

JUSTICE AND THE PLANNING PROCESS:
HOW FAR HAVE WE COME AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?

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A Major Research Paper
presented to Ryerson University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Planning in Urban Development

Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2014

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Master of Planning in Urban Development

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ABSTRACT

Justice is a context-dependent, multi-faceted concept that has historically been associated with planning theory. In this paper, the literature surrounding the concept of justice will be explored to understand where the concept of justice has come from, how it has evolved, and how it can be applied to the planning process. In addition, how justice interacts with other critical concepts, such as the law, morality, and ethics, as well as its ability to function within the institutional context will also be assessed. The concept of justice is be applied to the planning process as it occurs in planning practice in an attempt to bridge the theory - practice gap that exists in planning. Using Fainstein's concept of justice, with her three criteria of equity, diversity, and democracy, the planning process of the two redevelopments of Regent Park is assessed through the lens of justice in an attempt to apply theories of justice to planning practice.

Keywords: Justice, Planning, Regent Park

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Joe Springer and second reader Dr. Pamela Robinson. Without their guidance and support this paper would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my friends and family who tirelessly listened to my thoughts and ideas and provided me with support throughout this process.

This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.



Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada

Conseil de recherches en
sciences humaines du Canada

Canada

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INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the role of justice in the planning process, justice must first be understood in the context of planning theory. Justice has been associated with planning theory since its beginnings, however, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a renewed interest in justice. As justice gained importance in theory, it came into conflict with the concepts of ethics and morality, as well as the legal nature of planning. Given the context-dependent nature of these concepts and the legal boundaries in which they function, each concept is modified as it is implemented. Both planning practice and the institutional context of planning affect how justice is implemented, requiring the theoretical perceptions of justice to be modified. The role of the planner and the boundaries set by planning's institutional framework affects how justice is implemented in planning practice. Therefore, while planning theory has had a strong grounding in justice, planning practice has struggled to use justice as a guide given other competing concepts, the legal nature of planning, and the institutional boundaries. Despite this disconnect between planning theory and planning practice, it is critical to close the divide and understand how justice is functioning within planning practice. As planning deals with wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973), justice will continue to be an important concept on which to judge planning decisions. For the purpose of this paper, justice will be defined as Fainstein (2010) has put forth with her three criterion of equity, diversity and democracy and will be applied to the case study of Regent Park in an attempt to close the theory - practice gap. The concept of justice will be used to assess the two redevelopments of Regent Park located in Toronto, Ontario. Both of these redevelopments will be examined in order to understand how the planning process has evolved over time in its incorporation

of not only justice, but also its interaction with morality, ethics, and the legal nature of planning. This will allow for an assessment of where the planning process has come from and where it is going in terms of justice.

JUSTICE IN PLANNING THEORY

Throughout the history of planning, there have always been elements of planning that have been associated with justice. As Fainstein (2010) has noted, justice is relevant to both planning theory and practice. However, in order to explore the use of justice regarding the planning process, the theoretical underpinnings of justice must first be considered. To do this, the relationship between justice and planning will be explored: how justice is conceptualized in relation to the city as well as in planning theory and how justice interacts with other core concepts of planning, such as morality and ethics. As Fainstein (2010) states, to consider justice in planning, the literature surrounding the concept of justice must first be explored.

Friedmann (2000) theorizes about justice by saying that we may react strongly to what we perceive to be an injustice, however, it is difficult to conceive of what is just. While there is a significant amount of literature surrounding the concept of justice, for the purpose of this paper, justice will be explored specifically in regard to the institutional context in which it is being applied, in this case, the context of planning. Grounding justice in the context of planning is critical, because as O'Neill (2000) points out, there is a specific need for justice to be concerned with the practical. This is, in part, because the concept of justice is context dependent which indicates that it must be theorized about in the context in which it is being used to ensure it functions and is applicable given the existing institutional boundaries. Fortunately, justice is not a new concept in planning, as Campbell and Marshall (2006) note, "conceptualizations of justice, whether implicit or explicit, have always underpinned the development of intellectual thought about planning" (p. 240). However, despite the relationship between justice and intellectual planning thought, the

application of justice in planning practice changes how justice functions.

HISTORY OF JUSTICE IN LAND USE PLANNING

There is no singular, universal definition of justice. As Johnston (2011) highlights, justice is a concept that is conceived and refined by those who are influenced by the context in which they are situated. The outcome results in many theories surrounding justice, each one reflecting the context in which it has been conceived (Johnston, 2011). Theorizing about justice in the context of the city is not a modern concept, it has been contemplated throughout history, most notably in Plato's *The Republic*. In *The Republic*, Socrates puts forth the notion of justice and the city by arguing that the qualities of justice can be determined at the city-state level easier than at the individual level" (Connolly & Steil as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). As a result, Socrates puts forth what would characterize a just city (Connolly & Steil as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). While Socrates refers to a just city in a historical sense, in many ways he echoes the foundation of justice in planning today. For Socrates, justice in planning functions at the city-state level, a concept which today is often referred to as the public interest, rather than at the individual level, otherwise known as the individual interest. Furthermore, Socrates's early conceptualization of justice in regard to the city has another commonality with theories of justice in planning today, the occurrence of a disconnect between the normative concepts of justice in theory and the form they take when applied in practice (Connolly & Steil, as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009).

While historically there has been a connection between justice and the city, many of the contemporary theories of justice have tended to be from liberal philosophers, such as John Locke, John Rawls, and Martha Nussbaum (Connolly & Steil as cited in Marcuse, 2009). Despite these theories of justice not being situated specifically in relation to the city, they

attempt to answer the same questions as planning theorists (Connolly & Steil as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). In addition, rather than theorize about new concepts of justice, planning theorists look to contextualize existing concepts (Harvey & Potter as cited in Marcuse, p. 2009) and therefore, those theories of justice that have been put forth by liberal philosophers are often drawn upon. John Rawls has been one such philosopher that has arguably had a significant influence on the concept of justice in planning thought. For Rawls, justice is an extension of fairness; it increases equality by benefiting the least advantaged (Campbell & Marshall, 1999). In planning theory, Rawls' theory of justice has not only influenced planning thought, but it has influenced those, such as Susan Fainstein (2010) and David Harvey (2009), who have tried to bridge the disconnect between the two, analyzing planning practice based on justice. Rawl's concept of justice that is used in planning thought and is linked to the liberal tradition of justice but also differs from it is the concept of social justice. For Rawls, social justice is the most "comprehensive and fundamental" type of justice (Johnston, 2011).

The concept of social justice is raised frequently in theories of planning, but has largely been associated with David Harvey's work. At its most basic level, social justice is the degree to which individuals within a society are afforded fair treatment (Fischer, as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). However, the weakness in the social justice literature is that what is considered to be fair is not explicitly stated (Fischer, as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). Harvey (2009) has built upon this idea of social justice; he sees social justice as consisting of a set of principles that, to be relevant, need to be specific to the context in which they are being applied.

Despite the perceived similarities between libertarian views of justice and social

justice, there are some significant differences between the two views of justice. As Campbell (2006) notes, the libertarian view of justice perceives rights as liberty rights whereas social justice perceives rights as being moral rights. This is critical because planning is often caught between these two differing but similar concepts of justice (Campbell 2006). The concept of morality and rights being internal to justice is further complicated as justice interacts with morality and ethics externally in the context of planning.

JUSTICE, MORALITY, ETHICS, LAW, AND PLANNING

Understanding the context of planning requires defining what planning does. Since planning is based on values and context, how planning is defined matters since this influences how concepts are conceptualized and therefore, used. For this paper, the definition of planning by Campbell and Marshall (2006) will be used because of its inherent concern with justice. Campbell and Marshall (2006) define planning as, “an activity which is concerned with making choices about good and bad, right and wrong, with and for others, in relation to particular places. It is about making ethical choices over issues which are often highly contested.” (p. 240). The dual concepts of justice and morality are evident in this definition of planning (Campbell & Marshall 2006). Furthermore, for Campbell and Marshall (2006) the concept of justice in planning recognizes the vulnerable, the poor, and the weak. However, it should be noted that this definition and view of planning does not have universal consensus. For instance, Stein and Harper (2005) state that the, “professional responsibility as a public planner is to reflect her liberal democratic society’s overlapping consensus (or the results of a process supported by this consensus), and to put aside her private moral values” (p. 151). However, the consensus of a liberal democratic society may have no reference to justice, morals, or ethics. In addition to the lack of consensus on the definition of planning, defining planning as a function of justice has its own consequences. For instance, if planning acknowledges justice as a function of those who are disadvantaged, it is essentially a, “situated ethical judgment” (Campbell & Marshall, 2006, p. 241). Furthermore, justice is not only affected by planning’s concern with making ethical decisions but also its tendency to ground justice in moral norms (Campbell, 2006). Thus, in defining the activity of planning in regard to justice, the

concepts of justice, morality, and ethics are not mutually exclusive. Rather, justice, in many ways depends on the concepts of morality and ethics in order for it to be implemented.

