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The extraordinary renditions of Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki : Orientalism, Islamophobia, and the erosion of citizenship and human rights

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ABSTRACT

Extraordinary rendition has gained significant notoriety as an inhumane practice against suspected terrorists in the "war on terror." It is a highly controversial initiative whereby many critics contend that the purpose of such renditions is to subject the suspects to aggressive methods of persuasion such as torture and other human rights violations that are illegal in Western liberal democracies. The CIA implemented the extraordinary rendition program, but other Western states have participated in the rendering of Muslims to the CIA's global web of secret prisons. Canada was involved with the renditions of two Muslims-Canadians, Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki. This paper will discuss their respective renditions and the ideological machinations that fuel the extraordinary rendition program using Edward Said's theory of Orientalism and its relationship with Islamophobia. A lexical discourse analysis will be integrated into the paper to evaluate negative Muslim identity construction in Canada post-9/11.

Key words: Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Extraordinary Rendition, war on terror, Orientalism, Islamophobia, Muslims.

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

September 11 marked a decisive break in respect for human rights. In the name of a "just war" against terrorism, many infringements were suddenly permitted. The defenders of civil liberties have good reason to be worried. The general trend of our society towards increasing respect for the individual and individual freedoms has been brought to a brutal halt. And there is every indication that we are now drifting towards what appears like more and more a paranoid police state.

Ignacio Ramonet, *Le Monde Diplomatique*

At its core, this major research paper will examine the extraordinary rendition program and the ideologies that fuel its existence. This paper will specifically investigate two naturalized Muslim-Canadians: Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki, each of whom were wrongfully incarcerated in Syria due to the explicit involvement of United States intelligence and immigration agencies in conjunction with the direct cooperation of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Accordingly, it is important to consider how these cases have affected the settlement experiences of the respective individuals as well as the Muslim-Canadian community in general, which has become increasingly marginalized with greater emphasis to securitization policies and overt negative identity construction by the media in Canada after September 11, 2001. Moreover, this research paper will evaluate how Canada's involvement with providing intelligence on Arar and Almalki to U.S. authorities, with no safeguards as to their treatment, affects Canada's ability to protect rights associated with citizenship.

This examination and analysis of extraordinary rendition, the violation of citizenship and human rights happens in a liberal democratic society where it appears that both the state and the dominant section of the populace is complicit in these actions. To get a sense of how this happens, this research employs Edward Said's theory of Orientalism, and attempts to get a better understanding of the phenomenon of Islamophobia as well as a deeper understanding of how Muslims have been made the "other" since September 11, 2001.

This research paper will be divided into four main chapters. The first chapter will identify the theoretical lens in which the research will be evaluated. Since September 11,

2001, the Western world has targeted Muslims as the primary "enemy combatants" in the "war on terror" (Grey, 2006, p. 15). Therefore, Edward Said's theory of Orientalism, which shares a symbiotic relationship with the emerging form of racism known as Islamophobia, will be employed to situate Muslims post-9/11 as the "other." Islamophobia is a form of religious racial profiling that has increased dramatically since September 11 by Western institutions that have overtly targeted Muslims and Arabs as potential threats liberal democracies (Fekete, 2004). The term and its ramifications will be addressed in a subsection of this paper. The second chapter will review literature on the extraordinary rendition program and its infringement of international laws and human rights. This literature review will provide a contextual understanding of the program and link its connection to the first chapter on racism directed at Muslims from the Orientalism and Islamophobia theoretical lens. A lexical discourse analysis investigating Muslim identity politics in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 from Canada's two national newspapers, the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*, will comprise the third chapter of the paper to illustrate the increased marginalization of Muslims. The fourth chapter will involve case study examinations of two Canadian-Muslims: Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki who were rendered to Syria in 2002. This section will interpret the international law and human rights concerns that the paper discusses in the literature review.

It has become apparent that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States induced a major ripple effect that have forced Western nations to adopt increasingly stringent policies. Foreign affairs relationships, defence strategies, and security policies have been dramatically altered to ensure the protection of states' individual self-interests, and the safety of their respective citizens. In addition, Western

2

governments attitudes pertaining to immigration have been affected by growing security concerns, which have manifested in greater restrictions to migrants of certain faiths and countries of origin. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Arab Muslim migrants have particularly been subjected to racial profiling at various ports of entry throughout the world due to their perceived association with acts of terrorism. Consequently, the United States has led the charge against Islam with its "war on terror", which has replaced the Cold War in the hearts and minds of people across the globe (Welch, 2006). In effect, the Islamic world has been reduced to the twenty-first century's racial "other" from a Eurocentric perspective, but this is not a new phenomenon, as the scholar who began to popularize the notion of a "civilizational clash" and Muslims as the "other," claims that the division between Islamic and Western states has been in place for centuries (Huntington, 1996).

The 9/11 attacks were unequivocally orchestrated by the Islamist extremist terrorist cell al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden (Grey, 2006; Lewis, 2003). However, instead of focusing its might on al Qaeda, American President George W. Bush and his Hawkish administration in turn viewed the entire Islamic world as representative of al Qaeda's core fundamentalist values. According to Bernard Lewis, the American inference is somewhat logical as "most Muslims are not fundamentalists, most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such" (2003, p. 137). Consequently, the Bush Administration specifically targeted Arabs and Muslims as the primary "enemy combatants" in the "War on Terror" (McCoy, 2006, p. 171). Bush's flirtation with the idea of an anti-Muslim crusade has led to the West distinguishing between "good"

3

Muslims from "bad" Muslims, but the end result is unmistakable: "Islam must be quarantined and the devil exorcized from it by a Muslim civil war" (Mamdani, 2004, p. 24). America's vengeance has been exacted in military invasions, psychological onslaughts, and religious posturing. However, the United States immense political and economic influence has forced other developed nations to comply with its witch-hunt. Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice warned European heads of state that were they to challenge American anti-terrorist tactics, their criticisms could damage efforts to protect their own citizens from attacks (Dimento and Geis, 2006, p. 61).

Consequently, in 2003, nations such as the United Kingdom and Australia eagerly joined the "coalition of the willing," which invaded Iraq, while traditional ally and neighbour Canada reluctantly joined in its partial participation through its "peace-making" mission in Afghanistan (Ljunggren, 2003). However, Canada is not entirely absolved from participating in certain contentious aspects of the proxy battle against terrorism. The RCMP and CSIS knowingly surrendered vital information on Canadian-Muslims suspected of having links with al Qaeda to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Whitaker, 2008). As a result, Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki became victims of the "war on terror" and subsequently held in the CIA's web of secret prisons, known as "Black Sites" throughout the world (Amnesty International, 2006). It has become abundantly clear that various institutions in the United States and Canada abused Arar's and Almalki's basic human rights and citizenship privileges with their illegal confinements.

Recently, the CIA's secret prisons have become hotly debated subjects in the mainstream media with the emergence of torture claims at facilities like Guantanomo

Bay, Cuba; Abu Ghraib, Iraq; Bagram Air Force Base and the "Dark Prison" in Afghanistan (Worthington, 2007; Sadat, 2006). However, it has also become apparent that the prisons represent significant components of the highly contentious CIA program known as extraordinary rendition.

Extraordinary renditions were first developed by the Clinton Administration in 1995 as a method to capture Islamist militants and send them to third party countries like Egypt where they would be tortured and punished for their dissent (Worthington, 2007, p. 215; Mayer, 2005). The Bush Administration inherited the extraordinary rendition program, but increased its use exponentially in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Six days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush gave the CIA broad authorization to disrupt terrorist activity, including permission to kill, capture, and detain members of al Qaeda anywhere in the world (Priest, 2005). However, the breadth of the search for al Qaeda operatives expanded to include those with suspected ties to the terrorist cell. In an advanced communication age, this came to include many Muslim men and women like Arar and Almalki who emerged as innocent victims of the "war on terror." Nevertheless, it is important to consider that Arar and Almalki were deemed exceptional persons of interest by intelligence agencies in a heightened national security age. The concern with the Arar and Almalki cases is that the state's role to protect its citizens overrode the protection of certain individuals' rights, which is problematic.

Extraordinary rendition has gained significant notoriety as an inhumane practice and an affront to international law and basic human rights in the "war on terror." It is clear that the program circumvents international conventions and challenges aspects of the American Constitution and Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Moreover, the

program's ethos is imbedded in Islamophobia. As a result, Arab Muslims have become the de-facto rendered targets while being simultaneously constructed as the racially inferior "Other". Therefore, extraordinary rendition must be examined using Edward Said's theory of Orientalism along with a human rights framework. Moreover, it is important to consider how the binary construction and/or deconstruction of the "other" works within the context of identity politics, government policies, and notions of institutional racism.

Methodology

The methodological component of my paper will involve two parts. The first methodological part involves a discourse analysis of two Canadian national newspapers' coverage of Muslims in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. This discourse analysis will specifically look at articles published in the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*, from September 12, 2001 to November 1, 2002, which is the approximate date when the Canadian public became aware that Maher Arar was rendered by the United States to Syria (McCoy, 2006). It is important to examine how the print media's reportage using adverse language can negatively construct visible minority identities, as this no doubt has serious ramifications for ethnic minority groups' settlement experiences in Canada, and in this particular case, Muslims.

The second methodological component of the major research paper will investigate specific rendition case studies of Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki, which will be supported through the involvement of a key informant interview. Qualitative analyses will be conducted in regards to Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki, who were held captive in Syria in 2002. There is a significant amount of material pertaining to Arar's rendition; therefore, secondary sources will be evaluated in his case study. However, Abdullah Almalki has graciously provided his consent to be a key informant for this research; therefore, the research pertaining to Almalki will draw from secondary sources and his interview. Almalki's participation in this research will shed new light on Muslim settlement experiences in Canada post-9/11.

Nevertheless, the sample size for the key informant interview is extremely small, which is in part due to the limited availability and willingness of rendered victims to

participate in research projects of this nature. Moreover, the secondary literature of the specific case study subjects draws from previous interviews; therefore, further interviews may be repetitious in nature. Regardless, it is important to consider the dynamic of the key informant interview with Abdullah Almalki. His interrogation and torture experience in Syria undoubtedly shapes his perceptions and experiences. Moreover, the researcher's opinions and position may affect the research based on their experiences, which in turn may impact the key informant. Therefore, the interview will be conducted in semi-structured format to allow for variables in the questions and responses.

It is clear that the circumstances of Arar's and Almalki's renditions are unique; however, they each present some startling similarities. Both have had public inquiries that have found them innocent of their suspected terrorist connections. The inquiries have also concluded that Canadian officials carelessly surrendered information to American agencies that led to their respective tortures in Syria (Arar Commission, 2006). Therefore, it will be important to discern from the inquiries the human rights and international legal violations that occurred with their renderings. Moreover, what was the role of the state in their respective cases? More importantly, as Arab Muslim immigrants, how have their respective experiences affected their settlement experiences in Canada, and what have been the effects on the greater Canadian-Muslim community?

However, it is important to note that the extraordinary rendition cases involving Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki are only illustrative of tendencies of institutionalized racism and Islamophobia, and may not be entirely representative of widespread Islomophobic racism directed at all Canadian-Muslims. The public inquiries conducted by Justices Dennis O'Connor and Frank Iacobucci have discussed the confirmed

renditions of four Muslim-Canadians: Arar, Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddin. Furthermore, recent reports have surfaced pertaining to other Canadian-Muslims, namely Omar Khadr, Benamar Benatta, and Abousfian Abdelrazik, that have been precariously detained due to their suspected ties with al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the number of confirmed rendition cases of Muslims-Canadians is small; therefore, it is important to consider the extent in which generalizations can be inferred based on the limited number of cases in Canada. Consequently, both Arar and Almalki must be deemed as exceptional cases to avoid larger generalizations; however, the impacts of their cases have had serious ramifications for the Canadian-Muslim community, which will be addressed later in the paper.

Theoretical Framework: Orientalism

Historically, discourses around race have worked to produce ideologies pertaining to the construction of the "other" (Holt, 2000). From colonialism's initial stages where slavery was employed to conquer perceived "uncivilized" races for the benefit of European expansion, individuals from the "other" category have represented a significant marginalized social fragment. Interest in global expansion encouraged Europeans to gain and subsequently maintain power by constructing a hierarchical system where "race became the framework of ranked categories segmenting the human population" (Sanjek, 1994, p.1). Through systems of racial classification, subjugated individuals were confined to particular identities that maintained their inferior rank in the engineered social order (Omi and Winant, 1994). Despite efforts to eradicate ideas that encourage both biological and cultural inferiority, race continues to influence the "social ordering of perceptions and policies in the pervasive racism that has plagued the globe following the 1500s" (Sanjek, 1994, p. 1). Currently, the ideas around race and racism have become prominent in the division between Arabian Islamic nations and Eurocentric societies in the post-September 11, 2001 era.

