making; and ensuring that diverse perspectives and ways of knowing about the food system are recognized and respected (p. 3). According to some FSC coalition members, this kind of open dialogue between various sectors and interest groups would only be possible through a "big tent" approach.

At the same time, some FSC coalition members became increasingly frustrated with the "big tent" orientation, and there emerged an "activist" orientation toward coalition building that advocated for food sovereignty. As one FSC coalition member said, "food sovereignty sounds like a radical idea. And it is, but it is not that radical you know if you look at it" (M20). This frustration came about as some FSC coalition members began to question how big the tent could actually get. As such, an "activist" orientation, also known as the people's movement, emerged that included the local organizing of people. The result was an FSC organization that was more prepared to "push the envelope to go outside of the normal Policy Framework" of food security (M2). The so-named "big tent" vision was defending the housing of various interest groups and providing a forum for discussing and debating various methods for achieving food security. Whereas the vision of the "activist" group wanted the FSC coalition to adopt a more radical, political agenda at the expense of including certain interest groups. As one FSC coalition member described,

I mean nonprofits are not set up to transform the system, they are set up to often be more conformist in their actions, so to make their conditions more livable, make things work a little bit better, some are hesitant to adopt food sovereignty because they get that that means a radical shift (M4).

Both the "activist" and "big tent" groups were thus battling for air time and stating who had been more "hard hit" with food insecurity. One FSC coalition member recalled the tension as "the whole thing [Working Together conference] just blew up, acrimony" (M8). Clearly, from this first conference, two different visions of the FSC emerged: one vision was a "big tent" model and the other vision was one with "activist" tendencies:

There were two competing kind of visions – one was about having one big tent, and having everyone inside, and the more activist members of FSC were saying, "no, we need to take a stand on certain things, we need to move faster, there is urgency to act, so [we need] more of this activist [thinking], and we cannot please everybody, folks" (M8).

One FSC coalition member spoke of the challenges these two groups posed for coalition formation, stating that, "there were tensions around how political FSC should be, and I think at the beginning the idea was everyone and everybody was welcome and then that started to change" (M12). These two competing visions of a "big tent" approach versus an "activist" orientation could not be reconciled easily and tensions continued to form, this time related to sectoral priorities.

6.3 Tensions around sectoral priorities

Following the 2001 Working Together: Civil Society Input for Food Security Conference in Canada, a Canadian Food Security Network (later to be named the FSC) formed, and on October 16, 2004, the Canadian Food Security Network held a second national assembly in Winnipeg, Manitoba. During this assembly, the Canadian Food Security Network agreed to establish an organization to advocate on food security issues (Levkoe et al., 2012). It is important

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to note that the term "assembly" was chosen intentionally to highlight the advocacy coalition's underlying purpose, which was "to bring people together from across the broad spectrum of food security work to share insights and expertise" on food issues (Food Security Assembly, 2004, para. 1). More specifically, the term "assembly" was a term used to gather diverse sectors "under one banner: food security" (Food Security Assembly, 2004, para. 2). The assembly was a unique opportunity for diverse sectors across Canada to network with each other "across the many mandates that exist in the work of food security" (Food Security Assembly, 2004, para. 3*).* The participants of the assembly included a diverse range of individuals and organizations that were already working on food security issues in Canada, as well as internationally; these included, but were not limited to, all sectors, including fisher-folk, academics, health, government, farmers, and international and domestic non-profit organizations (Food Security Assembly, 2004). The participants who attended the assembly made goals that included increasing public awareness around issues related to food insecurity, reflecting on how to present issues relating to food security to the public, and encouraging and refreshing individuals and groups involved in food security work (Food Security Assembly, 2004).

Despite the success of the assembly, the efforts of the Canadian Food Security Network to mobilize its membership base were deeply affected by tensions between and among various groups in terms of their sectoral interests, concerns, and priorities. Non-profit organizations representing different sectors of the population, such as farmers, fishers, consumers, producers, community food security groups, and food banks, tended to have quite different objectives. As one FSC coalition member said, "there's no issue in the food movement that cannot be used to divide people. So the fact that we overcame division is a huge achievement" (M8). While not all sectors within the food movement were represented within the FSC coalition, there were major

groups with differing priorities. For example, groups representing farmers were more concerned

about commodity prices and government subsidies, and could not understand some of the

concerns of those who were defending vegetarianism for animal rights purposes. As one FSC

coalition member exclaimed,

> at some food security associations… all of their banquets now… you know they
> have banquets, they charge $50, it is all local which is fine, but it is all vegetarian.
> And I am part of the dissidents. Stop telling us we have to be vegetarians to be
> interested in food security. I find it a very Anglo Canadian, middle-class type of
> concept, vegetarianism (M5).

Differences among farmers also existed, especially in those sectors protected by marketing

boards (e.g., dairy and eggs), which produce mostly for domestic markets, as well as larger scale

export-oriented farmers specializing in cattle, grains, and oil seeds. Fishers who had made

significant investments in fishing gear could not relate to conservationists worried about long-

term sustainability. One FSC coalition member described the tension as having

> to do with the fisheries… because once again you have organizations representing
> the fishery, the fishers. Organizations that are very tied in with the corporate
> sector and do not challenge the corporate sector. And then there are some that, in
> fact, try to separate themselves from the dominant structures in the system (M19).

Another source of tension existed between the representatives of food banks and the

community food security groups. While the food bank groups focused their advocacy efforts on

income security, the community food security organizations advocated for an integrated and

multifaceted response to the needs of local communities, supporting individuals to not only cook

food but to grow and share food. For example, an FSC coalition member working with a food

bank expressed that "if we [food bank groups] wander off into just [focusing on providing]

healthy and culturally appropriate food, that takes it away from the family income argument,

which is what we see is the big nugget…we need a safety net and a basic income that touches all

families" (M9). In other words, if food banks focus on providing an income to families first, then the questions of the cultural appropriateness and healthiness of diets can be addressed. Another FSC coalition member described this tension as a fishbowl, whereby

> the real tension remains… you know that the movement only marginally addresses issues of income security. And of course, the food banks are particularly preoccupied with this [income security] and of course a lot of the organizers in the room are trying to organize things that are trying to get us out of the [food] banking (M3).

FSC coalition members argued that despite these tensions, many food banks have shifted their focus, with many members citing The Stop Community Food Centre as a great example of how a food bank has recast itself over time. Such food banks still do the rudimentary work necessary to be considered a food bank, but they also have many community development initiatives. Nevertheless, a tension remains in this regard, with some thinking that the FSC coalition may not really be paying enough attention to income while paying attention to other food system issues. These findings clearly outline the sectoral tensions present in the FSC coalition during its formational years. The ACF and RMT speak to the role that diverging beliefs have in emerging conflict and the importance of mutual interest in promoting action; these insights also focus on the policy actors of advocacy coalitions as the main sources of social change. The following paragraphs analyze the sectoral tensions that arose in the FSC coalition in light of the theories espoused by the ACF and RMT, and the strategies used to overcome those tensions.

First, coalition members worked toward establishing shared beliefs. This is an important factor as, according to Zafonte and Sabatier (1998), conflict within coalitions increases with belief divergence. The FSC coalition therefore complicates the ACF insofar as two opposing visions emerged and these visions became two different beliefs and thus created conflict and tensions. One vision held that the coalition should include multiple interest groups in the form of

a "big tent" approach and the other vision was held by the "activist" group, which advocated that the coalition should be more radical in nature, even if it challenged certain interest groups. The "big tent" vision believed that all views of food issues should be represented within the coalition, even if they contradicted each other. However, the "activist" approach advocated for a vision more radical in nature and aimed for the coalition's policy agenda to be more "activist" in nature, challenging the food system on terms which might not appeal to some interest groups, including, but not limited to, food bank operators and farmers and their practices. Both of these visions were held as contentious and worked as a divisive force within the coalition.

The ability of division to strike through the coalition and break it was a significant threat, as the vision of any organization serves a distinct function of defining what future success looks like for the organization. A vision is thought of as that which often propels an organization and inspires members to work toward future aspirations. A vision also has the ability to assist a coalition in achieving its goals, regardless of changes in leadership. The significant disagreements that occurred between FSC coalition members in establishing the coalition's vision demonstrate that, at the very outset of a coalition forming and mobilizing itself, coalition members, often referred to as policy actors, may each side with two opposing visions; this may in turn create conflict, even *before* there can be disagreements about beliefs and the objectives of the coalition. In this way, the very nature of a coalition's vision being future oriented places the longevity of a coalition at considerable risk when there are significant disagreements. While the ACF states that it is belief divergence that creates conflict, this study adds a layer of complexity to this analytical framework by establishing that a coalition's vision as it relates to coalition building strategies may also indeed lead to conflict.

Second, as outlined, differing sectors were present within the FSC coalition, meaning that a common ground needed to be worked toward. Each sector had their own vested interests and urged the coalition to prioritize their sector's interests in the coalition's advocacy efforts. This finding is significant as RMT declares that the foremost cause of action lies within the mutual interest of coalition members (Hart, Sinclair, & Veugelers, 2009). Therefore, given the multiple differing interests represented and the sectoral tensions outlined above, the ability for the FSC coalition to act would have been hindered, if not blocked completely. The conflict between the FSC coalition members around the two visions – big tent and activist – permeated the coalition insofar as it was an impediment to coalition formation, but only to a limited extent as they eventually built a common ground and created consensus around shared objectives.

Third, the creation of common ground was enabled through the work of FSC policy actors and did not come out of institutional factors. These findings thus confirm the RMT perspective, which proposes that policy actors, instead of institutions, play a critical role in social change (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003). The RMT builds on the ACF here, whereby, according to the ACF, it is natural that belief divergence will occur in a coalition and that this will lead to conflict; however, the RMT claims that it is policy actors who create change, and thus, to some degree, they must work together through conflict to achieve their ends (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1998). The findings of this study therefore affirm both theoretical frameworks, as the FSC coalition overcame conflict through the use of transformative practices on the part of policy actors to achieve consensus around common objectives, what the ACF identifies as Deep Core beliefs. Deep Core beliefs translate into Policy Frameworks, which are basic beliefs and policy strategies concerning a policy area (Henry, 2011). In the FSC's case, the Deep Core beliefs of the FSC coalition are its three common objectives – zero hunger, a sustainable food system, and

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healthy and safe food – and these objectives converted into the FSC's Policy Framework, which shifted from food security to food sovereignty. In terms of the ACF, it is important to acknowledge that conflict does occur through the convergence of differing beliefs, while at the same time acknowledging that policy actors can work together to create consensus over shared objectives to create social change. Before creating common objectives, however, the FSC coalition had to overcome differences amongst members regarding coalition building strategies and sectoral tensions, and it did so by establishing common ground. The next section examines how that was accomplished and discusses the insights gathered by applying the ACF and RMT to understand the role of friendship and ideology between coalition members in forming and maintaining the FSC coalition.

6.4 Creating common ground: big tent and activist views coming together

For the FSC coalition, shared values and years of activist involvement amongst its members helped to create common ground, which assisted it in overcoming challenges to forming a coalition (see Appendix A). Among the FSC's membership, members' experiences in advocating for "social justice, peace, labour, environmental and feminist movements prior to joining FSC created a common bond between coalition members" (M15). Eventually, this bond led to a collective sense of "belonging, common language" (M11), and "easier dialogue" among members (M6). There are two significant factors that made FSC coalition members – big tent and activist – able to create common ground.

First, a factor that made common ground possible was a shared ideological background, based on years of activist involvement prior to forming the coalition. In the case of the food movement, ideological similarities between FSC members reflect years of collective action for social change that has a long history in Canada, stemming as far back as the labour activism of

the early 20th century (Laycock, 1990). For example, early 20th century progressive labour activism in Canada involved agrarian feminists who fought against the physical toil and isolation of farm women, as well as their economic dependence on men, while at the same time raising funds for local hospitals and promoting civil education for families (Crowley & Morrison, 1997). The FSC coalition was comprised of members who were part of activist traditions and had been actively working for social change in the post-WWII era, such as through feminist, labour environmentalist, and civil rights movements. There was a general understanding between FSC coalition members about important key concepts such as social justice, equality, women's rights, human rights, and sustainability. These values provided a common language and common orientation shared by most people in the food movement and in the FSC coalition. In fact, there was a lot of cross pollination (e.g., interchange between different ideas) whereby some FSC coalition members were working in various movements all at the same time (e.g., community development, child poverty, housing, and universal health care). Many FSC coalition members interviewed stated that members approached the issue of food as a political issue, and one FSC coalition member claimed that all members "came from a political place where people fought for their political views" (M8). Additionally, FSC coalition members saw themselves as political actors who were working in various movements, but who were all fighting for a political view that they identified as "left-wing." One member recalled the experience of coming from an "activist" background and of suing a large company in the late 1970s due to a "no women hiring policy" (M12). This FSC coalition member further elaborated on how their own activism experience and the activism of other coalition members contributed to forming the FSC coalition and to building consensus:

> You know about [coalition] building work… [leaders are successful] by bringing coalitions together. And so I think, and this is of course true of Cathleen Kneen and true of Mustafa Koç, with Kathleen Gibson, very true of our current Executive Director, Diana Bronson, we are a people who know how to build coalition politics (M12).

FSC coalition members' similar experiences thus brought to the table a shared ideological background of viewing food as a political issue that ultimately enabled them to establish common ground.

The second factor was that the shared vision and manifesto created at the second national assembly was an intentional process. FSC coalition members stated that creating the three pillars was an intentional attempt to capture the passion that was common to all FSC coalition members, and this included the desire to have a voice at the national level of policy making for food policy in Canada. These findings clearly outline the contributing factors that enabled the FSC coalition to establish common ground during its formational years. The ACF and RMT perspectives speak to the important roles of friendship and similar ideology between coalition members in coalition formation and maintenance. The following paragraphs analyze specifically how the FSC coalition was able to establish common ground between "big tent" and "activist" FSC coalition members, in light of the theories espoused by the ACF and RMT.

First, the RMT claims that a coalition's "staying power" is directly related to having members who know each other over an extended period of time. In other words, when coalition members are not directly engaged in political conflict, or when there is a dip in political conflict, it is friendship between coalition members that keeps the spirit of collectivism alive (Hart, Sinclair, & Veugelers, 2009). FSC coalition members affirmed that this was indeed the case, as they referred to themselves as a nucleus of people who had known each other for several years, even decades, and said that this enabled them to build consensus. Also, coalition members stated

that, at the time the coalition reached consensus around its shared common objectives, the creation of the three pillars assisted them in working toward their common goal of a national food policy, even more so than if they had attempted to do so as individual members of the food movement outside of the FSC.

Second, the ACF states that ideological similarity makes coalition formation possible (Henry, 2011). According to the ACF, collaboration between coalition members is said to increase where there exists perceived agreement (Sabatier, 1998). In the case of the FSC, coalition members had ideological similarities that were carried into the coalition from their previous activist involvement outside of the coalition. These ideological similarities reportedly manifested themselves through perceived agreements around being "left-learning," politically speaking. Thus, although the "big tent" and "activist" groups were dissimilar in terms of the organizational model they envisioned for the FSC coalition, their prior political work in the community helped them to consider ways in which they could establish common ground. Third, the RMT asserts that the underlying social dynamic of action for a coalition is oftentimes the result of conflict (McAdam et al., 1996). In the FSC's case, the coalition's membership base was very much engaged in political conflict, and this orientation toward conflict and political activism was understood by members as the force that allowed members to create a common ground. In other words, the members of the FSC coalition were able to achieve consensus because they had been in conflict positions fighting for political views prior to joining the coalition. The following section explains how FSC coalition members managed to create consensus around three objectives, and then applies both the ACF and RMT in an effort to understand the role of transformative approaches to consensus building.

6.5 Creating consensus around common objectives

At the second national assembly, several workshops were held and a series of presentations were made. The three days of workshops facilitated discussions on a number of stimulating, challenging, and proactive topics ranging from the production, obtaining, and preparation of food, the effects of climate change on food security domestically and internationally, issues related to childhood obesity, and roles that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) should play in our food supply (Food Security Assembly, 2004). Along with the several informational workshops held at the assembly, the assembly was successful in the sense that toward the end, after a long discussion around the differences of opinion present within the coalition, a consensus around three objectives was reached. These objectives were shared values that centered around the commitment to advocate for zero hunger, a sustainable food system, and healthy and safe food. One FSC coalition member who was present recalled the chair of the assembly facilitating consensus for the three objectives as follows:

> … "Does anybody in this room disagree with this? No, everybody said yes. Okay, the second one is creating a sustainable food system… Does anybody disagree? No. The third one, healthy and safe food for all. Does anybody disagree? Nobody disagrees." … We said, look we have three general principles, we should not push any further than this. These are enough to move forward (M15).