The need for planning to have some ethical and moral components in order to be just conceals the conflict that may arise when all three of these concepts, justice, morality, and ethics, are incorporated. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to what formula of the three should be used in order to achieve justice within planning, both in theory and practice. The conflict between justice, morals, and ethical action becomes evident when planning attempts to implement the public interest. Whether it is reflecting society's overlapping consensus or the planner making choices that are considered to be 'good' or moral, as Campbell and Marshall (2003) note, planning finds its legitimization through the public interest. However, the public interest in planning is, in large part, legitimized through the law (Leung, 2003). As Leung (2003) states, the core elements of the public interest for planning include, "health, safety, and convenience; the ever-present considerations of economic efficiency and social equity" (p. 5). Leung (2003) also goes on to include environmental quality, energy conservation, and other controversial and emerging issues as part of the public interest. While some have argued the public interest is no more than a façade, one that does not provide a basis for decisions on policies to be judged (Campbell & Marshall, 2002), the public interest is the basis for planning practice. The difficulty regarding the legalistic nature of the public interest is that it may conflict with other concepts that support it, such as justice, morality, and ethics. Thus, not only do morality, ethics, and justice conflict with each other, they also come into conflict with the legalistic nature of the public interest, the very concept they are being employed to achieve.

What is in the greater public interest may not be just, and in turn, what the law dictates in terms of the public interest may not be moral or ethical.

An example of the conflict between ethics, morality, justice, and the legalistic nature of the public interest is evident in the persistent planning problem of the slum. Urban slums have been documented since the late 19th century, most notably in Jacob Riis' (2008) book *How the Other Half Lives*. Slums have posed a health problem, social problem, and safety problem for cities and, in turn, planners. The perceived problems with slums also happen to be the core components of Leung's (2003) public interest. Different solutions have been implemented in an attempt to "clean up" slum areas throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. During the 1930s and 1950s, slum clearance often consisted of areas being cleared and new public housing being built (Vale, 2013). However, rather than housing the slum dwellers who had lived there, very few residents were invited back; instead, the slum dwellers were replaced by members of the upwardly mobile working class (Vale, 2013). The public interest in this case was for the greater population of the city, rather than just the slum, therefore, making it possible and legal to remove people who may have moral but no legally enforceable rights, from the land. However, is it ethical or moral to force people from land because it is in the public interest to do so, furthermore, is this just? These questions are further complicated by the values embedded in the context, what we perceive to be a slum is actually a value-laden judgment; there is no universal measure for a slum that transcends context spatially or temporally. This touches on another difficulty with implementing justice, morality, and ethics, no two cities are identical in their context. Thus, these concepts must be specific to the situation in which they are applied; they must be situated judgments. These situations may differ within cities as different

neighbourhoods of the city demand different ways to achieve justice. The planning profession is therefore engaged in activities that may conceptually and spatially conflict given the institutional context and how the planner is situated within that society. Thus, the institutional context that the planner is functioning in and the role of the planner become central to creating a profession, and in turn, a process that is just.

JUSTICE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF PLANNING

Young (1990) echoes the importance of addressing the institutional context in which justice is being implemented by stating that, “many discussions of social justice not only ignore the institutional contexts within which distributions occur but often presuppose specific institutional structures whose justice they fail to bring under evaluation” (as cited in Campbell & Marshall, 2006, p. 246). This is especially relevant to the planning profession since, as Klosterman (1998) points out, the profession has been shaped by two different intellectual traditions, the rationalist and the reform tradition, which have, in turn, created a profession in which the role of the planner is conflicted (as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983). Since the concept of justice is context dependent, the institutional context will not only determine how justice is defined and used, but whether or not the concept of justice is an appropriate concept on which to base the planning process. The intellectual thought, or theory, behind the institutional context of planning is important to consider because it influences the actual practice of planning. Therefore, the contested nature of theory will not only influence how justice is thought in the theoretical context but also how it functions in planning practice. Thus, the institutional context needs to be assessed.

To understand the institutional context, Klosterman (1998) argues there are two main traditions that need to be explored: the rationalist tradition and the reform tradition (as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983 p. 114). The first tradition that will be explored is the rationalist tradition, which is grounded in both rationality and science (Klosterman as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983, p. 114). Functioning in a profession defined by this tradition, the role of the planner is to act with objectivity, collect and analyze data, and

adhere to the scientific method (Klosterman as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983, p. 114). Beauregard (1987) furthers this by saying that in order to be objective and maintain rationality throughout the planning process, the planner must ignore his/her own thoughts and be indifferent to the outcomes. Furthermore, Faludi (1996) notes that at a higher level, planning as a profession is concerned with being efficient, which will likely, “maximize the attainment of the relevant ends” (as cited in Mandelbaum, Mazza & Burchell, 1996, p.66).

The rational model allowed planning to distribute the risks in such a way as to share the responsibility (Faludi as cited in Mandelbaum et al. 1996) while at the same time legitimizing itself (Sager, 1999). Due to this, justice could only factor into the decision if the rationality of the decision would increase, otherwise, it would undermine the legitimacy of the process and therefore, the role of the planner and the planning profession.

Furthermore, using the concept of justice in a planning situation grounded in rationality could lead to unjust consequences. In the case that the decision is made with rationalistic subjectivism, in other words, that the decision is made taking into account what is good for everyone over a long period of time (Kutschera, 1977), the decision could be considered to be just despite the inability to quantify what is considered good for everyone.

Furthermore, what is good is a value-based decision, which does not necessarily mean it is associated with the concept of justice. Therefore, in the rationalist tradition, the institutional context may make it appropriate to use the concept of justice, however, given the constraints noted, what is just would be based on a scientific grounding that is quantifiable and what is good might not be what is just.

According to Klosterman (1998) the other tradition that planning is based on is the reform tradition (as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983). In this tradition, planning as a

profession is a tool with which to improve both government and society (Klosterman as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983). In addition, the role of the planner is that of an advocate of the client's best interests or the interests of the greater population (Klosterman as cited in Blau, La Gory, Pipkin, 1983, p. 114) and, "would plead for his own and his client's view of the good society" (Davidoff, 2007, p. 333). Much like rationalized planning, the institutional context matters. If planners are to advocate on behalf of themselves or their clients, it is their own values that determine what is considered to be just or good. This does not ensure the process will be just nor that the outcomes will be just.

The dual traditions in which planning is grounded show the complexity of trying to incorporate the concept of justice into the planning process. Nevertheless, as Campbell and Marshall (2006) have noted, the concept of justice has influenced planning thought throughout its existence, and therefore, the connection between planning and justice is not new. Thus, the concept of justice in the context of planning should be explored and evaluated. One of the first instances of justice becoming entwined with planning is the influence of utilitarianism on planning (Campbell & Marshall, 2006) which recognizes the inherent conflict between public and private interests (Campbell & Marshall, 2002). Furthermore, as Harvey (2009) has noted, the main definitions of social justice come from two different areas, the social contract and utilitarianism.