Given that the extraordinary rendition program targets specific ethno-religious men and women of Middle Eastern origins, it is impossible to ignore Edward Said's seminal theory of Orientalism. Said discusses Europe's construction of Middle Eastern identities as the supposedly inferior "other." According to Said, "Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the 'Orient' and the 'Occident.' Thus a very large mass of writers have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories concerning

the Orient" (Said, 1978, pp. 2-3). Moreover, Orientalism can serve as a "collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all non-European peoples and cultures" (Said, 1978, p. 7). Said's discussion was largely situated in Europe's colonial expansion phase; however, the theory can be interpolated in a contemporary framework when examining the division between Islamic and Christian states in the early twenty-first century.

It is important to consider that Orientalism reflects an ideology that is more about European identity in comparison to other groups, which is manifested through the notion that in order to define self, one must first define the other. Eurocentric identities thus become the reference point on which to compare and construct all other identities. In essence, the emerging notion of whiteness, and its various attributes such as privilege, is perceived as the standard that is used in comparison to all other races. Therefore, constructing the Orient says more about Europeans' sense of identity than it does about Afro-Asiatic cultures. As a result, this can be construed as generalizing other cultures based on the universalizing of European culture to all "non-Europeans." European culture, which is perceived as the dominant culture group, exercises this pervasive structuring of universalism to reinforce specific ideologies in order to legitimate economic, political, and social hierarchies that impact racial divisions, which clearly illustrates their privilege in comparison to other races (Teelucksingh, Racial Discourse, January 20, 2009).

The extraordinary rendition program is almost exclusively applied to Muslims in an effort to demonize and paint Muslim men and boys as potential "terrorists" or "enemy combatants," which is imbedded in the notion of the "other." Moreover, it is important to consider that the implementation of the program by the United States, and its Western allies, serves to project the idea of whiteness in the form of Islamophobia. In observing these developments, one can invoke the ideas of Said to identify the treatment of Muslims in the post-9/11 period as Orientalist in nature. Therefore, the extraordinary rendition program can thus be interpreted as a form of new Orientalism, as Eurocentric nations like the United States and Canada have justified the implementation of the program, which views Muslims as enemies and fosters the "us" versus "them" ideology, drawing their ideological wellspring from Samuel Huntington's work on the new post Cold War threat to the hegemony of the United States (Huntington, 1996). Said argued, "The Oriental was linked thus to the elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien... Since the Oriental was a member of a subject race, he had to be subjected: it was that simple" (Said, 2007, p. 47). Said's ideas can bee in their contemporary application through the utterances of United States President George W. Bush, who in a 2003 speech outlined his administration's view of what can only be considered as the "Orient":

> Events during the past two years have set before us the clearest of divides: between those who seek order, and those who spread chaos; between those who work for peaceful change, and those who adopt the methods of gangsters; between those who honor the rights of man, and those who deliberately take the lives of men and women and children without mercy or shame. Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground (Hanson, 2009).

Consequently, since September 11, 2001, Western governments and influential institutions such as the newsprint media have increasingly come to view Middle Eastern Muslim men and women as archaic radical savages that pose significant threats to democratic states. As a result, the economic, political, and military power that the Western world possess has gravely influenced the manner in which the Middle East is currently viewed, which has enabled Eurocentrism to perpetuate and boldly implement gruesome programs like extraordinary rendition. As a result, Arab Muslims in particular are confronted with complex mobility and settlement challenges in Western states, as they are consistently portrayed in accordance with Said's definition of the "other."

Islamophobia

The division between Islam and Christendom is not a new phenomenon that arose at the end of the Cold War, as some have suggested. Europeans have traditionally viewed the Islamic world as barbaric and uncivilized since the Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries (Lewis, 2003, pp. 47-50; Huntington, 1996, pp. 209-212). Mahmood Mamdani (2004, p. 25) cites historian Tomaz Mastnak who argues, "When Christian society became conscious of itself through mobilization for holy war… an essential moment in the articulation of self-awareness of the Christian commonwealth was the construction of the Muslim enemy." Moreover, "the perception of Islam as not only an historical but a continuing threat to Christendom is attributable to stereotypes that suggest that the Arab/Muslim exists in a manner devoid of space, time, and history; that he/she is effectively de-historicized, and unchanging and without progress" (Muscati, 2002, p. 135). However, constructing the Islamic world in the twenty-first century as the "other" can be identified within the emerging term Islamophobia, an identification of Muslims as the "other" in Western states since September 11, 2001.

Western media have taken the notion of Islamophobia and increased its reportage on Islam in negative fashion. Therefore, the proliferation of Islamophobia has led to the perpetuation of institutional racism towards Muslims and Arabs in Western states. Sivanandan argues that Islamophobia is a form of zeno-racism that combined with institutional racism creates a recipe for conflagration (Sivanadan, 2006). It is important to note that although Islamophobia and racism are interconnected, there are important differences. Islamophobia is the racial profiling of an individual based on their religion, whereas racism is based on prejudice against one's phenotypical characteristics.

Nevertheless, this notion of intersectionality whereby race and religion meet to produce a kind of extreme profiling that has led to programs like extraordinary rendition. The proliferation of Islamophobic rhetoric has led to the demonization of Muslims and Arabs, which makes successful integration for the respective groups tenuous in Western societies.

What makes the extraordinary rendition program an even more contentious topic is its symbiotic relationship with Islamophobia. The reasoning that fuels the West's justification for the extraordinary rendition program is fear of Islam and its Muslim followers. Consequently, the term Islamophobia has been used to describe Western sentiments towards Islam. Islamophobia has been described as a fear or hatred of Islam and its adherents that translates into individual, ideological, and systematic forms of oppression and discrimination (Zine, 2006, p. 239). Naturally, since September 11, 2001 the term has been employed with greater frequency whereby it has become part of the vernacular. In effect it serves as a term for the West to construct a racial "other," which once more is congruent with Edward Said's Orientalism theory.

According to Sheridan (2006, p. 317) "the first known printed usage of the word Islamophobia appeared in a published periodical in the United States in February 1991. The term is functionally similar to xenophobia and offers a useful shorthand way of referring to a dread or hatred of Islam and therefore a fear or dislike of Muslims." Islamophobia's link with xenophobia is an important consideration in the discourse. Gardner, Karakaolus, and Luchtenberg (2008, p. 121) use the term Islamophobia to refer to an irrational distrust, fear or rejection of the Muslim religion, and those who are perceived as Muslim. They infer that Islamophobia is a subcategory of xenophobia and

closely related to anti-Semitism as another rejection of an ethno-religious group. This was particularly evident with the increased number of hate crimes directed at Muslims, and those perceived to be Muslims following 9/11 whereby the attacks were predicated on phenotypical or biological characteristics. Consequently, the growth in Islamophobia has been justified through the racial profiling of men with Middle Eastern features, which is not only legal today, it is fully embraced by many as an acceptable price to pay for national security (Elia, 2006, p. 156).

Sheridan (2006, p. 319) also cites the seminal work conducted by Allen and Nielsen in 2002 whereby they propose that the perceived increase in xenophobia and fear of Muslims noted throughout many parts of the European Union represented an intensification of pre-existing sentiment, which exacerbated latent feelings of fear and vulnerability and a perceived threat of the "enemy within." If the extraordinary rendition program is undeniably linked with Islamophobia, then one can infer that Western nations who render Muslims are in fact guilty of xenophobic tendencies.

The construction of the Islamic world as the "other" is vitally important for understanding Islamophobia. Is it right to largely persecute an entire religious sect based on the crimes of a few radical members? This leads to generalizations of ethno-religious groups, which perpetuate their marginalization. The ideology behind Islamophobia has led to alarmism that is concerned with the Islamic threat, which Islam poses to the non-Muslim world. Non-Muslim simplification involves many obvious issues whereby terrorism is seen as an activity practiced by most Muslims, but can be also be construed as believing that most terrorists are Muslims (Halliday, 1999, p. 892). The attack now is against not Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all,

especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term. Equally, the Islamophobic attack is against states, which may or have been among the most secular in the world, such as Iraq. Therefore, Islamophobia leads to negative stereotyping whereby the enemy is not a faith or a culture, but a people (Halliday, 1999, p. 898).

The proliferation of the term Islamophobia can be attributed to the West's sensational media representations of Islam. "The silence maintained by the media regarding Muslims until they are perceived as a threat means that Muslims become visible as a people only when they represent threats as Muslims" (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008, p. 143). This has led to the wrongful assumption that Islam is monolithic and that all Muslims have terrorist leanings. This is compounded when the media incorrectly represents Muslims. According to former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan (December 7, 2004), Islam has been distorted and taken out of context, with particular acts or practices being taken to represent or to symbolize a rich and complex faith, which is obviously problematic. This is particularly evident in Western motion pictures. "Whenever Muslims are represented, they invariably appeared in the role of villains—and always as foreigners—Arabs, not Arab Americans. This unique distancing is best understood when one thinks of other religious minorities in the United States who, while recognized as minorities, are not necessarily perceived as foreigners" (Elia, 2006, p. 156).

To compound the matter, the United States and other Western countries are currently witnessing a growth in the number of Muslim residents, but unfortunately they are also experiencing increased Islamophobic tendencies. Gardner et al. cite an Australian newspaper article that clearly demonizes Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11. "Unlike

Mohammed, Christ did not slaughter unbelievers, execute women who sang rude songs about him, cut off the limbs of apostates, sleep with a woman whose family he had just killed, have sex with a nine-year-old, urge the murder of Jews, authorize the beating of wives ... and promise heaven above all to those who made war on infidels" (2008, p. 125). This report was no doubt extreme in nature and a clear misrepresentation of Mohamed, but this negative mentality has been supported throughout the world, which has led to human rights concerns such as racial profiling at border crossings and ports of entry. Moreover, it has become clear that the media has a role in negatively constructing racial identities, which demonizes Muslims and furthers the notion of "us" versus "them."

Some scholars have argued that the media is in effect perpetuating negative stereotypes of the Islamic world, which leads to racial profiling. Racial profiling is said to exist when members of certain racial or ethnic groups become subject to greater levels of criminal justice surveillance than others. Therefore, it is typically defined as a racial disparity in police stop and search practices, racial differences in customs searches at airports and border crossings, increased police patrols in racial minority neighbourhoods, and undercover activities or sting operations which selectively target particular ethnic groups (Wortley and Tanner, 2005). This premise can also lead one to include the extraordinary rendition program as a preventative paradigm that seeks to limit the movements of Muslims, which is predicated on the fear of further attacks like September 11. As a result, the increase in Islamophobia has led to an increase in security measures and the racial profiling of Muslims.

Nevertheless, the discourse relating to the extraordinary rendition program rarely discusses its roots in Islamophobia. Moreover, the discussion revolves around Western

perceptions of Muslims, but omits Muslims' perception of the West. Muslims' thoughts

and sentiments towards the West have been displaced from the narrative, or in many

cases completely absent. The discourse concentrates on Muslims as the specific targets in

the "war on terror", but fails to examine how overt Islamophobic programs like

extraordinary rendition affect Muslim settlement experiences. Moreover, it is important

to consider the how Muslim communities in Western states cope and adapt to the

increased securitization and racial profiling directed at them.

Literature Review

The Cold War was an ideological conflict staged between the world's two most dominant military powers. Yet, "as the Cold War dissolved, the Soviet menace was replaced with the putative threat of Islam" (Welch, 2006, p. 58). After September 11 2001, the world has experienced an increased division between two of the most reactionary religious faiths. Consequently, some Christians and Muslims have adopted intense measures in an attempt to gain retribution for real and perceived crimes against their respective followers. In the West, the events of September 11 catalyzed the transition from border security to national security, resulting in widespread efforts to identify threats. This shift in perception that all spaces are vulnerable is evidenced in the claim that borders, air cargo, ports, and railways are open to exploitation by terrorists and organized criminals. (Kruger, Mulder, and Korenic, 2004, p. 82). In effect, the vulnerability that September 11 induced acted as a cathartic event that pushed liberal democratic societies to adopt regressive and conservative policies that serve to evade basic human rights by targeting certain ethno-religious groups. "National security is once again centre stage and once again in need of creative rethinking about how to reconcile security with respect for human rights and civil liberties" (Whitaker, 2008, p. 38).