The adoption of these objectives was a crucial event at the assembly that enabled FSC coalition members with different perspectives and priorities to agree to work together. The FSC coalition utilized two transformative approaches to create this consensus around common objectives (see Appendix A).

The first of the transformative approaches that the FSC coalition utilized in creating consensus around its three objectives involved the influence of the second-wave feminism that emerged in the 1960s. While working for women's rights and working toward eliminating

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gender inequalities in both the public and the private sphere, feminist activists began addressing issues such as the gender division of labour at home (Brady, Gingras, & Power, 2012). The women's movement and feminist politics sought to achieve equality in terms of political, economic, and social rights for women. The demands of the women's movement, and more specifically, the organizational strategies of feminist politics had important influences on the food movement (Brady, Gingras, & Power, 2012). For example, scholars in the area of feminist inquiry have recently explored the ways in which women produce and reproduce, as well as resist and transform, gender ideologies in their everyday practices that lead to them feeding themselves and others (Brady, Gingras, & Power, 2012). The following paragraph will elaborate on how feminism brought a whole new understanding about gender that FSC coalition members utilized to achieve consensus in their coalition around their three objectives.

FSC coalition members stressed the importance of including women in consensus making, and talked about the role that women played in creating an atmosphere conducive to facilitating consensus. As one coalition member stated, "if you only have one or two [women], it doesn't really make a whole lot of difference. And, if there are more women than men, there is a critical mass somewhere, where the consensus building is a hell of a lot easier and that is my observation" (M5). Feminist insights about the importance of listening reportedly played a role in overcoming differences:

> How do we build consensus? We build consensus by listening. It was the key
> thing because … people would just sit and yack and listen. And if someone is
> quiet for a long time, somebody says "Susie, are you thinking of something else
> or, what is going on here?" Or "do you just want to listen right now?" And that is
> just the way we work. Not necessarily in an annual meeting, mind you. And I
> really like the use of a circle, the ever-moving circle … that is a very consensus
> model (M1).

FSC coalition members believed that the food movement was and still is connected to, informed by, and supported by the women's movement, and agreed that feminist approaches assisted the coalition in achieving consensus.

Second, FSC coalition members utilized a consensus building approach grounded in principles of peacemaking circles under the restorative justice model. In peacemaking circles, consensus is dependent upon giving everyone a voice and an opportunity to speak with respect (Student Peace Alliance, n.d.). Circle processes are "simple and organic" and are founded upon skills such as listening, communicating, and healing, which lay a great foundation for building community activists (Bazemore & Schiff, 2001, p. 234). While the purpose of peace circles is to strive to encapsulate the various interests of all in reaching a final decision, when this is not possible, then those who disagree with the final decision must be willing to "live with the outcome" (Bazemore & Schiff, 2001, p. 234). FSC coalition members described the coalition's use of peace circles as a reflection of a deep commitment to collectivization and collaborative approaches. One FSC coalition member spoke to the dynamics of the peace circles in reaching consensus around the three pillars of the FSC:

> We were very skillful in making sure we had a process in place that invited people to share their views…and also to just continue to keep the conversation going. That is something that really inspired me. I always felt confident when I was going to be with FSC people that I was going to be with people who want to know what people are thinking and want to be sure that we listen to each other. I always had that kind of comfort. I think it is a unique organization in the country, from that point of view…where they honour consensus processes (M19).

FSC coalition members claimed that consensus became possible through using the peace circles to elicit ongoing dialogue about how the coalition would "define problems as well as possible solutions as a collective entity" (M4).

These findings clearly outline the transformative approaches the FSC coalition embraced during its formational years to create consensus around its three objectives: zero hunger, a sustainable food system, and health and safe food for all. The ACF is helpful in analyzing these particular findings related to the role of transformative approaches to consensus building in reaching consensus over the FSC's three objectives, also known as Deep Core beliefs. The following paragraph will analyze the importance for advocacy coalitions to overcome differences so as to establish consensus around shared beliefs.

These findings bring out three analytical insights related to the ACF. First, according to the ACF, the Deep Core beliefs of an advocacy coalition are normative in that they prioritize various ultimate values (Weible & Sabatier, 2005). In relation to the ACF in this regard, FSC coalition members were able to gain consensus in prioritizing the ultimate values of zero hunger, a sustainable food system, and healthy and safe food. To accomplish this, the FSC coalition used two consensus building approaches grounded in feminism and restorative justice. Second, the ACF claims that Deep Core beliefs are the most resistant to change, and this is seen in the case of the FSC coalition as its three common objectives have not changed from their adoption of them at their second national assembly. The three common objectives of the FSC coalition describe what *ought* to be and these beliefs have acted like a glue that has held the coalition together for over 10 years (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996). Third, the FSC coalition's ability to reach and maintain consensus on three common objectives ultimately means that these Deep Core beliefs have transcended any disagreement related to Policy Framework beliefs, such as the disagreement of the FSC coalition members to adopt a food security or Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. These findings therefore reveal the solidifying potential of bringing coalition

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members together to agree on a set of fundamental beliefs, and illustrate how agreement on beliefs can keep a coalition together despite emerging and differing policy positions.

In fact, the establishing of Deep Core beliefs in an advocacy coalition is akin to taking on an identity (Sabatier, 1993). In the quest to establish consensus, advocacy coalitions should consider making linkages between coalition members' personal and professional experience, in order to explore connections that will encourage them to create a new shared identity (Sabatier, 1988). These findings also reveal that consensus does not happen by chance, but is achieved through strategies that assist coalitions to build agreement around Deep Core beliefs. However, even though the FSC coalition was able to establish Deep Core beliefs, tensions arose next regarding which Policy Framework ought to be used to implement those Deep Core beliefs.

6.6 Tensions in terms of defining Policy Framework

From September 30th to October 1st, 2005, the third national assembly took place in Waterloo, Ontario (Levkoe et al., 2012). The delegates registered at the assembly represented a variety of sectors, including farmers, non-governmental organizations, international groups, academics, public health professionals, and governments entities from across Canada (Desjardins & Govindaraj, 2005). The significance of this particular assembly was the birth of Food Secure Canada / Sécurité Alimentaire Canada (FSC) as a non-profit organization. On the last day of the assembly, the National Food Security Assembly officially launched the FSC coalition (Levkoe et al., 2012), set up to speak to issues related to food insecurity on a national level (Desjardins & Govindaraj, 2005).

This assembly was a monumental one due to both the FSC coalition being officially inaugurated as a non-profit and because it was at this time that the language of food sovereignty was introduced to the coalition (FSC, 2011). Tensions developed between FSC coalition

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members who advocated for the coalition to embrace a Food Security Policy Framework and those who felt the FSC ought to promote a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. These tensions emerged during the formational years of the coalition, between 2001 and 2006, when the FSC coalition was the "Canadian Food Security Network," and during its early years, between 2006 and 2012. The following section outlines the tensions pertaining to these two Policy Frameworks, while chapter 3 has explained the principles and tenets of each Policy Framework in detail (also see Appendix A). The first section below outlines the reasons why some FSC coalition members supported the Food Security Policy Framework. The second section discusses why others supported the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework.

6.6.1 Defending the Food Security Policy Framework

Not all FSC coalition members were comfortable with the food sovereignty agenda, but instead embraced a Food Security Policy Framework. First, FSC coalition members understood that food banks perceived the adoption of food sovereignty as a threat to their organizational apparatus and vocational calling. The adoption of food sovereignty as a Policy Framework meant that the FSC coalition had taken an active stance against the corporations (e.g., Loblaws, McCain) that food banks often rely on. Such corporations control the food system, and by virtue of this, the coalition members who were food bank supporters did not agree with the change to a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. Those coalition members who supported food sovereignty often criticized food banks, claiming that in a multicultural and multi-faith country such as Canada, charitable food provision should be secularized (many food banks have a religious affiliation); furthermore, one member said, "at the very least, the provision of food should be a government-led initiative" (M14). This finding reveals that some of the FSC coalition members' fear of "rocking the boat" with funding sources led them to resist the Food Sovereignty Policy

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Framework and defend the food security Framework as a viable policy position. In other words, the policy positions that coalition members take may not necessarily be based on the best interest of the coalition, but instead are based on their perceived and also well-founded fear of losing financial resources.

Second, members of the FSC coalition suggested that in the transition from a food security to Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, food banks were left on the fringes of the FSC's work. As one FSC coalition member claimed, those organizations who opposed the shift to food sovereignty were

> … the organizations [including food banks] who do not have a strong political agenda but had a more mainstream development or mainstream service oriented approach were uneasy with the idea that we should use this network [the FSC coalition] to advocate or to push policies rather than to share information and use of dialogue (M12).

A FSC coalition member who represented a food bank described the unease and sense of being philosophically on the fringe of the coalition as it moved toward a Policy Framework based on food sovereignty:

> I think there is a lot of push for food sovereignty and to get natural food, healthy food, etc., … Families that we know that are struggling in Canada and they need economic access to food, and after that economic access is done and then the conversation about food sovereignty is much, much easier (M10).

The tension between FSC coalition members who advocated for a Policy Framework based on food sovereignty and those who wanted a Policy Framework based on food security was very apparent.

Third, opponents of the food sovereignty approach felt that it would belittle their efforts to fight against hunger. One FSC coalition member in support of food security stated, "there has

been tension from the beginning… between income security and food banks with sustainable agriculture people who push for food sovereignty" (M3). Such FSC coalition members felt as though the word sovereignty hid issues related to hunger; one member referred to it as a "cloak that would distract from what is so important to us [food banks]" (M7). Coalition members questioned the practicality of the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, and advocated for a practical emphasis on physical and economic access as opposed to food sovereignty: "to be able to say to families in Canada that we believe in food sovereignty, here are some seeds, and by the way we cannot get your plot of land, it is under snow or someone else owns the land…well, we do not see that as a practical thing to bring families" (M9).

Fourth, FSC coalition members also identified the resistance to food sovereignty as being tied to its lack of a clear definition insofar as the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework was considered to be inaccessible and not easily understandable for organizations to take up or individuals to embrace. Opponents of food sovereignty would argue that it was not yet a word that many low-income community organizers, service providers, and service users could comprehend easily. One FSC coalition member asked: "What does sovereignty mean? Does the community control it? Does the province control it? Does the municipality control it?" (M19). Defenders, on the other hand, pointed out that food sovereignty was not a strange concept, but a concept in accordance with the three FSC pillars. As one member recalled: "I think FSC has always fought for food sovereignty as a value, they [the FSC coalition] were just not using a particular term to express that. So there has always been this challenge in the food movement and debate over terminology" (M7). FSC coalition members thought food sovereignty was in the fabric of the FSC even before it was officially adopted as part of its policy platform, and believed that "eventually food will enter into the language of organizations due to the compelling nature

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of the differences with the Food Security Policy Framework" (M14). The significant challenges around the definition and clarity of the language of food sovereignty imply that, in order for the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework to be fully understood and embraced, it was just a question of waiting for the concept to be more clearly defined.

Fifth, opponents of the food sovereignty perspective also claimed that it was too political, contentious, and an impediment to policy change at the federal level. As one FSC coalition member stated, "when we identified the direction of food sovereignty, people said, 'we do not want to be that political' and they meant it" (M19). Other coalition members believed that a shift to a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework meant that the coalition would become weaker in advocating for policy change at the federal level. As one member said, "I was very interested in being able to make a difference at a policy level, which meant that I would probably have to adopt a less radical stance" (M2). Pragmatic concerns around securing industry donations also came into play. As another member stated, "if we started to sound like we are fundamentally trying to change the very system that we are getting all of our donations from… how will we keep our funding?" (M21).

Supporters of food sovereignty, however, argued that the FSC coalition should fight to build a system where reliance on donations will end. One member claimed that there was so much tension because at first glance food security and food sovereignty might appear to be the same Policy Framework, but that the former has much to do with "good will and charity," whereas the latter looks at "transforming systems and [making] structural changes" (M20). The FSC coalition members who supported food security and those that advocated for food sovereignty had very different reasons for supporting each of these positions. The next section

looks at those members who advocated for the coalition to endorse a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework.

6.6.2 Advocating for the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework

This section outlines why, despite opposition, FSC coalition members advocated for a shift to food sovereignty. First, members who supported a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework claimed it addressed a fundamental tension between "producer interests" and "consumer interests." They felt that the Food Security Policy Framework was more administrative and often articulated as being primarily concerned with *how* food is consumed. In contrast, the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework utilized a "bottom up" approach insofar as it was primarily concerned with *who* produces the food, including farmers, small-scale fishers, and Indigenous peoples. It also aimed at local producers gaining control of the food system and ensuring their interests are being met.

Second, for some coalition members, the term food security also implied that the coalition only worked within Canada; however, food sovereignty proponents believed the FSC coalition should have a local, provincial, federal, and international focus. Proponents of food sovereignty believed this international Policy Framework meant seriously considering food producers living in the global South, who had developed the term. These members wanted the coalition to aim to have honest dialogue between producers and consumers within the global North and global South. Unlike the Food Security Policy Framework, which was very specific to North America and the United States, the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework had a very different ideal behind it. FSC coalition members believed that the essence of food sovereignty, both in terms of how the Policy Framework was developed and where the Framework came from, spoke very much to what they thought the food movement ought to be doing. These

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members suggested that the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework made room for an international perspective, but also for advocacy for food policy on a national level. As one coalition member claimed, "as food sovereignty began to be articulated through FSC and we began to integrate food sovereignty into the People's Food Policy Project (PFPP, 2011), organizations had begun to see how food sovereignty could articulate their concerns on the national level, like never before" (M7).

Third, food sovereignty proponents advocated for this Policy Framework because they saw it as considering the political nature of the food system itself, not just food access. Speaking to this, one member said: "the food system is a political system, it is used politically, it is organized in a political way… in a hierarchical way, actually" (M19). As well, food sovereignty asks "what about the land and the sea, and how it is being treated, how about all of the aspects of the ecological system in relation to how food is developed, and all of that – it is a political question" (M19). Fourth, FSC coalition members justified advocating for a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework due to its ability to challenge the commodification of the food system. By transforming the view of food as "sacred," FSC members had the ability to challenge the notion of food as a commodity to be traded. As one FSC coalition member explained, "food sovereignty is a direct response to liberalism, [to] capitalism, to looking at injustice, to talking about power, the rights of women, talking about the rights of marginalized people" (M4). Fifth, FSC coalition members identified that the move to a Policy Framework based on food sovereignty meant a move toward challenging the corporatization of the food system, re-appropriating control of the food system, and challenging the commercial uses of land and water that, more often than not, exclude and defer the rights of Indigenous users.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the strength of the Indigenous food sovereignty movement lies in its ability to build relationships with various networks. A prime example is the network it has established with Food Secure Canada. At FSC's first AGM, the coalition agreed to focus on building relationships with Indigenous peoples and with Quebec (Kneen, 2011). At the same time, it is interesting that the FSC coalition members who were participants in this study avoided speaking to how FSC built relationships with Indigenous peoples and the Indigenous circle. In fact, this may have been a divisive point that participants choose not to speak to during the course of my interviews. Cathleen Kneen (2011) explained these tensions that existed within the coalition, as not all members of Food Secure Canada "see colonialization as a critical issue for both Indigenous people and settlers" (2011, p. 88). Kneen (2011) also pointed out that Indigenous food sovereignty was by "no means widespread, even within Food Secure Canada's constituency" (p. 88). Nevertheless, FSC has made strategic decisions to implement an Indigenous perspective in its work and it is important to acknowledge the development of this perspective during its formational years. The following paragraphs will describe the development and impact of the Indigenous perspective within Food Secure Canada.

In FSC's 2008 assembly, First Nations speakers were featured on every plenary panel including several workshops (Kneen, 2011, p. 88). Kneen (2011) recalled one panelist who spoke in the tradition of Indigenous storytellers and who "was awarded an enthusiastic standing ovation despite having used up all the discussion time by going well over his allotted time" (p. 88). There were a series of speakers at the assembly, which brought in a unique perspective from the Global South. One particular workshop titled *Building Food Sovereignty from the Ground Up* was also held and it explained the original concept of food sovereignty from the perspective of the global peasant movement. The workshop began its discussion by first referencing the work of La Via

Campesina and provided an opportunity for delegates to discuss how food sovereignty has been interpreted in Canada (Kneen, 2011; Wittman, 2009). Several groups, including but not limited to groups from Quebec and Indigenous groups in Canada, shared that they had already been working from a food sovereignty perspective (Kneen, 2011). It was during the formational and maintenance years of the FSC coalition that the Indigenous Circle was created and its impact was especially made during the People's Food Policy Project.