In the case of utilitarianism, as Campbell & Marshall (2002) have put forward, there is an understanding that the state should intervene to ensure that, "the individual's pursuit of private pleasure is consonant with the collective good" (p. 175). However, utilitarianism does not go so far as to theorize how this conflict is to be balanced, rather, an intervention is based on an ethical judgment of what constitutes the public good and the trading of

private interests to ensure the public good (Campbell & Marshall, 2002). Calculating what is in the public good and how this should be traded against private interests is difficult, if not impossible and has been one of the main criticisms of utilitarianism. . Putting values on public goods or private goods and attempting to calculate these is difficult because it is a value judgment. Furthermore, as Sen (1972) has pointed out, utilitarianism does not necessarily mean that the outcomes are just or egalitarian because if the existing distribution is not taken into account, then the end result may not be more egalitarian distribution. Thus, decisions based on utilitarianism may be morally unjust (Campbell & Marshall, 1999). Putting utilitarianism into practice shows how the concept of justice becomes even more complex. Utilitarianism is one of many theories that attempt to conceptualize justice, however, it may not produce more equitable or just outcomes. Advocacy planning and social justice, in many ways, attempted to address the short falls of utilitarianism.

Advocacy planning took up the idea of justice in the form of social justice (Campbell & Marshall, 1999). Rather than be concerned with the public good, planning became concerned with fairness, power structures, and the concept of social justice. Under advocacy planning, it is proposed that the planner should ensure there is some measure of fairness in the planning process (Campbell & Marshall, 1999). In addition, advocacy planning sees planning as a profession that is charged with making urban life, among other things, more just (Davidoff, 2007). In this view, the planner acts in a key role to ensure a just process as well as just outcomes. However, the planner's ability to undertake these tasks is dictated by the institutional context in which he/she is functioning. In this case, the planner would be a tool to promote social justice (Campbell & Marshall, 1999) only if the

institutional context allowed it. According to Davidoff (2007), the planner would be an advocate of what he/she or the client deems to depict the good society. In essence, advocacy planning attempted to bring values to the planning processes, the main one being fairness (Campbell & Marshall, 1999). However, Campbell and Marshall (1999) point out an important factor; there may be competing plans, but within these plans the planner or political process would have to be the decision maker on which plan wins. Therefore, depending on who is chosen and the criteria the choice is based upon, the process and outcome might be unjust. As Friedmann (1965) notes, this process could favour those who are already favoured, leading to a process that is unjust (as cited in Campbell & Marshall, 1999).

POWER, JUSTICE, AND PLANNING

As a planner acts in the capacity of an advocate, technician, or however else they have defined their role, the existing power structures need to be considered because as Hoch (1992) states, planners are in a unique position to, “both reinforce and camouflage the perverse effects of the power relations that planners and planning analysts hope to escape” (p. 207). Thus, because of the way in which planning is situated, it can perpetuate power structures in society under the guise of achieving the just city, the good city, or even the ideal city without the planners being aware of this. In planning, both Forrester (1989) and Flyvbjerg (1998) address this idea of power and its link with institutional structures, the public interest, and planning. Forrester (1989) acknowledges the effects of power being implicit in the planning process by stating, “choosing to address or ignore the exercise of political power in the planning process, planners can make the process more democratic or less...still more dominated by the established wielders of power or less so” (p. 28). If planners do not address the power structures, power will define what is considered to be a democratic or just planning process. By influencing the information provided to the public, who gets to participate, and in turn, the expectation of citizens, planners play a significant role in shaping what is considered to be a democratic process (Forrester, 1989). Therefore, the role of the planner is to address the power structures in the institutional context of planning, how they shape the planning process, and counteract their influence to ensure the process is democratic.

In his case study of Aalborg, Flyvbjerg (1998) described how power played a role in protecting certain interests and that power was exercised throughout the process; however, the role of power was hidden behind the concept of the public interest. Flyvbjerg

(1998) found that the institutions that were charged with the public interest were those which power had infiltrated. This is, in part, because, “power defines, and creates, concrete physical, economic, ecological, and social realities” in which planning exists (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 229). Therefore, just as power defined a democratic planning process for Forrester (1989), the existing power structures also define the public interest, what is moral, what is ethical, and the actions taken to achieve these concepts. This results in the planning profession being uniquely situated to perpetuate the existing power structures within society through the planning process but also through its use of the public interest as a fundamental source of legitimization.

In order to achieve a just planning process, the role of power structures must be acknowledged because much like the concept of rationality, justice is context-dependent. In both cases, the context is in the least, affected and, at most, defined by power and is in essence, a discourse of power (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Thus, without recognizing power structures and their impact, what is perceived as just may be just only to those who hold power and protect their interests. Forrester (1989) echoes this by saying that if planners were to understand how the planning process is influenced by power, then they could counteract it by improving their knowledge and empowering those participating. By understanding the planning process and critically assessing the concepts that it is grounded in or that it takes for granted, such as rationality, then one can start to deconstruct the influence of power on the planning process. Forrester (1998) builds on this notion by stating that planners need to be able to understand power relations to improve their ability to act in the capacity of a planner. By assessing the planning process through the lens of power structures and understanding the concept of just in a society

characterized by inequalities of status and access to resources, we move closer to understanding what a just planning process would look like. In the case of justice, questioning what is just and how we can come to a just process needs to be assessed by questioning the power structures and power relations within society. However, this is only one aspect of many that needs to be considered when striving to achieve a just planning process. Solely understanding the role that power plays is not enough to achieve a just planning process, there must be other criteria available to guide the planning process.

JUSTICE AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

To theorize about a just planning process that would solve the problem of injustices in the current planning process, one must think in a utopian manner (Friedmann, 2000).

However, to achieve a just planning process in practice is not the same as theorizing about a just planning process. When applied to planning practice, the utopian ideas of a just planning process cannot ignore the complexities that face both the concept of justice and the planning process. In reality, planning does not function in a utopian society; it functions within a complex society, which is inherently concerned with these complexities.

In addition, exploring what a just planning process would look like is not an exercise in finding a universal process that works despite the situation in which it is being applied.

Attempting to put forth a just process that can be universally applied is closer to the rigid structure reflected by the rational approach, rather than that of an approach grounded in justice which embraces the complexity of the society in which it is applied. The impossibility of defining a universal just planning process is due to the complexity of planning and the tendency of planning to occur as a response to a problem.

This tendency of planning to respond to problems can be seen in the advent of the ideal city that was theorized and put forward by those looking to fix the social and urban crisis that were facing cities at the time (Fishman as cited in Campbell & Fainstein, 2003). Exploring a just planning process is not unlike this; it is at best, solving the problem of an unjust process and at worst, filling in the gaps of the process that ignores aspects of justice. To add further complexity, there is not a singular problem of unjustness that a just planning process looks to address; rather, the concept of unjust is multi-faceted and is a product of the time, the context, and the locality in which the concept is defined. Furthermore, the

concept of a just planning process is a theoretical ideal that when applied to practice, will likely change given the circumstances. In practice, it is bound by the institutional context of planning and the underlying structures of a society in which it is sculpted, such as power relations and the values held by both the participants and the planners.

While an ideal planning process has been theorized about, it has not been theorized about in terms of the concept of justice. Rather, an ideal planning process has been based on characteristics like inclusivity and openness, such as in communicative planning or participatory planning, or being replicable, such as in the rational model. Both of these give a narrow concept of what a better planning process would look like because not unlike the conception of the ideal city, they are in response to specific problems in the planning process. For instance, communicative planning sees planners as actors rather than neutral experts and is, in large part, a response to rational planning (Innes, 1995). Furthermore, when theorizing about the good city, such as Friedmann (2000) does, or the just city as Fainstein (2010) does, they address the planning process only so far as to state it should be democratic; however, how this takes shape is not explicitly stated. This is important because a democratic process does not necessarily ensure a just process or just outcomes. In addition, the theories surrounding an ideal planning process have shortcomings themselves, often not addressing specific issues that arise due to their implementation. Despite the lack of literature on what would constitute a just planning process, criteria can be extracted from Susan Fainstein's (2010) *The Just City* as well as from those theorizing about the ideal planning process.