Furthermore, it has become apparent that the United States, for instance, has selectively ignored its recent past with the terrorist transgressions of the Unabomber (Ted Kaczynski), Timothy McVeigh, and the Washington Sniper (John Allen Muhammad) and focused its attention on Middle Eastern Muslims as the solitary threat to the nation. Consequently, the West has racially constructed Arabs and Muslims as "enemy combatants" that threaten Christianity and the liberal democratic states that support the

religion (Worthington, 2007, p. 215). On September 17, 2001 president Bush addressed the U.S. Armed Forces at the Pentagon claiming that the new enemy in the "War on Terror" was sufficiently barbaric to justify hunting them down (Bowker, 2005, p. 183).

As a result, in order to protect the various border crossings the United States has deployed the extraordinary rendition program as a measure to prevent another September 11 (Grey, 2006; Fischer, 2008). Yet, it is important to ask if the actions of the United States are truly in the best interests of its citizens as the judicial and constitutional implications of such programs are severely problematic. "The practice of extraordinary rendition raises fundamental questions about priorities and means-end considerations. There are, for instance, the issues of whether an end, in this instance the presumed protection of the public, is sufficient to overcome objections to the means, the kidnappings and the torture" (Dimento and Geis, 2006, p. 36).

There are debates on when the extraordinary rendition program was first developed. According to law scholars Dimento and Geis (2006, p. 39), "Extraordinary rendition was employed under president Ronald Reagan as a tactic to allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to deal with wanted persons in so-called lawless states such as Lebanon." However, a significant contingent argues that the program was developed during Bill Clinton's presidency in the mid-1990s (Grey, 2004; Mayer 2005; Worthington, 2007). According to Michael Scheuer, a former high-ranking CIA officer during Clinton's tenure, the motivation behind the development of the program was inevitable. "We were turning into voyeurs. We knew where these people were, but we couldn't capture them because we had nowhere to take them. The agency realized that we

had to come up with a third party... The obvious choice was Egypt, the largest recipient

of U.S. foreign aid after Israel" (Mayer, 2005; Pither, 2008).

Egypt and other Middle Eastern nations such as Jordan and Syria soon became

eager, albeit unlikely, partners with the CIA thereby introducing the extraordinary

rendition program as a tightly controlled project to apprehend Islamist militants with

outstanding arrest warrants. Andy Worthington (2007, p. 148) defines the extraordinary

rendition program after 9/11 as a preventative operation against terrorism whereby the

"CIA renders supposedly high value terrorist subjects to its own secret global network of

prisons, or to other countries, where they could be interrogated by proxy torturers without

the CIA operatives having to lift a finger." Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer in the

Middle East, explained in an interview with the Manchester Guardian how the program

worked. "We pick up a suspect or we arrange for one of our partner countries to do it.

Then the suspect is placed on civilian transport to a third country where, let's make no

bones about it, they use torture. If you want a good interrogation, you send someone to

Jordan. If you want them to be killed, you send them to Egypt or Syria" (Pither, 2008, p.

101). In addition, another former CIA operative explains the program in even cruder

terms: "We don't kick the shit out of them. We send them to other countries so they can

kick the shit out of them" (Worthington, p. 216). The events of 9/11 provided the United

States and other liberal democracies that teetered on conservatism with the impetus to

implement programs such as extraordinary rendition, which clearly circumvent human

rights treaties, to prevent imminent threats. However, the defiance of international and

domestic law exemplifies an Eurocentrism and an Orientalist understanding of Muslims

and Islam that it produces a justification for the unfair global targeting of Arabs and

Muslims.

Nevertheless, the extraordinary rendition program was considered a small operation under the Clinton Administration. Once more, Michael Scheuer in a testimony before a subcommittee on international relations describing his role in the initial stages of the program stated:

> I authored it and then ran and managed it against al Qaeda leaders and other Sunni Islamists from August, 1995, until June, 1999. The purpose was to take men off the street who were planning or had been involved in attacks on the United States or its allies and to seize hard copy or electronic documents in their possession when arrested. However, interrogation was never a goal under President Clinton" (Lobel, 2008, p.1419).

It was deemed extraordinary because it was only used in exceptional circumstances; however, this changed dramatically after 9/11. The program was originally carried out on a limited basis, but after September 11, when President Bush declared a global war on terrorism, the program expanded beyond recognition. What began as a program aimed at a small, discrete set of suspects came to include a wide and ill-defined population that the administration terms "illegal enemy combatants" (Meyer, 2005, p. 2). According to British journalist Stephen Grey, "After 9/11, a trickle of renditions became a flow, and became the foundation of a whole system to tackle world terrorism" (Grey, 2004, p. 23). The evolution of the program clung to the common denominator that interpreted Islam as the harbinger of terrorism and the defiant "Other". Therefore, the escalation of the program was also logical, as the surveillance of potential terrorists not only on a national scale, but also a global scale was far more tenable in an advanced technological communication age.

Regardless, the extraordinary rendition program has emerged as a highly contentious initiative, as critics contend that the sole purpose of such renditions is to

23

subject the suspects to aggressive interrogations that are illegal in America, which include torture and inhumane confinements (Mayer, 2005, p.1). It is evident that the "war on terror" has adopted extreme measures that clearly constitute human rights violations. As a result, the term rendition has been used as a euphemism for kidnapping (Welch, 2006, p. 167. Essentially, renditions have been sanctioned by the White House, which allows the CIA broad authority to act without case-by-case approval from other government departments (Welch, p. 167). Moreover, the CIA's autonomy and secrecy is highly problematic, which has led to increasing human rights concerns, as a significant proliferation in the number of rendition cases has been experienced post-9/11.

Prior to 9/11 the United States rendered 23 Muslim males from various countries to the U.S., Egypt, and Saudi Arabia between 1993-2001 (Grey, 2006, pp. 269-271). "Since September 11, 2001, the United States government has reportedly transferred more than 100 suspected terrorists to countries that routinely torture prisoners" (Lobel, 2008, p. 479; Grey, 2006, p. 39). Given the secret nature of the program, these estimates are reduced to conservative guesses, as it is difficult to know the exact number of rendered victims. However, in 2005, the CIA had reportedly operated 307 rendition flights in Europe since 9/11 (Fisher, 2001, p. 1425). In addition, Human Rights groups have estimated that 12,000-15,000 alleged terrorist suspects have been incarcerated in the "war on terror" (Sadat, 2006, p.309). Once more, it is difficult to ascertain the veracity of such reports, but it is clear that the United States has used prisons and interrogation facilities in the Middle East in its global battle against terror.

However, it is important to consider what was the reasoning behind the United States' motivation for sending suspected terrorists to Middle Eastern nations, which is

largely absent from the literature. One question immediately becomes apparent when looking at extraordinary rendition cases under the Bush administration. Why would the United States send suspected terrorists to Syria or Jordan for instance, which the administration claimed were state sponsors of terrorism and widely known to practice torture, and not to ally nations like Canada or the United Kingdom? For instance when looking at Canadian rendered subject Maher Arar, Human Rights Watch (June 7, 2005) stated, "Notwithstanding the absolute prohibition on sending persons to places where they at risk of torture of ill-treatment, the United States delivered Maher Arar to the custody of a government [Syria] that President George W. Bush would later criticize for leaving its people a legacy of torture and oppression."

According to Ismael and Measor (2003, p. 106) the mentality that fuels the United States' logic to dictate the terms of its extraordinary rendition cases can be found in Orientalism.

> "Said's Orientalism has provided an unparalleled tool for the analysis of global cultural and political interactions, specifically those which exist between Europe and the formerly colonized territories of the Africa and Asia. Presented in the form of a discourse, the inherent nucleus of Said's argument is that to know something is to have power over it. More so, power relationships turn this relationship around, and allow the powerful to establish the terms and parameters by which they know the world."

Based on this argument, the United States knew exactly what would transpire to subjects rendered to Middle Eastern nations: namely torture. The United States is arguably the most powerful nation in the world and functions as an extension of European imperial ideologies; therefore, its power allows the nation to dictate how suspected terrorists will be captured and where they will be tortured, which is inherent in the form of manifest Orientalism.

It is abundantly clear that after September 11, renditions became a significant tool in the "war on terror," enabling the CIA to kidnap, render and facilitate the torture of large numbers of suspected enemy combatants with complete impunity (Worthington, 2007, p. 216). The growing discourses on the program; however, do not denote the institutional racism that is imbedded in the program. Evidently, Arab and Muslim men are the primary targets, and many have been rendered to the CIA's secret prisons around the globe. Obviously, the term "illegal enemy combatant" is a fluid term under United States interpretation, which has led to the widespread justification for targeting young Muslim men. The "war on terror" clearly acts as an extension of long-standing Eurocentric ideologies, which allows for the implementation of such contentious programs despite clear human rights violations.

Human Rights Concerns

The "war on terror" has produced serious ramifications for Arabs and Muslims throughout the world. The United States has justified the proliferation of rendition cases as an integral method to combat terrorism, thus they are viewed as necessary steps by elected officials whose sworn duty is to protect their citizens. However, the cost of securing and protecting nations is clearly justified through the violation of human rights of those who are categorized as potential threats, as if a few encompass the whole. Once more, the foundation for this ideology is based on Said's theory, but this consideration is largely absent from the literature. Nevertheless, for a country like Canada, which extols the virtues of their civil liberties, it is duplicitous that they are so quick in removing the human liberties of non-members like Benamar Benatta[1] and even circumventing the

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[1] Benamar Benatta is an Algerian-Muslim who left the United States to claim political asylum in Canada in early September 2001. After the 9/11 attacks, Canadian immigration official handed Benatta over to United

citizenship rights of its state members such as Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki. Yet,

there is growing concern about the proliferation of extraordinary renditions, as by their

very nature, renditions and torture have to be carried out in secrecy under the direction of

questionable human rights violator nations.

The victims of extraordinary rendition are sent to notoriously brutal prisons

throughout the world. "Detainees are sent to countries that have terrible reputations

regarding torture and that torture is applied: Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Jordan,

and Saudia Arabia are only some of the destinations (Rapley, 2007, p. 250)." These

prisons are commonly referred to as "Black Sites."

> Amnesty International has received persistent reports that the USA operates,
> or has operated, secret detention centres in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay in
> Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and other unknown
> locations in Europe and elsewhere, including on the British Indian Ocean
> territory of Diego Garcia. The US State Department, the Federal Bureau of
> Investigation (FBI) and the CIA have all declined to comment on these
> reports. The UK government has denied allegations of such detention
> centres on Diego Garcia (Amnesty International).

Regardless, one can argue that the two most notorious prisons are the American

institutions at Guantanomo Bay in Cuba and Abu Ghraib in Iraq. Guantanomo has

recently come under extreme public scrutiny, but its infamy was preceded by the

atrocious human rights violations of Muslim prisoners that occurred at the hands' of

American soldiers at Abu Ghraib.

In May 2004, the American media launched a damning campaign that illustrated

the atrocities perpetrated at Abu Ghraib by American soldiers. "Agency officers

conducted harsh, unsupervised interrogations at that prison and others. Newspaper reports

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States officials. He was held against his will despite his innocence for five years.
http://benamarbenatta.com/.

in September 2004 disclosed that the agency had hidden at least two dozen detainees from Red Cross inspectors" (Fischer, p. 1420). For the first time gruesome images and videos were provided for the world to see (Welch, 2006, p. 111). The New Yorker vividly described some of the torture methods conducted by the American soldiers on Muslim prisoners:

> Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee (Hersh, 2004).

All of these torture methods are cruel and humiliating, but for Muslim prisoners they are virtual religious death sentences. Naturally, the Abu Ghraib reports and their explicit association with the extraordinary rendition program sent shockwaves throughout the world. "The CIA renditions, together with Abu Ghraib and Guantanomo Bay, unfortunately have tarnished the image of the United States in the fight against terrorism, among Muslims and non-Muslims" (Saunders, 2007). However, the negative publicity that the United States garnered did not deter their resolve for implementing extreme measures in their "war on terror." It is abundantly clear that the American politicians viewed the state's role to protect its citizens of greater importance than the violation of a few exceptional individuals.

The United States and many other countries signed the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Winkler, 2007, p. 50). In fact, the United States was a vocal champion for

the Torture Convention. In 1999, in a report to the UN, the U.S. State Department stated, "Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state authority (Goldstone, 2006, p. 344). However, CIA interrogators in the overseas "Black Sites" have ignored international and domestic regulations through the implementation of its "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques," which are prohibited by the UN Convention and by U.S. military law. They include tactics such as "waterboarding," in which a prisoner is made to believe he or she is drowning (Priest, 2005). This is in direct violation of the International Humanitarian law outlined in the Geneva Convention, which describes states' responsibilities pertaining to torture. "International Humanitarian Law prohibits torture or ill-treatment of combatants and civilians, in all circumstances of international and non-international armed conflict... The laws of war prohibit torture of ill-treatment in all circumstances, including refoulement to such abuse" (Human Rights Watch, 2005, pp.16-17).