The Indigenous Circle at Food Secure Canada remains a "space where Indigenous people and non-Indigenous allies can share, strategize, and act to ensure food sovereignty for Indigenous peoples" (Food Secure Canada, 2015). The primary principle that guides the work of the Indigenous Circle – The People's Food Policy project (2010) includes the following:

> We respect and honour Indigenous peoples' knowledge, land and worldview. We recognize Indigenous peoples as the original inhabitants of this land. The longer people have inhabited a place, community, bioregion, food system the more expert they are in that place. We look to Indigenous people for guidance and to work in partnership in changing destructive relationships with Mother Earth to healthy relationships for everyone and future generations (Indigenous Circle, p. 1).

While the Indigenous Circle of Food Secure Canada still endorses this primary principle in their work, it is important to recognize that the Indigenous Circle formed during the work of the People's Food Policy Project (PFPP) which occurred during 2008-2012. During this time, the leaders that formed the Indigenous Circle agreed to develop a protocol for engagement with Indigenous people (Kneen, 2012). However, before agreeing to do this, they insisted that the PFPP add a seventh pillar of food sovereignty, known as "food as sacred" (Kneen, 2012). The First Principles Protocol for Building Cross Cultural Relationships was created by the Indigenous Circle in an effort to provide a firm foundation for the development of the PFPP and the pillar of

"food as sacred" (Indigenous Circle, 2010). The principles developed in this document were informed by both the historical and current experiences of Indigenous peoples living in Canada and by a group of "community-based activists, scholars and storytellers who work on issues of food sovereignty" (PFPP, 2011, p. 3). The Indigenous Circle (2010) of the PFPP put forward three major policy recommendations:

> First, coordinate a cross-sectoral approach to analyzing, forming, and influencing policies through the lens of Indigenous food sovereignty in the forestry, rangeland, fisheries, agriculture, mining, environment, health, and community development sectors. Second, designate Indigenous hunting, fishing and gathering reserves; work with local Indigenous nations to map out and set aside adequate tracts of land within the national and provincial parks and lands designated as "crown" land for the exclusive use of Indigenous hunting, fishing and gathering. Third, create provincial and federal budgets that specifically finance food programs for both urban and rural remote northern communities. While these are short-term food security solutions, permanent solutions must lie within the domain of inherent sovereignty to our lands and ways of life. Where applicable recognize the sovereignty promised at the time of Treaty signing (p. 9).

While developing these policy recommendations, the members of the Indigenous Circle recognized that the importance of including the complexity of colonial history in their discussion paper (Indigenous Circle, 2010). As a result, they made a firm decision to clearly refer to the sources which informed their thinking and recommendations by citing various authors (e.g., Morrison, 2006; Morrison, 2008). For the Indigenous Circle, the implementation of these policy recommendations would require that Indigenous peoples be able to establish their own projects under Indigenous leadership, whereby they can determine what should be "grown, cooked, taught and shared" (PFPP, 2011, p. 8; LaDuke, 2008; 2012).

Despite its internal challenges, today Food Secure Canada serves as an example of a solidarity between both Indigenous peoples and Non-Indigenous peoples who work together to protect and promote Indigenous food systems.

For example, in 2013, Food Secure Canada expressed solidarity with the Idle No More

movement issuing the following resolution:

> We stand with Idle No More and call upon the Government of Canada to remedy
> its historical and current policies of colonalization, assimilation and destruction,
> and work with each Nation to define and engage in an appropriate relationship
> based on respect and responsibility and full recognition of the right to self-
> determination. Healing and rebuilding contemporary relationships between
> Indigenous peoples and the Canadian government and honouring original nation-
> to-nation agreements are crucial steps towards achieving food sovereignty and
> food security for all. (Desmarais & Wittman, 2015, p. 46).

Prior to this, Food Secure Canada joined voices to convey indignation at the Federal

government's cuts to Indigenous health organizations (Food Secure Canada, 2015). On May 7,

2012, Indigenous human rights activist, Ellen Gabriel, from the community of Kanehsatà:ke

made a presentation to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in Ottawa.

During her presentation, Gabriel respectfully presented two significant concerns and urged the

Special Rapporteur to make strong recommendations to Canada to address these concerns. First,

Gabriel (2012) pointed out that "since 2006, the Canadian government has claimed both

internationally and domestically that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

"has no legal effect in Canada"" (p. 6). Gabriel (2012) also mentioned that Indigenous peoples as

well as civil society groups have called upon the government to abandon "such erroneous and

misleading positions" (p. 6). Second, Gabriel (2012) pointed to the way in which at a G8 and

G20 summit, Prime Minister Stephen Harper invited international corporations to Canada for

reasons related to Canada's rich resources and lenient tax laws. Gabriel (2012) claimed that this

was irresponsible "as most of Canada remains – without the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of

Indigenous Peoples" (p. 7). Gabriel (2012) affirmed that the right to food is *more* than ensuring

freedom from hunger but involves government policies which combat the monopolization that

corporations have on the "intellectual property of Indigenous peoples such as corn, beans and

squash among others" (p. 6). Finally, Gabriel (2012) brought awareness to the issues related to

defining "right to food":

> However, inherent right has not been defined causing a lack of respect of
> Indigenous peoples right to lands and resources. We have been relegated to tiny
> patches of land as wards of the state under a patrilineal and colonial system of
> government which continues to undermine our dignity and rights. Land and tenure
> rights of Indigenous peoples are human rights and should not be separated from
> each other (p. 7)

These continue to be contentious issues and the Indigenous Circle at Food Secure Canada (2015)

remains committed to inform the food movement across Canada of these issues. Finally, the

Indigenous Circle at Food Secure Canada has offered great insight into how behaviours can

change across the food system to recognize that food is sacred.

Overall, these findings help explain the reasons why some FSC members embraced a

Food Security Policy Framework while others advocated for a Food Sovereignty Policy

Framework. The perspectives gathered from the ACF and RMT speak to the role of Policy

Frameworks in shaping FSC coalition members' policy beliefs. The following paragraphs

analyze the FSC coalition's emerging Policy Frameworks in light of the theoretical viewpoints of

the ACF and RMT.

First, the ACF suggests that Policy Frameworks serve as the primary perceptual filter for

actors within a policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988), and assist policy actors in determining their

(perceived) allies and opponents (Weible & Sabatier, 2005). Along these lines, Henry (2011) has

asserted that disagreement should be a strong predictor of non-collaboration. In a tangible sense,

the argument that the ACF puts forward is that Policy Frameworks structure policy actors' choice

of network interactions, and that these interactions occur primarily with policy actors who have

similar Policy Framework beliefs. In the case of the FSC, there were two opposing visions – a

"big tent" and an "activist" orientation – for coalition building strategies, and the vision coalition members aligned themselves with was *determined* by the Policy Framework they supported. Those FSC coalition members who advocated for a "big tent" coalition building strategy were often supportive of a Food Security Policy Framework, whereas those who embraced an "activist" coalition building strategy were often supportive of a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. Thus, the coalition building strategies acted as the primary filter through which FSC coalition members viewed food system issues and influenced which Policy Framework they endorsed. This finding adds a layer of complexity insofar as it proves that it is not just Policy Frameworks that shape network interactions; a coalition's vision and approach to coalition building can shape those interactions and also shape Policy Frameworks. This finding is significant as it underscores the roles of coalition building and organizing strategies in influencing the policy positions that coalitions choose to orient themselves to and ultimately advocate for. Due to the important role that the FSC coalition's building strategies played in influencing its Policy Frameworks, it is important to examine how the FSC coalition was able to overcome challenges to coalition building through finding common ground, and this can be explained through ACF's concept of Deep Core beliefs.

With respect to the ACF, Deep Core beliefs are most resistant to change, while Policy Frameworks beliefs are easier to change but still somewhat resistant (Sabatier, 1993). The FSC coalition's Policy Framework shifted from a belief grounded in a Food Security Policy Framework to Food Sovereignty Policy Framework; this change did not come easy and there was resistance, as outlined above. These findings reveal that, for some coalition members, the Food Security Policy Framework was first about feeding people and *then* pushing for better food and food system reform, whereas the food sovereignty Framework started from the opposite point,

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one of pushing for food system reform *first*. To this end, identifying the varying perceptions of

coalition members regarding where the starting point ought to be in tackling policy problems is

crucial to coalition building. These findings on the FSC coalition illustrate that, at times, groups

can emerge within an advocacy coalition seeking to tackle policy issues and may each present

differing Policy Frameworks. The ACF contends that consensus on the Policy Framework is the

"primary force that brings actors together in the process of forming advocacy coalitions" (Matti

& Sandstrom, 2010, p. 10). However, the FSC case confirms that it is Deep Core beliefs that

keep an advocacy coalition together, despite differing Policy Frameworks. Advocacy coalitions

should therefore still seek to embrace various Policy Frameworks, as it is a coalition's achieved

common objectives (Deep Core beliefs) that will sustain that coalition over time.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the challenges and opportunities of forming the FSC coalition.

Overall, I found the FSC coalition surmounted threats to collective action through creating a

shared belief system. A key objective of this chapter was to discuss the nature of the tensions that

arose in the FSC coalition in creating a shared belief system around Deep Core beliefs and a

Policy Framework, and how it overcame these challenges. It was important to explore the

challenges that impeded collective action.

First, I found that tensions emerged in terms of coalition building strategies in that there

was both a "big tent" and an "activist" oriented group; the former sought to keep the coalition

aimed at providing a space for dialogue among diverse interests promoting a Food Security

Policy Framework, whereas the latter embraced a more political, radical agenda that advocated

for a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. These findings demonstrated that coalition building

strategies, and more specifically, a coalition's vision, play a vital role in directing a coalition's

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members in choosing which Policy Framework they will advocate for. Second, I found that the differing sectoral priorities of FSC members led to contention; in fact, the more divergence of beliefs existed, the more conflict between coalition members occurred. Furthermore, efforts to mobilize membership were affected by tensions around sectoral priorities between various groups, including, but not limited to, small-scale and large-scale farmers, small-scale and large-scale fishers, consumer and producer interests, and food banks and community food security organizations. Yet, despite such contention, FSC coalition members acted as policy actors who overcame conflict and threats to collective action. The FSC coalition overcame challenges to collective action by achieving common ground, and by creating a belief system using transformative practices to achieve consensus over three objectives: zero hunger, a sustainable food system, and healthy and safe food. Shared values and years of activist involvement among members who had previous involvement in social justice, peace, labour, environmental, and feminist movements helped in the creation of a common bond. This bond led to a collective sense of belonging and common language around shared ideologies, and facilitated easier dialogue among members. Building consensus around three objectives was an intentional act, and was reached using two transformative approaches: a feminist approach and restorative justice approach. Adoption of the three objectives was a crucial event that caused coalition members with different perspectives and priorities to agree to work together. These findings demonstrate that advocacy coalitions must achieve consensus over Deep Core beliefs in order to hold the coalition together over time.

Chapter 7: Coalition Maintenance and Change

7.1 Introduction

The findings and discussion presented in this chapter are based upon the insights shared by participants involved in the study, document analysis, as well as the supplementary academic literature reviewed. This chapter explores the main research question of this study, which asked how the Food Secure Canada (FSC) coalition surmounted threats to collective action. This chapter is the second of two chapters that aim to answer this question by focusing in on coalition maintenance. The FSC coalition overcame challenges to collective action by maintaining itself through securing resources. This chapter uses the theoretical lenses of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) to explore the organizational resources and assets used by the FSC coalition to advance itself, namely, knowledge and information based resources, organizational resources, financial resources, and leadership. The second half of this chapter discusses how the FSC coalition maintained itself in spite of the changing policy beliefs within the coalition, and aims to address what factors led to a shift in its Policy Framework. This section outlines how a desire for change and inspiration from the experiences of coalition members led the FSC coalition to build an engine of change for a different Policy Framework outside of the coalition and then return it to the coalition, using a method that Sabatier (1998) called a Tool for Implementation.

7.2 Organizational Assets and Resources: Applying the ACF and RMT

The role of coalition resources in maintaining advocacy coalitions has been a regular feature within the ACF, and scholars have placed particular emphasis on this area by offering a typology of coalition resources: (1) information; (2) mobilizing troops; (3) financial resources; (4) skillful leadership (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). Sewell (2005) also confirmed that in an effort

to influence policy, members within coalitions seek out available resources that allow them to use strategies in a variety of settings. RMT, on the other hand, serves to uncover the social conditions and strategies that social movements, including coalitions, use to influence resources and transform power into success (Buechler, 1993; Hart, Sinclair, & Veugeles, 2009; Kubler, 2001; McAdam et al., 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Schlager, 1995). By examining how the FSC coalition utilized resources as outlined by the ACF and RMT, one can better understand the organizational factors that led to the rise, persistence, and decline of advocacy coalitions. The following sections will explore each type of coalition resources described above, drawing from the analytical insights of the ACF and RMT.

7.2.1 Knowledge and information based resources

Oftentimes non-profit organizations work with very limited resources related to knowledge generation and knowledge mobilization. Yet, they are still required to provide evidence using credible knowledge and information to support their policy arguments. Due to their limited resources, non-profit organizations are often required to collaborate with universities and academics who work at universities to gain assistance in conducting their research. Given the very limited resources that the FSC coalition had to work with in this area during its maintenance years, it had to collaborate with universities to find academic researchers. In the FSC coalition's case, its partnership with universities and academics provides proof that partnerships are crucial to maintaining a coalition over time.

First, one outcome of the FSC coalition partnering with universities was the access gained to knowledge. Indeed, the ACF suggests that exchange of information involves actual interactions among advocacy coalition members that help them seek out information and advice from sources within their coalition. One such example is how "an environmentalist might rely on

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information from a like-minded university researcher to support their argument" (Weible &
Sabatier, 2005, p. 185). In the case of the FSC, coalition members stated that they created
partnerships with universities by collaborating with academics who supported their policy
arguments, identifying those academics they wanted to collaborate with by determining whether
they were like-minded allies. For FSC coalition members, being "like-minded" involved having
activist tendencies, as well as supporting the FSC's goal of developing and promoting a national
food policy based on a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. One FSC coalition member
claimed, "there have been lots of academics who have been allies in this…The academics who
are really active in this work also do have an activist streak, which makes them acceptable to the
movement" (M1). For example, Dr. Nettie Wiebe, at the time a farmer and a professor at the
University of Saskatoon and the head of the National Farmers' Union, was one of those
academic-activists involved with the La Via Campesina and was instrumental in bringing the
idea of food sovereignty to the FSC coalition (M14). In addition, academics Annette Desmarais
and Hannah Wittman lent resources, support, and the capacity for sustaining an argument for
food sovereignty when the coalition engaged in policy disputes (Weible, 2005; 2007). FSC
coalition members reportedly preferred to work with activist academics who did not limit their
research to finding facts, but also committed to social change (M13). This finding points to the
role of various coalition members, including analysts, researchers, and consultants within
coalitions, in supporting advocacy coalitions in changing their Policy Frameworks, and in the
case of FSC, in adopting food sovereignty as its focus.

Second, while FSC coalition members sought out information from like-minded allies,
those allies were also able to provide a critical sense of inquiry and assist them in thinking more
deeply and critically about the policy options they would present to the coalition. This fits with

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the ACF, which presents the "depth of challenge" factor as important in coalitions, in that it is crucial that coalition members challenge taken-for-granted assumptions (Gramson, 2007). FSC coalition members further described the relationship between themselves and academic partners as symbiotic and as working quite well. As one FSC coalition member stated, "most of the academics who were involved in FSC are really what I would call activists academics…[who] prompted us to look beneath the surface and I think [this was the] real strength of the movement" (M11). In other words, academics who supported the FSC coalition provided technical and scientific information that assisted in not only defining policy problems (e.g., looking beneath the surface), but also in providing policy options. The ACF affirms that empirical knowledge provided by academics is able to help coalition members determine the strengths and weaknesses of solutions and desired outcomes; it is this type of support that is vital to advocacy coalitions being able to choose the options that are of the greatest benefit (Albright, 2011).