The concept of the just city has been explored by Susan Fainstein (2010). In her book, *The Just City*, Fainstein (2010) puts forth criteria to measure planning outcomes to

determine whether or not they are just. The characteristics used by Fainstein will be used as the foundation on which to measure a just planning process. These specific criteria will be used because, as Fainstein (2010) notes, since John Rawls' (1999) *Theory of Justice*, these are the criteria that she has distilled from the philosophical and theoretical conversations about justice. The criteria of a just city encompasses three specific qualities: equity, diversity, and democracy (Fainstein, 2010, p. 58). How Fainstein (2010) has defined these three criteria will also be employed, although it needs to be acknowledged that these concepts are context-dependent and thus, in practice, the context will dictate how these concepts should be defined to achieve a just planning process. Furthermore, the formula, or degree to which each of the three criteria should be applied in relation to the others is dependent on the context that the process is functioning within. This is critical because the three components of the criteria may conflict with each other, and understanding the context-dependent nature of the concepts will influence the way in which they are invoked.

Equity is the first of the three criteria that will be used on which to base a just planning process. In the case of Fainstein's (2010) just city, equity is defined as the, "distribution of both the material and non-material benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning" (p. 35-36). If this definition of equity is taken and applied to the planning process, the process would take into consideration the unequal backgrounds of participants and favour those that are disadvantaged in the process. Favouring those who are disadvantaged could take various forms. For instance, it could benefit those who are less better off regarding knowledge or resources, those who hold less power, or even those who will be affected the greatest.

Understanding that not everyone who participates in the planning process comes with the same knowledge, status, or resources is critical to implementing equity as a criterion of justice (Fainstein, 2010). In the case of the planning process, equity is not the same as equality. If achieving equality was the goal, then it would undermine justice by perpetuating inequalities because striving for equality ignores the existing power imbalances within society and runs the risk of perpetuating the existing inequalities. Rather, a just planning process should recognize the inherent inequalities and treat people accordingly. The role of the planner in a process striving to achieve equity is to acknowledge existing inequalities and structure the process to address them in a way that ensures greater equity among participants. Understanding that multiple people participate in the planning process, ensuring they have the ability, and they are included to participate leads into Fainstein's second concept of diversity.

The second criterion to achieve a just city is diversity, which Fainstein (2010) defines as, "the physical environment as well as social relations, and refers to policy ambitions that go beyond encouraging acceptance of others to include the social composition of places" (p. 66). In other words, diversity is defined in terms of both social diversity, that is diversity in the need for mixed populations, and physical diversity, diversity in the physical structures that make a city (Marcuse as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). However, understanding and implementing diversity as a criterion for a just planning process is complex because as Fainstein (2010) goes on to acknowledge, diversity in planning is no more than an "aspirational goal" that is affected by the context and process in which it is achieved (p. 76-77). Diversity is measured by the context in which it is being applied, what would be considered diverse in one city, say Toronto, could not be

achieved in a small town, such as Qualicum Beach. The ambiguity of diversity is further complicated because incorporating diversity into the planning process, whether it is in the form of embracing difference or ensuring inclusion, has not been fully addressed by either Fainstein or other theorists (Marcuse as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). The lack of conceptualization of what diversity would look like or how it would be implemented is a product of its complexity as a concept. Despite this, diversity must be included if planning is to achieve a just planning process since it not only embraces multiple representation but respects different ways of interacting with the process.

Using the concept of diversity in the planning process means understanding the concept of diversity in the context in which the process is being applied. This could take the form of an understanding that would ensure there is inclusion of multiple people who represent different positions, perspectives, and backgrounds in the process. In other words, the planning process would be about going beyond what would normally be considered the traditional stakeholders, looking for knowledge from other members of society. Incorporating diversity in the planning process this way is not unlike the process that the communicative model promotes which includes the ideas of openness and diversity (Fainstein, 2000). It looks to be inclusive of a variety of participants and in practice, states that the planning process accepts different ways in which people participate and considers all the ways in which participants may know, value, or give meaning to things (Healey as cited in Campbell & Fainstein, 2003). Ensuring the planning process is inclusionary of all participants means accepting different forms of knowledge, different ways of conveying knowledge, and opening up the process to acknowledge, engage, and accept difference. This embraces not only diversity but also creates a more

democratic process, one that removes itself from paternalism to a more inclusive form that allows for participatory planning (Healey as cited in Fainstein & Campbell, 2006). Thus, in a just planning process, diversity has to be defined by those participating in the process as well as those implementing the process, in this case, the planner. Including diversity in a planning process leads to the third criterion of democracy.

Fainstein's third criterion, democracy, is defined loosely as a consultation regarding urban development which takes into consideration the broad interests of the city (Marcuse as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). Democracy is not as clearly defined as the other two criteria due to its ability to be at odds with justice in an unequal society (Fainstein, 2010). While democracy may be employed in the planning process, this does not mean it will result in a just process or outcomes because democracy, or the people participating in the process as part of the democracy, may choose unjust outcomes or ways of progressing forward with the process. Young (1990) echoes this reasoning highlighting that the distribution of goods and resources is central to reflections on social justice as well as the processes and relationships that produce and reproduce those patterns. In the case of implementing democracy, the role of the planner is not only to facilitate democracy but also to consider democracy in the context of justice. However, overriding democratic choice results in a less democratic process, the seriousness of which should be considered. Fainstein (2000) expresses this challenge when she states that, "democracy is desirable, but not always" (p. 469). Democracy alone does not ensure a just planning process; just because a process is democratic does not mean it is fair or that it will result in fair outcomes. In this case, democracy may reproduce inequalities and therefore in turn, produce unjust outcomes.

Despite democracy's conflict with justice, implementing democracy as a criterion on which to base a just planning process is appropriate given the scale at which the process is functioning. This is because the greatest opportunity for democracy is at a small scale, such as the neighbourhood scale, which is the scale at which the planning process is applied (Marcuse as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). Ensuring everyone has access to the process is one aspect of democracy; however, this alone does not ensure a democratic process. Meaningful participation is just as important as access because without it, as Arnstein (1969) highlighted in her "ladder of participation", the process becomes something similar to a facade. Ensuring the process is democratic in such a way as to not only facilitate participation but to gain buy-in from those affected by planning decisions is important.

Despite these three criteria facilitating a basis on which to ground a just planning process, when applied jointly, they do not necessarily complement each other to create a just process. Fainstein (2010) recognizes that these three components have conflicting agendas with each other, which is further complicated by each concept being defined by multiple meanings. For instance, including diversity may not facilitate a democratic process; rather, participants may perceive the process to be undemocratic. Thus, how these concepts are employed, how they interact with each other, and the formula in which they are applied are dependent on the context in which they are used. The planner, who facilitates the planning process and has the ability to assess the situation from a broad perspective, needs to be actively involved to ensure the way in which the criteria is being implemented functions to achieve the goal of being just. To do this, the planner needs to not only take into account the three criteria but also the existing power relations and the context in which the planning process is occurring. What is considered democratic or

diverse in one situation may not be the same in another situation, even if the two situations are occurring in the same city. Another important aspect that affects how these concepts are implemented is the need to understand the social concept that they are trying to achieve. Defining social concepts, in this case justice, affects the social processes in which social processes, in this case equity, diversity, and democracy, are implemented (Marcuse as cited in Marcuse et al., 2009). Thus, how justice is defined affects the processes in which it is implemented; the concepts and processes are inherently linked and dependent on each other. The problems surrounding the implementation of a just planning process are numerous, although once identified, empower the planner to work towards a just planning process.

PLANNING PROCESS, OUTCOMES, AND JUSTICE

While it is important to consider justice in regard to the planning process, justice cannot be considered in isolation from planning outcomes. This is, in part, because focusing only on processes has the ability to minimize concern with outcomes (Campbell & Marshall, 1999). This, in turn, can contradict the purpose of creating a just planning process and undermine the aspect of justice in the process. Furthermore, as Fainstein has noted, planning theory has suffered a theoretical weakness due to its separation of planning outcomes and the planning process (Fainstein, 2005). This theoretical separation can be seen in the early theories of what an ideal form of an industrial society would look like; Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier all worked to achieve this ideal city form (Fishman as cited in Campbell & Fainstein, 2003). To achieve the ideal city, these early theorists were less concerned with planning processes; making planning focused on outcomes with little attention given to the process of how they came to these outcomes. Whether it was Ebenezer Howard's Garden City or Daniel Burnham's City Beautiful movement, the focus was on the outcome of producing the ideal city (Fainstein, 2005). Ignoring the process was necessary as the planners strove to implement their ideals because any concern with process would have interfered with their vision.