Nevertheless, the CIA justified the use of torture to prevent another September 11, but major policy concerns exist for such atrocious behaviour. "The practice of extraordinary rendition raises significant policy issues regarding legally acceptable government behaviour. [It] also provides a context for consideration of national values and the manner in which such values should be taken into account in determining public policy" (Dimento and Geis, 2006, p. 36). In addition, "The atrocities that occurred in prisons like Abu Ghraib were the product of decisions that began at the very top, when the Bush administration decided that Sept. 11 had wiped out its responsibility to abide by the rules, including the Geneva Conventions and the American Constitution" (McCoy, 2006, p. 172). Moreover, in August 2002, the Human Rights Watch declared that U.S.

authorities deliberately trampled constitutional rights after September 11 in a crackdown

that saw immigrants jailed without cause, tried in secret, and physically abused. It

accused the Bush administration of displaying "a stunning disregard for the democratic

principles of public transparency and accountability" in its response to the terrorist

attacks. "The country has witnessed a persistent, deliberate and unwarranted erosion of

basic rights against abusive governmental power" (Khan, 16 October 2002).

After 9/11, the Bush administration's rhetoric reiterated the need to have the

terrorists brought to justice (Lendman, 2008). It is important to note that the rendered

subjects were conceivably viewed as valid threats. Presumably, governments would not

capture, detain, and interrogate individuals unless they were considered exceptional

threats. However, the extraordinary rendition program also has judicial ramifications. The

harsh and aggressive methods used in extraordinary rendition would undermine potential

prosecutions because a court would exclude confessions or evidence that had been

illegally coerced (Fischer, p. 1416). Moreover, intelligence officers have argued that

information extracted from physical and psychological torture are often compromised, as

the victims will confess to anything in order to end their torture (McCoy, 2006, pp. 13-

14).

Nevertheless, there is significant support for the use of torture after 9/11. Kent

Roach (2003, p. 101) cites a January 2002 editorial in the National Post claiming,

"Torture is always wrong. Yet it is inevitable that torture may sometimes occur in nations

whose commitment to human rights has been understandably vitiated by regular

encounters with suicide bombers. Whether we deport terror suspects to such nations is a

difficult and often agonizing decision that must be made on a case-by-case basis."

Moreover, Alan Dershowitz (2002, p. 135) argues that torture should be judicially approved and controlled in cases in which a suspected terrorist withholds information that could prevent another September 11. He also suggests that judicial warrants authorizing torture would be consistent with the American Bill of Rights. However, this reasoning is tremendously flawed.

> The magisterial report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Center for Human Rights at the New York University School of Law concluded that the legal and political evidence clearly supports the position that both domestic and international law prohibit the practice of Extraordinary Rendition. Far from being an acceptable tool in the "War on Terror," Extraordinary Renditions are illegal and constitute a perversion of justice that must be exposed and brought to an end (Dimento and Geis, 2006, pp. 58-59).

Regardless, it is important to make the distinction that the United States is not autonomous is its participation in the extraordinary rendition program. Numerous Western nations have rendered nationals to the program. Australia, Western European countries, and Canada are just some examples of nations that have contributed to Muslim renditions (Amnesty International). For instance, Canadian intelligence officials provided sensitive information to the FBI and Syrian government that led to the capture and subsequent torture of Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki, both Syrian-born Canadian citizens (O'Connor, 2006; Iacobucci, 2008). Arar and Almalki are just two examples of the Western world's cooperation in the extraordinary rendition program. One can assume that there are countless other examples. According to Arar (2007, p. 12), "I now understand how fragile our human rights and freedoms are, and how easily they can be taken from us by the very same governments and institutions that have sworn to protect us."

Arar's statement leads to significant questions that have been raised in the human rights discourse that addresses individual human rights and their intersectionality with societies' collective rights. In effect, the root of the concern surrounds the role of the state in protecting society as a whole by threatening the rights of a few citizens versus maintaining all individual rights. According to British Scholar Conor Gearty,

> There will always be a radical tension between human rights as a guarantee of individuated rights on the one hand and as a system of overarching values on the other. The pressures inherent in seeking to speak both specifically and generally at the same time are worked through in this complex inter-relationship between democracy and human rights, between a community dedicated to the success of all and the human rights impulse to insist that each of this 'all' should be individually esteemed (Gearty, 2006, pp. 156-157).

Gearty argues that this balance has been increasingly challenged in Western states with the growing threat of terrorism with the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the 7/7 attacks in London, and the Madrid bombings in 2004. Consequently, "Anxiety about terrorism has gripped public discourse exactly at the same time as [human rights] has at last been securing centre stage. The two are strong rivals for the same public space. However, terrorism since 9/11 has launched draconian attacks on the basic DNA of human rights – dignity, legality and democracy" (Gearty, 2006, pp. 106-107). Therefore, the threat of terrorism has increased the tension between "special rights" and the rights of "ordinary people," which has resulted in calls to rebalance human rights so as to de-prioritize the rights of protected groups and terrorists in order to prioritize public security (McGhee, 2008, p. 138).

Western states' responses to terrorism can also be construed as regressive through the use of several questionable tactics. The "war on terror" has launched physical and mental onslaughts on Middle Eastern nations that have placed human

rights in perilous status. Sherene Razack argues that the racist machinations

inherently linked in the "war on terror" have been transferred to Western states as

well.

> It may seem not entirely surprising that there has been such a strong
> resurgence of an old Orientalism and an immediate intensification of
> surveillance, detention, and the suspension of rights for those who are
> Muslim-looking. As Western governments have argued, these are times of
> emergency and a deadly threat confronts the nation, a threat that warrants
> the suspension of rights. The threat explains, if not excuses, the rise in anti-
> Muslim racism (Razack, 2008, pp. 5-6).

Canada, which is often regarded as a progressive multicultural state is not immune from

Razack's charges. For instance, after 9/11, security certificates have been issued for five

Arab Muslims, each of who have been detained, served extended periods in solitary

confinement, and have been held without charge indefinitely (Kruger et al., 2004). The

impetus for providing the security certificates in conjunction with the Arar and Almalki

rendition cases are examples that serve to question the veracity of national security

measures that may threaten Canada's human rights records.

Ultimately, the move to national security is embraced by society as a whole, but

victims of human rights violations are displaced from the discourse. "National security

measures adopted post-9/11 have created heightened levels of insecurity among certain

individuals and groups at home and abroad, precisely because many of the actions taken

have come up against respect for human rights, international law, treaties, and

conventions" (Dobrowolsky et. al, 2009, p. 22). Moreover, although national security

may be enhanced, it is at the cost of encroachments upon the rights of all citizens and the

increased insecurity of particular groups of citizens (Rollings-Magnusson, 2009, p. 215).

As a result, programs like extraordinary rendition, which are designed to ensure national security, serve to further ignite the human rights debate post-9/11.

Discourse Analysis

Traditionally, the media acts as the principal conduit of communication in all societies. Whether the dissemination of material is provided through print, radio, television, or the Internet, the media is the first source that exposes the general populace to current issues. In the digital age, mass media consumption has proliferated and its influence has grown enormously. It can be argued that greater access to a wide range of sources has diluted the media's integrity and accountability; nevertheless, it has retained its ability to solidify, sustain, and even create consensus public thought patterns that echo the dominant culture's beliefs and ideologies. As a result, "The media represent one of the most important vehicles for reproducing the collective belief system of the dominant culture and the core values of society" (Henry, 1999, p. 135). For instance, the print media has significant influence in constructing visible minorities identities. Positive representations can be constructed, but negative stereotypes may also be perpetuated through print media's institutional cultural dominance.

The events of 9/11 sparked an intense media maelstrom across the globe, but especially in countries where mass media forms the backbone of communication delivery. In Canada, the media was predominantly critical of Muslims after 9/11, which in effect resulted in furthering the notion of the "other." With its close proximity to the United States, the Canadian newsprint media echoed much of the rhetoric that originated in America. Questions were rampant about who was responsible for the attacks, which quickly led to the inference that the Islamic world, as the perceived foe of Western democratic states, was to be blamed.

> Almost immediately after the assaults, with virtually no proof, the North America media pointed an accusing finger at Arabs and Muslims. Some American officials

blamed Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the usual villain for more than a decade; others
blamed Arabs and Muslims in general. The explanations by experts, tones of the
announcers and repetitions of biased reporting set the stage for Arabs and Muslims
to feel besieged (Salloum, 2002, p. 147).

The Canadian newsprint media published sensational reports on Islam that had damaging

effects on Canadian Muslims. However, media production and readership consumption

must be questioned as "the blend of the xenophobic fears of the 'other', and that of

terrorism, provided media consumers in Canada with a clear path to the conclusion that

Islam was a faith in which acts of unspeakable violence were acceptable and that

terrorism was endemic to Muslim and Arab culture" (Ismael and Measor, 2003, p. 102).

This was especially prevalent after September 11 and the 2006 arrests of the "Toronto

17."

The discourse is predominantly critical of media (mis)representations and calls for

more transparency and the inclusion of minority voices in the reportage of such sensitive

topics (Henry and Tator, 2002, pp. 7-8). However, negative identity construction has

been institutionally imbedded in the Canadian print media since colonialism whereby

immigrants and visible minorities have been portrayed as deviant aliens who threaten the

purity of the nation's dual culture identity (Henry and Tator, 2002, p. 41; Mahtani, 2001,

p. 2). Therefore, the newsprint media has long established its institutional and

Eurocentric cultural dominance by constructing visible minorities as the "other."

Consequently, the reportage on immigrants and visible minorities is limited and generally

framed in deleterious fashion to support the supposed superiority of European-Canadians,

which was particularly the case after September 11, 2001.

The under-representation of a range of cultural groups in Canadian media has

been suggestive of their unimportance or their non-existence. Despite the culturally

diverse nature of Canadian society, that very diversity is regularly absent from media representations (Mahtani, 2002, p. 101). Evidently, this has made the transition into Canadian society tenuous for most newcomers, as they are largely removed from the print media's narrative. However, when dangerous events or even sensational allegations associated with immigrants or visible minorities occur such as the 1999 Chinese boat smuggling scandal and the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the media is quick to cast immigrants and visible minority groups in a negative fashion. This has been especially prevalent in Canada with the reportage on Muslims in the newsprint media post-9/11.

The overall stigmatization that Muslims have received since the September 11, 2001 attacks have fuelled negative stereotypical identity constructions. As a result, this racialized issue has emerged as a hotly debated topic in academic forums, but is largely absent in the mainstream media. Consequently, the power of media construction may show that ethnic minorities tend to appear as the causes, rather than the victims of problems (Smith and Ley, 2008). The 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by a small number of Islamic fundamentalists that the larger Muslim community renounces, but the media has grouped all Muslims together with the common denominator identity of terrorist (Lewington and Peritz, 2001), as the sensationalist coverage made in the public discourse within Canada equates Islam with terrorism and the profession of the Islamic faith as fundamentalism (Ismael and Measor, 2003). Still, the myth making which fuels the hostile aura surrounding Muslims is rarely questioned, and the media is seldom held accountable for stigmatizing their identities. Moreover, the public consumes the media's stereotypical generalizations as credible and accurate, which is problematic.

Even with the emergence of the Internet, the authority that print media commands is still undeniable. The print media's power is generally symbolic and persuasive, in the sense that it has the potential to control the minds of some readers, but not directly their actions (van Dijk, 1995a). If published reports are critical of Muslims then one can infer that the public will form its opinions based on these reports. Such susceptibility helps the media manipulate and promote agendas that are conducive to their institutional self-interests. Tuen van Dijk states, "Manipulation as a form of media power enactment is usually evaluated in negative terms, because mediated information is biased or concealed in such a way that the knowledge and beliefs of the audience are changed in a direction that is not necessarily in its best interest" (1995a, p. 11). The print media is in the business of selling as many publications as possible, therefore, sensational reports, whether accurate or not, will sell more issues. As a result, newspapers and journalists employ specific language to attract readers, which raises questions pertaining to the media and public's respective accountability in the production and consumption of such stereotypical reports.

Public accountability has been edged out of the process, as the Canadian media is increasingly immune to public review processes, industry or government ombudsmen, and civil society organizations (Ismael and Measor, 2003, p. 102). Henry and Tator specifically found that after September 11, 2001, "Arabs were repeatedly portrayed as bloodthirsty terrorists. They were depicted in cartoons as ignorant, cruel, and backward" (2002, p. 42). As a result, the cumulative effect of constant stereotyping and misrepresentation serves to create a polarization between "us" and "them" and negatively portrays Muslims as "barbaric monolithic terrorists." This chapter will investigate the

Canadian newsprint media's reportage on Muslims in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Using a lexical discourse analysis, Canada's two national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post will be evaluated to ascertain the depictions of Muslims in Canada.