Third, in addition to conducting research, the FSC coalition often turned to academics for assistance because they had access to media outlets. Relatedly, the ACF claims that information is often used as a way to influence public opinion (Weible, 2007). Coalition members reported that, when academics spoke to the media on behalf of the FSC, they brought credibility to the coalition. As one coalition member stated, academics "represent a voice that often has credibility… there is a lot of credibility that community people have, but there is always this kind of assumption of a built-in credibility when academics get asked these kinds of questions" (M11). Academic partnerships therefore enhance the credibility of a coalition in promoting their policy agenda, as they have the ability to influence the opinion of others.

The ACF also argues that advocacy coalitions use financial resources to finance research and think tanks that can generate information, as well as hire public relations experts. However,

in the case of the FSC, this study's findings demonstrate that non-profit coalitions have to rely on their own membership base to conduct research and offer public relations expertise (Heinmiller, 1975). The next section will therefore outline the role of membership as a major advocacy coalition resource.

7.2.2. Members as resources

The second category of organizational resources an advocacy coalition needs to secure is the ability to mobilize its members. Advocacy coalitions that have very limited financial resources rely on their membership when facing adversity, such as "reductions in government-sponsored benefits" or "additional government oversight and regulations" (Weible, 2007, p. 100). In the case of the FSC coalition, the findings resulted in two main analytical insights regarding the organizing of coalition members.

First, having limited resources, the FSC coalition relied on its members to maintain the coalition and further build its membership base, which resulted in significant challenges related to funding and human resources. According to Weible (2007), advocacy coalitions often rely on mobilizing their membership base when there are significant threats to their resources. In fact, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) claimed that political outcomes are often dependent on whether support has been mobilized. At times, advocacy coalitions will request assistance from supporters in participating in events to "help achieve objectives" (Weible, 2007, p. 100). For example, members are often asked to "engage in letter-writing campaigns, to provide labor in electoral and fund-raising campaigns, and to participate in public demonstrations and other activities" (Weible, 2007, p. 100). The significant organizational challenges the FSC coalition experienced were due to its reliance on membership for support, which was the result of a shortage of funding and human resources.

All members supported the FSC coalition on a volunteer basis. As one member stated: "[We are always short of] money and time… we are all volunteers" (M3). FSC coalition members claimed that the only way that they could actively participate in the coalition was if they managed to make their work for the coalition be a part of their employment activities. As one member expressed,

> I was not given much time to work on it from my employer… There was a request by some people [FSC coalition members] to see if I would run to become chairperson and I asked my union if they would support the coalition… It is a big job to do it right… And it would take a lot of my time in a year and they were not willing to have me to devote my time to it.… There [were] so many issues… lack of time and money [were the biggest] (M16).

As this member demonstrated, FSC coalition members who were able to dedicate time to building the coalition's membership had to attempt to make their coalition-related work fit within the umbrella of their positions within their organizations. Many could not achieve this, leaving the FSC's coalition building efforts to the skills of the leaders of the coalition, and specifically to the co-chairs of the FSC. According to RMT scholars (for example, Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Jenkins, 1983), a "free-loader" problem exists in advocacy coalitions, whereby coalition members take advantage of the benefits of joining a movement and do not work toward attaining the goals of the movement. Due to their financial and time-related challenges, FSC coalition members were at risk of being labelled "free-loaders " (Hart et al., 2009; Jackson et al., 1960) This speaks to the ongoing struggle that organizations in the non-profit sector face; in continuing their advocacy efforts, many find it difficult to secure time and finances and often have to turn to their membership base for support. When a coalition's membership base is unable to provide support, it is important to examine factors such as human resources and financial

issues that might be compromising their ability to support the coalition. In the case of the FSC, it pressed forward with recruiting members through holding national assemblies.

To overcome challenges, the FSC coalition mobilized its members through hosting national assemblies throughout the country, which created bonds, promoted solidarity, and brought together diverse members. This is the second analytical insight provided from the findings. Successful recruitment of coalition members requires that potential members be in contact with an advocacy coalition, and this underscores the need for coalitions like the FSC to actually go into communities to make contact with potential members (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Myers, 1994). The FSC coalition did just that by holding national assemblies in an effort to reach the public and "blocs" of already highly organized non-profit organizations and academics. As one FSC coalition member described it, the "assemblies gave [the organization] an excuse to go out and keep proselytizing in our own communities and constituencies" (M1). The FSC coalition used the assemblies as a way to "facilitate contact" between potential participants within various communities and the FSC coalition.

According to FSC coalition members, membership grew after having assemblies in different parts of the country (M6), and this impacted the coalition in two ways. First, FSC coalition members understood that holding national assemblies created bonds and promoted solidarity and shared ownership. As discussed by various scholars in the literature, such national assemblies serve as the collective setting necessary to create solidarity between participants (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Jackson et al., 1960; McAdam, 1988). FSC coalition members' participation in assemblies and sharing of various ideas "created internal bonds as the sharing [of] ideas created solidarity," and more specifically, "a sense of shared ownership of the coalition" (M13). Solidarity was also reportedly demonstrated in the fact that members became

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"repeat participants" in the FSC national assemblies. Second, FSC coalition members found that the national assemblies were extremely important in terms of garnering members from diverse backgrounds. The coalition aimed to recruit individuals already involved in networks outside of the FSC, yet those networks were still associated with the food movement; these are known as "associational networks" (McAdam, 1982). According to members, the FSC's focus being centered around food made it a unique non-profit, as food functions as a nexus for an array of members involved in associational networks, such as environmental, urban planning, health, anti-poverty, and Indigenous groups. The FSC's successful recruitment of members in the networks contained with the larger food movement demonstrates the importance of recruiting coalition membership from already existing groups that are associated with the larger scale movements to which coalitions belong (McAdam, 1982). Overall, then, the assemblies held were pivotal to the FSC's success. An advocacy coalition must not only secure membership, however, but also financial resources in order to maintain itself over time.

7.2.3. Financial resources

According to the ACF, the financial resources of a coalition are a proven asset and thus a coalition's value is based on its ability to secure additional resources (Mawinney, 1991). Financial resources can afford an advocacy coalition the means necessary to finance research and think tanks that can generate information in an effort to alter the policy process (Weible, 2007). The FSC coalition faced a major challenge in securing financial resources, and this had an affect on its ability to maintain itself over time.

Recent fundraising restrictions on advocacy set for not-for-profit organizations have created severe limitations for securing financial resources. Triggered by the Harper government, these restrictions have often been referred to as the "advocacy chill" (Evans, Richmond, &

Shields, 2005). The advocacy chill refers to the federal government, in particular, the Canada

Revenue Agency, determining that a non-profit organization can claim charitable status only if it

does not allocate more than 10 percent of its financial resources to advocacy-related activity

(Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). In the face of this restriction, and without much hesitation

from its membership base, the FSC coalition "made a commitment to remain a political

advocacy organization, rather than a charity" (M1). The implications were that, while it could

remain an advocacy-based organization, the FSC forfeited its ability to secure funding from

government sources, making securing funding extremely difficult. Although it would have been

helpful to know whether "big tent" or "activist" oriented FSC coalition members objected to this

decision, no interviewee commented on this particular matter. Remaining an advocacy-based

organization meant that the FSC coalition had to become financially dependent on its

membership, as well as search out foundations and private funding bodies willing to donate to

the coalition. The following paragraphs discuss findings and the ACF and RMT perspectives

regarding how the FSC coalition overcame challenges to secure financial resources.

First, due to the status of the FSC coalition as a non-profit and not a charity, it became

increasingly important that the coalition find allies that understood the goals the coalition was

trying to achieve (M14). As such, a group of FSC coalition members with the goal of wanting to

advance a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework submitted an application to Heifer International

in an effort to secure the financial resources necessary to conduct research through the People's

Food Policy Project (PFPP); one member stated that "securing funding from Heifer International

was key because they gave a lot of money to the project" (M5). Heifer International (2017) is a

non-profit working to eradicate poverty and hunger through sustainable, value-based holistic

community development. FSC coalition members described the challenge of securing funding

for their organization and acknowledged that Heifer International was a funding body that was more supportive of progressive movements. As one FSC coalition member stated, "Heifer International was very supportive of FSC…being an advocacy group [but] sometimes politics or bureaucrats do not look at advocacy very positively" (M18). Forming alliances with like-minded funders such as Heifer International was important for coalition maintenance. FSC coalition members elaborated on this political obstacle, claiming that securing funding for the PFPP outside of Heifer International was extremely difficult, because many funders were very afraid of funding policy and advocacy work, with many thinking it was, "like pouring your money into a black hole…and so no one is moving any progressive policy agendas forward" (M13). Whereas the ACF argues that in order for advocacy coalitions to maintain themselves over time, securing funding is necessary to allow them access to political appointees who can influence policy, the "advocacy chill" is a tangible phenomenon of funding bodies hesitating to grant funding to advocacy groups that may be considered too political (Weible, 2007). In this way, securing funding impacts coalition maintenance insofar as the presence or absence of funding either promotes or compromises an advocacy coalition's ability to create the research necessary to galvanize advocacy coalition members into building Policy Frameworks, just as the PFPP assisted the FSC coalition in developing the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. Despite these challenges, through funding support for the PFPP from major foundations such as Heifer International, the FSC managed to shift its Policy Framework toward change.

Second, FSC coalition members identified that the way to overcome obstacles to securing funding involved the ability to build relationships. RMT's application of cultural diffusion suggests that the more integrated potential funders are with the coalition, the quicker they will adopt the coalition's policy perspectives (Norris, 2002; Pinard, 1971; Vrablikova, 2014). The

concept of cultural diffusion can be applied in the case of the PFPP, as FSC coalition members relied on the relationships built with individuals who were connected to funding bodies and also convinced and supportive of the Policy Framework shift to food sovereignty. For example, one FSC coalition member explained the importance of the Nyéléni Forum in shaping the beliefs of the individuals who attended and were employed at Heifer International, which funded the PFPP:

> when we came back… someone from FSC had a part time, or had a short-term contract with Heifer International and so they managed to get us some funding for the Food Policy Project, which was a project to create a framework of food sovereignty within the food movement in Canada. So that's how that happened. And so we just bust our gut to do it (M1).

FSC coalition members believed that securing funding was a matter of "affiliation by association"; one coalition member described it as "the way that people get major grants anyway is setting [up] a personal relationship within the granting organization" (M19). Coalition members elaborated further on the connection between securing funding through relationship building with funding organizations, alluding to the fact that relationship building for funding purposes is a difficult painful process. As one member said, it was "important work, and it was painful work" (M6). Another FSC coalition member talked further about the capacity of the PFPP's "leadership, who were able to make the connections necessary to be able to sell the PFPP" to funders (M19). FSC coalition members cited Amanda Sheedy, the PFPP's coordinator, as the initiator of securing funding for the PFPP. One FSC coalition member declared this of Amanda Sheedy:

> she did an incredible job of building – this is one of her strengths, is that she is this incredible networker and is able to make all of these connections. And this is the type of person you need in [this] kind of job [securing funding], somebody who is listening and building connections constantly, finding relevance (M13).

The case of the FSC coalition, and more specifically, those FSC coalition members who worked to secure funding for the PFPP, demonstrates that in spite of barriers, where there is a will to build relationships, there is a way to secure funding. The following section explores leadership as the fourth main resource important to the maintenance of advocacy coalitions over time.

7.2.4 Leadership as resource

FSC coalition members identified "leadership" as residing with three chairs between 2001 and 2012: Mustafa Koç (2001–2006), Cathleen Kneen (2006–2011), and Eric Chaurette (2011–2012). Although it would have been helpful to know how the leaders were selected and whether they were "big tent" or from an "activist" orientation, no interviewee commented on this particular matter. One FSC coalition member discussed how leadership in the FSC coalition "resided in a couple of people, and luckily, those are and were people who have a deep commitment to all of the ideals of FSC that have developed over the years" (M19). Each of the three leaders of the FSC held central positions and were widely recognized within their respective communities, including in the academic community, non-profit sector, and wider food movement (Lipset, 1950). According to coalition members, the co-chairs brought several distinct leadership qualities to the table that helped in building the coalition, moving the coalition forward to a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, and in generating resources to maintain the coalition. The following sections will identify how the FSC chairs' leadership style enabled the building of the FSC coalition, the ways in which the leaders played an integral role in framing the coalition's Policy Framework, and how they secured resources.

First, FSC coalition members described leadership styles as being integral to building the coalition. They explained that strengthening the coalition depended upon nurturing relationships across the food movement in Canada. One member stated that FSC's leadership was made up of

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"[these] great people [who would] pick up the phone and talk" (M18). This fits with one premise of RMT, which suggests that, when leaders tied to existing networks emerge in a coalition, by virtue of the relationships they have built outside of the coalition, they are readily received by coalition members (McAdam, 1982; 1988). One FSC coalition member elaborated further on the ability of FSC's leadership to nurture relationships across the food movement for specific policy objectives, particularly a national food policy for Canada, and how that resulted in the FSC's growing membership and its national assemblies:

> It is all based on relationships…so [FSC's leadership] was a huge part of that [in that they] nurtured those relationships…people would join FSC, and come to the assemblies… that is how a lot of organizations structure their membership process, but all of that has to be carefully attended to and that is what [FSC's leadership] did - And that is what the staff do now, through coalitions and networks, and partnerships, and sponsorships - they developed relationships (M13).

> RMT also argues that it is the associational networks (i.e., what some FSC coalition members referred to as "databases" [M2]) surrounding an advocacy coalition that help to establish leaders who can be called upon to use their organizing skills and prestige to build the movement (McAdam, 1982). Coalition members described the FSC's leadership as having the ability to see the value of connecting people and to mobilize individuals across the food movement in ways that transcended personal and professional life spheres:

> [They] understand the value of connecting people… [they] have this database of people, and [know] who does what… I was just speaking to [FSC's leadership] casually the other day and I told [them] that I was going away, and [they] said "oh, you should really connect with so and so, he is up there!" And I said, "I am not going for work… Just for fun," and [they] were like "oh, of course. Of course." Yeah, [FSC leadership] sees the incredible value of connecting all of these different players in the food movement together (M20).

This member also elaborated on the backgrounds of FSC's leadership: "I think for [FSC leadership], and I have reflected on this a number of times, [they] are first and foremost activists.

So [they do] all of this work kind of as a lifestyle. It is not sort of segmented off to a box called work" (M20). This case study demonstrates that building a coalition's membership over time does not limit the related designated time and space to what one would consider to be the workplace. Instead, the work easily becomes integrated in the personal lives of leadership. It is perhaps this facet of the work that is so powerful. It is important to note, however, that although it would have been helpful to know the potential impact and ramifications of blurring the personal and professional in working toward building the FSC coalition, no interviewee commented on this particular matter.

Also regarding the importance of leadership styles, the ACF asserts that the leadership of an advocacy coalition has a significant influence on the internal cohesion within a coalition (Heinmiller, 1975). Relatedly, FSC coalition members described FSC leaders as networkers who fostered internal cohesion and an environment grounded in respect, whereby coalition members felt safe to share their thoughts without being judged, which in turn led to creativity. One FSC coalition member described this:

> [FSC's leadership] are fantastic networkers, and so [they] were very instrumental in building up membership across the country … respecting the fact that people's voices need to be brought up…[they] kept people talking…[and their] leadership created a safe space. And that meant a nonjudgmental environment where people opened up and let loose and came up with very creative things (M19).

Finally, coalition members described the FSC's leadership as organizers who also motivated coalition members to dig deeper in relation to their belief systems. As one FSC coalition member described, "[FSC leadership] was very motivating too. [They] would always stir the pot. Always with great respect. And so people absolutely loved [them] and joined in" (M9). FSC leadership was also described by members as having the ability to bring a diverse

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group of stakeholders together, to see the value of local grassroots organizing, and to relate to everyday people in the community:

> [FSC leaders] could relate to the grassroots movement. Not to say that the others could not, but [they] could always relate. I could bring [them] to talk to a group of community people that were not bureaucrats who just wanted to talk about food and [they] could relate. And I think that gives credit to who FSC is, they have the grassroots [mentality] (M19).

FSC coalition members also discussed FSC leadership being able to bridge divides between the English and French speaking populations in the Canadian food movement at large, as well as in the FSC coalition. One member described meeting with FSC leadership during the early stages of the coalition's formation, and vividly recalled them eagerly expressing the need to make the FSC more bilingual. As such, FSC's leadership asked this coalition member to help "organize getting more Francophone speaking people involved in FSC… because they wanted the coalition to be more bilingual" (M5). Thus, members not only described FSC's leadership styles as being integral to coalition maintenance, but also talked about how leadership communicated a belief system that coalition members could agree with and take up.