This separation of outcomes from process did not only exist in theory, it transcended into the realm of planning practice. Again, this can be seen in the theory of the ideal city as these ideals became popular in planning practice, influencing planning's focus on outcomes. As Fishman (1977) notes, these proposals of the ideal city have influenced how cities have been shaped and could influence the future of our cities as well. The process that planning was concerned with was one concerned primarily with ways to facilitate

the desired outcomes (as cited in Campbell & Fainstein, 2003). Taking Howard's concept of the Garden City as an example, planning's focus on outcomes becomes evident. The Garden City movement created two cities based on its ideals, Letchworth Garden City and Welwyn Garden City, and influenced a variety of communities in Canada.

Regent Park also offers an example of change in planning, from being concerned with outcomes to being concerned with processes and how outcomes can influence the process. Both development choices for Regent Park were a response to a fundamental problem, housing low-income residents. The first clearance of Regent Park and the construction that ensued in the 1940s and early 1950s was built on the Garden City principles which was the popular thought at the time (CBC, 2010). Rather than focused on process, planning was based on the desired outcomes, in this case, the principles of the Garden City. However, despite implementing what was thought to be the ideal physical environment, the goal of a successful neighbourhood was not achieved, and in the early 2000s, a proposal to revitalize the area was put forth. This revitalization, rather than focusing solely on outcomes, shifted to focus more on the process. However, the revitalization now occurring in Regent Park is based on the current popular planning thought: mixed income, mixed-use, and an integrated neighbourhood into the rest of the city. Despite having a focus on a specific planning process, the outcomes that are being sought after, those grounded in planning thought, affect the process and in part, lead it. Even though a process was followed, it is not a coincidence that despite the process, the outcomes are in line with the popular planning thought.

This separation between outcome and process in early planning theory could, in part, exist and be acceptable because planning was engaged with fixing specific problems

arising from the industrial city. For instance, Howard's Garden City was in direct response to the problem of the industrial city (Fainstein, 2005). Solving these early problems, such as sanitation, was relatively easy given that the problems were, "definable, understandable, and consensual" (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 156). In contrast, the problems that planners face today are societal problems which are ill-defined, never solved, and are often symptoms of other problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973). The profession of planning is still inherently concerned with solving problems, which means as the problems have evolved, so too has planning. This will continue as it is not sufficient to base planning decisions solely on an outcome or a process. While one may be favoured over the other, neither should be ignored.

Therefore, when assessing what constitutes a just planning process, planning outcomes cannot be ignored or else planners act in a capacity no better than those early visionaries implementing their plans; however, assessing outcomes that occur from a just planning process should not influence the process. Thus, to base a planning decision on a perceived just outcome becomes an exercise in complex, value-laden decision making that will likely fail in its objective of being just, rather the outcomes should be acknowledged in terms of their impacts, who they benefit, and who they disadvantage. Outcomes are critical to acknowledge because a just planning process does not ensure just outcomes; on the contrary, a just planning process is a product of the context in which it is defined and therefore, may not only be unjust in a different context but produce unjust outcomes. Furthermore, since the problems that planners face stem from other problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973), acknowledging outcomes and their impacts can help to anticipate other problems that may arise. Much of planning can be seen in this way. Even today, planners

solve problems and attempt to fix outcomes which have come about due to factors they may or may not have direct influence over.

Theorizing about planning allows the space for the profession to attempt to answer the difficult questions of planning. However, theory has long been criticized for being inadequate, and being, as Beauregard (2005) states, “less about what planners do than how they should do it” (p. 203). This has led to a perception that planning theory is not relevant to planning practice; instead it is often thought that planners learn by doing (Friedmann, 2005). However, this misses the value of planning theory; planning theory has the capacity to influence and improve planning practice (Beauregard, 1987). Even though planning practice seems to work in isolation of planning theory, in practice, planning functions under some thought, whether it is seeking the public good and invoking utilitarianism or acting on one’s belief of good planning and representing advocacy planning. The leap from planning theory to practice is large; however, it must be made. Bridging this gap will correct the division planning currently experiences and allow for theory to become more relevant to practice and practice to be improved by theory. In the case of a just planning process, it is critical to theorize about what it looks like but also apply it to practice to understand how it affects the planning profession and how it changes once put into practice.

THE CASE STUDY OF REGENT PARK

The theoretical exploration of the concept of justice as well as what a just planning process would look like is important insofar as it adds to the theoretical discussion of planning. However, adding to the theoretical discussion is not enough; applying these concepts to planning practice will not only inform practice based on theory, but it will also highlight the incompatibility that often occurs between planning theory and practice. For theory to be relevant to planning practice it must be applicable; however, this means theory must be adaptable if it is to be applicable. The practice of planning occurs in a context-dependent situation in which theory will be shaped by various factors including the values, ideologies, and power structures in which it is functioning. The slum clearance, development and subsequent revitalization of Regent Park will be used as a case study in which to apply the theoretical concepts of a just planning process to planning practice. This will allow for an understanding of how these concepts interact with each other given the complexity of the situation in which they are applied.

REGENT PARK AS SLUM CLEARANCE

Regent Park, located in Toronto, Ontario, is widely considered to be the oldest social housing development in Canada (CBC, 2010). This area has undergone two redevelopments, one in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the second in the early 2000s, which is ongoing. The first redevelopment of Regent Park occurred between 1948 and 1959 in what was formerly known as Cabbagetown South and is widely considered to be slum clearance (James, 2010). The slum clearance of Cabbagetown South was undertaken after Herbert A. Bruce put forth a report highlighting the “slum districts” in Toronto (Sahak, 2008, p. 17). This report was the foundation on which a committee was created and tasked with identifying slum areas to be redeveloped in Toronto, the first of which was Regent Park (Sahak, 2008). The site consisted of 69 acres in the heart of Toronto, which upon completion, would house approximately 10,000 residents (James, 2010). The slum clearance was approved by a referendum that was put to the public in 1946 (James, 2010). The referendum was one way in which the architects of the redevelopment justified the slum clearance. A referendum allowed for the action of slum clearance to be legally acceptable. Furthermore, by using the method of a referendum, it evoked the notion that it was in the greater public interest as the public had vocalized their desire through a referendum.

While the slum clearance of Cabbagetown South was justified as a legal action, much of the language surrounding its justification had a moralistic tone. As far back as Jacob Riis’ (2008) *How The Other Half Lives*, the slums were seen as places of, “deadly moral contagion” and for Riis, “This is their worst crime, inseparable from the system” (p, 3). More recently, slums have been described as having, “human and moral costs” as well as

threatening the, “health, safety, and morals” of the city (Vale, 2013, p. 7, 40,). Therefore, in many ways, slum clearance was seen as an act to bring morality back into the areas, in this case the slums, where morality had previously been perceived to be absent. James (2010) echoes this by noting that the slum clearance of Cabbagetown South was aimed at, “the moral regulation of the poor and working class” (p.70). Slum clearance then becomes an activity that is concerned with the moral and as a result, is an ethical action to undertake. Therefore, slum clearance is not only justified through legal means, it is also in the public interest, and is a moral and ethical action to bring morality back into those parts of the city in which it is absent. However, a closer look into the process of the slum clearance of Cabbagetown reveals inconsistencies in using the law, morality, and the public good as justifications.

The process of the first redevelopment of Regent Park has been highly criticized today for its lack of public consultation and is often referred to as an example of planning in which the planner and other professionals adopted the role of experts. The process of slum clearance of Cabbagetown South was widely recognized by the dwellers and architects, such as Albert Rose, as paternalistic; however, the architects felt as though this role was necessary and desirable (James, 2010). Given their legal rights to impose a redevelopment, their solid grounding in the public interest, and their ability to evoke morality as their purpose, this type of process was seen in the least necessary, if not desirable. However, was the process itself moral, ethical, and just? The process was legal, and given the concern with reinstating morality into the area, it could be argued that it was moral and therefore, ethical. Using Campbell and Marshall’s (2006) definition, a choice was made; in this case slum clearance was seen as good and right. In addition, using Stein and Harper’s (2005)

idea of a planner's professional responsibility as a planner, given the situation, the experts implementing slum clearance were reflecting a consensus of liberal democratic society. Thus, it can be argued that the process was legal, moral, and ethical as they were envisioned by those making the decisions. Acknowledging the presence of these three concepts, the three characteristics of a just planning process as identified by Fainstein (2010): democracy, diversity, and equity will be applied to see how the process incorporated, if at all, these concepts and how they interact with the law, morality, and ethics.