Negative Muslim identity construction is not isolated to the print media. For instance, Hollywood films like Paul Haggis' Crash and Edward Zwick's The Siege have portrayed Muslims as violent non-communicative fundamentalists that threaten American societies. A 2007 report in the Manchester Guardian examined a small number of Hollywood films and concluded that, "Popular films ranging from Hollywood blockbusters to children's cartoons are depicting "crude and exaggerated" stereotypes of Muslims and perpetuating Islamophobia" (Ward, 2007, January 25). The stereotypical images are also found on television programs such as 24. However, including film, television, and radio depictions of Muslims would expand this discourse analysis. As a result, the two Canadian daily national newspapers will be examined to provide a more controlled sample size to evaluate Muslim representations post-9/11.

Canadian Newsprint Reportage

There were four distinct phases in the Globe and Mail and the National Post's reportage on Muslims in the year after September 11, 2001. The first phase occurred in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 where the newspapers were critical of the attacks and the presumed Islamic terrorists involved, which in effect promoted the idea of Muslims being the "other." The second phase occurred at the end of 2001 when Osama bin Laden released videotape professing his pleasure in regards to the outcomes of the attacks that he orchestrated. Once more, the newsprint media latched onto this and focused its

attention on Muslim extremists cells and their threat to Western liberal democracies. The third distinct phase occurred one year after the September 11 attacks and served as a recapitulation of the events and the collective effects on the world. The reportage in this phase emerged as more tempered than the reportage a year earlier. The fourth phase occurred a little over a year after 9/11 when the media became aware that Maher Arar, a Syrian-Canadian had become a victim of the extraordinary rendition program.

Phase One

Both the Globe and Mail and National Post reported extensively on the September 11 attacks, but Canada's two national newspapers approached the topic from different perspectives. The Globe, although critical of the Muslim terrorists, was quick to provide a voice to concerned Muslim leaders in Canada who expressed worry that Canadians would not differentiate between militant extremists and ordinary Muslims. An article cited the Canadian arm of the Islamic Society of North America that stated, "All Canadian Muslim residents strongly condemn what are apparently vicious and cowardly attacks against innocent human beings" (Gadd, 2001, September 12). In addition, a September 14, 2001 article published in the Globe cited the global Muslim community condemning the attacks. "Muslim scholars and spiritual leaders around the world responded similarly, with categorical statements that criminal terrorist acts are sins that have no place or endorsement in Islam and could not be committed by any true Muslim" (Elmasry, 2001). The Globe's attempt to abate the rise of hate crimes aimed at Muslims was starkly contrasted by the reports published in the National Post.

Stewart Bell immediately set the overtly conservative tone that the National Post adopted after 9/11. "Through negligence and indifference, the Canadian government has

permitted virtually every major terrorist organization to operate within its borders...
Canada's vulnerability to infiltration by terrorists is deeply entrenched. Its refugee laws
are probably the most lax in the Western world" (Bell, 2001, September 13). George
Jonas (2001a, October 15) followed Bell's lead by suggesting to his readership that, "We
have to fear our neighbors down the street... a degree of ethnic or religious profiling is
unavoidable... Though few of our neighbors are terrorists, some are sympathizers." The
laymen inference that Jonas is suggesting could only have deleterious effects on
Canadian-Muslims. The message is clearly divisive by forwarding the "us" versus "them"
ethos, which compromises the multicultural fabric that Canada clings to for its identity
while in conjunction threatening the possibility for Muslims social inclusion. His
suggestion that "some are sympathizers" could only serve to spark more anxiety aimed at
Canadian-Muslims, which naturally manifest in violent hate crimes directed at visible
minority groups.

Nevertheless, in November 2001, Jonas continued his argument that terrorism had
reached nations such as Canada by suggesting, "Some commentators on the Palestinian
side of the Middle East conflict try to obscure the threat of militant Islam, whose fifth
columns of theo-fascist storm troopers have infiltrated Western democracies" (Jonas,
2001b, November 27). Fellow Post writer Jonathan Kay who wrote under the headline, A
healthy dose of bigotry, echoed this sentiment, "We should not pretend that an effective
fight against terrorism [in Canada] can be waged in a truly color-blind fashion. The fact
is, those who plot the annihilation of our civilization are of one religion and, almost
without exception, one race" (Kay, 2001, October 18). Kay's statement is highly
evocative and is deeply racist. For instance, it has robbed people of their identity whether

as Arabs, Bosnians, or Indonesian – all who happen to be Muslims. Moreover, Kay's racism lies in how identities are homogenized so that a monolith "other" can be presented. In addition, reports such as Jonas' and Kay's forward the notions that Canada, and arguably its citizens, must address the percolating issue of Islamic extremism not only abroad but also domestically. With tangible examples of increased violence against Muslims post-9/11, these assertions presented dangerous reprisals towards Muslim communities and further distanced their hope for social inclusion.

Nevertheless, other Post journalists supported the ideas forwarded by Jonas and Kay, namely Andrew Coyne, who continued the National Post's overt rhetoric. "If the West is serious about confronting Islamic terrorism -- if the enormity of [the] attacks has at last convinced us we have no other choice -- then it must also realize that the terrorists will fight back. There will be Canadians killed, and on our soil" (Coyne, 2001, September 16). The article suggests that Canadians must go to war because hundreds of Canadians were conceivably killed in the 9/11 attacks. He proposes going to war against Islam without any regard or compunction. Once more, this is a dangerous proposition, as some Canadians may see this a call to rise up in arms against Islam, but not in the Middle East, the war could conceivably occur in the streets, schools, and other public places in Canada.

In fact, Muslims were targeted in a staggering increase in hate crimes. The Globe published several reports on attacks on Canadian-Muslims. "Acts of stabbing, vandalism, and physical attacks have been reported by frightened Muslims to many community and spiritual leaders… An elderly woman in Kansas wore her headscarf, or hijab, in public this week -- and was assaulted as she sat in her wheelchair. In Montreal, a mosque was

fire-bombed" (Elmasry, 2001, September 14). The Globe also reported on September 15 that, "Alarm and concern [increased] with the growing number of anti-Muslim incidents documented in the last few days... [Such as] attacks on mosques in Montreal, Oshawa, and St. Catharines, as well as death threats and other verbal abuse levelled at individuals" (Lewington and Peritz, 2001). Once more, the Globe reported an increase in hate crimes directed at Muslims, which was noticeably absent from the Post's coverage. "Hate-motivated crimes have skyrocketed in Canada since the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington last week. This is happening in lock step with a wave of similar incidents in the United States and Britain," (Mitchell, 2001, September 21) which put Canada's multicultural foundation into question. "Canadian Muslims should not suffer for being Muslims...Toronto is praised as a multicultural city, yet all of a sudden you feel very isolated" (Lewington and Peritz, 2001, September 15).

Nevertheless, despite the Globe and Mail's clear departure from the National Post's reportage, the Globe is not entirely absolved from contributing to the negative identity construction of Muslims. "This is a show of power and strength. It is a show of cold-hearted brutality perpetrated by fanatics who have discarded all pretence of humanity or morality. No matter what their foreign political cause, their campaign has now lost all international support and legitimacy" (Editorial, 2001, September 12). Although, the report attempts to calls the perpetrators "fanatics," this is a highly evocative response and serves to reduce Muslims to a primitive state that lacks any form of reasoning. Freedom of speech is celebrated in Canada, but reports of this nature may have serious damaging effects on the larger Islamic community that was clearly, and wrongfully associated with the 9/11 terrorists.

Furthermore, a September 25, 2001 article published in the Globe cited author Ian Buruma who compared the anti-Semitism of Islamic extremists with that of the Nazis in WW II. "Nazi and Muslim extremist demons overlap. World Jewry has survived the last world war as a great Satan. Its headquarters has shifted from Moscow to New York" (Gee, 2001). There is a caveat at the end of the article stating experts claim that the anti-Semitism spouted by the extremists is not typical of mainstream Islam. However, once more the language is concerning in its suggestive nature. Although, the article attempts to be informative, it is a precarious piece whereby the consuming public may construe Muslims with Nazis. Once more, it is important to consider how the newsprint media's reportage affected Muslims' settlement experiences and their overall social inclusion in Canada following the events of 9/11.

Phase Two

The initial stage of reportage by the National Post largely castigated the Islamic world for the 9/11 attacks and in effect constructed Muslims identities as a monolithic following intent on the annihilation of liberal democratic states. Edward Said has been a leading critic of Western media's dangerous hegemonic stereotyping of Islam. "Given the tendency to reduce Islam to a handful of rules, stereotypes, and generalizations about faith, its founder, and all of its people, then the reinforcement of every negative fact associated with Islam – its violence, primitiveness, atavism, threatening qualities – is perpetuated" (Said, 1981, p. xvi). Nevertheless, as new information on the 9/11 attacks surfaced at the end of 2001, the Post increased its negative reportage on Islam and its followers. Barbara Amiel (2001) wrote,

> "Islam itself is split between Islam as a religion that can be essentially peaceful -- endorsing the qualities of charity and mercy -- and militant Islam

(Islamism), which is intolerant and expansionist. Militant Islam wants to be the dominant force in the world. Its crusade has Muslims fighting Christians in Indonesia, Sudan and Pakistan. Islamism has been on the move all right, but it hasn't a chance now, because it finally woke up America."

Amiel was suggesting that America's looming eradication of Islamism was acceptable and should be fully endorsed, but this may have led to vigilante behavior, as citizens would move to eliminate Islamism on their own accord.

A December 18, 2001 report in the Globe and Mail reported a Christian Pastor, Mark Harding, who delivered highly racialized pamphlets relating to Muslims. According to the article, Harding claimed that Muslims, "sound peaceful and try to act peaceful, but underneath their false sheep's clothing are raging wolves, seeking whom they may devour -- and Toronto is definitely on their hit list" (Makin, 2001). It would not be prudent to suggest that Harding's beliefs were representative of the public's overall perceptions of Muslim; however, Harding's views were not entirely uncommon. More violent crimes such as murders were committed in the United States; however, hate crimes and racial profiling experienced an increase in Canada (Welch, 2006; Razack, 2004).

The National Post again was highly critical of Islamism, but offered few caveats to qualify their position in terms of the larger Muslim community.

> Osama bin Laden and his ilk, the suicide bombers who prey on innocent Israeli citizens out shopping or lunching at their local pizzeria, and fire-breathing imams from Missouri to Mindanao, refer to us as satanic. We are infidels, but it is also obvious that we prosper. This combination is vital in making us Islamism's enemy, as the brilliant Princeton scholar, Bernard Lewis, has pointed out. It is because the West offers a universalistic challenge to the would-be dominance of Islamism that al-Qaeda and like-minded groups hate us and seek our destruction (Gurdon, 2001 December 24)

The suggestion that the violent tendencies of Islamic extremism are motivated by the core values of liberal democratic societies such as universal freedom and capitalism is

irresponsible. The report simply investigates the extremists' reactions, but does not adequately examine causal factors such as endless invasions and Western Imperialism in Middle Eastern nations.

On December 27, the National Post published the transcript of Osama bin Laden's address to the world.

> Three months after the blessed attacks against the international infidels, against the main infidel America, and after almost two months have passed since the start of the vicious Crusade against Islam, we would like to talk about some of the facts that these events have revealed. These events have revealed a lot of very important issues to Muslims. It is very clear that the West in general, spearheaded by America, holds an indescribable amount of Crusader loathing for Islam, and that those who have lived all these months under the constant bombing by different types of U.S. planes know this for a fact (Anonymous, 2001).

Once more the Post was critical of Canada's role while consistently constructing Muslims in negative fashion.

However, in counterpoint, the Globe and Mail continued its largely unbiased coverage of Muslims at the end of 2001. When bin Laden's video footage was released the Globe questioned president Bush's judgement of the video and the veracity of its authenticity.

> The Bush administration released the hour-long tape, convinced it has the smoking gun that will bolster shaky support in the Muslim world for the war in Afghanistan and its relentless pursuit of Mr. bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network... Many people greeted the videotape with indifference, scepticism or outright disbelief. Since Sept. 11, Muslim commentators have called on the United States to produce proof of Mr. bin Laden's involvement in the attacks (McKenna, 2001, December 15).

This was a clear departure from the coverage that the National Post undertook, which is evidenced by McKenna addressing Osama bin Laden as Mister bin Laden. Presumably,

this is representative of the Globe's, and perhaps Canada's common law heritage, which clearly states that criminal suspects are innocent until proven guilty.