Second, FSC coalition members described FSC leadership's styles as being integral to articulating the coalition's belief system, and more specifically, to shifting the focus of its Policy Framework. While FSC leaders were successful in establishing the coalition around its common objectives during its formational years, they were also instrumental in embracing food security and in pushing for the adoption of the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. Weible (2007) has argued that advocacy coalition leaders play a key role in articulating a "coherent belief system for other coalition members [that] strengthens their resolve and focus" (p. 100). FSC's leadership played a significant role in information sharing, which strengthened the focus of the FSC. For example, one member vividly recalled the Working Together conference, where one of the FSC

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coalition leaders was hosting a session, speaking on the Food Security Policy Framework and the

universal right to food. This member described the impact of that session, stating,

> it just made so much sense to me and it never left me, since it is so strange that we
> live in this world where there is so much food and people do not have the right to
> it. So anyway [FSC's leadership] had a big influence on me, and every time I hear
> about [them], I am always going to say "oh! I know [them]!" (M16).

In addition, coalition members discussed how FSC leadership articulated a belief system

grounded in the pillars of food sovereignty in many different ways, and described leaders' ability

to take the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework and make it tangible for coalition members. As

one member stated: "[FSC leaders] were certainly thinkers. [They] would have grasped the

importance of the word sovereignty early on, and [they knew] it was not just a word but a

different concept from what was being [currently] mobilized, so [they] found the path to infuse

the language [into discussions at the National Assemblies]" (M21). Coalition members also

stated that FSC leadership developed the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework within the FSC

coalition through bridging global and local based issues. The ACF argues that an advocacy

coalition is employing an effective framing strategy when it aims to neutralize and discredit the

messages of rivals and of those in opposition to the coalition's goals (Gamson, 2007). The FSC's

leadership accomplished this by prodding coalition members to consider the ways in which the

Food Sovereignty Policy Framework was about looking outward toward the global movement,

by saying… "What can we learn from this global movement and how does it relate to what is

happening here?" (M13), as well as by sifting through the work of "what was currently going on

here in Canada" and saying "this [work] is about food sovereignty" (M13).

FSC leaders also aimed to break down the boundaries between diverse FSC coalition

members. Members described the leadership's ability to bring together diverse coalition

members, in particular those members who were staunch food security or food sovereignty

proponents. One member provided the following example:

> You would get the paralyzing and polarizing people that say, "We hate all food banks…don't want anything to do with you and food sovereignty is the only way. You are part of the problem." And food banks saying, "Why the hell are we wasting our time with this nonsense, we have people at our doors right now hungry and you want to give them food sovereignty language?" So there [were] fringe people on [the edge of the] food security movement and [the] food bank movements that were not helpful and [the FSC's leaders] were very helpful in being able to bridge some of this stuff. [They] would say "wait a minute, there is room for both here. We don't like the bad stuff, but we like the good stuff. Let's build us up. And, there is room for economic access with food sovereignty" (M9).

Moreover, the ACF argues that an advocacy coalition's "mobilizing potential" is effective to the

extent that it formulates a strategy that mobilizes individuals conveying messages of good will

and creating sympathy for the policy change that the coalition is advocating for (Kingdon, 1995;

Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). The leadership of the FSC coalition did not just aim to bring

together diverse stakeholders, but were also process-oriented. In other words, they valued

inclusion insofar as they valued the process of seeking consensus around the Food Sovereignty

Policy Framework, and they aimed to include various stakeholders in the PFPP, later adopted by

the FSC coalition. One member described this in more detail:

> I will never forget… it was a game changer for me, personally… we had people working on the various position papers and the Aboriginal one… when it came back to the group, they protested. And they protested in a way that, "we are quitting…we will not go any further with this… We cannot follow your timelines. Your timelines are not our timelines." It was very, very emotional. So they left the group. So [the FSC's leadership] was chairing the meeting… [and they] adjourned the meeting and asked us to come back in two or three hours, something like that. So they sat down [with] the leaders of the event. FSC's leadership sat down at the Aboriginal table and they negotiated an agreement. So some of the plans for the PFPP had to change because they were not going to complete their chapter on the same timeline. Anyway, it was very dramatic for me, because I said, "how did they do this?" It was so amazing, and it was just kind of an emotional moment. And that is where I learned a lot about how much we take for granted. Earlier on I was talking about how we use language, and [how] language can actually be

offensive to people from another culture. So anyway, that was probably the big moment (M19).

Thus, the FSC coalition's leadership successfully employed a distinct leadership style and articulated a belief system for their members.

Third, FSC leadership also worked to secure additional resources to advance the FSC coalition and its policy agenda. Their success in this regard supports Weible's (2007) suggestion that it is important for coalition leaders to entice additional resources to their advocacy coalition; this in turn allows for more strategic choices, as well as more settings in which to influence and advance the coalition's public policy interests. FSC coalition members identified FSC leadership as being key in mobilizing resources for the coalition in order to advance policy interests for a national food policy in Canada. It was clear, for example, that the FSC's leadership played a key role in securing financial resources for the Working Together Conference, held at Ryerson University in 2001. The Working Together Conference brought members of civil society together to discuss the policy positions to bring to the 2002 World Food Summit – Five Years Later, and the FSC's leadership was a "key part of that [putting the conference together]" (M6). FSC coalition members also identified that its leadership was the force of energy that brought the initial Working Together group together. One member described FSC leadership as a group made up of "entrepreneurs, organizers, and organizational entrepreneurs [who have] a real knack for identifying things that need to happen…[Their] enthusiasm is a key factor in whether these things come into being" (M8). This same coalition member credited the FSC's leadership, Ryerson University, and the Ryerson Centre for Food Studies with having fought for the struggle around food to become visible as an issue, stating that, at the time, "Ryerson was the only bastion of respectability in the country" (M8). Financial resources were key to the success of the

FSC's leadership, which secured these by writing "a grant to IDRC, and for a big meeting" (M14), and by writing "multiple grants to secure funding for the conference and a space to hold the conference at Ryerson University" (M17).

FSC coalition members commended their leaders for the time they dedicated to being chairs of the FSC coalition on a volunteer basis, as "in its [the FSC's] formal years there were no paid staff" (P11). Coalition members interviewed attributed the decision of FSC's leadership to invest their time and energy into advancing the coalition on a volunteer basis as an indication of their deep-rooted commitment to the Canadian food movement. One member declared: "but what a commitment [FSC leadership] made to the food security and the food sovereignty movement across the country. I mean surely [they are] a statue [of commitment]" (M20). These kinds of testaments are a reminder of the financial barriers present in the non-profit sector, specifically in terms of staffing non-profit organizations, and the increased difficulty experienced by those whose mandate is a food sovereignty agenda, such as the FSC and others who face the "advocacy chill" and related decreases in funding. Nonetheless, the FSC's leaders have been heralded as leaders who harnessed the resources of their time and energy: they were "fantastic leaders…[who] did what had to be done, [and they] worked like dogs for nothing" (M16). The voluntary efforts of the FSC's leadership and their success in seeking out partnerships with academic and government institutions speak to the resourcefulness of coalitions when it comes to overcoming funding challenges. Furthermore, their success demonstrates the potential of coalitions for expanding organizational partnerships and how building partnerships with funders is contingent on relationship building. Leadership in this sense serves as an important catalyst to mobilizing organizational resources that contribute to coalition maintenance. The following

section examines how the FSC coalition changed its Policy Framework, and how this change was first developed from the outside and then brought back into the coalition.

7.3 Building change outside the FSC advocacy coalition

Advocacy coalitions often channel their efforts toward a specific goal in influencing public opinion, governments, and key stakeholders (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009; Weible, 2007). However, in the process of developing specific goals, conflicting perspectives may emerge. Competing perspectives often clash and the idea of maintaining a policy position versus the desire to introduce change often lead to internal tensions between advocacy coalition members. In turn, advocacy coalitions often worry about cooptation and compromise. This section examines these tensions within the FSC coalition, and discusses how such tensions may lead to the changing of Policy Frameworks – with changes first developing outside of a coalition itself and then creating change within the coalition.

In 2008, a group from *within* the FSC coalition emerged that created the PFPP (2011). The PFPP was a project created *by* FSC coalition members *outside* of the FSC coalition, with the goal being to craft a Policy Framework based on food sovereignty. The PFPP was a project centering around two elements: "leadership development for policy analysis and change, and building public awareness and public opinion" (M18). These coalition members believed that developing a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, and ultimately bringing a shift in focus for the FSC coalition from food security to food sovereignty, required that the work be done outside of the coalition. The factors that led to this change are discussed below in detail, first, by exploring the desire and inspiration for change in Policy Frameworks, and then, by showing how the engine of change was built outside of the coalition. Finally, the method by which the change in Policy Framework was then brought back into the FSC coalition for adoption is examined.

In 2006, the FSC coalition held its fourth national assembly. Coalition members interviewed credited Professor Nettie Wiebe with bringing the idea of food sovereignty to the coalition, stating that it was

> at one of the break-out meetings at the assembly where Professor Wiebe suggested that the FSC coalition begin to think about principles of food sovereignty and what the FSC coalition could do to look at what the global peasant movement, specifically La Via Campesina, is demanding in terms of food sovereignty (M2).

By 2007, further inspiration for the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework came out of the Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty, held in Sélingué, Mali. At this Forum, participants debated issues related to food sovereignty in an effort to "deepen collective understanding…strengthen dialogue among interest groups…and formulate joint strategies and an action plan" (Nyéléni, 2007). Sabatier (1993) found that within a policy subsystem, and over a decadal period, Policy Framework beliefs are resistant to change. However, Sabatier (1998) also confirmed that while Policy Framework beliefs are resistant to change, changes related to the Policy Framework beliefs of an advocacy coalition are possible if and when "experience reveals serious anomalies" (p. 145). FSC coalition members who attended the Forum returned to Canada greatly inspired by the experience. As one FSC coalition member expressed, "when we came back from Nyéléni we decided to bring food sovereignty into FSC's Policy Framework" (M1). Thus, findings illustrated that FSC coalition members understood the Nyéléni Forum on Food Sovereignty to be the catalyst in setting the FSC coalition on the path of changing its policy platform to food sovereignty. Nyéléni allowed those who participated in the Forum to re-examine the work that was already happening related to food system issues in Canada. As one member recalled:

> It just made sense, but it also pushed us a lot, I think, to think not just of our own activities around democracy, the politics about what we were doing…but the process in which we were engaging in as a broader community. And it spoke very

consciously and very deliberately to our local places, in our regions, in our provinces…that we were actually part of a much bigger movement (M4).

In the case of the FSC, attending the Nyéléni Forum on Food Sovereignty armed coalition members with a more convincing argument for the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, through the information shared by other global participants who demonstrated the shortcomings of the Food Security Framework. FSC coalition members who advocated for the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, being convinced that it provided a stronger Policy Framework, then sought to develop it outside of the coalition.

Between 2006 and 2007, tensions among FSC coalition members became apparent in the varying preferences for directions in which members wanted the FSC to proceed. Together with the group of FSC coalition members who attended the Nyéléni Forum, a larger group of members emerged with a more "activist" orientation, advocating that FSC should take a clear position on making changes to the agri-food system using the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. These "activist" FSC coalition members, were not willing to be bound by "organizational limitations and conservative forces" by way of "big tent" FSC coalition members, who would say "we can't touch that [food sovereignty] because we might lose members" (M11), made up the group that created the PFPP.

In 2008, the FSC coalition held its fifth national assembly. During the last day of the assembly, FSC held its annual general meeting (AGM), at which the group of members involved with PFPP provided an explanation of it to the FSC coalition as a whole, including both "big tent" and "activist" oriented members. However, building the engine of change for food sovereignty was not possible within the FSC at this time; the organizational model required

consensus, and according to the members interviewed, consensus to endorse the Food

Sovereignty Policy Framework could not be established.

Between 2008 and 2011, the FSC members who created the PFPP continued to work to

build a Policy Framework of Food Sovereignty. An important question the ACF poses relates to

consensus building and what strategies coalitions use to achieve consensus in order to reach their

policy goals (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). In the case of the FSC coalition, the strategy used by

the "activist" oriented coalition members in creating consensus around food sovereignty was to

establish the PFPP outside of the coalition. The following section provides detail on how this

group gained consensus within the PFPP, specifically by making use of kitchen table talks,

participatory democracy, and a technique called the "red flag process."

First, kitchen table talks are a community development approach and strategy used to

engage individuals by bringing more community members "to the table" to express their own

voices so that stronger relationships can be built (Fitzpatrick, Nicholson, & Telford, 2010, p. 10).

In the tangible sense, kitchen table conversations are held at a location and time of a facilitator's

choosing, where various groups and stakeholders are invited to come together to discuss topics

of mutual interest or concern (Fitzpatrick, Nicholson, & Telford, 2010). Cathleen Kneen was

described as being one facilitator of the PFPP who brought various groups and stakeholders

together to discuss how to address food system issues in Canada. As one FSC coalition member

who participated in the PFPP described:

> my perception of the kitchen table meetings was that there was a real educational
> process, and I think that Cathleen Kneen did a great job, because she is such an
> networker. She knew the people from across Canada who were in communities,
> and she grabbed them and got them first of all in Food Secure Canada, and then
> later in the People's Food Policy Project [PFPP]. She got them and made them
> animators in the People's Food Policy Project. So she – these were the opinion
> leaders in the food movement, and she did a great job in bringing them on board.

And she is very convincing, so I honestly think that, again, a lot had to do with her (M10).

In terms of location, these types of conversations can take place in informal settings such as a community center, a pub, a backyard, a living room, or even a kitchen. One FSC coalition member noted: "And there's something about kitchen table meetings which feels very rural to me and maybe that's why I find it so attractive" (M1). In the case of the PFPP, kitchen table talks were used as a way to foster relationships, garner support, and gain consensus over the policy document, which outlined principles of food sovereignty and how they could be applied in Canada. Another member who was part of the PFPP described the process as follows:

> you have people over for a cup of tea and you start talking, about the fact that there are no parks in your neighbourhood… Our kids need a place to play that is safe. So they get together around the table and have a conversation, and figure out what to do about it (M20).

The kitchen table talks served as a means for educating and informing participants of the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. As one FSC coalition member stated, "we needed to sort of understand what it meant in the Canadian context, [and] that is why we decided to have these kitchen table conversations" (M11). The use of kitchen table talks allowed those involved in the PFPP to begin discussing the need for a national food policy document across Canada, and by sitting, talking, and listening to each other, they were able to gain consensus for the food sovereignty agenda. The educational focus of the kitchen table talks made reaching consensus possible and helped to bring it about with ease, because "members were informed on what food sovereignty was and they together decided what it meant for drafting a national food policy in Canada" (M10).

In addition, the use of kitchen table talks to garner support and consensus was important because the technique allowed for hundreds of individuals from across Canada to be part of the

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PFPP's development and adoption. As one member stated, "you know how sometimes groups do really well and they develop a policy and it's a great policy – but not many can say this was developed by a couple of hundred people, and that was the case [with the PFPP]" (M19). In addition to the kitchen table talks, participatory democracy techniques were used.

FSC coalition members involved in the PFPP identified participatory democracy techniques as the second method used to gain consensus for food sovereignty in the PFPP. As one FSC coalition member affirmed, "we used participatory democracy techniques as we are all trained in facilitating and organizing with very consensus-based decision-making" (M20). Participatory democracy involves citizens in community-policy making initiatives with the intention to improve information flow, accountability, as well as due process through collaborative decision-making (Sisk, 2011). Participatory democracy as a technique for advocacy coalitions is significant because it aims to give a voice to those most directly affected by public policy (Sisk, 2001). The collaborative decision-making that took place in developing the PFPP involved implementing conflict resolution techniques to build consensus. As one FSC coalition member stated, the participatory democracy process provided for "honest dialogue, employed a give-and-take mentality, and [allowed an] empathic appreciation of opposing points of view" (M17). This technique translated into decisions being reached among FSC coalition members, including those with the ability to "scuttle" or "spoil" the decision to move forward with a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework (Sisk, 2001). In addition to participatory democratic techniques, consensus around the PFPP was reached by way of the use of a "red flag process."

The specific technique coined by Cathleen Kneen as the "red flag process" emerged as a third way through which consensus was built within the PFPP. FSC coalition members who participated described the red flag process as a mechanism that accepted arguments against

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consensus for only those aspects of the document that one could not in any way, shape, or form support, endorse, or "live with" (M18). Figuratively speaking, members would "raise their red flag" to interrupt the process to discuss their concerns. One FSC coalition member provided the following example of when the red flag process was utilized:

> For example, if someone thought that we should not be behind the labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and thought that that position is totally ludicrous…and they felt that they could not get behind a policy paper that advocated for labeling genetically modified organisms, GMOs, then that would be brought up in a meeting… So it was red flagged and gaps were addressed (M17).