The first of the three of Fainstein's (2010) criteria that will be assessed is democracy. Veronis (1999) touches on the role of the residents and their participation in the process. The process by which the decision to undertake slum clearance was reached could be argued to be democratic because it was put to the public in the form of a referendum. This echoes Fainstein's (2010) statement that given a society characterized by inequality, democracy and justice are often at odds. While an action may be democratic, it may not be just, especially if the population which it is affecting is already disadvantaged. Upon further examination, the planning process that occurred in direct relation to implementing the slum clearance could be characterized as undemocratic. As Veronis (1999) highlights, "the construction of Regent Park itself was imposed in such a way that the local population had no say in a project that affected them directly. The experts worked without consulting the residents and without their participation." (p. 58). Excluding people from the process, especially those who were directly affected, meant that nobody affected was consulted and that residents were not included in the decision making process. The lack of inclusion, and therefore, participation among those affected by slum clearance,

resulted in a process that was undemocratic. Given that the area was perceived to lack morality, and the architects of the slum clearance, the experts, “knew best”, it is unsurprising that the process was undemocratic. Rather than acting in the capacity of a facilitator of democracy, experts acted in a paternalistic fashion that suppressed democracy; however, this was justified given the perceived lack of morality existent among the residents of Cabbagetown South. Just because a democratic process takes place, such as a referendum, it does not ensure it is just or moral. Furthermore, the planning process might be implemented in such a way as to be undemocratic, which may undermine how just the process is, despite how democratic the process to initiate the action was presented.

The second characteristic, diversity, was considered in the process; however, not in such a way as to create a just process. In the case of the referendum, just because a referendum was democratic did not mean it incorporated diversity; a referendum does not automatically equate to inclusion of a spectrum of respondents that can reflect diversity. Rather, diversity is dependent on the way in which the referendum was carried out and the process by which people were included. A poster for the public encouraging the people to vote shows that not everyone was eligible to vote, for instance, a tenant would have to have a lease that extended for a period over 21 years and has covenanted to pay municipal taxes to be eligible. Purdy (2005) echoes this by noting that only property owners and those with long-term leases had the option to vote. This meant that besides the poster being confusing and hard to understand, not everyone, even if they understood the poster, was eligible to vote on the matter. The voters would include only a homogenous group of people with a certain level of income and stability. Thus, the referendum process did not account for diversity.




Figure 1.1 (Bradburn, 2013)



Figure 1.2 (Bradburn, 2013)

The process to implement slum clearance acknowledged the diversity of the area which was to be cleared. As Rose (1958), referring to Cabbagetown South, pointed out, "The residents of a slum area are by no means as homogenous as a specific racial or ethnic group or the residents of a middle-class or upper-middle-class neighbourhood. They are by no means adept at settling their problems" (as cited in Sahak, 2008, p. 19). In this case, Rose perceived diversity as a justification for acting in a paternalistic fashion. Rather than diversity being seen as a prerequisite for a just planning process, it was seen as the reason to stifle participation in the planning process. Had the process valued diversity, it would have included not only those being displaced by the clearance, but also those who would be affected in the adjacent neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the ways in which knowledge was shared and the methods used to come to a decision should have been diverse and reflect

those participating. This did not happen as the only participation, and therefore knowledge, that was taken into account was that from the experts. Neither the referendum process nor the process of slum clearance embraced diversity, resulting in an unjust process.

Finally, the last characteristic of the three, equity, was not evident in the process. The process of the referendum was not equitable as it favoured those who could vote. In addition, it did not assist the disadvantaged in any way to allow them to be a part of the process. The referendum was characterized as a formal election as a part of democracy, which does not necessarily result in people being treated equitably. The question on the referendum reflects the influence of power. The undertone of rationality and the way in which the question was worded was influenced by a rhetoric of power. The question put forth was spun in a positive manner, giving no hint of the disruption or impact on the people living in the community. It was framed as being a rational, positive, and desirable project. Furthermore, in the way the referendum was set up, only those who held the proper credentials could vote. Thus, power also defined who could vote and how. The process made no attempt to include those who were disadvantaged, rather it perpetuated the existing power imbalances.

The process of conducting the actual slum clearance was not equitable and was highly influenced by power as well. The process did not consult with residents or the public as a whole. Rather, only the people with power, who were deemed to be experts were allowed to participate in the decision about slum clearance. Through this, those with power were able to define the process and, in turn, the outcomes that would occur. An equitable process would have advantaged those who were disadvantaged and worked to

make their voices heard. Instead, the opposite happened, residents were deemed not to be worthy of consultation. Setting up a process to favour themselves, the experts showed the implicit and explicit influence of power. Not only was power implicit in defining the process, it was explicit in justifying why experts should be the ones to plan the new Regent Park. Because of their access to power, the planners assumed they knew what was best, and therefore, were able to carry out their vision disregarding any concern for equity.

Following Fainstein's (2010) criteria, it becomes clear the process for the referendum and of the actual slum clearance was not just. While it could be argued to be legal, moral, and ethical, this did not mean it was just. Rather, it was the opposite of just, it further disadvantaged a group of people, excluded people from participating, and took on undemocratic characteristics. This shows that while something may be upheld as moral, the morality in which it is grounded might be a source of why it is unjust. The lack of diversity and democracy were both acknowledged and justified because of the moral right that experts felt. Thus, morality does not necessarily result in a just process and can be used to justify unethical actions, such as implementing an unjust process. The end result of this slum clearance brings into question the use of morality as a justification. Of the people who were displaced due to slum clearance, only 23% returned to the new Regent Park due to a variety of reasons, such as refusal to apply, did not qualify, or were deemed to be morally unfit (Purdy, 2003). Thus, the slum clearance brought morality back to the area but not by assisting those who had lived there. Instead, new people, who were deemed to be morally fit were allowed to move in. Thus, this slum clearance, it could be argued, was not in the public interest as people were moved from one site to another. Moving a community of people causes upheaval and shifts the problem to other areas of the city. In

addition, while it can be claimed to be moral to bring better housing and services into an area, the morality is lost if the people for which it was supposedly intended are not allowed to return, and thus, are not beneficiaries of the redevelopment.

REGENT PARK AS REVITALIZATION

Not long after Regent Park was built, rather than be described as a success, it would be described as a failure (James 2010). In 1968, Rose, who was an advocate and had praised the expert-led planning for the slum clearance of Regent Park, described the failures of this approach; Regent Park was a planning failure (James, 2010). Regent Park was not only a space of marginalization and community fragmentation but it was once again thought of as a slum (James, 2010). In 2002, new plans to revitalize the area were put forth because once again Regent Park was described as, “a neighbourhood that hopelessly leads to violence, substance abuse and community fragmentation due to its built environment” (James, 2010, p. 76). The landowner, Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), initiated this revitalization. In July 2003, City Council approved plans to revitalize all 69 acres of Regent Park over the next 12 to 15 years (City of Toronto, 2014).

While the second revitalization has been described by some as the answer to Regent Park’s problems, others, such as James (2010) have called into question the revitalization by stating that, “Once again, the drastic modification of this environment is being posited as a monolithic solution to these problems” (p.76). Modifying the built environment in the hopes to “improve” an area is comparable to the first slum clearance of Regent Park. However, this new revitalization attempted to learn from its past, correcting the expert driven planning approach, acknowledging the value of community input and the importance of considering the social aspects beyond just the “bricks and mortar” of Regent Park (Toronto Community Housing, 2007). The revitalization is once again based on popular planning thought; the new Regent Park will be a, “mixed income, mixed-use

community, integrated into the mainstream of city life” (City of Toronto, 2014). However, it has also been described in contradictory ways, some have called it practical and being characterized as just while others have described it as another moral regulation of the poor and working class, much like the first redevelopment of Regent Park (James, 2010). By assessing the revitalization’s planning process, it will not only allow for an assessment of the concepts of moral, ethics, and justice in regards to the revitalization, it will also offer insight into how far the planning process has incorporated these concepts.