David Hirst on December 9, 2001 wrote a similar article in the Globe that echoed the critical message that was clearly identifiable in McKenna's report investigating bin Laden. "...Though his address was couched in the imagery of uncompromising Islamism, he did not belabour his doctrines and beliefs. Those beliefs have only a limited appeal to the Arab people. In fact -- as Mr. bin Laden knows -- a great many of them pine for those ideals of democracy and freedom that the U.S. stands for." It is apparent that the Globe and Mail's coverage remained objective, whereas, the National Post presented overt condemnations of the Islamic world and of Canada's response to 9/11.

Phase Three

The reporting trajectory that Canada's two national newspapers followed were similar in September 2002. Both the Globe and Mail and the National Post reflected on how the world had changed after 9/11. The reportage was much more tempered in comparison than the initial phase. For instance, the Post, which was highly vocal in its condemnation of Islam, published an article that called for peace to be embraced. "...It is now time to move on and come up with creative solutions to the conflicts that have plagued our world. Peace at the moment is fragile and we all need to rise above our self-interest if we are to preserve it. For those who cherish and espouse freedom and democracy, it is imperative that we champion it for all of humanity" (Shahid, 2002, September 28). Shahid was the president of the Mississauga chapter of "Muslims Against Terrorism," but the report in the Post was a clear departure from its earlier reportage. In fact, Shahid's

article mirrored the Globe and Mail's approach for providing Muslim-Canadians with a voice in a major newspaper.

Nevertheless, the Post did continue its negative identity construction of Muslims. Hymie Rubenstein (2002, September 16) wrote a damning article that constructs Muslims as a poor desperate people.

> This is the most dangerous feature of contemporary Islamic terrorism: millions of otherwise non-violent but terribly poor and unhappy Muslims in dozens of Third World countries have been enculturated to believe that the alleged greed, arrogance, and hedonism of the West are the root of all evil. These poor people need rich and charismatic leaders like Osama bin Laden to guide them in Jihad. Conversely, history has shown that the bin Ladens of the world cannot long survive without the encouragement of the downtrodden masses.

This report does little to dispel the negative myth making that surrounded Muslims a year after 9/11. The suggestion that millions of Muslims are like a large flock of sheep awaiting a Sheppard to guide them removes any ability for rational thought from the millions of Muslims in the developing world. This report is congruent with how Said described the Eurocentric thought in relation to the Orient where the media's production is not benign (Said, 1981).

The Globe and Mail recapitulated much of its reportage on Muslims from the previous year. Once more, the Globe provided a voice for Muslims-Canadians that sought to identify their concerns and sentiments. "…The Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN) released the results of a poll about how Canadian Muslims have fared in the year since that fateful day. Of nearly 300 respondents, 60 per cent indicated that they had been subject to some form of discrimination or bias, while 80 per cent indicated they knew of someone else who had been subject to the same" (Khan, 2002, October 14). The report also described police reports that discussed the rise in hate

crimes directed at Muslims and compared Canadian Muslims with Ukrainians and Poles during WW I and interned Germans, Italians and Japanese during the WW II. Clearly, the Globe continued to offer an objective and compassionate avenue for Muslims while the Post maintained its conservative and Islamophobic approach, albeit with a modicum of tempered reportage.

Phase Four Arar

Maher Arar emigrated with his family from Syria to Canada in 1989. He enrolled at McGill University in Montreal and completed his Masters degree in telecommunications from the University of Quebec's Institut national de la recherché scientifique (Pither, pp. 50-60). Naturally, when the media was notified that a naturalized Canadian citizen had been captured and sent to Syria, there was significant public outcry; however, once more the reportage by the Globe and Mail and the National Post differed significantly.

October 12, 2002, the Globe and Mail ran the first story that discussed Arar's capture. The title, Canadian deportation causes furor, summarized the article's content. The report cited Riad Saloojee of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada, who argued, "This deportation was illegal, and it has placed the life of a Canadian citizen at risk. We are gravely concerned about the U.S. deporting a Canadian citizen without consulting the Canadian government." In addition, the article described Arar as a "respectful Canadian engineer" and a devout husband and loving father, and had interviewed Arar's wife Monia (Cheney, 2002, October 12). However, once more, the National Post took a distinctly different approach. The Post's article described Arar as a "suspected terrorist," which has far more dubious connotations. The article was also extremely brief and appeared as nothing more than a mere passing caveat.

Two days later the Globe again published a report that interviewed Saloojee. Saloojee claimed, "The detention and deportation of Maher Arar is a grave breach of both international human-rights law and Mr. Arar's rights as a Canadian citizen" (Honey, 2002, October 14). The report cites Bill Graham, the former ministry Foreign Affairs, and other politicians who voiced their deep concerns for Arar. The Post, however, was late in its reportage. The first article describing Arar's perilous situation did not surface until a full ten days after it had become publicly aware that a respected Muslim-Canadian engineer had been forcibly taken hostage and sent to Syria (Bell, 2001a, October 22). The article in effect displaced Arar and his predicament from the narrative by focusing on the tenuous diplomatic relationship between Canada and the United States. One can only assume that this was a bi-product of the Post's overt views towards Muslims, which was previously discussed, irrespective of their citizenship.

The following day, Stewart Bell continued to investigate the diplomatic posturing by the United States and Canada in relation to Arar. The article served as an expansion on the previous days report; however, the last sentence emerges as problematic inference. "Muslim activists have cited the case as proof they are being treated unfairly in the post-Sept. 11 security crackdown" (Bell, 2002b, October 23). The Globe had previously provided a tangible forum for Muslim leaders such as Riad Saloojee to voice their concerns over Arar's case. However, Bell has described, presumably the same Muslim leaders, as activists. The word choice is problematic because the public generally would infer that activism leads to protest and dissent: images that are negatively associated with Muslims.

The Globe and Mail continued its significant attention on the Arar case, but the Post's coverage waned. From October 12, 2002 to November 1, 2002, the National Post published four articles relating to Maher Arar, whereas the Globe and Mail published eight. The Globe's reportage continued to provide voices for Muslims and to describe Arar's character while alongside, outlining the abuses to his citizenship and human rights. The Post again served as a distinct counterpoint in its coverage of Arar by attempting to situate the events in a diplomatic arena, and little consideration was given to his character or the circumstances of his capture.

It is apparent that the print media possess significant power to construct negative identity representations, which have detrimental effects on newcomer and visible minority group's successful integration in Canada. Minelle Mahtani argues, "Canadian media continue to broadcast negative and stereotypical images that serve to demean minority Canadians. Ethnic minorities do not see themselves accurately reflected in Canadian media, and that marginalization perpetuates feelings of exclusion" (Mahtani, 2001, p. 100). Moreover, when UBC professor Dr. Sunera Thobani delivered a controversial speech on October 1, 2001 at a conference for the Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centre in Ottawa, she was widely criticized in the Canadian press. In her speech Thobani cited past U.S. foreign policy maneuvers like the CIA coup d'etat in Chile that killed 30,000 people and the U.S. backed regime in El Salvador that used death squads to kill 75,000 people (Thobani, 2001). In effect, Thobani's argument was seeking to increase the Canadian public's critical dissemination of media reports pertaining to U.S. foreign policy. It was a critical speech that argued that it was not surprising that the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred, as the United States' actions in developing

countries had cultivated extreme hate towards the nation by numerous subjugated peoples.

However, the media portrayed Thobani, a visible minority immigrant, as an "enemy" whose voice fostered dissent, which echoed the destructive sentiments imbedded in Islamic fundamentalism. The Prime Minister, all the leaders of the opposition parties, editorialists, and media columnists castigated Thobani for her insensitivity and ill-timed comments. She received hate mail, death threats, and calls for her to be fired from her position at UBC (Thobani, 2003, p. 403). Yet, Thobani has resolutely defended her speech by clarifying her position.

> "I also pointed out that the institutionalization of racial profiling in the wake of September 11, and the targeting of immigrants and refugees within Canada and the United States as a threat to the nation's security, especially of those who "look" like Muslims, inevitably followed from this logic. The women's movement had to disrupt this racialized discourse and challenge the notion that the War on Terrorism was a reasonable, just, or righteous response, and instead insist upon naming it the imperialist venture that it was" (Thobani, 2003, p. 402).

This certainly raises questions surrounding the freedom of speech in Canada. Regardless, Thobani's speech and the media's subsequent response were indicative of the media's power to influence its audiences' perceptions of events.

Michael Welch has identified a significant issue that is rarely considered when evaluating the production and consumption of media reports on Middle Eastern issues associated with Islam. "One of the most obvious pitfalls in the media's coverage of Islam is that reporters and many Western self-appointed experts do not read, speak, or understand languages indigenous to the Middle East (Welch, 2006, p. 59). Once more, the identity politics imbedded in Western media reflects Said's theory of Orientalism where Eurocentrism is the identity standard in which all other races are compared.

In addition, national newspapers like the National Post, which largely echoed

American-conservative reports after 9/11, have placed more emphasis on their

institutional self-interests while in large part eliminating objectivity. Bernard Lewis raises

a valid point through his statement that, "Understandably, Muslims complain when the

media speak of terrorist movements and actions as "Islamic" and ask why the media do

not similarly identify Irish and Basque terrorist and terrorism as Christian" (Lewis, 2003,

p. 137). Lewis' statement is somewhat ironic, as he was the person who initially came up

with the "clash of civilizations" thesis that Samuel Huntington later adopted. The

National Post clearly exercised its institutional influence in its reportage on Muslims

post-9/11. The Globe and Mail offered a more tempered approach, but cannot be

absolved entirely of creating negative stereotypes associated with Muslims. Nevertheless,

"by reductively portraying diverse [Muslim] societies into the caricature of Islamic

Fundamentalism, and by frequently repeating the Orientalist insistence that Islam is a

threat to global stability, they have, more deeply popularized the mythology surrounding

the threat of the "other" in the minds of Canadians" (Ismael and Measor, 2003, p. 126).

Case Studies – Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki

Maher Arar is arguably the most recognized victim of the extraordinary rendition program. Upon his return to Canada in October 2003, Arar launched lawsuits against the governments that were responsible for his year incarceration in Syria, which served to further thrust his name into the public's consciousness. However, Arar is among a group of Canadian-Muslim males who shared the horrific experiences of extraordinary rendition. Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddin were also held captive and tortured for extended periods in the "War on Terror." This chapter will discuss Arar and Almalki's respective cases, the implications of Canadian officials involvement on citizenship protection rights, and Muslim settlement concerns.

Maher Arar

Maher Arar immigrated to Canada in 1987 from Syria and received his Canadian citizenship in 1991. He attended high school in Montreal and eventually obtained a Bachelors degree in engineering from McGill University. He would later go on to obtain a Masters degree in telecommunications from the University of Quebec. In December 1997, Arar and his young family moved from Montreal to Ottawa and in 1999, he began working for a high tech firm called The MathWorks in Boston, which involved significant 73travel within the United States. In 2001, he decided to return to Ottawa to begin his own telecommunications consulting company. (Testimony of Maher Arar, October 17, 2007).

According to Arar's wife Dr. Monia Mazigh, business was slow for her husband, as the high-tech bubble of the late 1990s had burst and the sector was suffering. In July 2002, Arar and his family went on vacation to Tunisia to visit Dr. Mazigh's relatives and

to evaluate Arar's next business plan. Arar decided to return to Ottawa in late September to reignite his business (Mazigh, 2008); however, his return to Canada was interrupted on September 26 by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) who arrested him at JFK International Airport in New York (McCoy, 2008; Grey, 2004; Mayer, 2005; Lobel, 2008).

Arar was sent to the Metropolitan Detention Centre (MDC) in Brooklyn where he was questioned at length about his association with a suspected terrorist and al Qaeda member. At the prison, they strip-searched him and placed him in solitary confinement without any contact with his family or the outside world (Lobel, 2008). According to Arar, "It was humiliating and against my religion to be naked in front of others. They put me in an orange suit and took me to a doctor where they made me sign forms and gave me a shot. I asked what it was for and they would not tell me. My arm was red for almost two weeks" (Testimony of Maher Arar, October 18, 2007). Arar was held at the MDC for nearly two weeks in which time he endured long interrogations and was denied legal counsel. When he was granted counsel, it was done so in improper fashion. Arar's time in the MDC would prove to be the first in a series of human and legal rights abuses that he would face over the following year.

Arar was rendered from the MDC on October 8 onboard a CIA registered Gulfstream jet to Jordan, and ultimately to Syria (Grey, 2006, pp. 62-63). Arar had repeatedly expressed his fear of torture in Syria to INS authorities while he was detained at the MDC (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 28). The State Department was equally aware that Syrian torture methods included electrical shocks, pulling out fingernails, the forced insertion of objects into the rectum, and severe beatings (McCoy, pp. 173-174).