Coalition members identified that the red flag process meant that creating the policy document was a process-oriented affair. As one member described,

> it was quite a slow process, and quite carefully done. Like those position papers [draft of the "Resetting the Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada"] went out in total form, before they were finished, [and] people were asked to comment on them. Each paper had a team working on it and tried to have input from various community groups (M19).

The red flag process is a technique that honored the process of consensus building that is not just aimed at hearing all voices within the decision-making process but also embraces dissenting ones. The following paragraphs discusses these findings in light of RMT and the ACF perspectives from the FSC coalition.

In terms of coalition maintenance, it is important to understand how FSC coalition members built the engine of change outside of the coalition by first gaining consensus around a new Policy Framework based on food sovereignty. Looking at this process analytically, the ACF asks the question of how exactly does an advocacy coalition create consensus for shared beliefs amongst coalition members (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). As discussed above, the PFPP group specifically worked to gain consensus around the shared belief of food sovereignty using three specific methods: kitchen table talks, participatory democracy techniques, and a "red flag

process." The findings of this study, and particularly, the consensus building methods the PFPP implemented contribute to the knowledge of consensus building for the ACF insofar as it is important that coalition members have opportunities to present areas of disagreement. At the same time, these findings have illustrated that a coalition must also have mechanisms to limit these disagreements to any areas of the policy that coalition members cannot live with. Findings also showed the importance of coalitions creating an environment where members are educated about various policy positions through participatory democracy techniques, and the value of creating a collaborative approach to conflict. Consensus was achieved through implementing strategy as opposed to simply happening "on a whim." Therefore, this case study and its findings contribute to the ACF by suggesting that a coalition needs to employ democratic methods to achieve consensus.

Also, this study contributes to the knowledge of the ACF insofar as it complicates Barberio's (2014) assertion that an advocacy coalition is *either* "tightly bound" by a few policy actors, or that policy actors are like a "loose constellation" that enter and leave a coalition based on the policy issue at hand (p. 62). The FSC case demonstrates that a coalition may have *both* a "tightly bound" *and* a loose group of policy actors; in other words, if a conflict around Policy Frameworks arises, this may cause those "tightly bound" policy actors to loosen up from the coalition in order to advance a specific agenda, while at the same time remaining "tightly bound" within the coalition. Further, while the ACF says that shared beliefs are what promotes coordination insofar as policy actors coordinate with each other in an effort to participate in joint activities to advance a policy position, a lack of shared beliefs may also push policy actors to coordinate activities for a policy position outside of the coalition. In this regard, the FSC case contributes to the knowledge of the ACF insofar as it was the precisely the lack of a shared belief

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of food sovereignty that saw FSC coalition members coordinate action in joint activities to advance a Policy Framework of food sovereignty, *outside* the coalition. The ACF also states that policy actors are more likely to engage in activities if they interact on a repeated basis, like at conferences or assemblies. The FSC case confirms this analytical insight. This study's findings demonstrate that the repeated interactions of FSC coalition members at FSC National Assemblies were precisely what allowed for the dialogue around creating and implementing a different Policy Framework based on food sovereignty to take place. Therefore, while the FSC case confirms that repeated interactions between coalition members are what promotes coordinated activity, policy actors may indeed choose to coordinate activities to build shared beliefs outside of their coalition. In turn, if Deep Core beliefs are not created within the coalition, this can completely tear the coalition apart.

Upon reaching consensus, the PFPP group achieved its goal of creating a policy document grounded in food sovereignty titled "Resetting the Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada" (hereinafter, "Resetting the Table"; PFPP, 2011). According to the PFPP (2011), the policy was "grounded in food sovereignty" (p. 2) and launched in collaboration with the FSC, "the voice of the food movement in Canada, uniting groups and individuals working towards a food system that is health, ecological, and fair for producers and consumers" (p. 3). The same group of FSC coalition members that created the PFPP were the same members who brought the PFPP's final report "Resetting the Table" (2011) back to the FSC coalition to be adopted as a policy document by its membership. The following section provides an overview of how these FSC coalition members re-introduced the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework by way of this PFPP policy document, and how the FSC coalition as a whole adopted it as its Tool for

Implementation (Sabatier, 1988), to bring about the new Policy Framework based on the goal of food sovereignty.

7.4 Bringing change inside the FSC advocacy coalition

In 2012, at the FSC's seventh national assembly, the coalition officially adopted the "Resetting the Table" (PFPP, 2011) document as the FSC's policy platform. The adoption meant an official FSC policy platform based on food sovereignty, and consensus within the coalition in reaching its adoption was attributed to two major factors.

First, FSC coalition members described the adoption as transformative. The 2011 PFPP policy document had made FSC coalition members more politically aware of the differences between the food security and Food Sovereignty Policy Frameworks when it came to addressing food system issues. One FSC member recalled that discussing the policy document was "not a matter of convincing some FSC coalition members," but rather that "they saw the Canadian system [as] being in crisis, including but not limited to the loss of control of the food system by trade deals being made by governments" (M18). Ultimately, according to coalition members, the contents of the "Resetting the Table" (PFPP, 2011) policy document persuaded coalition members of the accuracy of the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework in addressing food system issues. Second, according to FSC coalition members, consensus was garnered because coalition members believed that the 2011 PFPP policy document was a resurrection of the People's Food Commission (PCF) of 1977–1980. One FSC coalition member described the process as follows:

> when we came back from Nyéléni, we looked around and said "okay maybe what we should do [is the PFPP]," and this had been said at the very beginning of Food Secure Canada…"should we do the PFC again?" The point of that [the PFC] was to find out what the problem was. And so those of us who had done it said "Oh god, not again." But then when we came back from Nyéléni, we said maybe we should do something different, which is not [focus on] what is wrong, but what needs to be done about it, and frame it that way (M1).

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Many FSC coalition members interviewed believed that consensus was reached in part because coalition members were ready for something different, and also ready for an initiative that involved more of Canada. They also believed that the coast-to-coast dialogue created to establish a policy document for Canadian food policy had a galvanizing effect on the food movement, as it was aimed at pointing out what needed to be done to address food system issues in Canada.

These findings have outlined the factors that contributed to establishing consensus within the FSC coalition in order to adopt PFPP's "Resetting the Table" policy document and the Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. The ACF speaks to the role of Sabatier's (1988) Tools for Implementation in changing over to a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework in the FSC coalition. The following paragraph analyzes the consensus building process that occurred within the FSC coalition in light of the theories backed by the ACF.

First, according to Sabatier (1988), Tools for Implementation refers to the instrumental decisions and information-related searches that assist coalitions in implementing a Policy Framework. In the case of the FSC coalition, the instrumental decision that the FSC made to implement a Policy Framework based on food sovereignty was to adopt the 2011 PFPP policy document titled "Resetting the Table." Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1997) affirmed that Tools for Implementation are "specific beliefs concerning the seriousness of the problem in specific locales" and "policy preferences regarding desired regulations" (p. 447). The FSC coalition's policy preference shifted from a food security to a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework when, the FSC coalition members said, they realized that they "needed a policy document that we knew

reflected the reality of the movement's focus on the international level, and that is exactly what the PFPP created" (M1).

Second, Sabatier (1988) suggested that changing an advocacy coalition's Tools for Implementation is "moderately easy," as these are the easiest beliefs to change in relation to Deep Core and Policy Framework beliefs (p. 145). FSC coalition members decided to create the tool of the PFPP and craft the "Resetting the Table" (PFPP, 2011) document outside of the FSC coalition precisely because they believed that other members were not easily susceptible to change, and thus that reaching consensus over a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework was not going to be easy, for the reasons outlined above. However, once the PFPP policy document was complete, it was moderately easy for the FSC coalition to adopt it as its policy platform and bring change within the advocacy coalition.

These findings demonstrate that these members of the FSC advocacy coalition, when seeking to establish, maintain, and implement a new policy position, aimed to have a transformative effect on all coalition members through cultivating new thoughts and policy options. Findings discussed here also show that advocacy coalitions should aim to connect current actions in the policy-making process to a process from the past with which coalition members are familiar, and that has also been considered effective in the past. The fact that the FSC coalition members had to exit their coalition to develop the Policy Framework and the reasons for such an exit together provide important insights, specifically into the reasons why and how advocacy coalitions might develop a Policy Framework outside of their coalition, and the extent to which coalition members will go to develop a new Policy Framework agenda when there is resistance within their advocacy coalition.

7.5 Conclusion

This second findings chapter has examined the study's findings around the challenges and opportunities of the FSC advocacy coalition and its maintenance, as well as key organizational assets involved in this process. A key objective of the chapter was to discuss how coalition resources were maneuvered, and how leadership managed to effectively mobilize membership around core principles using different organizational strategies while also bringing about change.

Advocacy coalitions such as the FSC surmount threats to collective action by maneuvering their resources to their best advantage. In terms of securing knowledge and information based resources, findings showed that the FSC coalition formed partnerships with universities, specifically academics and researchers. In working with their limited resources, oftentimes non-profit organizations are required to provide evidence to support their arguments for policy change. The FSC was required to collaborate with academics within their coalition who were viewed as both activists and allies, and who provided critical analysis and dialogue, support, information, and capacity to the FSC coalition in its transition to a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. Second, the study's findings highlighted that the FSC's leadership overcame challenges of limited financial resources by mobilizing members; this was accomplished through reaching out to local communities and organizations, and by hosting assemblies that created bonds and a shared sense of ownership amongst coalition members. Third, the chapter discussed how advocacy restrictions set on non-profit organizations, also known as the "advocacy chill," create severe limitations for fundraising. The funders of the FSC coalition, and more specifically, of the PFPP, were supportive of the objective to build a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework. Findings showed that is vital that advocacy coalitions build relationships with potential funders

and cultivate understanding and acceptance of their objectives, as funders are more likely to fund objectives they support. Fourth, in terms of leadership, the FSC leadership team articulated belief systems based in food sovereignty for FSC coalition members and for the PFPP, thereby strengthening the coalition's resolve and focus. Also, they secured resources insofar as the FSC's leadership, specifically its co-chairs, worked to secure additional resources to advance the FSC coalition and policy agenda. Findings thus showed that skillful leadership that involves facilitating a coalition's focus on specific objectives and securing resources is of vital importance in promoting coalition maintenance over time.

As it relates to bringing change within a coalition, the study's findings highlighted several factors that led to a shift in FSC Policy Frameworks, from one of food security to one of food sovereignty. First, the change within the FSC coalition began within a few years of its formation when tensions among members became apparent. A group with a more "activist" orientation emerged and advocated that the FSC coalition adopt a Food Sovereignty Policy Framework in an effort to take a clear position on agri-food system issues as a non-profit. After attending The Nyéléni Forum on Food Sovereignty, a group of FSC coalition members demanded that the FSC adopt food sovereignty. When the coalition could not establish consensus, organizational challenges within the FSC and the desire to reach consensus around food sovereignty led the "activist" group to seek external funding to form a new project, the PFPP. These coalition members built the engine of change outside of the FSC coalition, drafting the PFPP's "Resetting the Table" policy document grounded in food sovereignty. Consensus within the PFPP around food sovereignty was reached through participatory democracy techniques, kitchen table talks, and a "red flag process." This "activist" group then brought the new policy back into the coalition, and the "Resetting the Table" policy document was officially

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adopted by the FSC as its official policy platform in 2012. Consensus was reached because FSC coalition members believed it had a politicizing effect as well as was seen as the reminiscent of the PFC of 1978. While the previous chapter presented the findings of this study and explored theoretical frameworks pertaining to the ACF and RMT as it relates to how the FSC coalition formed, this chapter presented key findings and analysis on how the FSC coalition maintained itself over time. To conclude the dissertation, the following chapter discusses the conclusions and limitations of this study, as well future directions for research.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

Since the 1970s, the shrinking of the Canadian welfare state has gone hand in hand with the growing responsibilities of non-profit organizations for service delivery. Responsibility for social support has shifted from the government to the voluntary sector, including the non-profit sector, and this has greatly impacted non-profit organizations financially, compromising their autonomy as well as their advocacy functions (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). Working with limited resources, these non-profit organizations are hard pressed to fulfill most of the functions now left to them by the state.

State restructuring since the 1970s has been particularly noticeable in the agri-food sector; the numbers of family farms has declined, well-paying jobs in the manufacturing sector have disappeared and, most importantly, the number of people experiencing food insecurity has risen. The first food bank opened in 1981 and the number of users continue to increase. Estimates suggest that the known food bank users might only reflect about 25% of the food insecure in Canada (Proof Food Insecurity Policy Research, 2016). It is no surprise that the problems in the agri-food system have resulted in civil society advocacy for a better food system, for food justice, food democracy, food security, and food sovereignty. A number of non-profit organizations are involved in food policy advocacy, addressing their demands to various levels of government in Canada (Koç et al., 2008). This study examined how the FSC coalition formed itself based on shared beliefs and maintained itself despite changing policy positions and limited resources.

Through the examination of one Canadian food policy advocacy coalition that emerged in the early 21st century, the FSC coalition, this study has gained insights into the formation and

maintenance of advocacy coalitions, and how shifts in policy directions occur within these

coalitions. Specifically, this project has examined how the FSC coalition surmounted internal

threats to collective action, by asking two questions.

- o   How did the FSC coalition surmount threats to coalition formation?

- o   How did the FSC coalition surmount threats to coalition maintenance?

This research question was explored using a qualitative approach (Creswell, 1998;

Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). A qualitative approach provided a pathway to explore the interactions

of the FSC coalition members and the organizational practices of the FSC coalition that formed

and maintained the coalition for over a decade (Denzin, 2013; Creswell, 2011).

8.2 Coalition formation

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is "a policy making framework developed to

deal with intense public policy problems" (Weible & Sabatier, 2007, p. 123). The ACF is based

on three major assumptions:

> a long-term time perspective is needed for understanding subsystem affairs [i.e.,
> 10 years]; the expansive set of actors involved in policy systems may be
> aggregated into coalitions; the policy designs are interpreted as translations of
> coalition beliefs (Weible, 2007, p. 351).

According to the ACF, an advocacy coalition forms and avoid threats to formation by

establishing a shared belief system (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997). By effectively creating

consensus around a shared belief system, an advocacy coalition increases its ability to coordinate

action towards specific policy objectives and agendas. According to Zafonte and Sabatier (1998),

these shared beliefs act as the "glue" that binds the coalition together, propelling it forward to

achieve its policy objectives (p. 476). In the ACF, there are three specific types of beliefs that

increase coordination: Deep Core beliefs; Policy Framework beliefs; and Tools for

Implementation. The following paragraphs review these specific types of beliefs as identified by the ACF and applied to the FSC coalition in this study.

The Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) is a "theory of action," which is not always accounted for within the ACF (Kubler, 2001, p. 626). RMT views coalition formation as a political process and explores the strategies that coalitions use in order to utilize resources and translate action into success (Hart, Sinclair, & Veugelers, 2009). In particular, RMT examines the value of informal networks (e.g., friendships) in the rise of a coalition. This study explored RMT's applicability to the ACF by examining the strategies the FSC coalition used in its coalition formation.

Deep Core beliefs are "fundamental normative and ontological axioms which define the coalition's underlying philosophy" (Sabatier, 1993, p. 30). According to Sabatier (1998), the unit of analysis of the ACF is understood as "the group of people and/or organizations interacting regularly over periods of a decade or more to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy area/domain" (Sabatier, 1998, pg. 111), The ACF claims that Deep Core beliefs are the hardest beliefs to change and are most resistant to change over a period of a decade. The FSC coalition's Deep Core beliefs were established in 2004 and are referred to by FSC coalition members as the "three pillars." These "common objectives" are a commitment to zero hunger, healthy and safe food, and a sustainable food system; these have not changed throughout the ten years of the coalition's operation, supporting the assertion that Deep Core beliefs are resistant to change, even when a coalition undergoes major changes.

According to the ACF, ideological similarity is what makes coalition formation possible and is key for coalition formation (Henry, 2011). RMT affirms that the mutual interests of coalition members are what gets a coalition to act (Hart, Sinclair, & Veugelers, 2009). This was indeed the

case with the FSC coalition, which managed to form a coalition and establish consensus around three Deep Core beliefs, referred to by FSC coalition members as the three pillars. A significant factor was particularly important in this process: members shared similar interests, values and ideological perspectives prior to joining the FSC coalition, as revealed by their years of activist involvement, and these common experiences and shared values allowed them to establish common ground when forming their coalition.