Much like the first redevelopment of Regent Park, two main processes took place: the first was the process that allowed the revitalization to take place and the second was the actual process of undertaking the revitalization. Since TCHC owns the land on which Regent Park is located, their action to revitalize was justified through its legality. As recipients of subsidized housing, even though the residents of Regent Park occupied the buildings, they had no legal rights to the land. The decision to initiate the revitalization could be considered moral because the area was characterized by physical and social problems. The design of the neighbourhood did not function for the residents and the buildings were in a state of disrepair (Schippling, 2007). Thus, revitalizing the area, it could be argued, was the right thing to do given the available options to TCHC. However, this morality can be called into question as the residents, while expressing dissatisfaction with their neighbourhood and allowed to give input, were not able to participate in the decision to initiate the revitalization.

The process that was undertaken by TCHC to implement the revitalization has been described as being unique, a process of collaboration, and an engagement to strengthen the community (Meagher & Boston, 2003). TCHC partnered with two consultants to undertake

the consultation aspect of the process because they wanted more than a community consultation; they wanted to actively engage with the community (Meagher & Boston, 2003). TCHC and the Community Engagement Team identified three specific goals to be achieved as a result of the community engagement, “1) Ensure the community had a distinct voice in the planning process. 2) Strengthen existing and emerging community infrastructure through the consultation process. 3) Assist TCHC staff in building new and effective long-term relationships with residents” (Meagher & Boston, 2003, p.9). To achieve these goals, the consultation process occurred in three phases, which unfolded in a linear fashion (Meagher & Boston, 2003). The first phase was to get a sense of what residents liked and disliked about Regent Park, and what they hoped and feared regarding the revitalization whereas phase two asked more specific questions about the neighbourhood, such as questions about the parks, buildings, streets, and commercial areas (Meagher & Boston, 2008). Finally, in phase three there was a presentation of the draft plan from the other two phases of consultation that asked what the participants liked and disliked about the plan (Meagher & Boston, 2008).

Throughout the consultation, people from the community were employed as animators and engaged with the community throughout the process, which assisted in the accommodation for language and cultural differences within the community (Meagher & Boston, 2008). This reflects the understanding that community members held important knowledge about the community and would be instrumental in making the revitalization work. The result of the community consultation was the creation of 12 guiding principles that became part of the community’s foundation moving forward (Micallef, 2013). In addition, these guiding principles became the foundation for the Social Development Plan,

which put forth 75 recommendations, all of which were influenced by these guiding principles (Micallef, 2013). As stated in the plan itself, “the goal of the social development planning process is to put in place the mechanisms that will focus on achieving greater levels of equity, access, participation, social cohesion and community capacity” (Toronto Community Housing, 2007, p. 2). While many documents were put forth at the start of the revitalization, such as the social development plan, the master plan, community services and facilities plan, and housing issues report (Gladki Planning Associates, 2013), the process of revitalization is long-term and puts the community in a state of flux. While many of the documents were created at the beginning of the revitalization, they have been referenced throughout the revitalization, including in the Planning Report for Phases 3,4,5 (Gladki Planning Associates, 2013). As the revitalization continues to move forward, Regent Park is changing, and how the community is consulted through these changes must also be assessed. Thus, it is not enough to assess the planning process at the beginning of the revitalization, rather the continual process that occurs must also be taken into account.

The planning process throughout the revitalization will be assessed to understand how it interacted with the concepts of morality, ethics, and justice. Fostering inclusion, and facilitating residents to define the process for themselves would be considered to be both moral and ethical. The process undertaken is often referred to as a, “participatory design” which means the process was a collaboration between stakeholders and residents (Greaves, 2011). Part of this, as stated by the community engagement document, “was to ensure that as many residents as possible were a) informed about the redevelopment plans and b) offered the opportunity to have input and participate in the planning process” (Meager & Boston, 2008, p. 33). In this case both TCHC and City staff directed these

consultations (Greaves, 2011), which gives rise to a power dynamic which not only affected how residents were informed but also their opportunities to contribute. This raises the question of morality and ethics; more precisely, the moral and ethical nature of directly influencing, and therefore, controlling the consultation. How much participation and input should residents have in defining both the process and the subsequent outcomes? For instance, during a community consultation on the park that was to be developed in Regent Park, the community was given different options put forth by landscape architects (Greaves, 2011). Community members were not only confined to the options that were given to them but also were not able to have the final say (Greaves, 2011). Thus, those involved in the planning and implementation of the revitalization, much like in the previous slum clearance, were seen as the experts.

In addition, as Greaves (2011) found, the revitalization is market driven which means that even the provision of office and program space is provided based on the market. Thus, the space for community programming could not be available for free, rather it needed to be rented so that it would be based on, “a business model that makes sense” (Greaves, 2011, p. 99). However, given that Regent Park is characterized by subsidized housing, the morality of using a market driven business model for the revitalization is questionable given that residents may not be able to compete in the market to acquire space for programming. Thus, because of the revitalization, not all residents may have access to the space in the neighbourhood. While this process is considerably more moral and ethical than the first slum clearance, certain values still linger. Experts still largely drive the final decisions of the revitalization and have the power to do so. Furthermore, there is a power dynamic that controls the degree of morality that is involved and where

the two conflict, the decision rests with those who possess the power. In the case of the revitalization, there is inclusion of morality to the extent that it does not interfere with the market-driven basis of the revitalization.

The process of revitalization also needs to be assessed in terms of Fainstein's three criteria to determine whether or not the planning process and revitalization of Regent Park is just, or at least, more concerned with justice than the first redevelopment. Using the first of the three criteria, democracy, the planning process of the revitalization uncovers the complexity of grounding these concepts in practice. The community engagement process could be considered to be democratic in that it engaged with residents and facilitated input into the revitalization plan. In addition, stakeholders and community members from neighbourhoods that were in close proximity were also consulted and their input taken into account (Meagher & Boston, 2008). However, as Fainstein notes, "genuine democratic deliberation requires background conditions of equality" (Fainstein, 2009, p. 2). The Regent Park revitalization planning process was not premised on equality; participants were not equal with each other or in comparison to TCHC representatives and representatives of the Daniels Corporation. For instance, the rezoning public consultation that took place on September 17, 2013 highlighted the City of Toronto and TCHC taking into account consultation feedback from the previous meeting of June 10, 2013 (Toronto Community Housing, 2013). The heights of buildings were adjusted and the density would be re-distributed. However, there were non-negotiables, such as the increase in density, and, to ensure residents understood, they were told the density would occur, "through good planning and urban design principles" (Toronto Community Housing, 2013). In many ways, this type of language fails Fainstein's test that deliberative democracy should occur

in conditions which have undistorted speech (Fainstein, 2009). In addition, some residents felt as though their input was not taken into account. Schippling (2007) found that some residents felt as though the redevelopment was not collaborative and that some of the “real decision-making was made without them” (p. 109). Thus, the process was democratic only insofar as TCHC allowed for democracy to occur on specific decisions regarding the revitalization.

Incorporating democracy within the planning process is further complicated when land ownership comes into the equation. The question arises, to what extent should a landowner take into account the broader interests of the residents and the city? Fainstein, in her definition, comments on this by saying democracy involves, “consultation about urban development; it takes the broader interests of the city into consideration” (Fischer as quoted in Marcuse et al., p. 61). This becomes complex because while the city will be affected and therefore, should be taken into account, the degree to which this may/ can occur is unclear. In addition, this is dependent on people participating and the broader interests being known. The organization Public Interest, which was involved in the community engagement, states that consistently, 1,000 Regent Park residents participated (Public Interest, n.d.). This equates to about 10% to 12% of Regent Park residents, further, one assumption is that this group was diverse enough to represent the larger population. At the same time, getting a clear sense of the interests represented by a group of 1,000 would be difficult. In order for the broader interests of the city to be taken into account, people must be engaged. While the process was more democratic than the previous redevelopment in that it included residents and community members and stakeholders, it lacked a few elements. First, participants and their input was not equal to that of other

“experts” in the process and second, the degree of representation of the interests of the broader city is unclear because the elements of power were never acknowledged. In this case, power relations defined the scope of input, what was considered to be “valued” input, and in turn, the boundaries of democracy, which limited the extent to which democracy could function.