However a troubling revelation showed that the INS had originally agreed that Arar was entitled to protection from torture and that rendering him to Syria would likely result in his torture. It was assumed that he would be sent to Canada for further questioning; however, that decision was ultimately overridden (Lobel, 2008, pp. 483-484).

Arar arrived in Syria on October 9, 2002 where he was held in the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) Palestine Branch, otherwise known as The Grave by its prisoners. The Grave received its name because the rat-infested cells were approximately the same size as graves. He was routinely beaten on his back, his buttocks, and his feet with shredded two-inch-thick electronic cords (Grey 2006, pp. 2-3; Arar Chronology, p. 5). Arar was eventually released from The Grave on August 19, 2003 and received his full release from SMI on October 5, 2003 (O'Connor, 2006, p. 467). However, it is important to ask why Maher Arar became a victim of the extraordinary rendition program. In order to answer this question, one must look to his association with fellow Syrian-Canadian Abdullah Almalki.

Abdullah Almalki

Abdullah Almalki and Maher Arar share identical migration histories. Almalki was born in Syria and immigrated to Canada in 1987 with his family, which was the same year that Arar arrived in Canada. Moreover, like Arar, Almalki enrolled in an engineering program at Carleton University and eventually received his Canadian citizenship in 1991 (Amnesty International, 2006). In 1992, Almalki travelled to Peshawar, Pakistan and Afghanistan where he was moved by the regions vast humanitarian needs. In the summer of 1993, he returned to Pakistan to volunteer with a Human Concern International (HCI) project funded by the United Nations Development Program (Almalki biography).

Almalki was described as a "very religious man, educated in the Koran, who was viewed as an elder in the [Ottawa Muslim] community" (Pither, 2008, p. 56). However, his volunteer work in the Middle East would ultimately prove to be one of the primary reasons for his suspected terrorist activities prior to, and post-9/11.

In the 2008 Iacobucci Inquiry, which addressed the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddin, Almalki had become a person of interest prior to September 11, 2001. In the late 1990s, presumably related to his travels in Afghanistan and Pakistan, "CSIS shared information about Mr. Almalki with the RCMP and various foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including US agencies and Malaysian agencies" (Iacobucci, 2008, p. 194). Moreover,

> Following the events of September 11, 2001, the RCMP received several letters from CSIS and U.S. authorities advising it of individuals suspected of Islamic extremism in Canada. Among these letters was a September 26, 2001 letter from CSIS that mentioned but did not name an individual believed to be an "al Qaeda procurement officer in Canada," and a September 23, 2001 letter from the FBI describing Mr. Almalki as the "Ottawa-based procurement officer" for Osama bin Laden (Iacobucci, 2008, p. 194).

According to the 2006 O'Connor Inquiry, which similarly addressed the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki was a primary target of the Ottawa RCMP and the focal point of Project A-O Canada's lengthy investigation.

Project A-O Canada was a joint RCMP division investigation that was charged with investigating Abdullah Almalki. "In early October 2001, RCMP "O" Division asked "A" Division for assistance in investigating the activities of Abdullah Almalki, an Ottawa resident who was believed to be connected to al-Qaeda. In response, "A" Division created Project A-O Canada with three priorities: prevention, intelligence and

prosecution" (O'Connor, 2006, pp. 16-17). Clearly, the intelligence community thought Almalki to be an exceptional person of interest, which explains the development of Project A-O Canada, as it was provided with information linking targeted individuals with imminent threats to the security of Canada (O'Connor, 2006, pp. 35-36). Consequently, Muslim men such as Arar and Almalki became the subjects of intense surveillance for intelligence gathering initiatives to prevent further terrorist attacks. However, the veracity of the intelligence gathered concerning Almalki was largely questionable and had racial profiling concerns. According to Almalki, "Clearly from the way I was falsely labelled by the RCMP before they even started their investigation, and before they even knew much, if anything, about me, and the false information and accusations that they sent to Syria and many other countries at that time, that strongly suggests that it was because of racial profiling and incompetence" (Interview, August 10, 2009).

Nevertheless, Almalki did little to abate the suspicion surrounding his alleged terrorist connections. While under surveillance in Ottawa, Almalki left the country on November 27, 2001 for Malaysia, under what Justice O'Connor (2006, p. 72) described as "suspicious circumstances." Almalki's departure from Canada occurred without Project A-O Canada's knowledge until several days later, which arguably gave the RCMP and CSIS the sense that he was fleeing. Accordingly, on January 21, 2002, search warrants were granted for Almalki's house, his brother Nazih Almalki's home, and Ahmad El-Maati's residence. The searches were not expected to yield much information, but a significant amount was gathered. 26 computer hard drives, 40 videotapes, 100 compact discs and diskettes, 20,000 pages of documents including photographs and

financial records, and 2 boxes of shredded documents for reassembling. Some of the computers, compact discs and diskettes were hidden either in walls or rafters (O'Connor, 2006, p. 73). Obviously, the dubious nature of the material left serious questions surrounding Almalki and his associates, but Almalki's location was still a mystery to CSIS and the RCMP at the beginning of 2002; however, they suspected he was in Malaysia, his wife's home country.

On May 10 2002, CSIS and Project A-O Canada learned that Almalki had left Malaysia, and in late May learned that he may have been detained in Syria, which was later confirmed in the middle of June (Iacobucci, 2008. p. 203). Like Arar, Almalki was held in the SMI Palestine Branch in Syria from May 2002 to March 2004. Almalki also endured the same horrific torturing methods administered by SMI officials. He described his first interrogation at the SMI Palestine Branch whereby the interrogator ordered him to take off his jacket, shoes, and socks and to lie on the floor on his stomach. His knees were bent, with his feet in the air. Two or three men whipped the soles of his feet with frayed cables while other men kicked him repeatedly (Pither, 2008, p. 117). Almalki also frequently endured the severe torture method known as the Tire, which Arar had been threatened with (Arar Chronology, p. 5).

> "He [Almalki] was taken from his cell to an interrogation room, blindfolded, and told to strip down to his underwear. They brought a tire to him and told him how to get into it. He sat in the tire with his back on the floor, and the back of his neck against the inside of the tire. His arms were around the tire. They raised his legs up so his weight was on his back and he was completely restrained. They started beating him on the soles of his feet, head and body, and also struck him on his genitals" (Copeland, n.d., p. 14).

Almalki suffered long interrogations for twenty-two months, while Canadian officials largely remained idle in their attempts to ensure his release. This leads to serious

questions about citizenship protection in a heightened age of national security.

The suspicion surrounding Almalki was predicated on various intelligence reports, but what were the charges that warranted Maher Arar's alleged terrorist activities, and his subsequent rendition? According to Justice O'Connor (2006, p. 51), "Mr. Arar did not come to the attention of Project A-O Canada until an October 12, 2001 meeting between Mr. Almalki and Mr. Arar at Mango's Café in Ottawa." Consequently, Arar became a person of interest and his biographical information was collected by Project A-O Canada. In November 2001, Project A-O Canada discovered that in 1997, Arar had used Almalki as an emergency contact on an Ottawa apartment contract, which became known as the Minto Lease. This document along with information about the Mango's Café meeting was given to the FBI with no written caveats attached (O'Connor, 2006, p. 55). This conceivably led to Arar's arrest at JFK International Airport on September 26, 2002. The alleged terrorist and al Qaeda member that was the focus of Arar's intense interrogation at the MDC was Abdullah Almalki. The veracity of Almalki's terrorist connections was purely speculative, but for American intelligence officers, Arar was guilty-by-association. Once more, this perception can be interpreted as an extension of the "us" versus "them" mentality that is imbedded in Orientalism.

The omission of any written caveats by the RCMP with regards to the Minto Lease and other intelligence reports given to American agencies has been the matter of significant debate. However, it is important to note that RCMP policy requires that decisions to exchange intelligence be made on a case-by-case basis, and that judgement be applied to determine whether sharing would violate anyone's rights, or otherwise be inappropriate (O'Connor, 2006, p. 33). However, once more 9/11 acted as a cathartic

event that called for several policy changes with little time for bureaucratic discussions.

> According to RCMP witnesses, members of the RCMP and its domestic and foreign agencies met at RCMP Headquarters on either September 12 or 13, 2001 to discuss the threat of another attack, and the need for increased cooperation and coordination among the agencies, including the need to share relevant information in a timely manner. These discussions were the starting point for information-sharing arrangements that ultimately resulted in Project A-O Canada providing American agencies with information about a number of individuals, including Mr. Arar. Some of this information likely played a role in the American decision to transfer Mr. Arar to Syria (O'Connor, p. 37).

In addition, Justice O'Connor found that Project A-O Canada provided American authorities with significant information about Arar on different occasions prior to September 26, 2002 despite the assessment that Arar was no more than a person of interest. The information passed to American agencies included a number of misleading or false statements that were damaging such as the description that Arar was a member of a group of Islamic extremist group with suspected links to al Qaeda. Moreover, there were several references to Arar being a suspect, principal subject, and target or important figure in the RCMP's investigation of Abdullah Almalki (O'Connor, 2006, p. 113). Justice O'Connor (2006, p. 157) concluded that the American decision to render Arar to Syria was largely based on false information provided by the RCMP, which did not include written caveats. In the "war on terror" due processes and legal considerations were eroded. Canadian officials sharing of sensitive and inaccurate information on Canadian citizens with foreign agencies clearly led to Maher Arar's rendition to Syria. Moreover, Both Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki's renditions to Syria proved that the litigious ramifications of 9/11 would affect human and citizenship protection rights beyond recognition.

Furthermore, Justice Iacobucci's inquiry into Abdullah Almalki's 22-month

detention in Syria has yielded similar conclusions. However, it is first important to note that Almalki's circumstances are not entirely congruent with the definition of extraordinary rendition that was outlined in the literature review. Almalki traveled to Syria on his own accord to visit his ill grandmother in March 2002 at which point he was detained by the SMI. Nevertheless, the same machinations that fueled the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar are inherent in Almalki's case, which has been called "opportunistic rendition" (Interview, August 10, 2009).

It is called "opportunistic rendition" because Almalki was conveniently detained by the SMI in Damascus. "It was clear that the RCMP provided false information that was sent directly to Syria that set up his detention and torture there, and he was interrogated and tortured on questions that were sent to the Syrians by the RCMP and information that was exchanged directly by CSIS with the Syrians (Interview, August 10). Once more, Justice Iacobucci found that Canadian officials played a significant role in the capture of a Canadian citizen. In April 2002, Project A-O Canada provided U.S. agencies with three CDs containing the RCMP's Supertext database without written caveats. The database contained a considerable amount of material relating to Almalki, including documents that had been seized during the January 22, 2002 search of his residence and other documents related to Project A-O Canada's investigation (Iacobucci, 2008, p. 403).

Once more, the sensitive information of a Canadian official was released to a foreign agency without written caveats, which renders the information susceptible to interpretation. According to Justice Iacobucci (2008, p. 409):

> The fact that the database was provided without caveats, and the fact that the U.S. had its own investigative interest in Mr. Almalki prior to the events under review, I believe it is reasonable to infer that the documents provided in the Supertext database, or information from those documents, made their way

into the hands of Syrian officials, and were then used by them, together with other information, to interrogate Mr. Almalki in Syria. On this basis, I conclude that the actions of Canadian officials in sharing the Supertext database likely contributed to, and therefore resulted indirectly in, mistreatment of Mr. Almalki in Syria.

This has been a contentious issue surrounding both Arar's and Almalki's cases, as it is clear that in both instances Canadian officials have played a significant role in their captures, and ultimately their tortures.

In addition, Canadian official's involvement with Arar and Almalki's renditions have breached parts of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part 1 Fundamental Freedoms states that everyone has freedom of conscience and religion and freedom of association (Charter, 1982). One can argue that both Arar and Almalki became "persons of interest" due to their Syrian heritage and Islamic faith. Justice O'Connor stated that Arar did not become a "person of interest" until he met Almalki at Mango's Café on October 12, 2002. The biographical data relating to Arar after this meeting was given to American agencies with no written caveats; therefore, Arar was rendered based on his association with Almalki without proper evidence. This clearly breaks the freedom of association in the Charter. In addition, under the Legal Rights section, everyone has a right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment of punishment (Charter, 1982). Despite Arar and Almalki's confinements and torture in Syria, Canadian officials involvement led to their cruel and unusual treatment of punishment. Once more, it is important to distinguish Arar and Almalki as exceptional cases that may not necessarily be representative of the larger mindsets and ideologies of Canadian intelligence and enforcement agencies.