Gaining consensus on the Deep Core beliefs was particularly important. Transformative practices, which involved both feminist and restorative justice approaches to consensus making, enabled the coalition members to agree on the three pillars. The coalition utilized a feminist approach (Crowley & Morrison, 1997) by emphasizing sensitivity in listening to the opinions of others in the consensus-making process. The restorative justice approach (Bazemore & Schiff, 2001) involved taking part in peace circle processes that were organic in nature and that upheld principles related to listening, communicating, and healing. Both of these transformative approaches involved incorporating opinions and values from all coalition members into the final decision to adopt the three pillars, until even those who disagreed with the decision felt comfortable with the outcome. The emphasis on beliefs in the ACF is rooted in the concept that policy-oriented decisions are not necessarily rational, but are, instead, attributable to the interests of coalition members, for example, their policy-focused and shared beliefs. The FSC coalition's success demonstrates the potential of utilizing a transformative approach to achieve consensus in coalitions seeking to develop shared Deep Core beliefs, when the coalition's aim is to have various interests incorporated and have all coalition members agree with the final decision.

The second set of beliefs in the ACF, known as Policy Framework beliefs, are a coalition's "fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving normative

axioms of Deep Core" beliefs (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, p. 145). Sabatier (1993) found that within a policy subsystem and over a decadal period, Policy Framework beliefs are resistant to change. This assertion was partially upheld by this FSC coalition case study, as the FSC coalition experienced resistance in changing its Policy Framework beliefs when, between 2001 and 2012, the FSC coalition changed its policy position from a food security framework to a food sovereignty framework. However, the FSC coalition case study revealed that despite resistance, a change in policy position took place within its coalition; the wheels for change began to move when FSC coalition members attended the 2007 Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty, which inspired "activist" coalition members to create change within the coalition. However, resistance within the coalition forced this "activist" group to build their food sovereignty policy position outside of the coalition, and then later re-introduce the change in policy position to the coalition. The ACF asserts that consensus on the Policy Framework is the "primary force that brings actors together in the process of forming advocacy coalitions" (Matti & Sandstrom, 2010, p. 10); however, the FSC coalition reveals that it was consensus on common objectives, known as (Deep Core beliefs) that held the FSC coalition together for over a decade despite changes in the Policy Framework.

Previous research has suggested the conflict between coalition members over their main objectives forms a major impediment to coalition formation and maintenance (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, p. 477). In the case of the FSC coalition, as ACF literature predicts (see Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Weible et al., 2011), conflict between coalition members increased when coalition members' beliefs about how a coalition should function begin to diverge. The tensions arose when a group with a belief system that challenged the coalition's beliefs sought to change the coalition's policy direction. In the FSC coalition's case, tensions emerged between "big tent"

coalition members and "activist" coalition members. The activist FSC coalition members wanted to change the coalition's direction by changing its Policy Framework beliefs from a food security framework to a food sovereignty framework. The activist group's desire to change the policy direction came out of wanting to take a definitive stand on certain issues in the food system, including, but not limited to, the use of genetically modified organisms. This is significant, because whereas the ACF asserts that Policy Frameworks are the primary filters for actors within a policy subsystem, in the FSC coalition's case, it is their coalition building strategy that acted as the filter that informed the Policy Framework of FSC coalition.

This study also confirmed Sabatier's (1998) claims that the desire to change policy direction, and specifically Policy Framework beliefs, can arise when experiences reveal anomalies. For example, FSC "activist" coalition members who attended the Nyéléni Forum on Food Sovereignty in Mali stated that the experience of attending the Forum was a turning point that revealed anomalies within the food security framework; this experience drove the "activist" group, upon their return, to change the coalition's Policy Framework beliefs to a framework based on food sovereignty. Confirming Sabatier's (1998) theory that beliefs are not always easy to change, the "activist" coalition members, believing that conservative proponents of the food security framework would block consensus to a change in policy position to food sovereignty, mobilized themselves outside of the coalition to create and build a new policy position for the FSC coalition by way of a separate project. These "activist" FSC coalition members formed the People's Food Policy Project (PFPP, 2011), an independent grassroots initiative that later created a policy document grounded in a food sovereignty framework, titled *Resetting the Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada*. Achieving consensus for food sovereignty within the PFPP required participatory democracy techniques, including a "red flag" process and kitchen table

talks. It is important to recognize that achieving consensus for the PFPP was an intentional effort and that this consensus was made by a group of FSC coalition members who built consensus outside of the FSC coalition. Therefore, this study has demonstrated that even when it may appear that a coalition has achieved consensus on a policy document relatively easily, there are times when groups within coalitions emerge with a desire to change a belief system. If they are confronted by other groups who block consensus, they may strategically choose to develop a belief system outside of the coalition, and then return to the coalition and skillfully seek to integrate it into the coalition.

The third set of beliefs is known as Tools for Implementation, and these are considered to be the instrumental decisions and information-related searches that assist coalitions in implementing their Policy Framework beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). According to the ACF, Tools for Implementation are moderately easy to change and are a frequent topic of administrative policy-making discussions that dictate the "seriousness of the problem in specific locales" as well as their "policy preferences regarding desired regulations" (Sabatier, 1988, p. 145). In the case of the FSC coalition, as outlined above, Policy Framework beliefs were shifted from a policy position based on food security to one based on food sovereignty. The instrumental decision the FSC coalition made in terms of implementing its Policy Framework was to adopt the PFPP policy document *Resetting the Table: A People's Food Policy for Canada*. This policy document contained the information the FSC coalition thought was necessary to implement food sovereignty in Canada. The FSC coalition achieved consensus for the *Resetting the Table* policy document because the PFPP transformed FSC coalition members' belief systems insofar as they became more politicized, and as a result, were easily inspired to recognize the utility of a food sovereignty approach.

8.3 Coalition maintenance and change

The role of coalition resources in maintaining advocacy coalitions is emphasized within the ACF, and scholars have placed particular emphasis on this area by offering a typology of coalition resources (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013), including: (1) information; (2) mobilizing troops; (3) financial resources; and (4) skillful leadership (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013). According to RMT, organizational resources are critical to transforming "conviction [in]to action" (Kubler, 2001, p. 628) and involve the flow of communication, the entry and exit of members, and leadership structures (Hart, Sinclair, & Veugelers, 2009). The following paragraphs explore how, in their efforts to influence policy, members within coalitions seek out each of these available resources in order to act upon strategies in a variety of settings.

First, although non-profit coalitions work with very limited resources, they are still required to secure information resources to support their claims and policy positions. According to Weible and Sabatier (2005), policy actors within coalitions, also known as coalition members, prefer to seek out information from like-minded sources that can support their policy positions. This study on the FSC coalition has revealed the complexity of identifying like-minded allies who support a coalition's policy positions. The FSC coalition's "activist" coalition members, who were proponents of a policy position based on food sovereignty, relied on information from like-minded university researchers to support their arguments for developing a new policy position of food sovereignty. In particular, the FSC coalition's "activist" members relied on like-minded university researchers who were also coalition members, determining them to be "like-minded" if they had an "activist streak" and activist tendencies. These researchers were referred to by coalition members as FSC "activist-academic" coalition members. These "activist-academic" members lent support in terms of their capacity and expertise around sustaining an

argument for food sovereignty when engaging in food policy disputes, and ultimately, they assisted the FSC coalition in transitioning to a food sovereignty Policy Framework.

This case study has confirmed the ACF's understanding of information-related resources insofar as advocacy coalitions will utilize information to influence others' opinions in policy related disputes (Weible, 2007). In addition, this study revealed that oftentimes information based resources, including having a number of coalition members who are academics, are highly scrutinized and determined to be a valuable asset, at which point they are considered to be "allies." These researchers then play a pivotal role in introducing new policy positions to coalitions and assist them in developing new belief systems that support emerging policy positions. These findings point to various coalition member roles, including "analysts, researchers, and consultants within coalitions" (Weible, 2007), that support advocacy coalitions in changing their Policy Framework beliefs, and in the case of FSC coalition, in adopting the food sovereignty framework.

Second, advocacy coalitions with very limited financial resources often rely on the "mobilization of troops," especially when they are endangered by threats of "reductions in government-sponsored benefits" or "additional government oversight and regulations" (Weible, 2007, p. 100). The FSC coalition, as a non-profit advocacy coalition with limited financial resources, experienced challenges in generating its membership base. This study has shown that financial constraints make it difficult for non-profit coalition members to mobilize their coalition and generate a membership base. Non-profit advocacy coalitions deal with extended financial constraints and are oftentimes asked to do more, with less. This study also confirmed the ACF's assertion that in times of funding cuts, coalitions rely on their membership to mobilize to maintain their coalition and generate more membership.

However, the study also found that the FSC coalition members themselves struggled to incorporate the work of the FSC coalition into their employment activities, which left coalition building efforts to the leadership of the FSC coalition. This finding challenges the RMT's assertion that coalition members who do not work towards the coalition's goals are "free loaders." In this case study, the FSC coalition members who attempted to incorporate the work they performed for the coalition into their employment were often left isolated and had to choose between supporting the coalition as volunteers with limited resources and minimizing their support altogether. Nonetheless, the FSC coalition worked to generate membership through grassroots organizing by way of reaching out to local communities, as well as hosting national assemblies in various locations throughout Canada. The FSC coalition members utilized "associational networks" insofar as they aimed to recruit individuals already involved in networks outside of the FSC coalition but still connected with the food movement and through "bloc" recruitment by way of recruiting highly organized non-profits to join their coalition (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Myers, 1994). Additionally, the national assemblies garnered members from diverse backgrounds and created bonds between members – a key aspect of coalition formation and maintenance.

Third, the ACF suggests that access to financial resources plays a pivotal role in the formation and maintenance of advocacy coalitions, as they enable coalitions to finance research that can in turn generate public support and mobilize coalition members (Weible, 2007). For non-profit advocacy coalitions, restrictions on advocacy efforts, often referred to as the "advocacy chill," pose a major barrier to financial resources. The "advocacy chill" refers to the fact that a charitable organization in Canada cannot allocate more than 10% of its budget to advocacy efforts. In other words, an advocacy coalition registering as a *charity* in Canada increases its

chances of gaining stable funding from the government; however, this comes with the condition

of having to limit their advocacy efforts to less than 10% of their budget. Many advocacy-based

coalitions, such as the FSC coalition, face challenges securing funding as donors hesitate to grant

funding to advocacy groups who may be considered to be "too political" and more specifically,

to carry a left-leaning political agenda. Thus, the ability to secure additional resources for

research, which would assist an advocacy coalition's efforts in advocating for policy change, is

often severely compromised. In the case of the FSC coalition, it made a strategic decision not to

become a charity, with the result that it forfeited the opportunity to gain secure funding from

some sources, including the government. Instead, the members of the FSC coalition, and more

specifically the PFPP, overcame these challenges by relying on funding support from major

foundations that supported their policy positions. FSC coalition members assisted the coalition in

securing these finances through the personal and professional relationships they had built with

funding bodies. Despite these significant barriers, the FSC coalition's case demonstrates that

"where there is a will to build relationships, there is a way" to securing financial resources.

  The ACF also claims that effective leadership skills are demonstrated within a coalition

when a coalition leader can assist coalition members in articulating a "coherent belief system for

other coalition members," thereby "strengthening their resolve and focus" (Weible, 2007, p.

100). According to RMT, effective coalition leaders are able to mobilize coalition members in a

"centralized direction" (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973). This study has revealed that leaders within

advocacy coalitions use particular tactics to articulate a belief system for coalition members.

ACF suggests that coalition leaders emerge and play a significant role in securing additional

resources, including financial resources for the coalition (Sabatier, 1988). RMT also asserts that

leaders share their prestige and organizing skills to maintain the coalition (McAdam, 1982).

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Leaders within the FSC coalition used their prestige and organizing skills to successfully secure resources through their work conducted on a volunteer basis, while others used their roles and positions in other organizations to secure financial resources for the FSC coalition.

Within the FSC coalition, the leadership encouraged a change in the belief system to a policy position based on food sovereignty, and their leadership skills strengthened and resolved the coalition's focus on food sovereignty. For the FSC coalition's leadership, articulating an effective belief system for a food sovereignty framework involved having deep personal convictions related to this framework; these convictions transcended the professional sphere in that leaders advocated for a food sovereignty framework outside of the FSC coalition and in their daily lives. Leadership within the FSC coalition also strengthened the coalition's resolve and move to a food sovereignty framework by honouring consensus models that were process-oriented and not solely focused on the outcome of decision-making, but on *how* the decisions were reached. Additionally, the FSC coalition's leadership's ability to motivate coalition members to examine taken for granted assumptions about previously held policy positions, such as that of the food security framework, allowed coalition members to embrace a different framework and strengthened their resolve to adopt a policy platform based on food sovereignty. The findings of this study illustrated that the leaderships' ability to bring together dissident voices also contributed to the coalition being strengthened by its move towards achieving a food sovereignty framework. These leadership skills contributed to the FSC coalition being able to understand, accept and mobilize around a new policy position around food sovereignty.

8.4 Limitations

This study had a number of methodological and analytical limitations. The following section explores the limitations pertaining to qualitative research and the limitations pertaining to the use of the ACF.

I used qualitative research as my tool to conduct this study. This approach had a number of methodological limitations in the context of this study. First, while interviews were utilized, allowing experiences to be at the forefront of data collection, this study examined only those organizational documents of the FSC coalition that were publicly accessible, and not the archives pertaining to the FSC coalition, such as meeting minutes. Instead, observations were based on my review of FSC coalition's Assembly/Conference reports and the PFPP (2011) report, as well as my interviews with participants who had attended some of the key events.

Second, I used a snowball sampling technique to identify non-profit organizations that had been in partnership with the FSC coalition from its inception in 2001 until 2012. However, this sampling may not have produced a representative sample of FSC coalition members, as these members did not necessarily represent all differing sectors, camps, or fractions within the FSC coalition. I interviewed five academic FSC members who were employed by various post-secondary institutions and 16 non-profit FSC members who were employed by non-profit organizational members. This sample method did not help to identify or map out which specific sectors, camps or fractions or even leadership within the FSC coalition specifically advocated for a "big tent" approach to coalition building or had an "activist" orientation. Also, no interviewee self-identified as advocating for a "big tent" or "activist" approach. Similarly, the extent to which academic-activist FSC coalition members or non-profit FSC coalition members endorsed an "activist" approach or "big tent" approach to organizing strategies is unclear. Also, this study did

not explore the process of how the FSC coalition developed an addition pillar to its Food Sovereignty Policy Framework, "food as sacred." In addition, past coalition members who were no longer coalition members were not included, as this study focused on how the coalition accepted a transition of belief systems and policy positions and overcame challenges to coalition building, and not specifically on why coalition members withdrew from membership.

Third, throughout this study, I referred to FSC coalition members as organizational members; however, some interviewees did not always claim to be key spokespeople of their organization. As one FSC coalition member stated: "it is just a long-established habit within the left, that you go there [to Assemblies/Conferences] carrying the credentials of an organization, you do not go there because you are just some lone guy or woman, but the fact is you are a lone guy or women" (M8). In fact, the current bylaws of the FSC coalition indicate that FSC coalition members cannot represent any particular organization in their dealings within the FSC coalition. With that said, a fourth limitation is that I did not examine the FSC coalition's bylaw changes over time, and this could have been a useful way of documenting organizational changes.

I used the ACF and RMT as my framework to glean analytical insights for this study. There are a number of analytical limitations to this study. First, the RMT has two versions, one based on an economic perspective (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and the other on a political perspective (McAdam et al., 1996). This study utilized the political perspective to examine the FSC coalition's resources, and paid particular attention to the political struggles in securing resources. However, the economic perspective would also have been a valuable way of examining how economic factors (e.g., supply and demand) can explain collective action in the FSC coalition.

Another limitation is that this case study focused exclusively on coalition building within one coalition, the FSC coalition, whereas the ACF suggests that policy subsystems can contain from one to five advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, Hunter, & McLaughlin, 1987). Thus, exploring the struggles between the FSC coalition and other opposing coalitions would have been a valuable way of seeing how policy change occurs within a policy subsystem. Certainly, former FSC coalition members would be beneficial to such a case study, and this would be a fruitful area for future research. It is interesting that no interviewee commented on whether the FSC coalition lost members as a result of the FSC coalition changing its Policy Framework.