The second characteristic of diversity will be used to assess the revitalization process. The consultation process, according to Fainstein’s criteria, could be considered to be diverse. An effort was put forth to accommodate language and cultural differences in the process, which in turn, ensured residents and their diversity was represented in the process (Meagher & Boston, 2008). Furthermore, residents in neighbouring communities, such as Cabbagetown, were invited to participate. The community engagement process accommodated seven main languages and also identified opportunities to engage those not represented in these seven groups (Meagher & Boston, 2008). However, since only 10% to 12% of Regent Park residents were consistently engaged, it raises the question of how much diversity was accommodated and if there were barriers to achieve higher engagement. In addition, how residents’ participation was incorporated dictates how diverse the process was. As Greaves (2011) in his thesis quotes the developer saying, “the planning is very challenging because there are so many people. So we listen we try to, you know, incorporate people’s different ideas. But ultimately we have a pretty good sense of, number one from a condo-marketing perspective, what’s going to sell” (p. 99). Thus, diversity is not only including participants in the process, it is dependent on the degree to which their input is taken into account. In addition, when faced with specific requests, such as for a mosque, the developer shied away from incorporating due to the diversity of the

area and the potential for other faiths to ask for space (Greaves, 2011). Diversity, in this context was seen as a potential complication that needed to be avoided because of the feared inability to accommodate all groups.

The outcome of the revitalization ensures, at least in the short term, that the area is more diverse. The creation of a mixed-use and mixed-income community embraces the diversity of which Fainstein speaks. In addition, the right to return for existing residents ensures the diversity that existed in Regent Park would be protected (City of Toronto, 2007). However, the ratio between social and market housing is in a state of flux. In phase 1 of the revitalization, the desired social mix was 40% social housing and 60% market housing (Toronto Community Housing, 2012). By phase 3, a rezoning application for more density is looking to implement 30% social housing and 70% market housing (Toronto Community Housing, 2013). This is compounded by the Regent Park Secondary Plan policy 3.1.2 which states, “Each replacement *social housing* unit will be maintained as a *social housing* unit for not less than 25 years from the date on which it was first occupied” (City of Toronto, 2007, p.8). Therefore, while diversity is present now, there are no measures to protect and ensure the types of diversity that includes affordable housing as a significant element will be a feature of the Regent Park neighbourhood in the future.

The last of the three criteria, equity, is critical to look at given the context of Regent Park. As Fainstein defines equity, those who are the worst off should benefit the most. Since Regent Park prior to the revitalization was 100% public housing, if the process were to be equitable, then it would favour those who are disadvantaged, in this case, the residents who live there but have no legal right to the land. Meagher & Boston (2003), in their community engagement document, characterize the neighbourhood as being

impoverished and state that residents have experienced a history of disappointments. Thus, through the extensive community engagement, there was a recognition that the community needed to benefit (Meagher & Boston, 2003). Residents who participated did benefit, it can be argued, because they influenced the plan. The Community Engagement Team claims that, "Virtually every aspect of the plan bore the mark of the community and the presentation of the plan articulated, clearly, the impact community input had" (Meagher & Boston, 2003, p. 51). This impact can be seen in some of the elements of the revitalization, such as ensuring all social housing units are replaced (City of Toronto, 2007). However, the relocation of residents outside of Regent Park during the revitalization was not to their benefit. This undermines equity, because as Fainstein notes, "If people are moved against their will, then democracy and equity are not served." (Fainstein, 2010). This forced relocation undermines the equity of the process since residents who were already disadvantaged were further disadvantaged short-term through relocation and may be even longer if they lost the accumulated social capital developed during their tenure in the older community.

Many of the outcomes of the revitalization benefit the residents. The deteriorated buildings are being replaced and the dysfunctional design of the neighbourhood is being corrected, reintegrating the community with the rest of Toronto. In addition, new community space, such as the Aquatic Centre, the Daniels Spectrum, and the Daniels Centre of Learning are incorporated. Thus, the residents did benefit from the outcomes of the revitalization. However, as (Schippling, 2007) found, "Some residents believed that the interests in gentrifying the Regent Park neighbourhood superseded the best interests of residents" (p.110). This would result in the process being inequitable because residents,

who are already disadvantaged, perceived their interests as coming second to the interests of the revitalization. However, to assess if residents benefited more from the process in comparison to other actors, such as TCHC and the Daniels Corporation is difficult to assess since this is a relative measure. What is considered to be a benefit is a value judgment that can be difficult to compare. For instance, Daniels may value making a profit whereas the residents may value community amenities. Also, given that phase one of the revitalization lost a significant amount of money, phase two also lost money, and phase three will almost break even (Skinner, 2013), TCHC may not perceive itself to have benefited significantly in comparison to the residents who gained amenity space and new units.

The two redevelopments of Regent Park offer a unique perspective into how planning processes have shifted throughout the last 70 years. The first redevelopment of Regent Park was expert-driven and lacked many of the criteria that make it just. The process of redevelopment was undemocratic towards the residents, lacked inclusion of diversity, and did not benefit the residents relative to other stakeholders. In addition, the people who lived there were further disadvantaged as some did not meet the requirement to move back into the area. The second redevelopment of Regent Park known as the revitalization was more concerned with being just. The process was more democratic in that its residents and community stakeholders were allowed to participate. However, the limiting of participation to certain aspects of the plan and privileging the experts with the final say undermined the degree to which the process was democratic. The revitalization process also made an effort to incorporate the diversity that existed in Regent Park. This is in contrast to the first redevelopment where diversity was seen as hindering the process and therefore, was avoided. However, the low rates of consistent participation from

residents raises the concern that there were barriers to accommodating resident diversity. In regard to equity, the first redevelopment lacked equity as residents did not benefit from the redevelopment, rather, they were further disadvantaged. The revitalization of Regent Park may be more equitable in comparison; however, the degree to which it is equitable is difficult to determine, given that the concept is subjective and the complexity of the stakeholders involved. Despite the revitalization falling short of fully meeting the criteria of justice, its incorporation of these criteria to a degree means it is more just than the first redevelopment of Regent Park.

CONCLUSION

The case study of the Regent Park redevelopments highlights how planning has evolved. As is seen in the case of Regent Park, planning has had an increasing concern with justice as it recognizes how planning decisions significantly affect residents of a city and how the city functions. However, the way in which planning approaches justice has been bounded by its institutional context and influenced by its historical roots. The legal nature of the public interest and role of the planner as an expert are areas in which the profession has struggled to incorporate justice in a meaningful way. Furthermore, the profession's concern with being moral and ethical ensure that any concern with justice will cause conflict when applied in practice. Despite these difficulties, planning is a unique profession that acknowledges and learns from its past mistakes. As can be seen through the redevelopments of Regent Park, what was thought to be moral and ethical planning processes at the time have now changed; planning is once again renewing its vision of a moral, ethical, and just planning process while functioning within legal and financial constraints. While planning theory has historically been disassociated from planning practice, it is becoming more influential as planning problems are increasingly complex and multi-faceted. While planning theory does not neatly transfer to practice, it has the ability to guide the profession to ensure the concepts of justice, morality, and ethics are incorporated into practice as planning seeks to serve the public interest.

As we move forward as planners, we need to progress with our concern of justice, both in the planning process and the outcomes of these processes. In order to achieve this, making justice as prominent as the concept of the public interest and the legal framework that planning has embedded itself in is critical. While we can theorize about the concept of

justice as being universal and normative, this is not sufficient for planning practice. In practice, planners need to apply justice in response to the context in which it is being used, which means applying justice in a way that allows participants to assist in its definition as they hold unique insights and knowledge. While justice must function in the moral, ethical, and legal framework of planning, as cities continually become the sites of disparities, our role as planners is to favour the concept of justice where possible to ensure those who are disadvantaged become advantaged through their interactions with us. We will never achieve a universal just planning process because much like people, cities are constantly changing, but concerning ourselves with the concept of justice along with the public interest allows planners to embrace this change as it manifests itself in the diversity, equity, and democracy.

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