It is also important to consider the international laws and conventions that Arar and

Almalki's renditions have circumvented. According to the United Nations' Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),

> Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
> mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
> from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
> act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
> intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
> discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
> the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
> other person acting in an official capacity.

Moreover, Article 3 states, "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a

person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be

in danger of being subjected to torture" (CAT, 1984).

Upon his capture in May 2002, Almalki claims that, "I knew that torture was

internationally prohibited, but I did not know any specific laws or conventions.

However, from what I saw in Syria, what I was told, and what I heard from other

detainees, it was clear that Syria was used as a proxy for interrogation, torture and illegal

imprisonment (Interview, August 10, 2009). Therefore, it is abundantly clear based on

CAT's definition of torture and Article 3 that state officials knew that both Arar and

Almalki would be tortured in Syria, which has violated their human rights in conjunction

with breaching a significant international convention. Both the United States and Canada

have signed CAT, thus one must begin to question their respective human rights records.

Consequently, it is important to evaluate Arar and Almalki's renditions from an

immigration and settlement perspective. On the surface, both Maher Arar and Abdullah

Almalki appeared to be the definition of ideal immigrants who had successfully

integrated into Canadian society. They were fluent in one of the official languages, they

were educated at prestigious Canadian institutions, they were successful and respected

telecommunications engineers and entrepreneurs, and they were regarded as leaders in the Ottawa Muslim community. However, both Arar and Almalki are shadows of their former selves after their horrific experiences. Canada, which is often heralded as a humanitarian state that extols the virtues of a progressive immigration policy predicated on multiculturalism and social inclusion, has in effect reduced the functioning capacity of two immigrants and their respective families.

Both Arar and Almalki have addressed the effects of their physical and mental trauma on their everyday lives since their return to Canada. For instance, Kerry Pither (2008, p. 386) quotes Dr. George Fraser of the Ottawa Trauma and Anxiety Clinic who describes Almalki as, "suffering from major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder… [His] coping strategy of blocking out emotional feelings and emotions in order to cope with his isolation has made reconnecting with his family and friends difficult." In addition, Almalki "has been seeking professional medical and psychological help for ailments resulting from the torture he was subjected to in Syria. Abdullah's doctor has told him that his jaw is displaced, and he is also being treated for chronic pain in his shoulder, hip and foot (Almalki Biography, n.d.). These aforementioned ailments have reduced his ability to work and provide for his family. He laments, "Engineering and business are part of me. I loved my company because I was able to combine both. Now not being able to do either, part of me is gone, and I constantly feel its absence" (Pither, 2008, p. 388). Moreover, Almalki states that his extraordinary rendition "destroyed my life and affected terribly my family, including my children" (Interview, August 10, 2009).

Maher Arar has been similarly affected by his experiences in Syria. According to his wife Dr. Mazigh, "For him work was out of the question: his mental and physical

health were fragile, he needed to rest – and besides, who was likely to hire someone suspected of terrorism, who was written about almost daily in the press?" (Mazigh, 2008, p. 223). In Arar's testimony to the United States House of Representatives Joint Oversight Hearing (October 18, 2007, p. 12) he stated through a satellite feed because he is still on a no-flight list in the United States:

> "Since my return to Canada, I have lived in constant psychological pain. This pain manifests in various forms. I feel emotionally distant from my family, including my wife and children. I am still fragile. I have lost confidence in myself and am easily overwhelmed. I have lost the ability to multi-task, which is essential for my engineering profession. I can no longer concentrate for more than a short time. I have nightmares and recurring flashbacks, and constantly fear flying and being kidnapped again. My body is slowly healing, but the cognitive and psychological scars are still with me.

Arar and Almalki's experiences in Syria and the role of Canadian officials had limited their ability to function in Canadian society. However, it is important to consider the impact of their renditions on the greater Canadian-Muslim community and the implications in regards to settlement experiences and immigration trends to Canada.

The move to national security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks has served to further marginalize Muslims in Canada. According to Almalki, "Had I led the life I did, had the business I had, and the social life I had, but were not a Muslim, would I had faced what I faced? I do not think so. So clearly I am being discriminated against because I am a Muslim" (Interview, August 10, 2009). Both Arar and Almalki are exceptional victims of programs that are Islamophobic in nature, which in conjunction with the irresponsible reportage claiming that they were terrorists without tangible proof has left both men on the fringes of society where few people will interact with them. It is abundantly clear that Canadian institutions need to navigate the post-9/11 climate with increased caution, as their campaigns against Muslim-Canadians have shown to have distinct ramifications.

The Arar and Almalki cases had led to concerns over citizenship protection for

many Muslim-Canadians. Almalki, who was considered an elder in the Ottawa-Muslim

community was held against his will in inhumane conditions in Syria for two years. The

Canadian government did little to ensure his release despite his dual citizenship.

According to Almalki,

> I had a very strong feeling from the experience I had in Canada before
> travelling abroad and in Malaysia and from what I was asked from the
> beginning in Syria that Canada was behind my interrogation and torture. But
> initially I thought that the Canadian External Affairs would work from my
> release. But as time passed and I did not receive any consular visits, and as
> more and more information and questions came from Canada, my hope that the
> Canadian government would ensure my release disappeared (Interview, August
> 10, 2009).

Therefore, one can infer that the greater Muslim-Canadian community may have felt

that they were the subjects of increased racial profiling, which could conceivably

lead to experiences reminiscent of Almalki and Arar's.

In 2004, lawyer Colonel Me. Michel W. Drapeau wrote to Justice Dennis O'Connor

on behalf of the Muslim Community Council of Ottawa-Gatineau (MCCO-G) to

illuminate the Muslim community's concerns after the release of Arar and Almalki. The

MCCO-G surveyed a number of its constituents who were afraid of Canadian law

enforcement agencies' aggressive tactics. Anonymous testimonies such as "Just being a

Muslim you could now become a terrorist suspect" and "I feel uneasy in public because I

look like a Muslim" illustrated their growing fears and apprehensions (MCCO-G, 2004,

pp. 35-36). A total of 404 survey forms were received and completed. 82 % of

respondents felt they did not have the same freedoms, rights and privileges as other

Canadians. 75 % of respondents felt that they could easily become suspect or labeled as a

terrorist by the RCMP, CSIS or police. Finally, 81 % of respondents felt more targeted

now because, as a Muslim person they may look or act differently (MCCO-G, 2004, pp. 43-44). This survey has significant ramifications on the multicultural social fabric that Canada is often heralded for. Moreover, one can infer from the MCCO-G's constituents' sentiments that their settlements experiences in Canada have been affected by their apprehension, which reduced their ability to successfully integrate into Canadian society. One can argue that the MCCO-G's respondents' perceptions, in conjunction with Arar and Almalki's renditions, may prevent Muslim from migrating to Canada.

However, the MCCO-G believed that the Muslim community's responses were derived by sensational media reports. Citing an article written in Islamic Horizons by professor Mohammed Elmasry (MCCO-G, 2004, p. 56) "A popular and largely media-created belief that Islam condones and encourages violence has led to significant societal anxiety among Canadian Muslims. This situation exists mainly because the Canadian media are creating an imaginary national crisis based on an inaccurate understanding of Islam." Scholars Barbara Perry and Scott Poynting (2006, p. 5) suggest,

> The media are especially complicit in the dissemination of anti-Muslim imagery. The widespread perpetuation of such caricatures—by the media and by public figures—fuels sentiments of suspicion and mistrust by unfavorably shaping public perceptions. There are few, if any, positive media images of Arabs, Muslims, or Middle Easterners generally.

In addition, Muslim-Canadians feel that more accountability and transparency must be place on media production and audience consumption. In a survey conducted by Caidi and MacDonald, they found that their Muslim respondents consistently pointed to the perceived bias of the media, particularly television and print sources, and the need for media literacy and critical skills. Respondents were quoted as saying, "Media is responsible for false information" and "Stories about Muslims are in negative light"

(2008, p. 367). This can also be applied to the inaccurate and negative reporting on Arar and Almalki. According to Abdullah Almalki, "Even though [the print media] is more balanced now, but before the media was willing to print and air government leaks of false and unproven information and allegations that was very damaging to myself and many other Muslim Canadians" (Interview, August 10, 2009).

The media's portrayal of Muslims in negative fashion, with the highly public stories of men like Maher Arar with headlines suggesting he is a "suspected terrorist" arguably leads to hate crimes directed at Muslims. A survey of Muslims-Canadians in 2002 by CAIR-CAN found that 56% of respondents had experienced at least one anti-Muslim incident in the twelve months since 9/11. The same percentage found increased media bias against Muslims and Islam. Some 33% had experienced verbal abuse; 18% had experienced racial profiling and 16% had experienced workplace discrimination (Caidi and MacDonald, 2008, pp. 3-4). Once more, it is apparent that the media, along with Canadian security agencies, have had adverse effects of Canadian-Muslims post-9/11, thus jeopardizing their ability to achieve social inclusion in Canadian society. Abdullah Almalki addressed his feelings of being a Muslim in Canada post-9/11.

Conclusion

The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States have acted as a catalyst that have forced Western liberal democracies to adopt and implement regressive policies and programs that target certain ethno-religious groups. The extraordinary rendition program was therefore devised and sanctioned by the United States government with the sole purpose of preventing another September 11. However, the United States is not alone in advancing the program. Canada, Australia, and Great Britain have participated in rendering individuals to the CIA's global web of secret prisons. Maher Arar and Abdullah Almalki are two Canadian-Muslims that have witnessed their citizenship and human rights eroded in the "war on terror," which has repeatedly circumvented international and domestic laws through its inhumane practices. Moreover, extraordinary renditions are clear and distinct extensions of Islamophobia, a form of anti-Muslim racism, which is particularly evident with the staggering number of Muslims and Arabs that have emerged as the victims of the program. On the surface it appears that the racism inherently involved in the program is based on religious beliefs rather than traditional racism, which is predicated on phenotypical characteristics.

However, extraordinary renditions also possess the overt characteristics of Edward Said's theory of Orientalism whereby Eurocentric ideologies have permeated the Islamic world and created Muslims and Arabs as the "other." The West's Orientalist thought patterns have thus justified the extraordinary program as a necessary initiative to purge an "inferior", "uncivilized", and "hostile" region of its "barbaric" people. Western institutions such as immigration departments, border control and intelligence agencies, and the media have furthered the Eurocentric notion of superiority by defining Muslims

and Arabs as uncivilized and hostile fundamentalists seeking to destroy the West. Yet, the critical analyses forwarded by these aforementioned institutions is rarely reversed thereby questioning their morality in their actions towards the Islamic world.

The divisive ethos of "us" versus "them" that Said discusses is reflected in the institutional nature of cultural dominance that the print media projects on society. "The ownership and management of media enterprises, and the growing coalescence and centralization of ownership by conservative idealogues, such as Conrad Black, leads to a homogenized portrayal of Muslims in the media, one which conservative ideologies are supported" (Henry, 1999, p. 26). Though violently denied, racism has reached the top, both in politics and the media. Or rather, as the history of racism shows, it has always been at the top, and in this respect continuity prevails (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 29). Moreover, the public is compromised by the capitalist imperatives that fuel profit driven enterprises like newspapers and magazines. It is essential that the public becomes critical in its dissemination of print media and questions the veracity of the reportage. This is especially pertinent in respects to visible minority groups' representation in the media, as they may become increasingly marginalized and face greater difficulties successfully integrating into Canadian society.

In addition, the United States', and its allies "war on terror" has only served to increase terror in their respective states and abroad, and further marginalize Muslims in their respective countries. According to Reg Whitaker (2008, p.10).

> The difficulties encountered by Muslim and Arab minorities post-9/11 as they find themselves deemed "suspect communities" in the eyes of the North American and European majorities will require more than one public inquiry to resolve, especially in light of the emergence of "homegrown" extremism and terrorist outrages planned and in some cases perpetrated against fellow citizens by young radicalized Muslims born and raised in the West

The role of Canadian officials in the renditions of Maher Arar and Abdullah

Almalki has had significant ramifications on their physical wellbeing and mental health.

Both men have launched social justice campaigns to alert the Canadian public of the

government's role in their captures. According to Almalki, "Like many other Canadians,

the picture I had of Canada as a country that was against torture and a champion of

human rights has severely been shaken. But as Canadians, the people of this county, we

have a responsibility to correct this" (Interview, August 10, 2009). Barbara Olshansky,

the assistant legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which represents

Maher Arar in his legal case against the United States, said that her view of America had

changed since the extraordinary rendition program was revealed in 2005. "I have not

changed my opinion about its people, but unfortunately I have changed my opinion about

its respect for human rights. It is no longer the leader in the world. It has become the

leader in the violation of human rights" (Mayer, 2005).

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