Weible and Nohrstedt (2013) identified six types of coalition resources that coalitions may use to form and maintain their advocacy coalition. While a coalition may use any one of the six types of resources, this study's data were only appropriate for exploring four of the six types of resources. Examining resources such as the role of the formal legal authority in making policy decisions or the resource of public opinion would have been a constructive way of exploring how the FSC coalition sought out available resources that allowed them to act upon or not act upon strategies in a variety of settings. Weible and Sabatier (2007) also clearly stated that external events can affect a policy subsystem, including changes in public opinion or policy decisions from other policy subsystems. This study did not examine possible external events as a cause of policy change.

Finally, there are three major theoretical emphases that the ACF supports and draws upon when examining the policy making process; however, the scope of this study permitted focus only on the first theoretical emphasis (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). The first theoretical emphasis is on advocacy coalitions and includes questions related to FSC's ability to form and

maintain an advocacy coalition. The second theoretical emphasis is on policy-oriented learning and includes questions related to the extent to which advocacy coalitions are informed by their allies and opponents. The third theoretical emphasis relates to policy change and asks questions about the factors that influence both minor and major policy changes. In light of the limitations of this study, the following section addresses areas for future research.

8.5 Future research

There are important lessons to be learned from this study, including some areas for future research on how non-profit advocacy coalitions are formed and maintained. Non-profit advocacy coalitions face a number of barriers and challenges in this era of austerity and funding cuts to non-profit organizations involved in advocacy. They rely heavily on resources that include, but are not limited to, knowledge-based assets, membership, financial resources, and their leaders' abilities to maintain their coalition. These are areas of research that need to be further explored as they may assist advocacy coalitions in addressing various challenges related to their formation and maintenance.

Non-profit advocacy coalitions continue to rely heavily on the expertise of like-minded researchers who can establish belief systems and develop policy positions. At the same time, these researchers, or "activist-academics," are highly scrutinized before being determined a valuable asset, at which point they are considered to be "allies." Further research should be conducted into the nuances of these processes, to determine when and how academic coalition members become valuable assets and allies. The extent of the influence that researchers have on policy making processes of advocacy coalitions should be further researched.

Second, given their very limited resources, non-profit advocacy coalitions often build their membership base by relying on existing coalition members to reach out through assemblies,

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even though these members are themselves often hard-pressed for time and finances and often support coalitions on a volunteer basis. While this study demonstrates the resiliency of coalition members, who, despite their own constraints, continue to support the coalition, the toll of their volunteer-based work and its impact on the policy making process is largely unknown and should be further researched.

Third, as demonstrated in this study, non-profit advocacy coalitions face considerable challenges when securing funding and are forced to rely largely on coalition members to assist in securing financial resources, as governments limit their funding or reduce it altogether, in a process known as the "advocacy chill." Further research needs to be done in this area, particularly around the adverse effects of the "advocacy chill" within non-profit advocacy coalitions on food policy making.

Fourth, in an effort to maintain themselves, non-profit advocacy coalitions rely heavily on their leadership, whose role is not only to secure additional resources, but also to articulate belief systems for their coalition members to consider, focus members on policy positions and work toward research consensus around such policy positions. Examining additional advocacy coalition resources, including public opinion and the role of formal legal authorities in making policy decisions, would fill a wide gap in this study. Additionally, future research can examine the role of formal legal authority in making policy decisions and the resource of public opinion as it relates to coalition maintenance.

Non-profit advocacy coalitions face challenges not only in regard to their maintenance, but also in forming their coalitions. These challenges may arise during the identification of a shared belief system or during campaigns for changes in policy positions when experiences reveal anomalies between various policy positions. The decisions coalitions make regarding their

policy positions are not necessarily rational, but are instead attributable to the interests of coalition members. For example, policy-focused beliefs and the beliefs of coalition members are very much shared based on interest, vision, and ideological similarities. As was demonstrated in this study, at times an interest group within a coalition may emerge, carrying a different vision and belief system for the coalition that the coalition is not willing to consider, let alone adopt. The resistance and tensions within a coalition may be so strong that the emerging interest group may deem it necessary to develop their new beliefs and policy positions *outside* of the coalition, through an independent project, while at the same time maintaining membership within the coalition. As I demonstrated in this case study, if and when the interest group develops a viable framework, they may then wish to reintroduce their policy position back into the coalition. This study has demonstrated that, as in the case of the FSC coalition, if coalitions can establish common ground between coalition members and employ transformative approaches to create consensus around fundamental normative maxims, then despite disagreements among coalition members, the coalition can remain intact and continue its advocacy efforts.

Other areas for further research include examining the ways in which external events affect coalition building and maintenance and the process of policy-oriented learning. In the case of the FSC coalition, researchers could examine how allies and opponents external to the coalition impacted their coalition building efforts and maintenance activities. The influence of the FSC coalition bylaw changes over time is another area for future research, as this may reveal organizational changes and their impact on coalition building and maintenance.

As of July, of 2017, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food launched consultations on a National Food Policy for Canada. On Wednesday July 5, a group of Toronto Members of Parliament met with members of civil society at Ryerson University in an effort to hear their

thoughts and assist the government in shaping the future of food across Canada (M. Koç, personal communication, July 2, 2017). The consultation focused on four primary issues: increasing access to affordable food, improving health and food safety, conserving soil, water and air, and growing more high-quality food in Canada (M. Koç, personal communication, July 2, 2017). Exploring the impact of policy change on the FSC coalition and maintenance is an area for further research, especially in light of the Prime Minister of Canada's recent mandate letter to the Federal Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food to develop a National Food Policy (Office of the Prime Minister, 2016) and emerging consultations with civil society and the non-profit sector.

8.6 Conclusion

Non-profit advocacy coalitions face challenges both within and outside their coalitions, particularly in securing resources such as information, mobilized membership, finances, and skillful leadership. Despite these challenges, as the case of the FSC coalition has shown, the non-profit sector is resilient and does manage to secure resources to create non-profit organizations that hold advocacy as their *priority*, despite government cuts in funding for advocacy efforts. In a neoliberal era, the place of the non-profit sector in advocating for social policy is increasing, and this is necessary if civil society voices are to be present within the policy making process. The case of the FSC coalition has shown what a group of individuals across the food movement in Canada who coalesce into a coalition can do with limited resources, and when facing a variety of challenges – they maintain fundamental belief systems while at the same time being willing to embrace changing policy positions, in an effort to advocate for a national food policy that aims for a sustainable food system that produces healthy and safe food while getting us to zero hunger.

Appendix A: FSC Coalition Building, Maintenance and Change

Note: The PFPP and FSC coalition were maintained at various points in time using the following resources: membership, leadership, finances and information.

Are you a steering committee/board member or a non-profit organization who is also a member of Food Secure Canada?

RYERSON UNIVERSITY

PARTICIPANTS NEEDED

CONFIDENTIAL

If you are…

A COMMITTEE/BOARD MEMBER OR A NON PROFIT ORGANIZATION

And have been supporting Food Secure Canada and are official organizational members of Food Secure Canada between 2001-2012?

And would like to share your story to:

- increase awareness of the impact of food sovereignty on individuals and communities
- improve the way food sovereignty and social policy is addressed at the national level in Canada
- improve access to food for all

PLEASE CONTACT **SARAH DUNI, Ph.D. Student**
by September 30, 2015
sarah.duni@ryerson.ca
416.675.6622 ext. 2612

With your permission, you will be asked to confidentially volunteer your organizational experience in a 1.5 hour interview at your convenience. This research has been approved by the Ryerson Research Ethics Board (REB).

Appendix C: Recruitment Script

Recruitment Script

1. Introduction of Investigator or Research Assistant

      Excuse me, sir/ madam   OR

       Excuse me, Mrs. Smith ?

- (confirm that you have the correct person if you are contacting a specific participant or potential subject)

      Do you have a minute? My name is Sarah Duni.

I am a doctoral student in Policy Studies at Ryerson University and I am working on a <u>research</u> study called Exploring the Advocacy Coalition framework and examining Food Secure Canada's (FSC) role in building coalitions for a national food policy in Canada. This research has been approved by the Ryerson REB.

2. Immediate opportunity to opt-out

      I am contacting you to see if you are interested <u>in hearing more</u> about my study. Is it OK for me to continue?

- If individual says "no, not interested" = stop, say thank you but do not continue.
- If he/she says yes, then continue or make plans to revisit at a more convenient time.

3. Make a BRIEF statement about why he/she was selected. Make sure the individual understands that this   research is separate from his/her employer. For example:

- Example: I'm approaching you to see if you'd like to be in the study. There is nothing in particular about you, personally, that made me ask you to participate. I am approaching every nonprofit organization who was a member of Food Secure Canada since its inception in 2001 to 2012 and who has been engaged in mobilizing around food security and food sovereignty issues on a national level in Canada. This research has been approved by the Ryerson Research Ethics Board (REB).

4. Ask if he/she is interested in hearing more details.

      So, are you interested in hearing some details about the research study?

- If not interested, thank the individual for his/ her time.
- If interested, then move to the consent form.

Appendix D: Screening Script

Screening Script

How I will determine if a person is eligible:
- Is this someone who works for a non-profit organization, in a management and/or senior position?
- Is this someone who was a steering committee/board member of Food Secure Canada from 2001-2012?
- Is this an organization who has been in partnership with Food Secure Canada between 2001-2012?
- Is this someone who has at one point supported Food Secure Canada?
- Has this organization demonstrated, in his or her earlier relationships with the researchers, an ability to articulate his or her partnership with Food Secure Canada?

What I will say if the person is eligible:
- Initial offer is made by telephone and followed up with documentation
- Congratulate and thank the successful participant and confirm the date of interview
- Follow up with any necessary documentation

What I will say if the person is ineligible:
- Thank candidate for taking the time to listen about the research study and/or review the recruitment poster. I will provide the candidate with a rationale as to why they were not chosen
  - i.e., unfortunately, although we thought you had a lot of great skills and experience in the non-profit sector (or any other relevant experience), we had many candidates whose skills and experience in non-profit sector (or any other relevant experience) matched more closely the requirements of the research. Once again, thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this study. We all wish you success, both professionally and personally.
- Some candidates may require more information than others and may probe my reasons for not selecting them. I will keep my comments about the competition general and specific comments will be directly related to the candidate themselves
  - i.e., when I am asked for some information by candidates who are unsuccessful in the job competition, I may highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the unsuccessful candidate with respect to the selection criteria. I may provide examples of what the candidate stated in the screening interview to a question, and then inform him/her of the expected/appropriate response.

Appendix E: Data Collection Instruments

Interview Project:
Exploring the Advocacy Coalition framework and examining Food Secure Canada's (FSC) role in building coalitions for a national food policy in Canada
Time of interview: N/A
Date:N/A
Place:N/A
Interviewer:N/A
Interview:N/A

According to Weible and Nohrstedt (2013), the first theoretical emphasis on advocacy coalitions includes key *descriptive questions* regarding coalition formation and development and these include the following:

- o When were you an organizational member of FSC?
- o What led to the development of Food Secure Canada?
- o Why did you join FSC? Why did you maintain your membership from FSC?
- o During your membership at FSC, what strategies and resources did you use to advocate for food sovereignty People's Food Policy Project (PFPP)?
- o During your membership at FSC, what was the role of different organizations within Food Secure Canada's coalition?

- How much consensus was there among Food Secure Canada's coalition members?
  - o How much consensus was there among Food Secure Canada's coalition members in the drafting and adoption of food sovereignty?

- What belief system (mission, value statement, organizational policies) did Food Secure Canada have and how, if at all, did these beliefs change through learning, specifically the adoption of food sovereignty?
  - o Why was food sovereignty adopted?
  - o What led to this change, in terms of internal and external organizational factors?
  - o What were the implications of this change in terms of policy objectives?
  - o What were the implications of this change in terms of FSC organizational membership?
  - o Did your organization support and share in FSC's beliefs of food sovereignty? If yes, how? If not, why not?

- The second theoretical emphasis is related to policy-oriented learning and important descriptive questions that guide inquiry into learning are the following:
  - o How, if at all, did the adoption and shared belief of food sovereignty bind organizations together to FSC and visa versa?

- o During the adoption of food sovereignty, how, if at all, did expert-based information collect FSC members who were proponents of this change and assist proponents in arguing for food sovereignty and against FSC coalition members opposed to food sovereignty?
- o How if at all, did the use of 'professional forums' where scientific and technical information was exchanged within FSC and organizational members provide for an opportunity in policy-oriented learning and the adoption of food sovereignty?
- o Which, if any, organizational members withdrew their membership from FSC as a result of the adoption of food sovereignty? Did your organization withdraw your membership from FSC as a result of the adoption of food sovereignty?
- o If your organization maintained membership as a result of the adoption of food sovereignty, what do you believe, if any, were the implications of maintaining membership for FSC and for your organization in advocating for a national food strategy?
- o Would you suggest an alternative to food sovereignty? If so, what do these alternatives include?
- o What, if any, were the implications of organizations withdrawing membership from FSC?

- How did learning disperse/diffuse among organizational allies within Food Secure Canada's coalition?

- What, if any, contexts and events fostered learning by brokers (elected officials, high civil servants, and courts)?

- To what extent, if at all, did a broker (elected officials, high civil servants, and courts) facilitate learning within FSC?

  - o What do you see as the role of government in policy solutions related to national food strategy in Canada?

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Date: November 21, 2015
Study Name:
      Exploring the Advocacy Coalition framework and examining Food Secure Canada's (FSC) role in building coalitions for a national food policy in Canada
Principal Investigator: Sarah Duni, sarah.duni@ryerson.ca, 416-675-6622 x2612

You are being asked to participate in a research study. Before you give your consent to participate, it is important that you read the following information and ask as many questions as necessary to be sure you understand what you will be asked to do.

      Purpose of this study: This research is part of a required PhD dissertation in the Policy Studies program at Ryerson University and will be used for publications, conference presentations, journal publications, books and additional educational services. The purpose of this study is to gain insights into the role of non-profit organizations in policy development and the importance of coalition building for policy advocacy through a specific case study of national food policy advocacy by Food Secure Canada. This study is also seeking to identify the alliances or coalitions utilized by non-profits in their policy advocacy efforts and what kind of obstacles and opportunities they face in forming alliances and coalition.

      Description of the study: You were invited to participate because you represent a non-profit organization who has mobilized around food security and food sovereignty issues by partnering with Food Secure Canada sometime between 2001 to 2012. You will participate in a 1.5hour interview and the interviewer will ask you approximately 40 open-ended questions. Interviews will take place during a time and location that is convenient for you. Interviews will be audio-recorded, however, you can choose not to have your interview audio-recorded. The interview will be transcribed and you will have the opportunity to review the transcripts.

      Risks or Discomforts:
      You may feel uncomfortable to answer questions but you can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the researchers, Ryerson University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed.

Benefits of the study:

The goal of this research is to improve our understanding of policy making processes related to food sovereignty issues in Canada and the role of non-profit organizations in initiating action and advocacy for food policy at the national level.

Confidentiality:

All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and unless specifically indicated by your consent, your name will not appear in any report or publication of the research. Your name will be anonymized by assigning a numerical alias that will replace your name. Only the researcher, Sarah Duni, will have access to the data. The data will be collected by way of hand-written notes, audio-tapes and/or a digital device. Your data will be safely stored in a locked facility and only the researcher will have access to this information. Your data will be stored for approximately 2 years and will be destroyed after the study by way shredding and deleting electronic files. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law.

Voluntary Nature of Participation:

Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision to take part (or not) will in no way influence your current or future opportunities and relationship with Ryerson University, or with any of the researchers involved in this study. If you decide to participate you are free to refuse to answer any question, stop participation altogether, and withdraw your consent.

Questions About The Study:

If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. If you have questions later, please contact Sarah Duni at sarah.duni@ryerson.ca.If you have concerns about this study, please contact Dr. Mustafa Koç at mkoc@ryerson.ca. This study has undergone review through the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board and this research has been approved by the Ryerson REB. If you have any questions or concerns about this research, feel free to contact Dr. Lynn Lavalee, Chair of the Research Ethics Board at rebchair@ryerson.ca.

Agreement:

Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and have had a chance to ask as many questions you have about this study. Your signature below indicates that you agree to be in the study and have been told that you can change your mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of this agreement. You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your legal rights.

Your signature below indicates that you agree to have this interview audio recorded.

Signature_____   Date_____

Participant I (*fill in your name here*), consent to participate in (*insert study name here*) conducted

by Sarah Duni. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am not

waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my consent.

Signature_____   Date_____

Participant

Signature_____   Date_____

Principal Investigator

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